POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS:STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND FOCAL POINTS by Ringe, Nils
  
STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND FOCAL POINTS 
 
by 
Nils Ringe 
B.A. in Politics and History, Brandeis University, 2001 
M.A. in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2003 
 
POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS: University of Pittsburgh 
 
2006 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Ph.D. in Political Science 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
This dissertation was presented 
by 
 
Nils Ringe 
It was defended on 
April 10, 2005 
and approved by 
B. Guy Peters, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
Jennifer Victor, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
Mark Hallerberg, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Political Science, Emory University 
Thomas Bräuninger, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science, University of Konstanz (Germany) 
 Dissertation Advisor: Alberta Sbragia, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science, University of 
Pittsburgh 
 
 iii 
Copyright © by Nils Ringe 
2006 
 
  
 
This dissertation introduces and tests a model of policy preference formation in legislative 
politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making 
process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative political 
space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposes that 
structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative 
specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of 
informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a 
legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences 
and, in turn, individual-level policy preferences. The propositions of the focal point model are 
tested empirically with data from the European Parliament (EP), using both qualitative 
(interview data, content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative methods 
(multinomial logit regression analyses of roll-call votes). The findings have implications for our 
understanding of politics and law-making in the European Union and for the study of legislative 
decision-making more generally. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
How do the general political preferences of legislative decision-makers translate into attitudes 
toward specific policies? Despite the uncertain relationship between political intentions and 
consequences, much of the existing literature on policy choice in legislative politics assumes that 
the conversion of ideological and constituency interests into policy preferences is direct and 
automatic, i.e., that preferences are fixed and exogenous and simply constitute an “input” into the 
legislative decision-making process. This approach assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that some 
kind of “objective interest” underlies the choices of political decision-makers. 
The problem with this conceptualization is that actors may have multiple “objective 
interests,” and, as a result, might perceive different and potentially competing policy alternatives 
as desirable. The translation process of objective interests into actual policy choices may be 
complicated at two levels. First, a legislator can pursue several objectives simultaneously, which 
may be at odds with one another. For example, a pro-environmentalist might have to trade off 
some of his “greenness” in order to represent the interests of his constituents, or he might have 
concerns about the economic and social impact of environmental legislation in addition to his 
interest in conservation. Additionally, the legislator may lack “cause-and-effect knowledge” 
regarding the effects of the legislation: he might not have sufficient information to judge how his 
interests would be met upon the implementation of the policy. How does he assume a position 
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toward the policy proposal under these circumstances? The translation of objective interests into 
actual policy choice may thus be anything but a straightforward process, as it often involves 
complex decisions under conditions of competing interests, substantive uncertainty, and 
asymmetric information. 
This dissertation challenges the assumption of fixed and exogenous policy preferences. 
Instead, it seeks to determine how stable preferences concerning the outcomes of policy choice in 
legislative politics shape the positions individual legislators take toward particular policy 
proposals, especially under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. Most 
importantly, the dissertation considers how individual-level ideal points on the primary 
dimensions of political contestation translate into actual legislation. It constitutes an effort to go 
beyond the question of what ought to be the positions of different political actors toward a 
specific policy proposal, and involves considering how legislators’ own perceptions of their 
political interests are translated and aggregated into policy choice. This approach ties the 
question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative and cognitive political space, 
while explicitly taking account of the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. Structure, 
actors, processes, and their interaction are thus taken seriously in explaining policy choice. The 
propositions of the decision-making model advanced here are tested empirically by analyzing 
policy choice in the European Parliament (EP). 
1.2 THE ROLE AND COMPETENCES OF THE EP 
The EP comprises the legislative branch of the European Union’s (EU) institutions together with 
the Council of Ministers, which consists of ministers of the national governments of the EU 
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member states. Since the most recent wave of enlargement, the EP has 732 members 
representing 455 million EU citizens from 25 member states. Members of the EP (MEPs) sit in 
transnational political groups, rather than national delegations. The two largest groups are the 
European People’s Party (EPP, which is made up of conservative and Christian-Democratic 
parties), and the Party of the European Socialists (PES, comprising Europe’s Social-Democrats). 
Over the past two decades, the EP has evolved from a mere consultative institution into 
an authoritative and assertive actor in the political and institutional framework of the European 
Union. While it cannot initiate legislation, the EP has the power of amendment and veto in most 
policy areas.1 In addition to its legislative role, the EP approves the appointment of the European 
Commission, which it can also dismiss with a vote of censure, and it ratifies the EU budget, 
except on agricultural price supports and regional development spending.  
While the right to initiate legislation lies with the European Commission, most proposals 
for EU law must receive the approval of both EP and Council. In this sense, the two institutions 
resemble the upper and lower houses in traditional bicameral legislatures. The legislative powers 
of the EP are restricted in some policy areas, but about three-quarters of EU legislation are 
covered by the co-decision procedure, under which the EP can reject legislation outright without 
the possibility of member state governments overturning this decision. This makes the EP an 
equal partner with the Council in most important areas of legislation, and the EP has proven very 
successful in shaping legislation: more than 80 percent of its amendments ultimately become law 
(Kreppel 2005: 4). 
As the powers of the EP have increased over the course of the last twenty years and as the 
institution has grown increasingly assertive, the amount of literature on the politics of the 
                                                 
1 In some high-profile areas, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the EP still only possesses consultative 
powers. 
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European Parliament has risen substantially. One of the most prevalent strands of this literature 
focuses on identifying the primary dimensions of political contestation in the European 
Parliament, i.e., the structure of the political space underlying policy choice. It examines whether 
political contestation in the EU is based on one, two, or more underlying dimensions (Hix and 
Lord 1997; Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2001; Hix 1999b; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and 
Steenbergen 2002; Gabel and Hix 2002; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Analyses of roll-call 
votes in particular have found that policy conflict in the EP is principally characterized by two 
tangible and substantively important dimensions.2 The first is the traditional left-right ideological 
divide, which explains the vast majority of the votes (Noury 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2005).3 A second dimension, evident to a lesser degree, is a sovereignty-integration dimension, 
ranging from less to more support for the European integration process (Hix 2001; Noury 2002; 
Noury and Roland 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005).4 
The existence and significance of these two dimensions has also been demonstrated in 
analyses of the European party federations’ election manifestos (Hix, 1999; Gabel and Hix, 
2002) and MEP surveys (Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004). Most recently, Voeten (2005) 
compared roll-call voting behavior in the European Parliament with the preferences expressed by 
legislators in the 1996 Members of European Parliament Survey. The results of this analysis 
confirm the significant impact of low-dimensional ideological competition on the behavior of 
                                                 
2 The existence of these two dimensions of EU politics has also been confirmed empirically in the positions national 
parties take toward Europe (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2001; Aspinwall 2002) and in the election manifestos of the 
European party federations (Hix 1999b; Gabel and Hix 2002). 
3 The Left-Right dimension is a summary of two socio-political or socio-economic value dimensions (Finer 1987; 
Hix 1999b; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). First, it refers to the extent of desired intervention in individual social and 
political relations for a collective good; second, it refers to how far there should be intervention in individual 
economic relations. 
4 The sovereignty-integration dimension, sometimes labeled the integration-independence dimension, implies that 
the European integration process creates a center-periphery divide between those actors or groups who see their 
identity and interests as threatened by the integration process and those whose identity and interests are protected 
(Hix 1999b). 
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MEPs. Voeten also fails to find support for the suggestion that gate-keeping institutions, such as 
party-group leaders, select issues strategically for roll-call votes, thus artificially reducing the 
dimensionality of the observed policy space. He does, however, suggest that the relevance of a 
third dimension may have been underestimated in previous studies, namely that of a libertarian-
traditional (Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004)5 or “new politics” dimension (Hooghe, Marks 
and Wilson 2002).6 This importance of this dimension has not been demonstrated in statistical 
analyses, however, and it does not easily lend itself to the individual-level quantification 
necessary for the analyses below. The dimension is also highly correlated with the Left-Right 
dimension (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Finally, a recent analysis on the basis of expert 
surveys identifies two orthogonal dimensions as the basis of party group positions: one 
consisting of the classic left-right social and economic issues, and the other related to the powers 
and scope of EU institutions (McElroy and Benoit 2005). For these reasons, this analysis 
assumes the importance of two primary dimensions of conflict.7 
1.3 THEORY, RESEARCH DESIGN & EMPIRICAL RESULTS: A PREVIEW 
One serious shortcoming of the literature on the dimensions of conflict in the EP is its static 
nature. While providing important insights into the underlying structure of political competition 
in the EP, it fails to take account of the dynamic character of decision-making processes. Most 
importantly, the existing literature assumes (at least implicitly) that the policy choices made on 
                                                 
5 This libertarian-traditional dimension consists of moral issues (e.g. abortion), the issue of immigration, and issues 
in the domain of law and order (Thomassen, Noury and Voeten 2004). 
6 This new politics dimension ranges from “green/alternative/libertarian” (GAL) to 
“traditional/authoritarian/nationalist” (TAN) (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). 
7 The theoretical model advanced and tested in this dissertation could accommodate a new two-dimensional spatial 
structure as well one or more additional ideological dimensions, however. For details, see Chapter 3 below. 
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the basis of the dimensional positions of individual parliamentarians are predetermined: their 
positions translate automatically and directly into choices and outcomes. Seeking to qualify this 
overly parsimonious explanation of policy choice, this dissertation attempts to specify the 
conditions under which ideology shapes decision-making processes and outcomes. 
Focusing on the interaction of structure, process, and actors in shaping policy choice, this 
dissertation presents a model of decision-making that views the translation of general interests 
into policy preferences as an indirect process: it is mediated by the degree to which strategic 
legislative specialists on the responsible EP committees successfully link normative and 
ideological preferences to specific policy proposals through the provision of focal points. These 
focal points are short-hand devices for communicating information. They shift attention toward 
particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus helping to classify and evaluate its perceived 
content and consequences. By shaping the process of deliberation, focal points may serve as a 
means to establish mutually acceptable general positions toward a policy proposal, thus 
providing a common theme around which policy coalitions can form. As the basis for the 
aggregation of individual-level positions toward the proposal, focal points critically influence 
policy choice. 
To test the applicability of the focal point model, the study relies on roll-call vote data 
that is analyzed in a multinomial logit regression framework, a simple content analysis of 
parliamentary debates, and a series of 80 interviews with members of the European Parliament 
and parliamentary officials, as well as a small number of representatives from other EU 
institutions. This data provides solid support for the propositions of the model. The interview 
data demonstrates that specialized committee members constitute the primary providers of 
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information to EP legislators not directly involved with a given legislative proposal.8 These 
“backbenchers” often lack detailed information about the content and consequences of the 
proposal, meaning that they have to rely on a handful of committee experts whose judgment they 
trust.9 The positions of these committee experts thus serve as the basis for the positions of the EP 
backbenchers. Much depends, however, on the configuration of involved actors, their 
reputations, and their interaction. Consequently, processes and outcomes are uncertain and 
cannot be predicted a priori.  
The analysis of the roll-call vote data shows that backbenchers indeed follow their 
committee representatives when voting in plenary. Specifically, the analysis reveals that MEPs 
are most likely to follow their national party colleagues, if they actually have a national party 
representative in the responsible committee. This is not the case more than 40 percent of the 
time, however, meaning that in the majority of cases, MEPs follow the representatives of their 
EP party group when voting on the EP floor. National affiliation, in contrast, barely matters 
when predicting plenary votes on the basis of the preceding committee vote.  
The results also demonstrate that MEPs compare the positions of their different 
representatives on the committee, that is, committee members who share their national 
affiliation, transnational party group affiliation, or national party affiliation. When choosing their 
own positions toward a policy proposal, members “triangulate” the information they receive, in 
particular from their party group and national delegation representatives. When these positions 
                                                 
8 This study distinguishes between policy experts who possess the specialized knowledge and information to 
objectively judge the content and consequences of specific legislative proposals and the majority of MEPs who do 
not possess this profienciency. It is concerned with the determination of policy preferences of this latter group. 
9 Note that the term “backbencher” is used throughout to describe those members of the EP not directly involved in 
the deliberation and negotation concerning a particular policy proposal. This term is not meant to imply a lack of 
proficiency, but rather describes those MEPs who are making decisions on legislation which is outside the realm of 
their legislative specialization. 
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diverge, the resulting vote in plenary is quite uncertain, while a shared common position means 
that the probability of a backbencher voting accordingly in plenary is almost assured. 
The detailed investigation of a series of legislative proposals from different policy areas 
demonstrates that political processes and outcomes differ depending on how a legislative 
proposal is presented by committee specialists in relation to the two dominant ideological 
dimensions in the EP, the left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension. 
Strategically deployed focal points influence the variable interpretation of what the issue at hand 
is “all about,” thus shifting policy preferences during the process of parliamentary deliberation. 
When an issue is presented as a left-right issue, for example, the outcome of a given policy 
making process can be fundamentally different than if the same issue is explicitly linked to the 
process of European integration. This can make or break a legislative proposal, with important 
consequences across the EU member states. 
This dissertation contributes to three strands of literature. In the realm of European Union 
studies, it adds to our knowledge of law-making in the EU and advances our understanding of 
political contestation and voting behavior in the European Parliament. It also makes a more 
general contribution to the study of legislative decision-making by specifying the conditions 
under which ideology structures policy choice. It emphasizes the importance of normative 
dimensions of collective action, while stressing the conscious interaction of these structural 
elements with distinctly strategic considerations in the legislative process: the strategic provision 
of focal points is constrained by the normative and political context within which the decision-
making process takes place. Within these constraints, however, focal points serve as intervening 
variables linking general ideological predispositions with specific policy proposals. Finally, at 
the most general level, this research contributes to the study of preferences and preference 
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formation, which have been examined widely in the research on policy choice, by questioning 
the conceptualization of preferences as exogenous inputs into decision-making processes. 
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2.0  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
The European Parliament (EP) plays a critical role in European Union (EU) politics. During the 
course of the past twenty years, the previously consultative “talking-shop” has gained extensive 
authority, not least in terms of legislative power, which has increased dramatically over time. 
Today, the EP is an equal partner of the Council of Ministers, where the EU member states are 
directly represented by ministers of the national governments, in most important areas of 
legislation.  
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been elected every five years since 
1979.10 A large number of MEPs have extensive political experience. For example, 28 percent of 
MEPs in the 1999-2004 parliamentary term (the 5th EP) had national parliamentary experience, a 
number that increased to 37 percent in the current legislature (the 6th EP). Often, these MEPs 
held important posts, such as Speaker or Deputy Speaker. 10.2 percent in the 5th EP and 16 
percent in the 6th EP have national ministerial experience, and many MEPs hold leadership 
positions in their national parties. Six MEPs in the 5th EP and eleven in the 6th EP are former 
heads of state or prime ministers, and numerous members have previously served as regional 
                                                 
10 This chapter relies heavily on Corbett et al. (2005) for descriptive information of the EP and its members, 
committees, and procedures. 
 10 
presidents, state or regional prime ministers, members of the European Commission, or held 
other posts in regional and municipal government (Corbett et al. 2005: 48-54). 
MEPs sit in transnational party groups that correspond to the traditional European “party 
families.” Currently, there are seven such party groups uniting the existing national parties along 
the lines of the traditional party “families.” The two largest party groups are the center-right 
European People’s Party (EPP-ED, consisting of Conservatives and Christian-Democrats) and 
the center-left Party of the European Socialists (PES, comprising Europe’s Social-Democrats). 
Smaller groups are the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, previously 
ELDR), The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), the Group of the United European 
Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), the Independence/Democracy Group (Ind/Dem), and the 
Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN). 
Most members tend to follow the collective position, or “party line,” of their party 
groups, but party discipline is less pronounced in the EP than in most national parliaments. A 
primary reason for this reality is the absence of a stable government-opposition dynamic, since 
there is no European-level government based on the partisan majorities in the EP. Hence, there is 
no traditional executive reliant on the support of a cohesive parliamentary majority. Secondly, 
party groups lack the sanctions available to national parliamentary parties against members 
deviating from the party line. They may be able to use the carrot-and-stick approach of granting 
or refusing committee membership or the responsibility for drafting legislative reports (see 
McElroy 2003, Kreppel 2002: 198-202), but these enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak. 
Most importantly, the ultimate sanction of excluding dissenting members from the party list in 
the next election is not available to EP party groups, as the power of nomination lies with the 
national parties. A third and final reason for a lower level of party discipline in the EP lies in the 
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diverse makeup of the party groups, which consists of national party delegations representing a 
distinct degree of national, regional, or sectoral interests (Corbett et al. 2005: 104). While not 
frequent, it is not uncommon for national delegations or other subsets of MEPs to opt out of the 
party line with regard to particular votes. 
National delegations play an important part in the structure of the EP party group, and 
most of them even have their own officers and staff (which tend to be quite small, however). 
National party delegations constitute the direct link between national parties and EP party 
groups, meet collectively as subsets of the party group, and often assume a common position and 
act as a cohesive bloc in party group discussions. Moreover, positions within the party groups are 
distributed on the basis of the sizes of the national party delegations that comprise them, and as 
explained above, it is the national parties that draw up electoral lists in EP elections. As a result, 
especially larger national delegations are in a very potent bargaining position within their EP 
party groups (Raunio 1996: 72). In rare instances, national party delegations receive specific 
voting instructions from their national leadership, but most of the time they act as their own 
principals while engaging in a continuous exchange of views and information with their national 
party leaderships. In general, however, there is no single leadership group that fully controls the 
activities and vote choices of individual MEPs (Kreppel 2005: 12). 
2.2 THE LEGISLATIVE ROLE OF THE EP 
While the right to initiate legislation lies with the Commission, most proposals for EU law must 
receive the approval of both the EP and Council. In fact, a “draft directive” introduced by the 
Commission is indeed a draft (Corbett et al. 2005: 9), with MEPs and members of the Council 
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going through the proposal sentence by sentence. After much rewriting and amending, the 
positions of the two institutions must be reconciled. In practice, this means that a large number—
more than 80 percent (Kreppel 2005: 4)—of amendments tabled by MEPs ultimately become 
law. Hence, individual MEPs play a substantial role in creating legislation, “a classical 
parliamentary function almost forgotten by some national parliaments” (Corbett et al. 2005). 
The extent of the EP’s legislative powers depends on the decision-making procedure 
applicable to particular pieces of legislation, and only with the recent introduction of the “co-
decision procedure” through the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, has the EP 
become a genuine co-legislator. Co-decision now covers the majority of policy areas and has 
become the de facto “normal” decision-making procedure. 
Co-decision is one of four decision-making procedures governing the EP’s legislative 
role, depending on the policy area of the proposal in question. The other three are the 
consultation procedure, the cooperation procedure, and the assent procedure. The consultation 
procedure was the EU's main legislative procedure historically. It is used much less today, but 
remains applicable to important institutional and budgetary matters, as well as certain aspects of 
citizens’ rights and justice and home affairs.11 Under this procedure, the EP gives its consultative 
opinion on a Commission proposal, but the Council is not bound by the EP’s position.  
While the EP provides its opinion only once under the consultation procedure, the 
cooperation procedure provides for two parliamentary readings. That is, after consideration by 
the Council, the text is referred back to the EP for a second reading at which the EP may approve 
the text, reject the text, or propose amendments. The Commission may incorporate any 
additional amendments into the text, which can then only be modified by unanimity in the 
                                                 
11 For more details on all four procedures, please refer to Corbett et al. 2005:196-239. 
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Council. Amendments not supported by the Commission also require unanimous support to be 
adopted in the Council. Hence, under the cooperation procedure the EP’s role is no longer 
merely consultative. 
Under the assent procedure, the Council must attain the EP’s assent before certain 
important decisions can be taken. While the EP thus has the power to accept or reject a proposal, 
with a rejection being final, it does not have the power of amendment. The assent procedure 
applies today to very few issue areas, including decisions with regard to sanctions against EU 
member states in the case of “serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights” (Article 7), 
aspects of EU central banking, structural and cohesion funds,12 and international agreements. 
Finally, the co-decision procedure is the primary legislative procedure by which 
European laws are created today.13 Co-decision provides the EP with the power to adopt 
legislation jointly with the Council of Ministers. It makes the two institutions equal partners in 
the legislative process by requiring them to agree on an identical text before a proposal becomes 
law. A conciliation committee featuring an equal number of members from EP and Council is set 
up when the two bodies cannot reach agreement after two parliamentary readings. This 
committee seeks to negotiate a compromise text subject to approval by both institutions. Under 
co-decision, EP and Council have the power to reject a proposal either at second reading or 
following conciliation, causing the entire procedure to lapse and the proposal to fall. The 
Commission may also withdraw its proposal at any time. Co-decision was introduced in the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, but its scope was expanded considerably by the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) 
                                                 
12 These funds are allocated by the EU to support the poorer regions of Europe and to integrate European 
infrastructure, especially in the transport sector. 
13 The volume of co-decision dossiers has increased dramatically just during the last few years. While only 166 co-
decision acts were adopted during the 1994-1999 legislative term, this number increased to 403 during the 1999-
2004 term, after the Treaty of Amsterdam increased the number of areas covered by the procedure from fifteen to 34 
(Rasmussen and Shackleton 2005: 1).  
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and Nice (2001). Today, about 80 percent of legislation is decided under the co-decision 
procedure.  
This study focuses on EP decision-making under the co-decision procedure, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
This warrants a more detailed description of this process, which begins with a legislative 
proposal being drafted and introduced by the Commission and considered independently by both 
EP and Council. The EP appoints a member of the responsible EP committee (see below) as the 
“rapporteur,” who is usually an MEP with expert knowledge in the issue area in question.14 The 
rapporteur has three primary responsibilities: 
• incorporating the EP’s amendments into the draft proposal (containing suggested 
amendments as well as statement of reasons behind these amendments), 
• steering the proposal through the different stages of the legislative process, 
• negotiating compromise both within the EP and with the other two institutions. 
The rapporteur’s report is discussed and voted on in the responsible committee, where a 
first set of amendments is tabled. Other committees may also be asked for an opinion report if 
the legislation touches upon their competencies, but their amendments are subject to a vote in the 
responsible committee before the report is submitted to the plenary. After this, the report is 
referred to the EP plenary for debate and a vote during the first parliamentary reading. The 
                                                 
14 Corbett et al. (2000: 117-18) maintain that “if the suggested rapporteur is recognized as a specialist on the issue it 
is easier to get an agreement on his or her nomination. Certain technical issues on which there is little political 
controversy but on which a committee member is a specialist are again and again referred to the same specialist.” 
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finished report is voted on in full plenary, where further amendments may be introduced to the 
existing text by EP groups or at least 37 MEPs. The report must be adopted by a simple majority, 
i.e., the majority of MEPs taking part in the vote. There is no formal time limit on the first 
parliamentary reading. 
Before the proposal is forwarded to the Council of Ministers, the Commission may alter 
its initial legislative proposal to incorporate EP amendments which, in its view, improve the 
initial proposal and/or are likely to facilitate an agreement. The Council can do one of two things 
in its first reading. First, it may accept the text as adopted in Parliament, which ends the 
legislative process with the proposal coming into effect as amended by the EP. This event does 
occur at times, either when there is a broad existing consensus in favor of the policy proposal, or 
due to time pressure. Alternatively, the Council may reject the text as it is and formulate a 
common position among the member state governments. This common position usually accepts 
some of the amendments of the EP in order to facilitate a compromise with Parliament in 
subsequent stages of the decision-making process, but may reject all EP amendments. 
Within three months of the Council’s common position, Parliament must conduct its 
second reading or formally extend the time table by one month. Otherwise, the common position 
enters into force. In second reading, the EP can either adopt changes to the common position or 
reject it entirely, which would end the co-decision procedure at this point in time. For both 
options, an absolute majority of MEPs is needed, that is, more than 50 percent of the total 
number of members, and strict rules govern the introduction of amendments in second reading.15 
Most importantly:  
                                                 
15 Key negotiators in the EP are well aware of the implications of the absolute majority requirement in second 
reading and plan their strategy accordingly (Rasmussen and Shackleton 2005: 17). 
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• amendments adopted in first reading may be re-tabled if they were not accepted by the 
Council, 
• amendments may be concerned with a part of the common position which did not appear 
in, or is substantially different from, the Commission’s initial proposal, 
• amendments may be introduced as a compromise between the positions of the co-
legislators. 
The text is first discussed in the responsible committee, following the same rules and 
practices in first reading. The only difference is that the text to be amended is the Council’s 
common position and not the Commission’s initial proposal. Also, the parliamentary committees 
which were asked for an opinion in first reading are not consulted again. While the committee 
adopts the report in second reading by simple majority, the text must be approved by an absolute 
majority of MEPs. The EP may also reject the common position in second reading, which ends 
the legislative procedure, but has never exercised this prerogative to this date. 
Usually, the text is amended and referred back to the Council. At this point, one of three 
things will happen. First, Council may adopt the proposal including the changes proposed by the 
EP. Second, it may reject the text completely, causing the proposal to fall. Third, the two 
institutions may enter conciliation.  
The conciliation committee is composed of an equal number of MEPs and representatives 
of the Council and tries to forge a compromise text acceptable to both institutions. Negotiations 
are conducted during informal trialogue meetings involving small teams of negotiators for each 
institution, with the Commission playing a mediating role (hence the name “trialogue”). The 
participants in these trialogues report to their respective delegations, which must approve the 
results of their negotiations.  
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In the end, conciliation has two possible outcomes. If the committee fails to come up with 
an agreement, the proposal is withdrawn and the procedure lapses. If the conciliation committee 
does succeed in agreeing on a compromise text, however, this text goes into third reading, in 
which either EP or Council may reject the proposal. In this case, the text is withdrawn and the 
proposal falls. If, on the other hand, the text is adopted by both institutions, the proposal enters 
into force. 
In sum, the EP is truly a co-legislator with the Council under co-decision. This 
conclusion is inevitable both in terms of the number of successful amendments and the 
substantive impact on proposed legislation (Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 291). Accordingly, it is 
increasingly inappropriate to view the EP, as once was the norm and remains popular, as a 
“powerless, money-wasting “talking shop”” (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 43). 
2.3 THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM OF THE EP 
The EP’s permanent committee structure has been described as its “legislative backbone” 
(Westlake 1994: 191). In effect, most of the detailed parliamentary work is conducted in and by 
committees, the majority of substantive changes and compromises are constructed inside the 
committee, and committee work is the most time-consuming activity for parliamentarians and 
defines the focus of their work (Kreppel 2005; Corbett et al. 2005; Neuhold 2001). As the 
powers of the EP have increased over time, so has the role of its committees in shaping 
legislation, especially as they have progressively acquired policy-specific expertise (Mamadouh 
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and Raunio 2003). As a result, EP committees are more active and influential than their 
counterparts in national European parliaments.16 
The number, sizes, and responsibilities of the committees are decided in the early days of 
a newly elected parliament. They are confirmed after two and a half years, at the mid-point of the 
parliamentary term. The current 2004-2009 EP has a total of 20 committees. This number is up 
from 17 during the previous parliamentary term.17 Committees vary substantially in size; during 
the 1999-2004 parliamentary term, for example, the Environment Committee had 56 members 
and the Legal Affairs Committee only 30. Membership is effectively decided by the EP party 
groups through the use of proportional representation of both party groups and nationalities, 
meaning in such a way that the composition of each committee reflects the balance between the 
party groups in plenary. As a result, their composition broadly reflects that of the EP as a whole 
(Shackleton 2002: 101). The majority of MEPs serve on one committee each as a full member 
and a substitute. 
Committees act as largely autonomous entities within the EP. All legislative proposals 
are referred directly and without debate to the responsible committee, which examines and 
deliberates the proposed legislation before returning it to the plenary in the form of a draft report. 
Committees have gate-keeping powers within their areas of jurisdiction and a “relative monopoly 
on information and expertise” (Kreppel 2005: 5). 
                                                 
16 For a comparison between EP committees and those in other European national legislatures, see Mamadouh and 
Raunio (2003). For a comparison between the EP and the U.S. Congress, see Kreppel (2005). 
17 Subsequent analyses are based on data from the previous parliamentary term (1999-2004), when the EP had the 
following 17 standing committees: Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development; Committee on Budgetary 
Control; Committee on Budgets;  Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs; Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; Committee on 
Development and Cooperation; Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs; Committee on Fisheries; Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy; Committee on Legal Affairs and the 
Internal Market; Committee on Petitions; Committee on Regional Policy, Transport, and Tourism; Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health, and Consumer Policy; Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities. 
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Each committee has one chair and three vice-chairs, who are elected by the committee 
members. In practice, however, these positions are carefully distributed by agreement among the 
party groups based on their number of members. Seniority does not play any role in this process. 
The chairs preside over the meetings of the committee, speak on its behalf at plenary sessions, 
and represent it at the regular meetings of committee chairs. Yet, the rapporteur system means 
that individual members, and not committee chairs, are the key actors negotiating individual 
pieces of legislation (Mamadouh and Raunio 2002: 13). 
Another important committee position is that of the group coordinator, who is the main 
spokesperson of his or her party group in each committee. In fact, previous research suggests that 
MEPs generally view coordinators as the most dominant force in EP committees, but that their 
influence is subject to their personalities (Whitaker 2002: 78-80). The coordinator also 
distributes tasks among the member of her party group. Most importantly, once a report has been 
allocated to a party group in a committee, it is usually the coordinator who picks the rapporteur 
among his party colleagues. The coordinators also convene the meetings of committee members 
from their party group and often act as party whips in committee (Whitaker 2001: 68, Corbett et 
al. 2005: 127). Jointly, the coordinators of the party groups set the committee’s future agenda, 
discuss forthcoming votes, and distribute rapporteurships. 
Rapporteurs are chosen by a system whereby each party group receives a quota of points 
according to its size. Reports to be allocated are discussed by the group coordinators who decide 
on the number of points an individual report is “worth.” They then make bids on different reports 
on behalf of their party group until they have used up their quota.  
Existing research concerning the distribution of rapporteurships has produced 
contradictory results. While Raunio and Mamadouh (2002) and Benedetto (2005) argue that the 
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division of rapporteurships between party groups is largely representative of their size, other 
research indicates that the distribution is hardly proportional among party groups and national 
delegations within the committee (Kaeding 2004, 2005). Hoyland (2006) maintains that MEPs 
from parties represented in the Council of Ministers are more active on co-decision dossiers than 
those not represented, while Kaeding (2004) points to differences related to background, 
expertise, and constituency interests as factors accounting for the active involvement of MEPs in 
the legislative decision-making process as rapporteurs. 
The groups who do not receive the rapporteurship for a specific report appoint a “shadow 
rapporteur” responsible for preparing the group’s position and monitoring the work of the 
rapporteur. This position has become increasingly important in the recent past. Shadow 
rapporteurs (often referred to simply as “shadows”) inform the other members of their political 
groups of the progress of the deliberation and negotiation process, give them recommendations, 
draw up amendments, lead the discussion and rally the troops when “their” issue is discussed in 
committee or plenary, or within their group. This position has become necessary because many 
dossiers discussed in the EP today are so highly technical that MEPs not dealing with the 
proposal directly are unfamiliar with the details of the proposal under consideration (Neuhold 
2001). 
 It is also increasingly common for rapporteurs dealing with important reports to have 
separate meetings with the shadows, who may even be invited to participate in meetings with 
Commission and Council.18 
                                                 
18 Different studies have shown that the Council is quite interested in informal contacts and negotiations with 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs from big political groups to ensure that deals are backed by a large range of 
opinion in the Parliament and are therefore more likely to be acceptable (Rasmussen and Shackleton 2005: 10; 
Farrell and Heritier 2003b: 592; Raunio and Shackleton 2003: 178). 
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Committees have a small staff, especially compared to the U.S. Congress, for example. 
They usually have only between two and eight administrators, one or two committee assistants, 
and a number of secretaries. Committees are also assisted by the EP’s Legal Service. Finally, the 
party groups have up to three people in charge of following a specific committee who, together 
with the personal assistants of individual members, assist the committee and its members. 
The existing scholarship on the EP committees remains sparse, despite some recent 
research on committee assignment and party control of EP committees (Kreppel 2005; 
Mamadouh and Raunio 2002, 2003; McElroy 2002, 2006; Whitaker 2001; Kaeding 2004, 2005; 
Hausemer 2005). Our understanding of committees in the EP is thus quite limited. 
2.4 POLITICAL CONTESTATION AND VOTING PATTERNS IN THE EP 
As a direct result of the increase in EP powers over time, academic interest in the EP has 
increased substantially during the last decade, with a group of young scholars taking the lead.19 
Deductive, quantitative and/or rational choice studies have been particularly influential, and our 
understanding of the institution has been expanded in a great number of ways. These studies 
establish that policy conflict in the EP is principally characterized by two substantively important 
dimensions, namely the traditional Left-Right ideological divide and a pro-/anti-EU dimension 
ranging from less to more support for the European integration process.20 
Analyses of EP voting patterns highlight the increase in party group cohesion and 
ideology-based party competition in the EP on the basis of these dimensions. While previous 
                                                 
19 The research of Simon Hix, Amie Kreppel, Abdul Noury, Gerard Roland, Tapio Raunio, and other members of 
the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG) deserve special mention. 
20 For additional details and bibliographical information, please refer back to section 1.2. in the Introduction. 
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research already suggested that MEPs are more likely to vote along transnational party lines than 
national lines (Attinà 1990; Brzinski 1995; Raunio 1997; Hix and Lord 1997), recent and more 
comprehensive roll-call vote analyses demonstrate that MEPs vote in accordance with their party 
affiliations, rather than their national affiliations (Noury 2002), and that the distance between 
parties on the Left-Right dimension is the strongest predictor of coalition patterns (Hix, Noury, 
and Roland 2005). This tendency was also confirmed in analyses of party competition between 
the two main EP party groups (PES and EPP), which show that the party system in the EP has 
become more consolidated and more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased over 
time (Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003). At the same time, party group cohesion in the EP has been 
shown to be quite high. Analyses on the basis of roll-call votes by Hix, Noury, and Roland 
(2005: 216) have confirmed past findings of significant levels of party cohesion (Attinà 1990; 
Raunio 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2002; Hix 2001; Hix 2002; Noury 2002; 
Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004), showing “that the six main political forces in the 
European Parliament are remarkably cohesive party organizations.” In sum, the power of 
transnational parties in the EP has risen “via increased internal party cohesion and inter-party 
competition” (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005).21 
This new literature on the EP has also confirmed that the EP, like the EU as a whole, can 
be fruitfully studied in a comparative framework, rather than being treated as a unique 
phenomenon. The most useful comparisons, in this regard, focus on the parliamentary 
(Westminster) system and on the US Congress. Both have yielded important insights into the 
regularities and singularities of the EP. While the comparison with “normal” parliamentary 
                                                 
21 A recent article on selection bias in the use of roll-call vote analyses by Carrubba et al. (2004) sheds some doubt 
on these conclusions, however. While instructive and pointing out very real potential problems associated with 
analyzing roll-call votes, a number of issues cast doubt on the validity of Carrubba et al.’s claims, which require and 
deserve further examination in the future. The issue of selection bias in the use of roll-call votes is addressed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
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systems demonstrates the importance of party politics and the EP party groups, comparisons with 
Congress emphasize the critical role of specialized parliamentary committees in EP decision-
making. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
The EP plays a critical role in EU politics today and has evolved from a mere consultative 
“talking-shop” into an assertive and powerful actor in the Union’s political and institutional 
framework, particularly over the past two decades. The attention it has received in academic 
circles during the last few years is thus well-warranted. Much remains to be learned, however, 
about this institution that is still in many regards a “new” legislature. While recent cumulative 
research efforts have produced invaluable insights into the broad patterns of behavior of 
European parliamentarians and the structural characteristics of the EP as an institution, each 
piece of newly acquired knowledge raises new questions. It is particularly evident that we have 
to start paying more detailed attention to the behavioral patterns of MEPs and the institutional 
setup and evolution of the EP. 
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3.0  THE FOCAL POINT THEORY 
3.1 UNCERTAIN PREFERENCES 
This dissertation seeks to establish how the general political preferences of legislative decision-
makers translate into their positions toward specific policies. To identify this translation process, 
the decision-making model advanced in this project distinguishes among ideological preferences, 
the positions decision-makers take toward specific policy proposals, and the strategies they 
choose to achieve their goals.22 It assumes that decision-makers’ outcome preferences are fixed, 
while their policy preferences and strategies are latent. Outcome preferences are defined as 
structural variables that are stable, exogenously determined preferences over outcomes, that is, 
preferences concerning the (uncertain) effects or consequences of policy choices upon their 
implementation (Krehbiel 1991: 66-67). Most importantly, outcome preferences can be policy-
oriented (decision-makers care about the content and consequences of the policies they choose) 
or office-oriented (decision-makers care about being re-elected). 
Policy preferences, in contrast, are derived from outcome preferences (Krehbiel 1991: 
66-67). They are the positions decision-makers assume toward particular policy issues or 
proposals, based on their beliefs about how a given policy action relates to their most preferred 
                                                 
22 There is no single definition of the term “preference.” Here, a preference is considered to be a comparative 
ranking of a set of objectives (Druckman and Lupia 2000), while preference formation refers to processes by which 
social actors decide what they want and what to pursue (Hall 2003). For a very useful discussion of preferences and 
preference formation, see Druckman and Lupia 2000. 
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outcome. Policy preferences are potentially changeable and inconsistent, since the link between 
policies (i.e., the objects of legislative choice, such as proposals, bills, legislation, or laws) and 
outcomes (i.e., the consequences of a policy upon its implementation) is often uncertain. 
Accordingly, a decision-maker’s utility function over policies is based on preferences over 
outcomes, while she can only take action on policies (Krehbiel 1991: 68).  
Finally, actors choose strategies to achieve the goals defined by their policy preference. 
This strategy is highly context-related, however; it is bound by the macro-political context, 
structural and institutional variation, and opportunity structures (Woll 2005). In the context of 
legislative decision-making, the most basic and common strategy choice is between voting for or 
against a policy proposal. 
This project approaches the question of preferences and outcomes by relying on the 
intuition of spatial theory, which originated in economics (Hotelling 1929; Smithies 1941), but 
has a long history of application in political science (Downs 1957; Black 1958; Arrow 1963; 
Duverger 1951; Shepsle 1979, 1991; Riker 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Hinich and Munger 
1994, 1997; Ordeshook 1986; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Spatial theory is a simple model of 
political choice that conceives of preferences as points in a “space” consisting of one or several 
dimensions. These dimensions are ordered sets of alternatives, and rational political actors 
choose the alternative “closest” to their own ideal points. 
I identify a low-dimensional ideological space as the critical context structuring choices 
in legislative politics (Hinich and Munger 1994, 1997). This ideological space is comprised of 
the dominant ideological dimensions, meaning that its dimensionality is much lower than 
classical policy- or issue-spaces. Moreover, dimensions of the space are determined by the way 
issues cluster in actors’ believes or rhetoric (Hinich and Munger 1997: 191). In the ideological 
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space, actors are assumed to choose policy alternatives that are closest to their ideological ideal 
points. These ideal points are stable normative and cognitive positions on the ideological 
dimensions, representing long-standing and durable norms and values that are exogenous to the 
decision-making process (Marks and Wilson 2000; Scott 2001). Ideal points on the ideological 
dimensions correspond to ideological outcome preferences, and thus the policy-orientation of 
legislative decision-makers. For the case of the EU, I assume this ideological space to be 
essentially two-dimensional,23 consisting of the Left-Right and sovereignty-integration 
dimensions.24 
Attaining a policy preference involves the process of balancing potentially conflicting 
ideological preferences, since most political issues are multidimensional in nature (Baumgartner, 
Jones and MacLeod 2000: 325). Legislators may thus be confronted with circumstances in which 
they face trade-offs between competing ideological preferences (Hinich and Munger 1997: 200), 
or between ideological preferences and constituency interests (Aldrich and Rohde 1997-98, 
1998, 2000, 2001). Hence, the translation of outcome into policy preferences is a matter of causal 
and normative beliefs. Policy makers must somehow relate a policy proposal to the existing 
ideological space by interpreting the content and consequences of a proposal in reference to its 
dominant dimensions. This, however, is hindered by the frequent absence of “cause-and-effect 
knowledge” regarding the effects of implemented legislation (Cooper 1977: 148; Austen-Smith 
and Riker 1987: 897; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990: 533). 
                                                 
23 As the discourse below will show, the model advanced here could easily be extended to either accommodate a 
new two-dimensional space consisting of a different set of dimension, if empirical findings were to demonstrate this 
structure, as well as one or more additional ideological dimensions. I limit the analysis to two dimensions for three 
reasons: first, the current state of knowledge about the dimensions of conflict in the EP supports this choice; second, 
the model will be more intuitive when discussed in the context of two dimensions only; and third, the ideological 
space is, by definition, considered to be low-dimensional.  
24 While some analyses suggest that additional dimensions of conflict may also structure policy conflict in the EP, 
such as a libertarian-traditional dimension (Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004) or a “new politics” dimension 
(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002), their impact on legislative outcomes, i.e., MEP voting patterns, has yet to be 
demonstrated. 
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3.2 FOCAL POINTS 
Under conditions of uncertainty about what ideological dimension is relevant to a particular 
policy decision, that is, which ideal point should become pertinent for the individual legislator, 
the ideological space provides for an infinite number of possible equilibria. The decision-making 
process thus resembles a coordination game that provides no way of distinguishing one 
equilibrium from another, even when the players have a shared interest in finding common 
ground for a policy outcome. Under these circumstances, where there is no one “natural” policy 
solution, or outcome-equilibrium, but a set of different potential solutions, it is difficult for 
political actors choose one over another. They have to rely on some feature external to the game 
to facilitate the selection of an equilibrium. For a two-person “pure coordination game,” 
Schelling (1960) and Mehta, Starmer and Sudgen (1994) show that people can use different 
“labels” to coordinate their behavior, resulting in the selection of one single equilibrium. 
Similarly, Garrett and Weingast (1993) suggest that “ideas, social norms, institutions, or shared 
expectations” can facilitate the realization of potential gains between actors facing multiple 
possible equilibria.25 
This proposition constitutes the starting point of my theory, which acknowledges that 
outcome preferences structure legislative decision-making, but suggests that this process is 
indirect and mediated by factors endogenous to the policy process. It maintains that structure, 
such as the ideological space or constituency interest, impacts decision-making to the extent that 
                                                 
25 In the example Garrett and Weingast (1993) provide, the member states of the European Community 
acknowledged the principle of “mutual recognition” to constitute an acceptable basis of an agreement that led to the 
creation of the European single market in the 1986 Single European Act. This principle was well-established in EC 
politics, had been used by the European Court of Justice to settle disputes in the economic policy realm, and could 
serve as a universally recognized keystone for the single market. In the game theoretic literature, the link between 
beliefs and equilibria has been emphasized in the context of signaling games. Kreps and Wilson (1982), for 
example, elevate beliefs to the level of importance of strategies in the definition of equilibrium. 
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legislative entrepreneurs link outcome preferences to specific policy issues through the provision 
of focal points that link ideological ideal points with particular policies. They connect outcome 
preferences to specific policy issues by supplying simplifying ideas or images about the 
consequences of a policy proposal to legislators faced with a large number of decisions on highly 
specialized and varied subjects. These focal points help resolve conflict between potentially 
contradictory normative and political considerations by emphasizing, classifying, and evaluating 
specific aspects of the proposal. Legislators acting under conditions of uncertainty about the 
consequences of a policy choice rely on focal points to help them link their latent ideal points on 
the ideological dimensions with specific policy proposals, making them pertinent to the decision 
at hand. Focal points thus serve as short-hand devices for communicating information that 
emphasizes the respective salience of the ideological dimensions by shifting attention toward 
specific perceived outcomes of a given policy proposal. Simply put, they affect the receivers’ 
perceptions of which outcome preference matters with regard to a policy proposal, and how 
intensely it matters. These perceptions are then aggregated through the formation of policy-
coalitions.26 
While the game theoretic literature conceives of focal points as the equilibria resulting 
from players in pure coordination games following the coordinating “label” they consider to be 
most salient (Schelling 1960; Metha, Starmer and Sugden 1994), that is, as the outcome of the 
game, the term is used more broadly in the less formal literature. Garrett and Weingast (1993: 
176), for example, maintain that focal points do not always emerge without conscious effort on 
the part of interested actors, but that they must often be “constructed.” Hence, focal points are 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that focal points are targeted at those MEPs not directly involved in the decision-making 
process either for a lack of time and resources, or because they do not possess the necessary expertise to genuinly 
evaluate the content and implications of the proposed legislation, or both. It is the preferences and positions of these 
MEPs that this study seeks to account for. MEPs who do not fall into this category do not have to rely on focal 
points for the determination of their policy preferences and positions. 
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less the outcome of process, but a tool facilitating this outcome. In this sense, the provision of 
focal points constitutes an example of what William Riker has termed “heresthetic,” which 
describes the attempt to structure the political context in such a way as to move the process of 
contestation from one to another dimension (Riker 1986, 1990). According to Riker, actors can 
introduce new issue dimensions, or dismiss or reinterpret existing ones by “displaying the 
relevance of a dimension, recalling it from latent storage to the center of psychic attention” 
(Riker 1990: 54). However, while the concept of heresthetic is quite broad and includes various 
forms of strategic voting and agenda manipulation (Riker 1990: 50-54), the provision of focal 
points should be conceived of as a very specific mechanism of heresthetic: by shifting attention 
toward particular aspects of a policy proposal, focal points influence policy-makers’ perceptions 
of the relevance and salience of the dominant ideological dimensions. Hence, their introduction 
structures the political context by affecting the dimensional location of political deliberation and 
contestation. 
Riker argues that heresthetic is a process that restructures the political space from a 
model where equilibrium is likely to exist to one where it is not (Riker 1990: 51). Focal points, 
however, work the other way around by transforming a model with multiple possible equilibria 
into one where certain equilibria are more likely. This is exactly the purpose of a focal point: to 
increase the likelihood of legislators choosing one equilibrium over another, thus providing the 
basis for a policy coalition to either push through or defeat a policy proposal. Focal points 
achieve this result by linking a policy proposal with the dominant ideological dimensions, i.e., by 
tying the decision-making process to the lower-dimensional ideological space. This decreases the 
number of dimensions considered to be salient for the decision at hand and decreases the number 
of possible equilibria; it thus puts a distinct limit on the ability of strategic actors to manipulate 
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the dimensional placement of an issue. However, focal points must supply information about the 
potential consequences of a legislative proposal in reference to the other legislators’ ideological 
ideal points or outcome preferences. If this link fails to be established, meaning if the focal point 
fails to appeal the other legislators’ exogenous sets of norms and values, it will be rejected by the 
“receiver.”27 In this sense, the provision of focal points reflects and is constrained by the existing 
ideological space: focal points are not “free-floating.” 
In the context of the EP, focal points are likely to fall into three broad categories based on 
the outcome preferences they “target.” Focal points relating to the sovereignty-integration 
dimension should address the trade-off between the objective to build an “ever closer Union” and 
the desire to retain national sovereignty. This emphasis should prompt decision-makers to act 
based on their positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension. Examples for such focal 
points would be the emphasis on the necessity for completing specific European projects on the 
one hand (such as the single market, Economic and Monetary Union, EU enlargements, a 
common foreign and security policy, etc.), or the emphasis on the singularity and desirability of 
national cultures, identities, institutions, or decision-making authority on the other.  
In contrast, focal points relating to the Left-Right divide should emphasize traditional 
Left-Right issues and induce European decision-makers to act based on their positions on the 
Left-Right divide. These focal points would, for example, stress the conflict between economic 
regulation and liberalization, or the tradeoff between employee protection and business 
promotion.  
                                                 
27 This is also important with regard to Riker’s concept of heresthetics, which has been criticized for failing to 
identify the constraints on the introduction of new issue dimensions. If each actor has to simply introduce an 
additional dimension in order to “win,” then why do we not observe the introduction of an infinite number of 
dimensions on any given issue (Mackie 2003)? Placing the manipulation process in a low-dimensional ideological 
space puts a distinct limit on actors’ ability to manipulate the dimensional placement of an issue. 
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Finally, focal points may stress the need to protect distinct constituency interests. In the 
case of the EU, these are most likely nationally-based, such as national economic interests. By 
emphasizing the positive or negative impact of a proposal for national constituencies, 
constituency-centered focal points should prompt decision-makers to vote in ideologically 
diverse coalitions, for example as national blocs. 
The basic argument advanced here is that depending on which focal point (or focal 
points) dominates the deliberation process concerning a particular legislative proposal, 
legislators not directly involved in the deliberation process will perceive of the issue in different 
ways. For example, a legislative proposal regulating economic policy at the EU level could be 
presented by the people directly involved in the dossier as a matter of harmonization toward the 
completion of the EU single market. As a result, pro-EU legislator without complete information 
about the content and consequences of the legislation would be likely to support the legislation. 
If, however, the issue were presented as one of liberalization, members of parliament on the left 
side of the political spectrum would likely oppose the measure. 
3.3 THE EFFECT OF FOCAL POINTS: AN ILLUSTRATION 
To illustrate the impact of focal points on the preference functions of legislators, consider first 
the ideological space below, which consists of the Left-Right divide and the sovereignty-
integration dimension. Also assume that there are three individual MEPs (x1, x2, x3), who each 
have ideal points on these dimensions.28 
 
                                                 
28 Note that for ideal points, subscripts are used to identify people, so x1 is MEP 1’s ideal point, and xi is MEP i’s 
ideal point. I use italics to indicate ideal points in the ideological space. 
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[Figure 2 here] 
 
The ideological space is not actually divorced from issues, because ideologies provide a 
set of “linkages” with the n-dimensional space of policies; these linkages are highly uncertain, 
however (Hinich and Munger 1997: 191). Hence, the process of relating a policy proposal to the 
existing ideological space by interpreting its content and consequences in reference to the 
dominant ideological dimensions consists of a complete or partial transposition of the ideological 
space into the relevant policy space in which decision-making takes place. In the case where 
there are no variables, such as focal points, intervening in the transposition of the ideological 
space into a given policy space, the relevant policy space looks exactly like the ideological space 
above. In this space, let SQ (status quo) and NP (new policy) be two competing policy options. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
If ideological ideal points and the two policy options are thus distributed in the policy 
space, and if the salience of the two dimensions is equal (when the legislators perceive neither 
dimension to be more important than the other), the status quo will be retained. As represented in 
the graphic below, equal salience of the two dimensions means that the legislators’ indifference 
curves (the sets of points that give them the same level of satisfaction) are of circular form. 
These circles have the property that all points along the indifference curves are equally far from 
the ideal points of the legislators x1, x2 and x3. The legislators compare policy proposals on the 
basis of the distance from their ideal points, meaning that if the radius of the circle 
circumscribing their indifference curves is the distance from their ideal points to the status quo 
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point (here: SQ), any new policy that falls inside the indifference curve constitutes a preferred 
alternative to the status quo. In Figure 4, voting for the status quo is the preferred alternative for 
x1 and x2, since the new policy (NP) lies outside their indifference curves. x3 would prefer NP, 
however, which is closer to her ideal point than SQ. Accordingly, under majority rule, NP would 
be defeated 2-1. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
As defined above, focal points emphasize the respective salience of the ideological 
dimensions by shifting attention toward the (perceived) consequences of a given policy proposal. 
In doing so, they affect the prevalent perceptions of which outcome preference matters with 
regard to the proposal, and how intensely it matters. In other words, focal points affect the 
salience attached to the ideological dimension when they are transposed into the policy space. 
The most extreme versions of this transposition would be if one of the two ideological 
dimensions were to become completely irrelevant, i.e. if its salience were zero. In this case, the 
relevant policy space is one-dimensional, reflecting only the dominant ideological dimension. If 
the Left-Right divide were this dominant dimension, SQ would be the preferred policy option for 
x1 and x2, whose ideal points are closer to SQ than to NP.  NP lies inside x3’s indifference curve, 
however, and would thus be her preferred alternative. Therefore, NP would again be defeated 2-
1. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
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In contrast, if the sovereignty-integration dimension were dominant to the degree that the 
Left-Right divide was irrelevant, NP would narrowly prevail. As the figure below demonstrates, 
both x2 and x3 prefer the new policy NP over the status quo SQ, as it lies inside their indifference 
curves. x1 still prefers the SQ, however, meaning that NP would defeat SQ in a 2-1 vote.  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
Yet, it might also be the case that neither dimension is utterly irrelevant, but that one is 
perceived to be more salient than the other. In this case, indifference curves are no longer 
circular, but have an elliptical shape. Specifically, if the horizontal dimension is more salient, the 
indifference curves are “squeezed” from the sides, because the more important a dimension is to 
an actor, the more small changes in the policy affect her satisfaction. In contrast, if the vertical 
dimension is more salient, the indifference curves are “squeezed” from above and below. Hence, 
if focal points affect the perceived salience of the ideological dimensions with regard to a 
particular policy proposal, they change the shape of the indifference curves of the decision-
makers. 
For example, if the provider of focal points could convince MEP x2 that the sovereignty-
integration dimension is only a bit more salient than the Left-Right divide when deciding 
between SQ and NP, x2‘s indifference curve would change in such a way that voting for NP now 
becomes his preferred alternative (still assuming equal perceived salience of the ideological 
dimensions for x1 and x3). As we can see in the figure below, the new policy NP, which was 
previously outside x2’s indifference curve (see Figure 4), now lies inside his new, elliptical 
indifference curve. 
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 [Figure 7 here] 
 
This result would be the same if the focal point affected not just x2’s perception of the 
salience of the ideological dimensions, but x1‘s and x3‘s as well. 
 
[Figure 8 here] 
 
An even greater salience of the sovereignty-integration dimension over the Left-Right 
divide, however, would entail that x3’s policy preference changed, and that SQ would actually 
defeat NP by a vote of 2-1. As we can see below, NP no longer lies inside x3’s indifference 
curve, meaning that if x3 perceived the sovereignty-integration to be very salient, she would 
consider the status quo to be her preferred alternative. 
 
[Figure 9 here] 
 
Finally, consider the case where a focal point aims to emphasize the salience of the Left-
Right over the sovereignty-integration dimension (where the indifference curves are “squeezed” 
from the sides). Here, the status quo would again prevail as the preferred policy preference for x1 
and x2, as NP lies outside their indifference curves. 
 
[Figure 10 here] 
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This series of examples shows how focal points could impact policy decisions by 
influencing the respective salience of ideological ideal points when the two-dimensional 
ideological space is transposed into an N-dimensional policy space. These examples, however, 
assume that actors are policy-oriented. This leaves us to consider the case of office-driven 
politicians, who may be willing to deviate from their ideological ideal points in order to better 
represent or “serve” their constituents (and to get re-elected). If this were the case, their 
indifference curves would change based on the degree to which the ideological dimensions’ 
salience diminishes.  
The most extreme example of this incidence would be if the ideological dimensions 
became completely irrelevant and their salience were zero, and were replaced by a constituency 
dimension where actors are aligned on the basis of the (perceived) respective gains of their 
constituents. In the case of the EU, this constituency element would most likely be national 
interest, where the comparative advantage of each member state is the most salient variable in 
the decision-making process. The graphic below provides one possible example where NP would 
pass with the votes of x1 and x3, for whom NP lies inside their indifference curves. 
 
[Figure 11 here] 
 
Another possibility would be that the constituency element affected the salience of each 
ideological dimension asymmetrically. If, for example, the sovereignty-integration divide 
became irrelevant, while the Left-Right dimension retained at least some of its salience, a policy 
proposal would be evaluated in a two-dimensional policy space such as the one below. In this 
case, NP would be x1’s and x3’s policy preference, and both would vote to defeat SQ. 
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 [Figure 12 here] 
3.4 THE SOURCES OF FOCAL POINTS 
All of this leaves one crucial question: Where do focal points come from? I argue that they are 
provided by legislative entrepreneurs with private information about the expected consequences 
of a policy proposal. These legislators are policy specialists to whom less-informed, and less-
involved, members have delegated the task of providing information relevant to the policy 
decision.29 Hence, the focal point model includes a distinctly strategic element, despite its 
emphasis on the constraints imposed by the structure of the ideological space. After all, shifting 
attention means emphasizing and evaluating particular aspects of a legislative proposal, even 
within certain constraints, and the providers of focal points should thus have a great deal of 
influence over decision-making processes and outcomes. 
Within a context of incomplete and asymmetric information, however, the institutional 
structure of a legislative arena is critical in positioning some actors in advantageous positions as 
providers of focal points. The important question is who this structure favors as the supplier of 
information and expertise, and the likely sources of focal points in legislative decision-making 
processes are either strong parties or strong legislative committees. 
While the literature on the development of the EP and its party groups has generally 
found their authority to be increasing, party groups in the EP remain weak compared to their 
                                                 
29 In the U.S. context, voting choice studies have frequently shown that legislators rely heavily on information from 
“specialist” legislators or “trusted colleagues” who are knowledgeable on the particular issue under consideration 
(Zwier 1979; Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 1981; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985). 
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counterparts in national parliamentary systems. Most importantly, EP groups are themselves 
made up of full, sovereign political parties, making it more difficult for the party groups to “bind 
the parts” (Lord 1998: 205). This makes them different from the internally hierarchical, strong 
parties in West European parliamentary systems. Moreover, the EP party groups have no direct 
influence over the selection of their members, since the authority to draw up party lists for 
European elections lies with the national parties. Finally, EP party groups have more limited 
resources and staff than parties in national parliaments, thus further undermining their role as 
information providers. 
The EP’s permanent committee structure, on the other hand, has been described as its 
“legislative backbone” (Westlake 1994: 191). The role of EP committees is more active and 
powerful than that of their counterparts in other national parliaments: they propose amendments 
to legislation in the form of a report and a draft resolution, which are then submitted to the EP 
plenary in an almost “take-it-or-leave-it” form (Hix 1999a: 78). The EP is more like the U.S. 
Congress than most European parliaments in this regard.  
The EP’s committee system provides members with the opportunity to acquire expertise 
in specific policy areas, meaning they should be expected to serve as the primary providers of 
focal points. As a result, committees in the EP can fulfill their role as formal mechanisms of 
establishing a division of labor among legislators of (nominally) equal status (Judge and 
Earnshaw 2003) and facilitate legislative decision-making by providing “economics of 
operation” (Mattson and Strøm 1995). This leads to efficiency gains, as legislation is processed 
more quickly than if the plenary as a whole were involved collectively, and promotes 
specialization and expertise to deal with “problems of complexity, technicality and information 
overload” (Judge and Earnshaw 2003). 
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Much like the permanent committees with fixed jurisdictions in the U.S. Congress, the 
jurisdictional organization of EP committees is based on the need to specialize, and its 
committees have considerable influence on the legislative agenda. This warrants a closer 
examination of the literature on committees in Congress. Within the branch of rational choice 
work grounded in the “new institutionalism,” two prevalent analytical perspectives have sought 
to explain the roles of committees. First, the “distributive perspective” is tied to the names of 
Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast (Shepsle 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 1981). It focuses on 
members’ gains from trade, where legislatures are “a collective choice body whose principal task 
is to allocate policy benefits” (Krehbiel 1991: 3). Legislators’ primary role is to secure a 
favorable distribution of direct benefits to their constituents. In this perspective, committees 
serve as instruments to fulfill this goal and are composed of high-demanders (members with a 
high demand for the policies in their jurisdiction). Congressional rules and procedures give such 
committees control over policy making within their domain, so that the committee system serves 
as a mechanism for a intra-institutional “logroll”: members gain influence in the policy areas 
they care most about, while sacrificing the ability to determine policy in areas less salient to 
them (Weingast and Marshall 1988). In effect, they trade influence with one another. 
The second, “informational”, perspective conceives of committees as more than 
distributional devices. Instead, they are also designed to help members reap gains from 
specialization. The informational approach emerged from a series of papers by Keith Krehbiel 
and Thomas Gilligan (1987, 1989, 1990), as well as Krehbiel’s 1991 book Information and 
Legislative Organization. In their view, institutional arrangements reflect the need to acquire and 
disseminate information, and committees provide the necessary incentives for legislators to 
specialize to achieve their political goals. Specialization is thus a potential collective good 
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(Krehbiel 1991: 5) realized through institutional organization. Rather than consisting of high-
demanders, as the distributive approach suggests, the informational perspective suggests that 
individual committees reflect the heterogeneity of the whole house, so that legislators can secure 
the gains from specialization while ensuring that the policy outcome does not deviate from the 
majority preference. Empirical tests of the distributive and informational perspectives have thus 
focused on the composition of legislative committees: do they consist of preference outliers, as 
the distributive perspective suggests, or are they representative of legislature as a whole, as the 
informational perspective maintains?  
Analyses of EP committee composition suggest that they are heterogeneous in terms of 
both nationality and party affiliation and thus generally representative of the parent chamber 
(Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2003). Moreover, the evidence points toward a high degree 
of specialization among committee members who tend to self-select into the committees of their 
choice based on policy interest (McElroy 2003; Whitaker 2001), rather than constituency 
concerns (Whitaker 2001; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). Therefore, empirical evidence suggests 
that EP committees assume an informational role by supplying information that reduces 
individual legislators’ uncertainty about the consequences of diverse legislative proposals 
(Krehbiel 1991). This is also the role that the focal point theory assigns to individual committee 
members, meaning that the focal point theory falls squarely into the informational camp. Using 
the general propositions of the informational perspective as a starting point, the focal point 
model specifies the mechanism of information distribution by emphasizing that focal points 
situate specific policy proposals in reference to the ideology space, thus summarizing and 
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simplifying the issue under consideration for those legislators not directly involved in the 
deliberation process.30 
One important question this discussion raises, however, is whether reliance on 
specialized sub-units for information about policy proposals equals the abdication of policy 
making authority by the less-informed and less-involved backbenchers.31 Lupia and McCubbins 
(1994: 370) argue one way to avoid this loss of control by the principal is an institutional 
structure where “the likelihood that there will be informed adversaries is high,” i.e., that there is 
“competition between information providers.” According to Bowler and Farrell (1995), this is 
indeed the case in EP committees, which feature internal deliberative processes with opposing 
sets of interests. While this is probably, at least in part, because EP committees are not composed 
of homogeneous high-demanders in comparison to the parent chamber (McElroy 2003: 129), the 
structure of EP politics provides members with an additional, distinct way of checking the 
information they receive from their committee representatives. After all, MEPs are not just 
represented by members of their EP party groups, but also by representatives of their country of 
origin, and often by members of their national party delegations. This reality means that MEPs 
who delegate the role of information provider to specialized committee members can 
“triangulate” the information they receive. For example, a German Social Democrat can compare 
the positions assumed by the committee representatives of the Party of the European Socialists 
(PES), the German Social Democrats (SPD), and all the other Germans on the responsible 
                                                 
30 It is important to note that this analysis does not follow the traditional path of weighing distributive against 
informational arguments in analyzing the composition of EP committees. Instead, it considers how information 
passes from committees, which have already been shown to be representative of the parent chamber, to the EP floor. 
31 As claimed, for example, by Blondel 1968; Meny 1990; Laver and Schofield 1990; Lowi 1979; Smith 1988; 
Wattenberg 1990. 
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committee when deciding on a policy position.32 As a result, MEPs can feel assured that 
delegating to specialized committees still results in “good” policy. 
3.5 HYPOTHESES 
I evaluate the applicability of the focal point model vis-à-vis two alternative theoretical accounts 
of the conversion of outcome preferences into policy preferences. The first is an “exogenous 
preferences” model that perceives of policy preferences as a predetermined and fixed input into 
the policy making process. In this perspective, outcome preferences translate directly into policy 
preferences, and decision-making processes do not shape policy preferences and policy choice. 
In other words, both policy preferences and outcome-equilibria are predetermined. 
 
H1a: Policy preferences are exogenous to the decision-making process. 
H1b: Outcome-equilibria are predetermined. 
 
The second model follows the logic of the new-institutionalist “garbage-can” (Cohen, 
March, and Olsen 1972), where policy outcomes are the result of an unpredictable confluence of 
problems, solutions, participants, (problematic) preferences, and choice opportunities. These 
elements flow in and out of a garbage-can, and which problem gets matched with what solution 
is largely due to chance. According to the garbage-can approach, policy preferences and policy 
choice are the random outcome of the decision-making process. 
 
                                                 
32 Naturally, MEPs may receive additional information from sources outside the parliament, such as national 
governments, national party leaderships, or lobbyists. The effect of these external sources of information will be 
discussed in the empirical sections below.  
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H2a: Policy preferences are endogenous to the decision-making process. 
H2b: Outcome-equilibria are random. 
  
The focal point model, in contrast, views policy preferences as neither exogenous nor 
random. While they are considered to be the outcome of a dynamic process, rather than merely 
an input into this process, the translation of outcome preferences into policy preferences is not 
coincidental. Most importantly, there is one subset of actors (committee specialists) that steers 
the process of conversion for the entire population, and thus creates opportunities for policy 
choice. That is, committee specialists provide a common theme around which policy coalitions 
can form and thus make certain outcome-equilibria more likely than others. 
 
H3a (= H2a): Policy preferences are endogenous to the decision-making process. 
H3b: Outcome-equilibria are neither predetermined nor random, but can be predicted on 
the basis of the prevailing focal points. 
3.6 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The focal point theory entails predictions about decision-making processes as well as their 
outcomes. Hence, the empirical analysis is based on detailed qualitative data about the process of 
policy making in the EP and quantitative analyses of their outcomes, namely voting patterns in 
the EP plenary. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, it examines the roles of committees in 
the European Parliament on a general level to determine if committee members serve as sources 
of information for legislative backbenchers. Second, it investigates to what extent legislators 
follow the lead of their committee members when voting on the floor. Third, it examines a series 
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of six legislative proposals in detail to establish the mechanism and patterns of information 
provision. 
These analyses are based on three sets of data: in-depth interviews, records of debates in 
the EP plenary, and roll-call vote data. The roll-call vote data is analyzed using multinomial logit 
regression and falls into two categories. First, I created a large-N dataset to compare the voting 
patterns in the committee responsible for a legislative dossier. This dataset includes 95 roll-call 
vote and 40,574 individual-level observations. Second, I analyze specific roll-call votes from my 
six case studies in each of the case study chapters. Specific details about these analyses are 
provided in the respective chapters. 
The EP plenary debates are analyzed in a content analysis framework, utilizing a 
computer text analysis software package called Textpack to establish frequency-of-use lists and 
to identify keywords in context. This analysis serves to determine the extent to which different 
focal points dominated the deliberation processes concerning the legislative proposals serving as 
case studies. Once again, details about coding and analysis will be found below. 
Finally, I rely on the responses of my interview partners from a series of 80 in-depth 
interviews with members of the European Parliament and EP officials, as well as a small number 
of representatives from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. The interviews 
were conducted between June 2003 and March 2005 in a semi-structured format, consisting of a 
series of core questions supplemented by follow-up and in-depth discussion about different 
subjects the respondent was willing to provide further detail about. Each interview focused on 
one particular legislative proposal to be evaluated in a case study format, yet went beyond issues 
particular to the policy at hand to address broader questions about decision-making processes in 
the EP.  
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While these interviews do not generate quantifiable data, this was not their purpose. 
Instead, they are supposed to provide in-depth understanding based on detailed observation about 
the processes and mechanisms of decision-making, which quantitative data alone could not 
provide. The result is a rich set of qualitative data providing general lessons and case-specific 
insights. It is important to note, however, that the interviews go beyond mere description and 
were conducted with the aim of testing theory, as they provide the basis for assessing deductively 
derived predictions about the sources and mechanisms of information provision. I thus seek to 
evaluate the overall consistency of the qualitative data with the predictions of the theory. 
Unfortunately, judging the validity and the reliability of the data is difficult with this kind 
of approach. I seek to overcome this limitation through three means. First, I conducted a large 
number of interviews, allowing for a search for consistency across the answers provided. For 
each case study, I conducted between nine and 13 interviews for a total of 80, reaching a point of 
saturation both with regard to the specific policy proposal and the general questions relating to 
processes of policy choice in the EP. Second, I conducted interviews not just with politicians: 
while 44 of the 80 respondents are MEPs (two of whom were interviewed twice, once in 2003 
and again in 2005), 27 are EP officials, three are Commission officials, and four are Council 
officials. Once again, consistency of responses across this diverse range of respondents enhanced 
their credibility. Finally, I sought to interview a sample of respondents representative of the EP 
population, which was particularly successful with regard to political affiliation. The interviews 
involved representatives from all seven major party groups in the EP and are distributed across 
these party groups proportionately by party strength (measured as total number of MEPs). In this 
regard, the sample of respondents does represent a “microcosm” of the Parliament. Concerning 
the countries of origin of my respondents, however, the interviews are not distributed as 
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proportionally, partially due to linguistic constraints, but also to availability and willingness to be 
interviewed. Specifically, Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden are 
overrepresented, while France, Italy, and Spain are underrepresented. Respondents from 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the UK are represented more 
or less proportionally. It is important to note, however, that my sample does include respondents 
from all the (then) 15 EU member states. 
 The interviews focus on six legislative proposals serving as case studies. These proposals 
concern: 
• EU takeover legislation (legislative reference number: COD/1995/0341). 
• Union Citizenship: free movement and residence (COD/2001/0111). 
• Liberalization of port services in the EU (COD/2001/0047) 
• Liability for environmental damage (COD/2002/0021)  
• Statutes and financing of EU-level political parties (COD/2003/0039). 
• A package of proposals on fuel quality and emissions from motor vehicles 
(COD/1996/164a, COD/1996/164b, COD/1996/163) 
 
In selecting these cases, I limited the pool of possible choices to recently concluded 
dossiers that were decided under the co-decision procedure. I excluded cases where the 
controversy was of a technical or definitional nature, rather than content-driven. Among the 
remaining legislative proposals, I sought to assure variance in critical case characteristics, such 
as issue area, committee jurisdiction, party membership of the rapporteur, number of 
parliamentary readings, and level of initial controversy. This case selection is non-random, but 
does not constitute a selection on the dependent variable, as details about the proposals were 
entirely unknown at the outset of the research project. 
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4.0  INFORMATION FLOW AND THE ROLE OF SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES 
This chapter investigates how legislators receive the information they need to make informed 
decisions about specific policy proposals. In this effort, it considers the extent to which their 
positions are shaped by decision-making processes, and the impact of institutional structures on 
information provision and transmission.  
Drawing from the interview data, the chapter demonstrates that MEPs often lack detailed 
information about the content and consequences of any given legislative proposal; that 
specialization in the EP committees serves as a way to alleviate this shortcoming; that 
specialized committee members constitute the primary providers of information to EP 
backbenchers; that a handful of committee experts creates their party groups’ official positions 
toward each policy proposal; that committee members lobby for their positions among their 
colleagues; and that, ultimately, these positions are likely to be adopted. 
Accordingly, this chapter demonstrates that policy preferences are hardly exogenous 
factors determining policy choice, a finding that contradicts hypothesis H1a, one of the 
propositions of the exogenous preference model. Instead, it lends support to the contention of the 
garbage-can and focal point models that policy preferences are endogenous to the decision-
making process (H2a and H3a). 
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4.1 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGISLATION 
One critical reason for the need for specialization in legislative decision-making is the 
informational constraints imposed on legislators by a lack of time and resources. This reality, and 
how it affects decision-making, was emphasized by numerous respondents in the interviews 
performed for this analysis. As one MEP noted:  
 
“So many things happen in the EP, so many different subjects are being debated in 
different committees, that none of us follows everything with much detail … You don’t 
have the time to look at everything yourself … We are always under time pressure 
here.”33 
 
This sentiment is widespread among MEPs, with time identified as the most important 
constraint.34 Closely related, however, are the limited resources available to MEPs in terms of 
personal and professional assistance.35 MEPs do not have the luxury of many advisors,36 and 
unless an assistant happens to be aware of a potential problem with a particular piece of 
legislation, for example, the MEP might very likely not be aware of it personally.37 As in other 
legislatures, such as the U.S. Congress (Hall 1996), individual legislators’ choices about 
participation in the active treatment of different policy proposals is a function of their willingness 
to invest scarce time, energy, and resources. 
                                                 
33 Respondent #48. 
34 Respondent #6, Respondent #68, Respondent #19, Respondent #9, Respondent #72, Respondent #18, Respondent 
#51, Respondent #38; see also Corbett et al. (2005: 57-8). 
35 For details on members’ assistants, see Corbett et al. (2005: 67-9) 
36 Respondent #18. Members are provided with a secretarial allowance to employ personal assistants and have 
considerable freedom in using these funds. They may choose to employ two well-paid assistants or several less-well 
paid or part-time employees (Corbett et. al 2005: 67). The total number of assistants per MEP is rarely more than 
three or four, however.  
37 Respondent #9. 
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As a result, it is quite common for members not to know very much substantive detail 
about the issues under consideration. A number of respondents readily acknowledged that most 
members generally do not know the majority of what they are voting on.38 One explains that she 
knows what an issue is “basically about” from the discussion in the party group meeting, but 
when an issue is divided into “75 votes, I really don’t know each time what I vote … If there is 
something that I don’t care about, it must be handled by somebody who has more knowledge and 
interest in it.”39 Another MEP, from the transport committee, describes that he cannot follow 
what is going on in the environment committee with regard to animal testing “from A to Z.” He 
relies on his party’s specialists to scrutinize those issues for him so that he knows what the basic 
issues and divisions are. He is provided the essential information he needs to “make up his mind” 
by his party colleagues, but he cannot “pay attention to Paragraph 7, Part 8, of some dossier” he 
is not directly involved in.40  
4.2 SPECIALIZATION IN COMMITTEE 
This results in the delegation of decision-making authority to a number MEPs in the responsible 
legislative committee who are experts in the particular policy area under consideration. It is these 
few informed legislators who guide the parliament as a whole through a given legislative process 
and set the parameters for action. Following a natural division of labor between specialists on 
                                                 
38 Respondent #35, Respondent #68, Respondent #19, Respondent #9, Respondent #7, Respondent #2. See also 
Rasmussen and Shackleton (2005: 3, 16), who maintain that the “vast majority” of MEPs are only able to “follow 
with difficulty the progress of negotiations before they are invited to vote at first or second reading” and that “the 
time available to verify an agreement is normally shortest at second reading, with the vote often taking place only a 
matter of days after the conclusion of negotiations. Necessarily this reduces the scope for challenges to an 
agreement, with other members obliged to accept on trust that they should vote in favor.” 
39 Respondent #7. 
40 Respondent #19. 
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different issues, legislators tend to follow the information and advise they receive from their 
colleagues. As the informational perspective on the role of committees suggests (Krehbiel 1991), 
MEPs essentially “leave it to the experts” and follow their lead, allowing them to reap the gains 
from specialization. 
In this context, it was striking that a large number of respondents used the word “trust” 
unprompted during the interviews,41 while others used similar terms such as “relying on”42 or 
“following” committee experts.43 This finding matches what we know about the U.S. Congress, 
where analyses of vote choice have found that legislators rely on information from legislative 
specialists or “trusted colleagues” knowledgeable about the particular issue at hand (Zwier 1979; 
Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 1981; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985). As one senior MEP 
from the environment committee describes, when a social policy expert who he has known for 
many years approaches him and suggests a position on a social policy issue, then he will, under 
most circumstances, follow this advice.44 Another MEP explains that: 
 
“You don’t even read the report. You go to plenary, you have some general knowledge 
what is in that report, but you just trust your colleagues from your party in that 
committee. You trust that they are the experts, and that they have gone through the issue 
details. It is based on mutual trust.”45 
 
Others maintained that: 
 
                                                 
41 Respondent #4, Respondent #6, Respondent #7, Respondent #11, Respondent #19, Respondent #22, Respondent 
#35, Respondent #38, Respondent #42, Respondent #42, Respondent #44, Respondent #47, Respondent #47, 
Respondent #48, Respondent #68, Respondent #72. 
42 Respondent #14, Respondent #34. 
43 Respondent #1, Respondent #8, Respondent #69, Respondent #18, Respondent #55, Respondent #51. 
44 Respondent #22. 
45 Respondent #35. 
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“If you are a specialist [and] you don’t know anything about some other issue … then 
you are going to trust your colleagues.”46 
 
“I trust my friends in the committee, and they trust me.”47 
 
“You rely on your colleagues, especially on technical issues.”48 
 
“[In each party group] you only really have three specialists, or four; the rest is [sic] just 
following the specialists.”49 
 
As this last quote indicates, not everyone is a specialist on a given issue even within the 
responsible committee, especially in those with broad jurisdictions.50 The complex nature of 
many proposals effectively excludes most members from the detailed negotiations and 
deliberations even if they possess general expertise in the substantive issue areas covered by the 
committee.51 For example, an expert on environmental policy might be a specialist dealing with 
biodiversity and be relatively uninformed on the nitty-gritty aspects of carbon dioxide emissions; 
it is “double-Dutch, even for someone who is living with it every day,” as one EP official 
maintained.52 
As a result, there are usually only a small number of people who assume the leadership 
among their party colleagues,53 who try to inform the committee about the breadth of the 
repercussions of what is going on,54 and who delineate the voting patterns of the party group as a 
                                                 
46 Respondent #72. 
47 Respondent #11. 
48 Respondent #14. 
49 Respondent #18. 
50 Respondent #17, Respondent #77, Respondent #19, Respondent #38, Respondent #18. 
51 Respondent #45, Respondent #72, Respondent #51, Respondent #49. 
52 Respondent #51. 
53 Respondent #18, Respondent #19, Respondent #38, Respondent #45, Respondent #48, Respondent #49, 
Respondent #6, Respondent #32, Respondent #68, Respondent #33. 
54 Respondent #38. 
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whole.55 Moreover, time and resource constraints also affect committee members, with the result 
that even within the committee, responsibility for handling a certain dossier is delegated to a 
select few. The most important official position, in this regard, is that of the rapporteur, who 
handles a dossier on behalf of the committee and the parliament as a whole.  
4.3 THE ROLE OF THE RAPPORTEUR 
The question of who is the rapporteur is quite important, according to my respondents. One 
parliamentary official maintained that whenever a party group gets a dossier, the question is 
“Who will be the rapporteur?”56 The individual aspect is almost as important as what party group 
the rapporteur is from, as a number of respondents explain, because it matters whether she is a 
moderate or center person from the left or right, how she presents her report, and if she is looking 
to capture the middle ground.57 One official goes as far as suggesting that it does not matter at all 
what country or party group a rapporteur is from, but that it depends on personality alone.58 
Whether the rapporteur establishes a wording of his report that is “as inclusive as possible, or 
[…] as narrow as possible” is of great importance for the decision-making process.59 The 
rapporteur has the ability to steer subsequent stages of the decision-making process through her 
initial report and her behavior throughout the process.60 
                                                 
55 Respondent #19, Respondent #47. 
56 Respondent #38, Respondent #9, Respondent #14. 
57 Respondent #21, Respondent #4, Respondent #18. 
58 Respondent #33. 
59 Respondent #38. 
60 Respondent #14, Respondent #48, Respondent #34, Respondent #30, Respondent #37, Respondent #35. 
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An important question is which way a rapporteur is likely to be arguing her case.61 One 
MEP provided the example that “if you are doing stuff that concerns terrorism and the rapporteur 
is a UK conservative, you are going to get a very different take on the report than if you have got 
a Greek communist.”62 This is partially a substantive issue, but also relates to the “tone of 
language” of the rapporteur; if “just the style of presentation is highly confrontational,” 
according to one MEP, it affects the process of deliberation.63 
Accordingly, the importance of the personal reputation of the rapporteur was emphasized 
by a broad group of respondents.64 Here, the key question seems to be to what extent a 
rapporteur is willing to take on the role of the rapporteur on behalf of the whole EP or attempts 
to promote her national or individual position.65 Her approach is usually already apparent in the 
first preparatory stages in the treatment of a dossier, where she assumes the leading role.66 She 
could, for example, follow a strategy of creating a working document that reflects her own 
personal convictions and positions more than those of the EP as a whole, or even her own party 
group. Alternatively, she can immediately seek to incorporate the positions of others into her 
initial working document, including actual preliminary negotiations with representatives from 
the other party groups.67 This makes a significant difference not just in terms of cooperation 
among the key actors and the atmosphere within which deliberation and negotiation take place, 
                                                 
61 Respondent #37, Respondent #14, Respondent #38. 
62 Respondent #38. 
63 Respondent #38. 
64 Respondent #33, Respondent #51, Respondent #9, Respondent #38, Respondent #17, Respondent #42, 
Respondent #47. 
65 Respondent #38. 
66 Respondent #17. 
67 Respondent #56. 
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but also, and perhaps more importantly, impacts the outcome of the first reading,68 which sets the 
stage for successive readings by significantly constraining the room for maneuver.  
These different styles affect how other MEPs perceive the rapporteur not just for the case 
at hand, but also in the future. If the rapporteur has the reputation of seeking cooperation and 
compromise, this will positively affect how she and her report are received in committee as well 
as in the plenary.69 This willingness and ability to compromise and go beyond national, partisan, 
or personal convictions is, in fact, what respondents identified as a primary factor of what makes 
a strong rapporteur, together with expertise and networks and contacts across party lines.70 One 
illustrative example for the importance of reputation was provided by a parliamentary official, 
who describes the reputation of Bernd Lange, a Socialist former MEP from Germany, as follows:  
 
“If you were to do a study of all the reports done by Mr. Lange, you would find that 99 
times out of 100, his proposals are adopted unanimously. In the past 5 years, the time I 
spent here, anything that he ever did, he was just blindly followed. […] Everybody 
thought that he was not going to pull a fast one. Even the EPP went along with him on 
lots of stuff, on nearly everything.”71 
4.4 OTHER COMMITTEE ACTORS 
Since there is only one rapporteur for each legislative proposal, this position is allocated between 
the party groups, sometimes amidst considerable controversy. The party groups who do not end 
up holding a rapporteurship then appoint a shadow rapporteur, whose responsibility it is to 
                                                 
68 Respondent #4. 
69 Respondent #17, Respondent #33, Respondent #47. 
70 Respondent #4, Respondent #17, Respondent #9, Respondent #33, Respondent #18, Respondent #42, Respondent 
#47, Respondent #25, Respondent #70. 
71 Respondent #9. 
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monitor the dossier on behalf of his party group. These shadow rapporteurs are very influential in 
that they are the primary negotiation partners of the rapporteur within the committee, as well as 
the primary sources of information for his or her party colleagues. 
Each party group also has a group coordinator in each committee. The responsibilities of 
the coordinators are much more broadly defined that those of the rapporteurs or shadows, 
however, in that they do not focus on a single issue or proposal, but seek to establish a coherent 
approach to the entire universe of proposals under consideration in the committee. For example, 
they generally have a file listing the different legislative proposals that come to the committee, 
including a brief description prepared by the EP secretariat as to what they concern.72 
Accordingly, their outlook is more universal than that of the shadow rapporteurs. Coordinators 
are, in essence, their party groups’ leaders within the domains of the committee, and they are 
superior to the rapporteur or shadow rapporteur. In reality, however, rapporteur and coordinator 
tend to work in tandem and jointly lead their party groups through the decision-making process. 
As a result, they possess considerable discretion, including being able to “put a lid” on issues 
they prefer to leave out of a report.73 
Finally, there is also an element of self-selected participation among committee members. 
If an MEP gets actively involved in a given issue based on personal interest or motivation, “you 
have to count him in,” as one MEP put it.74 All together, then, the actual group of participants 
remains relatively small. Specifically, my respondents suggested that it is usually only a handful 
of experts from each party who really treat a legislative proposal in detail and bargain amongst 
                                                 
72 Respondent #29. 
73 Respondent #38. 
74 Respondent #45, also: Respondent #18. 
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themselves with regard to matters of public policy,75 and that the set of active participants shifts 
across bills (see also Hall 1996: 8).76 Only when an issue is especially controversial does this 
number increase. In the words of one official, the rest of the committee members, just as the 
remaining MEPs outside the committee, “are following what their leaders are telling them.”77 
This reality is also important in formal terms, since it leaves committee members who 
participate actively in the deliberation process of a specific legislative proposal with a great deal 
of influence, especially if they also happen to play official roles, such as rapporteur or shadow 
rapporteur. The impact that a single MEP can have on a policy outcome appears to greatly 
outweigh that of his counterpart in an EU member state.78 Therefore, it is not only a question of 
who is actually involved in the deliberation process, but also of the configuration of those 
involved. These factors can have a significant impact on the level of contestation or cooperation 
within the committee, the substantive content of deliberation and negotiation, and thus on the 
outcome of the decision-making process.79 
 The important role that particular individuals play in the decision-making process 
means that it depends to a significant degree on who is involved, how they interact with their 
colleagues, and their level of influence in their respective party groups. Different respondents 
described this element as follows:  
 
“Each process is different depending on the people participating in it.”80 
                                                 
75 Respondent #45, Respondent #48, Respondent #49, Respondent #6, Respondent #18, Respondent #19, 
Respondent #38, Respondent #32, Respondent #68, Respondent #33. 
76 Rasmussen and Shackleton (2005: 4) argue that MEPs have little informal control over the work of key 
negotiators, while Farrell and Heritier (2003a: 8) argue that “it is often extremely difficult for others within the 
Parliament … to have any idea of what exactly is going on.” 
77 Respondent #18. 
78 Respondent #6, Respondent #44, Respondent #37, Respondent #72, Respondent #45, Respondent #48; see also 
Corbett et al. (2005: 9, 56-7). 
79 Respondent #28, Respondent #78, Respondent #29, Respondent #33, Respondent #77, Respondent #51. 
80 Respondent #28. 
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 “You have to be aware of the intraparliamentary element as well, between groups and 
personalities in committee.”81 
 
“It is an issue of how many people are worried, and how powerful they are.”82 
 
“It certainly matters who is in charge of a report: who are the rapporteur, shadows, 
coordinators?”83 
4.5 THE CREATION OF A PARTY LINE 
The informational structure of the party groups resembles a series of information filters, 
originating from the rapporteur and coordinator to the committee working groups, the 
coordinator meetings, the party working groups, and finally the party plenary. At each of these 
stages (which are explained and discussed below), information is made available and distributed, 
but within the constraints of time management and, to some extent, the strategic interests of the 
key players. The (more or less cohesive) official party line concerning a given proposal is the 
end result of this information distribution process, rather than an exogenous input preceding the 
decision-making process.84 Parties have, in the words of one MEP, “very broad lines, but there is 
no particular position on particular issues or particular directives. That is usually built up.”85 
There is no party line dictated by the party leaderships, but rather one that is defined, 
                                                 
81 Respondent #78. 
82 Respondent #29. 
83 Respondent #77. 
84 Respondent #47, Respondent #34, Respondent #2, Respondent #72, Respondent #45, Respondent #17. 
85 Respondent #45. 
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represented, and propagated by the key actors.86 In a sense, what constitutes the party’s 
“leadership” shifts with each legislative proposal and centers around the responsible rapporteur 
or shadow rapporteur and the party coordinators in the responsible committee. Rather than acting 
as representatives of an existing party line, those handling a dossier are its architects, as a large 
number of respondents maintained.87 
The cooperation among the critical players is a crucial element in this regard, as it 
constitutes a back and forth between positions that is ultimately carried into the party groups and 
the plenary. The central role of individuals and the significance of their interaction are further 
enhanced by the importance of informal channels in the decision-making process, described by 
one EP official as follows: 
 
“A lot of what goes on this parliament goes on in the lift, for example. The rapporteur 
bumps into the shadow from another group, and they have a bit of a chat, and maybe they 
will have a cup of coffee.”88 
 
Deliberation is thus not limited to formal settings, but proceeds (critically) in informal 
settings as well.89 
Once the key players in the committee have established their positions, often already 
targeted at a compromise with the other shadows, they establish a common position with their 
party colleagues in committee during the meetings of the committee working groups, which 
consist of all members of a party group sitting on the committee. Of course, these committee 
                                                 
86 Rasmussen and Shackleton (2005: 12) also argue that the grounds for deliberation and negotiation of particular 
legislative proposals is determined by the rapporteur and other key negotiators in first reading, when the formal 
positions of EP and Council are yet to be determined. 
87 Respondent #16, Respondent #22, Respondent #1, Respondent #2, Respondent #72, Respondent #9, Respondent 
#18, Respondent #45, Respondent #48, Respondent #56, Respondent #19, Respondent #44, Respondent #33, 
Respondent #69. 
88 Respondent #9. 
89 Respondent #22, Respondent #29, Respondent #9. 
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working group meetings are often preceded by informal or formal meetings between members of 
the same national delegations, who then promote their positions in the committee working group 
meeting. 
Once a common position has been established among committee members from the same 
party, this position is presented either directly to the party plenary or, increasingly, to another set 
of intermediaries, namely within the coordinator meetings (where the coordinators from different 
committees exchange information)90 and (in the larger party groups, such as EPP, PES, and 
Liberals) the party working groups, which coordinate the parliamentary work of the party group 
members across different committees with overlapping policy competences.91 These steps are 
very important, as potential controversies are detected and discussed with members of the other 
committees who may have a stake in the issue. The party working groups in particular are 
designed to reduce and relieve the work-load of the party groups. In the words of one Socialist 
MEP, they “filter out”92 the most important aspects of a proposal and, if possible, are supposed 
to come to solidify a common party group position.93 
It is at this step of the decision-making process, however, that a number of secondary 
sources of information and expertise can give their input into the evolution of a policy proposal. 
First, the lead committee is often not the only committee dealing with a particular piece of 
                                                 
90 Respondent #14. 
91 The EPP, for example, has five working groups: Working Group "A" (responsible for: Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy; Committee on Development and Cooperation); 
Working Group "B" (Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy; Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs, Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; Committee on Women's Rights and 
Equal Opportunities); Working Group "C" (Committee on Budgets; Committee on Budgetary Control; Committee 
on Agriculture and Rural Development; Committee on Fisheries); Working Group "D" (Committee on Legal Affairs 
and the Internal Market; Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs; Committee on Petitions); Working Group "E" (Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Policy; Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism; Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs). 
92 Respondent #56. 
93 Respondent #2, Respondent #72. 
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legislation, as other committees can request to serve as opinion-giving committees. These 
committees also appoint their own rapporteurs, who draft reports on their behalf. These opinions 
are not binding, however, meaning that they do not have to be incorporated by the lead 
committee. As a result, the impact of opinion-giving committees is generally weak.  
Furthermore, the EP party groups have their own political advisors who treat different 
dossiers on behalf of the party bureau.94 These advisors often work closely with the coordinators 
and rapporteurs of their party groups in the committees for which they are responsible. The party 
advisors can play important roles, especially in terms of coordinating various positions among 
party members; yet, the actual political responsibilities lie with the actors in the lead committee.  
Finally, the EP has become one of the central hubs for lobbying activities as its legislative 
powers have increased over time. Lobbyists come to play a role particularly when issues are 
highly controversial, either a priori or in the process of deliberation. For them to be successful in 
affecting the positions of large numbers of MEPs, however, they still have to rely on the right 
“players” in the lead committees. 
If a common position comes out of the party working group, it is unlikely to be 
questioned by the party plenary and stands as the official party line, including voting instructions 
for the plenary vote called “voting lists.”95 In the words of one long-serving EP official:  
 
“Sometimes the plenary of the group can depart from what is proposed by the working 
party people, the coordinator on the issue, or the shadow, but that is uncommon. Very, 
very uncommon.”96 
 
                                                 
94 The party bureau is the leadership of the actual EU level party organization, rather than the parliamentary party 
group. 
95 Respondent #34, Respondent #2, Respondent #43, Respondent #33, Respondent #72, Respondent #45, 
Respondent #58. 
96 Respondent #72. 
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Only if it is a very important issue for a national constituency or of conscience will 
national party delegations or individual actors deviate from the party line, following the so-called 
“conscience clause.” In this rare case, a separate voting list is supplied by the national party 
delegation, allowing the individual MEP uninformed about the details of a proposal to compare 
and contrast positions. 
In sum, the decision-making process in the EP strongly relies on extensive structuring of 
the matter under consideration before it reaches either the party group as a whole or the EP 
plenary. This is, in fact, the very purpose of the decision-making process being led by specialists: 
to avoid lengthy discussion of technical details in party group or EP plenary.97 Controversies are 
supposed to be settled amongst the specialists, while it is the broader political aspects of the 
proposed legislation that extend into the wider arena of party or EP plenary. Different, and more 
technical, aspects of a dossier might make it into the broader setting if they cannot be settled in 
committee, but is not very likely, especially with highly technical dossiers.98 
One German MEP explicitly distinguished this system from the German Bundestag, 
explaining that committee members in the EP are not merely representatives of their party 
organizations.99 Decision-making in the EP committees is not based on predetermined positions, 
but the reverse: positions toward a legislative proposal are the product of committee deliberation 
and negotiation. The party plenary as a whole enters the picture only toward the end of the 
negotiation process, when committee deliberation is almost complete. The party plenary then 
determines if there is need for adjustment of the committee position, but in the words of one 
                                                 
97 Respondent #38, Respondent #33. 
98 Respondent #33, Respondent #45 
99 Respondent #37. 
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British MEP, “it is rare for enough people in the full EP to study the question who are not on the 
committee, who actually want to change the whole thing.”100 
This system allows for a significant amount of individual leadership, yet with a series of 
checks and balances to the extent that it is hardly a “one-way street.”101 As a number of 
respondents maintained, it would be very difficult to “sneak” something of substantial 
controversy through the different screening stages without somebody noticing along the way;102 
hence, the party line proposed by the committee members has to be acceptable to the group. At 
the same time, all intermediary forums for deliberation falling in between the committee and 
plenary stage operate under significant time constraints,103 meaning that real controversy will 
only erupt if the issue contains provisions that are simply unacceptable to some. In most cases, 
according to my respondents, a majority position from the committee working group is likely to 
prevail in the party working group, which will then also succeed as the official party line in the 
party plenary. As a result, the transmission mechanism from key players in committee to the 
committee as a whole, and then further into the party groups and the EP plenary, functions quite 
smoothly, unless a player with the necessary stature intervenes in the process to raise additional 
concerns. In fact, this transmission from specialist to regular legislator appears to be the default 
option. This is partially for practical reasons. As one respondent explains:  
 
“If we [in the committee] were to go to the full group with very sensitive issues that we 
could not agree on among ourselves, all hell would break lose. Because then you know 
what happens? Members actually read the amendments! And this is not good.”104 
                                                 
100 Respondent #48. 
101 Respondent #47. 
102 Respondent #48, Respondent #14. 
103 Respondent #48. 
104 Respondent #9. 
 63 
4.6 THE ROLE OF PERSUASION 
The rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs serve as the architects of the party line regarding a given 
legislative proposal, meaning that they are not assured the support of their parties a priori.105 
Naturally, they have little coercive powers to actually “whip” their party colleagues into 
following this line. Therefore, discussion and persuasion play especially important roles in the 
internal party group deliberations,106 and the presentation of issues by the key players impacts to 
a significant extent how an issue is perceived by the less-involved party members.107 Rather than 
“whipping” their fellow colleagues into accepting their line, key committee actors have to “sell” 
it convincingly. The basic process consists of specialists seeking the necessary majorities for 
each individual dossier, rather than relying on an existing and predetermined configuration of 
party strengths.108 
Especially when there are competing views amongst different groupings in the EP, the 
“real battle begins before the plenary,” according to one MEP.109 The active members from each 
group – the rapporteur, the shadows, and the coordinators in particular – lobby for their 
amendments, and “you can really influence your colleagues by doing a lot of work after the 
committee vote and before the plenary.” Formally, it is the responsibility of shadow and 
coordinator to explain a common position to their party group and to convince them of its merit. 
One MEP describes this effort as “persuasion, or bringing to light the facts they [the other party 
group members] are not aware of.”110 Active committee members thus act as internal pressure 
                                                 
105 Respondent #4. 
106 Respondent #45, Respondent #56, Respondent #22. 
107 Respondent #59, Respondent #16, Respondent #25. 
108 Respondent #2, Respondent #40, Respondent #37. 
109 Respondent #35. 
110 Respondent #58. 
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groups among their party colleagues: they identify the key points of a legislative proposal to 
provide a general common understanding of why a position is taken.111 
Discussions in the party group meeting tend to be short, especially when an issue has not 
been previously identified as controversial. Much depends on the presentation and substantive 
foci of the committee members, however: what features of the proposal do they emphasize? 
According to a number of respondents, particular issues or specific aspects of an issue are often 
simplified and emphasized to make them comprehensible to all, and to fit within the timeframe 
of the party group meeting.112 As a result, certain (potentially important) nuances are sometimes 
neglected. Instead, certain value-laden keywords may prevail in the debate, at the expense of a 
more differentiated discussion. Another MEP put it more bluntly: final plenary votes are not 
votes on the issue, but “on the issue as it is presented!”113 As there are “a number of bases on 
which to judge what legislation is going to do, or not going to do, and what it is about,” it is often 
the particular focus created by those actively involved that informs vote choice.114  
Finally, shadows have the additional argument that if they lack backing among their party 
colleagues, their negotiating position in committee will be severely undermined, and that what 
they are presenting is usually the product of extensive negotiations.115 Hence, when a 
compromise between different shadows and the rapporteur stands, the shadows will likely fight 
hard to have their positions accepted in their respective party groups,116 and the expectation is 
that they should, and indeed will.117 Any other result would be quite an embarrassment; the usual 
assumption among negotiators in the responsible committee is that shadows do have a mandate 
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112 Respondent #25. 
113 Respondent #16. 
114 Respondent #16, Respondent #59. 
115 Respondent #7, Respondent #48, Respondent #33. 
116 Respondent #33. 
117 Respondent #7, Respondent #58. 
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from their groups.118 They might have to “go back and ask for a mandate” occasionally, 
especially when it comes to controversial points, but the sentiment, by and large, is summarized 
by a statement from one shadow rapporteur: “In the end, when I have done the negotiations, they 
better follow me!”119 Accordingly, the most common result is that after a short presentation by 
the coordinator or shadow the group will accept their positions relatively easily. The authority 
and standing of the shadow rapporteur are very important, however, and not all are equal.120 A 
lot, one MEP explains, depends on the image a shadow has in his group. The example she 
provides is that, given her own reputation and area of expertise, her party colleagues “probably” 
believe her when she argues that something “is good for small- and medium-sized businesses.”121 
4.7 SEQUENCE: COMMITTEE TO PLENARY 
As a result of this process, what comes out of committee sets the stage for what is to come in 
plenary.122 While it is not a foregone conclusion that a majority in committee will automatically 
translate into a majority on the floor,123 especially when the committee vote was decided by a 
small margin, the majority of respondents suggested that the plenary will follow the committee. 
 
“At the end of the day, the plenary always reproduces what has been done at the 
committee level … Most of the time, the work that is done at the committee level is 
accepted by the plenary.”124 
                                                 
118 Respondent #68, Respondent #33. 
119 Respondent #7. 
120 Respondent #25. 
121 Respondent #35. 
122 Respondent #2, Respondent #37. 
123 Respondent #44, Respondent #2, Respondent #38. 
124 Respondent #72. 
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 “It is often the case that the configuration of the committee translates into plenary.”125 
 
“It is usually the case that the configuration in the committee is reflected in the plenary 
vote.”126 
 
“We have a sort of saying that the full EP results tend to follow the results of the 
committee.”127 
  
“The consensus that arises from the committee is hoisted on the plenary as a whole … 
The majorities in the committee are the same as the majorities in plenary. Parliament 
rarely goes against what the committee says … Once an issue goes through the 
committee, it is going to invariably also make it through parliament.”128 
 
“Once you have something approved by a committee, usually that committee manages to 
get this approved by their political groups.”129 
 
This finding confirms what one would expect from an informational committee that is 
generally representative of the parent chamber (Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2003), 
namely that gains from specialization are ensured while committee outcomes appear not to be 
too detached from the majority preference (Krehbiel 1991). 
                                                 
125 Respondent #14. 
126 Respondent #55. 
127 Respondent #48. 
128 Respondent #16. 
129 Respondent #45. 
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4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In sum, this chapter finds that MEPs rely on their specialized colleagues in the responsible 
committee for information about a legislative proposal. Moreover, it demonstrates that positions 
toward specific proposals are far from predetermined, since party positions are the product of the 
committee decision-making process, rather than an exogenous input. This confirms hypotheses 
H2a and H3a of the garbage-can and focal point models, which stated that policy preferences are 
endogenous to the decision-making process, and undermined the rival proposition of the 
exogenous preference model (H1a). 
This chapter establishes that it is indeed the standing committees and their specialized 
members who serve as the principal providers of information to MEPs in the EP plenary, and 
that the positions assumed by committee members serve as the basis for the positions of the EP 
backbenchers. Much depends, however, on the configuration of actors involved, their 
reputations, and their interaction; as a result, processes and outcomes are uncertain. 
 One question this chapter raises concerns the link between parties and committees (Cox 
and McCubbins 1993). While the evidence highlights the informational role of committees in EP 
politics, it also emphasizes how party structures transmit positions toward policy proposals from 
the committee level to the EP plenary. Should we conceive of committees as informational 
bodies enhancing the possibility of making “good policy,” as the informational perspective 
maintains, or are committees instruments facilitating the creation of a cohesive party line? 
Since the informational and party control perspectives are not actually mutually exclusive 
or inherently contradictory, the answer to both questions is a conditional yes. On the one hand, 
information and the competitive exchange of information serve as tools for EP backbenchers to 
assure the representation of their interests even when they are not participating actively in the 
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deliberation of a policy proposal. They can select who they “trust.” On the other hand, the 
smaller number of actual participants who deliberate and negotiate on behalf of their uninvolved 
colleagues makes the formation of a common party position much easier, since the structure of 
the EP party groups ensures a smooth transmission of this position from the committee to the 
floor, at least most of the time. It is important to emphasize, however, that any party line is not 
imposed from above by the party group leaderships, but is endogenous to the deliberation 
process, which contradicts the notion of the cartel party proposed by Cox and McCubbins 
(1993). Instead, it appears that the party’s leadership is a fluid concept, as those members 
actively participating in the decision-making process regarding a legislative proposal are the de 
facto leaders of their parties. 
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5.0  COMMITTEE POSITIONS AND VOTING ON THE FLOOR 
One of the principal findings of the previous chapter is that it is members of the standing EP 
committees who are the architects of a party group’s position toward specific policy proposals. 
Unlike traditional parliamentary systems, where party positions are largely determined by strong 
party leaderships and based on a distinct government-opposition cleavage, a party line in the EP 
is not established prior to the deliberation in the first reading phase of the legislative decision-
making process. Rather, it is the result of this deliberation process, with committee members 
establishing and proposing the positions their parties are to assume toward a policy proposal. As 
a result, it is commonly suggested that the position of the party group delegation in a given 
committee translates more or less directly into the plenary, i.e. that the configuration of intra-
committee votes should be largely mirrored in the subsequent plenary vote. This proposition has 
not been empirically tested, however, a shortcoming this chapter seeks to rectify. It constitutes a 
first systematic comparison of votes on legislative resolutions in the responsible committees with 
the successive plenary vote. 
The results show that the positions of committee members constitute significant 
predictors of voting patterns in the EP plenary. Specifically, they indicate that MEPs primarily 
follow their national party delegation colleagues in the committee responsible for a piece of 
legislation when voting in the EP plenary, but only when they actually have a colleague from 
their national party delegation in the committee. This is not the case most of the time, however. 
 70 
When not represented by a national party colleague, MEPs follow their party group 
representatives. Yet, they do not rely solely on the national party delegation or EP party group 
committee positions. Instead, they seem to compare the positions of their subsets of colleagues in 
the committee when making a vote choice: they “triangulate” the information they receive. As a 
result, an individual-level plenary vote is quite uncertain when the positions of committee 
representatives of the national party delegation and the EP party group representatives diverge, 
while MEPs are almost certain to follow the committee lead when there is a common position 
among national party and party group representatives. 
Therefore, the evidence presented in this and the previous chapter disconfirms the 
contention of the exogenous preference model ( H1b), which stated that outcome-equilibria are 
predetermined, since voting patterns in plenary are actually quite uncertain. Depending on the 
combination of actors in committee and the configuration of who is represented by whom, 
individual-level positions are more or less secure, and voting patterns on the EP floor will vary 
substantially. 
5.1 DATA 
This analysis is based on the entire population of plenary roll-call votes on legislative resolutions 
taken during the 1999-2004 parliamentary term under the co-decision procedure where the final 
votes in either the first or third reading stages were recorded by name. Excluded are those cases 
for which there was no preceding vote in committee, or when the committee vote did not take 
place in the same legislative term. I also excluded all cases where the votes of committee 
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members were unanimous, as there would be no variation in the predictor variables. This yields a 
total of 95 roll-call votes and 40,574 individual-level observations. 
5.2 OPERATIONALIZATION 
For each roll-call vote, I identified how all members of the responsible EP committee voted 
based on their subsequent vote in plenary. I then treated these individual-level votes as predictors 
of plenary voting behavior. In light of the findings in the previous chapter, which showed that 
MEPs determine how to vote based on the positions of committee experts, there are three 
possible groups of experts who could serve in this position-setting role: first, the general 
population of MEPs may follow the vote recommendations of their party group colleagues in the 
committee. Second, they may follow the representatives of their national colleagues, rather than 
party group colleagues, when voting in plenary. Finally, they may focus specifically on the 
members of their national party delegations when considering how to vote. 
To operationalize these variables, I determined three types of “majority positions.” First, 
the majority position among committee members from the same EP party group. Second, the 
majority position of each national group. Finally, the majority position of each national party 
delegation. I defined majority position as a qualified majority of 60 percent.130 I then created 
variables for these common committee level positions of the EP Party Group, National Group, 
                                                 
130 This threshold is chosen based on the following reasoning: using the common majoritarian threshold of 50 
percent would entail that we identify a “common position” even when a grouping is, in fact, dramatically divided. 
For example, we would code a 100-99 majority in one of the large party groups as a common party position on an 
issue. At the same time, a threshold of two-thirds would be quite restrictive. We would, for instance, fail to 
recognize as a common position when five of eight members of a small party group vote together. The threshold of 
three-fifth, or 60 percent, was chosen to capture the middle ground. It is important to note, however, that most 
majority positions were quite robust; hence, it is unlikely that a different threshold would severely change the results 
of the analysis. The general patterns found below would likely be observed with different threshold specifications as 
well, while some of the actual values might vary somewhat.  
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and National Party Delegation as predictors for the votes of all party group, nationality, and 
national delegation members in plenary, respectively. If there was no majority position, or if an 
individual MEP did not have a representative of his party group, national group, or national party 
delegation in the committee, it was coded as a missing value.131 
Just like the dependent variable, which is simply the votes cast by the individual MEPs in 
the plenary, the three predictors can take three values: 0 for a No vote, 1 for a Yes vote, and 2 for 
an abstention. Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
5.3 METHOD AND MODELS 
I analyze the data in a multinomial logit analysis framework. In formal terms, the primary 
regression model is expressed as: 
 
(1) Vote =  a + ß1 EP Party Group + ß2 National Group + ß3 National Party Delegation 
 
  
To determine if the positions of committee members constitute potent predictors of 
voting patterns on the EP floor, that is, to establish the increase in the variance explained 
resulting from the inclusion of these predictors, I compare the model from above against a 
baseline model comprised simply of ideology variables for the sovereignty-integration and the 
                                                 
131 Since it was not possible to establish the EP Party Group predictor for non-attached MEPs, they are excluded 
from the analysis. 
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Left-Right dimensions. To account for individual-level positions on these dimensions, I use MEP 
NOMINATE coordinates on the classic economic Left-Right dimension and pro-/anti-integration 
divisions in the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005). The variables range from -
1 to 1, where -1 indicates an extreme leftist position on the Left-Right dimension and an anti-EU 
position on the sovereignty-integration dimension. I also compare the variance explained of the 
original model to an additional model that includes both committee position predictors and 
ideology variables. These models are expressed as: 
 
(2) Vote =  a + ß1 Left-Right Position + ß2 Sovereignty-Integration Position 
 
(3) Vote =  a + ß1 EP Party Group + ß2 National Group + ß3 National Party Delegation 
+ ß4 Left-Right Position + ß5 Sovereignty-Integration Position. 
5.4 RESULTS 
The first noteworthy result from the analysis of the voting data is that the positions of committee 
members are indeed very potent predictors of the voting patterns in the EP plenary. The pseudo-
R2 of model (1) increases by .51 in comparison to the baseline model (2), while the pseudo-R2 of 
model (3), which includes both committee predictors and ideology variables, is equivalent to that 
of Model (1): 
Model (1): Pseudo-R2 = .57 
Model (2): Pseudo-R2 = .06 
Model (3): Pseudo-R2 = .57 
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These results are strongly supportive of proposition that MEPs rely on their specialized 
colleagues in the responsible committee for information about a legislative proposal.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 displays the multinomial logit regression estimates for Model (1), with 
“Abstention” as the omitted baseline choice.132 It shows that the coefficients representing the 
common positions of the EP party group and the national party delegation are highly statistically 
significant, meaning that both common positions are potent predictors of Yes and No votes in the 
EP plenary. The coefficient for the national party position, however, is quite a bit larger than that 
of the EP party group, meaning that MEPs are most likely to follow their national delegation 
members. A common position of the national group, in contrast, fails to achieve statistical 
significance.133 
Since these coefficients are substantively difficult to interpret, the program CLARIFY is 
used to calculate conditional predicted probabilities. Clarify, which is compatible with the 
STATA statistical analysis package, is a computer program that uses Monte Carlo simulation to 
convert the raw output of statistical procedures into results that are intuitive and of direct interest 
to the researcher, including predicted probabilities, without changing statistical assumptions or 
requiring new statistical models (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). For example, it allows for 
the calculation of predicted probabilities at different values of all independent variables, chosen 
by the researcher. 
                                                 
132 Note that due to listwise deletion of missing values, the individual analyses conducted in what follows do not add 
up to the original N of 40,574. 
133 Note that the statistical significance of the coefficients does not change if the standard errors in the clustered roll-
call votes are adjusted for (making the standard errors slightly larger). 
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The columns in Figure 13 display the predicted probabilities of MEPs voting in favor of a 
legislative proposal on the EP floor as a function of different configurations of positions among 
committee actors, meaning the predicted probabilities of a Yes vote in the plenary vote at 
different values of the other independent variables.  
 
[Figure 13 here] 
 
Column 1 presents the probability of an MEP voting in favor of a proposal in plenary 
when her party group, national group, and national delegation representatives in the responsible 
committee voted against (when the value of all three independent variables is 0). This probability 
is negligibly small at only two percent. Columns 2-4 show the probabilities of voting Yes when 
the national group (column 2), the national delegation (column 3) and the EP party group 
(column 4) support a proposal, while the other two respective groupings vote against. Column 2 
demonstrates that the national group position is irrelevant in influencing vote choice: the 
probability of voting in favor of the proposal remains stable at two percent when the value of the 
national group variable is 1 and the values of the EP party group and national party delegation 
variables are 0. In contrast, if the committee members from the MEP’s party group vote in favor 
(column 4), the probability of a Yes vote increases by 31 percent to a total of 33 percent even if 
national group and the national party delegation vote against. The most powerful predictor, 
however, is the common position of the national party delegation (column 3): even if the party 
group and national group members in the responsible committee oppose a proposal, the 
probability of the MEP following the common position of her national party colleagues is 64 
percent. 
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Columns 5-7 show the additional increases in the probability of a Yes vote on the EP 
floor when different configurations of two of the committee groupings support a proposal. The 
pattern from above is also apparent in these columns. The probability of a Yes vote when 
national group and national delegation assume a common position in favor of a proposal while 
the party group opposes is 69 percent (column 5), while party group and national group sharing a 
common position in favor entails a probability of a Yes vote of only 38 percent (column 6). A 
vote in favor is all but assured, however, when party group and national delegation support a 
proposal together against the position of the national group; in this case, the probability of a Yes 
vote is 97 percent (column 7). This is equivalent to the probability of a Yes vote when all three 
groupings support the proposal (column 8), once again demonstrating the marginal impact of the 
national group position on voting patterns in the EP plenary.  
These results also show that MEPs “triangulate” the information they receive from their 
party group and national delegation representatives. If these positions are contradictory, they are 
considerably less likely to follow one or the other, while a consistent position across both groups 
of representatives yields a very high probability of the MEP following the committee position. 
 
[Figure 14 here] 
 
Figure 14 shows the predicted probabilities of a No vote in plenary and confirms the 
pattern from above.134 Starting from a baseline probability of voting against a proposal of one 
percent when party group, national group, and national delegation support a directive (column 1), 
the pattern of increases in probability is almost exactly the same as in Figure 13. 
                                                 
134 Note that since there are three outcome categories (Yes, No, Abstention), the probability of a No vote is not 
simply the opposite of the probability of a Yes vote.  
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The probability of a No vote is two percent when both party group and national 
delegation representatives vote in favor, with the national group voting against (column 2). Party 
group members opposing the proposal raises the probability to 31 percent (column 4), while a 
common national delegation position against the proposal yields a 62 percent probability of 
MEPs opposing a proposal on the floor (column 3). 
Once again, a joint common position of party group and national delegation members in 
opposition to a proposal entails a very high probability of MEPs voting No in plenary; as column 
7 shows, this probability is 98 percent, thus supporting the triangulation thesis. In contrast, the 
probabilities resulting from joint positions of national group and national delegation (column 5: 
67 percent) and between party group and national group (column 6: 36 percent) are considerably 
lower.  
The results indicating the predicted probabilities of abstaining are presented here in two 
categories: the probability of abstaining when some group of committee representatives opposes 
a proposal, and the probability of abstaining when it supports a proposal.135 As the figures below 
demonstrate, this differentiation does show some alternative patterns. First, Figure 15 shows the 
probability of abstaining when other committee members vote against a proposal.  
 
[Figure 15 here] 
 
                                                 
135 Abstentions are often the result of individual MEPs or entire national delegations deviating from the party line on 
the basis of the “conscience clause,” when a particular vote is perceived to have a special impact on their 
constituencies. To provide one example, a Belgian Christian-Democrat (Respondent #25) interviewed in the context 
of the Port Services directive gave the following reasoning for abstaining in the final vote on the EP floor: “I did not 
want to change my mind or my vote, but also did not want to punish my Belgian colleagues with a No vote. 
Abstaining hurt neither the Belgians nor Mr. Jarzembowski [the rapporteur and party colleague].” 
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The most obvious finding is that when it comes to abstentions, the position of the national 
party delegation members is the only potent predictor of MEPs abstaining on the EP floor. It 
entails a mere 10 percent probability of abstention, however, when party group and national 
group oppose a proposal (column 3, when the values of the party group and national group 
variables are 0 and the value of the national party delegation variable is 2). In contrast, neither 
party nor national group members abstaining in committee has any impact on the probability of 
MEPs abstaining in plenary, as columns 2, 4, and 6 demonstrate.  
Column 5 shows that the probability of MEPs choosing to abstain on the floor is eleven 
percent when national group and national delegation representatives abstain in committee. This 
number increases substantially to 80 percent, however, when party group and national delegation 
abstain collectively in committee (column 7). 
Next, Figure 16 illustrates the probability of abstaining when certain groupings of 
committee members support, rather than oppose, a proposal.  
 
[Figure 16 here] 
 
Once again, the probability of abstaining hinges primarily on the position of committee 
members from the national party delegation. This probability is higher, however, when party 
group and national group members support the proposal than when they oppose it (41 percent 
[column 3] versus ten percent [column 3 in Figure 15]). The probability of following party group 
members in abstaining is also slightly higher at nine percent (column 4), while the position of 
national group members is once again irrelevant (column 2). As in Figure 15, the probability of 
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abstaining is most pronounced when party group and national party delegation members abstain 
together in committee (81 percent, column 7). 
STATA’s default way of dealing with missing values is listwise deletion, where any 
cases with missing data on one or more of the variables are eliminated from the analysis. In this 
analysis, listwise deletion of missing values means that only those cases are included when 
MEPs are represented by colleagues from their party groups, national groups, and national 
delegations in the responsible committee. This, however, is often not the case. Most importantly, 
in the majority of cases MEPs are not represented by members of their national party delegation: 
of the total N of 40,574 valid individual votes, 17,306 (or 43 percent) are missing because MEPs 
do not have a member of their national delegation taking part in the committee vote. So the 
question is: who do MEPs follow when they do not have a national delegation representative in 
the committee? The analysis above suggests strongly that they would follow their party group 
representatives. To ascertain this pattern, I run an additional analysis excluding those cases 
where MEPs are represented by national delegation colleagues in the committee. 
 
 [Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 displays the multinomial logit regression estimates for those votes where 
legislators do not have a national party representative on the responsible committee. Again, 
“Abstention” is the omitted baseline choice. The table shows that only the coefficient 
representing the common positions of the EP party group is statistically significant. This result 
indicates that a common party group position in committee is a more potent predictor of both 
Yes and No votes in the EP plenary. Hence, MEPs are far more likely to follow their party group 
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colleagues on the responsible committee when they lack representation by members of their own 
national delegation. 
 Figure 17 makes the substantive impact of these coefficients more accessible by 
presenting predicted probabilities of a Yes vote on the EP floor. It shows that a common position 
in favor of a proposal on the part of the national group representatives yields only a 27 percent 
probability of an MEP voting in favor on the floor (column 2), while the probability is 81 percent 
when party group members vote in favor. 
 
[Figure 17 here] 
 
This pattern also applies in the case of No votes. Figure 18 shows that a common EP 
party group position in opposition to a proposal in committee entails a 73 percent probability of 
members voting against the proposal in the subsequent plenary vote (column 3), while this 
number is only 13 percent for a common national group position (column 2). 
 
[Figure 18 here] 
 
Finally, the EP party group position also constitutes the most potent predictor of 
abstentions in plenary. Figure 19 and Figure 20 demonstrate the probability of abstaining when 
the EP party group members in the responsible committee abstain collectively: it is 39 percent 
when the party group members vote against the proposal (Figure 19, column 3) and 38 percent 
when they support it (Figure 20, column 3). In contrast, national group members abstaining 
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together in committee does not increase the probability of MEPs abstaining in plenary, as 
columns 2 in Figure 19 and Figure 20 show. 
 
[Figure 19 here] 
 
[Figure 20 here] 
 
Committee Subsamples: One of the questions that remain is whether there are variations in the 
patterns from above as a function of issue area, i.e., the committee responsible for legislative 
proposals. I consider this by examining the probabilities of Yes votes in plenary by committee 
subsample. 
For some committees (Environment, Legal Affairs, Regional Policy and Transport) the 
data provides a substantial amount of roll-call votes, while the number of roll-call votes from 
other committees is more limited. Therefore, I consider three subsamples based on the 
responsible committee: 
• Environment Committee. 
• Legal Affairs Committee. 
• Regional Policy and Transport Committee. 
• A subsample combining all remaining roll-call votes from those committees where ten or 
less roll-call votes were taken.136 
                                                 
136 Votes from the following committees are included in this subsample: Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and 
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; Committee on Constitutional Affairs; Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, 
the Media and Sport; Committee on Development and Cooperation; Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy; 
Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities. 
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The results of these additional analyses suggest that there may be slight variations in 
voting patterns depending on the committee in charge of the legislation. Most importantly, the 
analysis of the subsample of different responsible committees suggests that national delegation 
representatives in the responsible committee are not necessarily the primary providers of 
information to their less-specialized colleagues in plenary.137 Figure 21, which includes the same 
substantive information as Figure 13, illustrates this variation. It shows that for the subsample of 
different committees with a small number of roll-call votes, it is the common position of party 
group members in committee that constitutes the primary predictor of voting patterns in plenary 
(column 4). The other predictors by themselves have little impact on the probability of MEPs 
supporting the legislation in plenary. It is noteworthy, however, that one important pattern from 
the analysis of the entire sample is confirmed here: when committee representatives from party 
group and national party delegation share a common position in committee, it is almost assured 
that a given MEP from this party group and national delegation will adopt this position in 
plenary. This probability of 97 percent is equivalent to that in Figure 13 (compare columns 7 in 
Figure 13 and Figure 21). 
 
[Figure 21 here] 
 
The other three subsamples of individual committees (Environment, Legal Affairs, 
Regional Policy and Transport) confirm the voting pattern from the whole sample of votes, as 
Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24 demonstrate. 
                                                 
137 To keep this discussion short, I explicitly discuss the predicted probability results only. The pure regression 
tables (Table 4 – Table 11) are attached in the Appendix of Chapter 5. I also focus here only on the probabilities of 
MEPs voting in favor of the legislation. 
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 [Figure 22 here] 
 
[Figure 23 here] 
 
[Figure 24 here] 
 
In each case, the common position of national party delegation members in committee 
constitutes the most potent predictor of votes on the EP floor (see columns 3). This trend is 
especially pronounced in the Legal Affairs Committee (Figure 23), where the probability of a 
given MEP voting in favor of a legislative proposal is 97 percent when her national delegation 
representatives support the proposal in committee, even when there is a common position against 
the legislation among party group and national group representatives in the responsible 
committee. 
The second most potent predictor of voting behavior in the EP plenary is a common 
position among party group representatives in committee (see columns 4 in Figure 22, Figure 23, 
and Figure 24), while the common position of MEPs from a member state is all but irrelevant. 
Once again, one important voting pattern is confirmed in these analyses: a shared 
common position among party group and national party delegation representatives in the 
responsible committee entails that MEPs are almost certain to follow their lead. Columns 7 in 
Figure 22 (91 percent), Figure 23 (99 percent), and Figure 24 (96 percent) illustrate this trend. 
As above, I also examine voting patterns based on these subsamples for the cases where 
MEPs do not have at least one national delegation colleague in the responsible committee. The 
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following figures (Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27, Figure 28) display the same substantive 
information as Figure 17 and confirm the finding that when lacking representation from a 
national party group member on the responsible committee, MEPs are most likely to follow the 
common position of their party group colleagues. The probability of following party group 
committee members in supporting a legislative proposal thus ranges from 73 percent to 84 
percent (columns 3 in Figure 17, Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27, Figure 28), even when national 
group representatives oppose the legislation. When the situation is reversed, on the other hand, 
this probability is significantly lower (between 17 and 35 percent, columns 2).  
 
[Figure 25 here] 
 
[Figure 26 here] 
 
[Figure 27 here] 
 
[Figure 28 here] 
 
To sum up the results from the subsample analyses: if committee members from a party 
group and national party delegation share a common position in favor of a piece of legislation, 
MEPs on the EP floor are almost certain to support the legislation as well. In contrast, the 
positions of national representatives are all but irrelevant. These patterns confirm the results from 
the whole sample of roll-call votes analyzed above. The results presented in Figure 21, on the 
other hand, suggest that there may be variation in the relative predictive power of the party group 
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and national party delegation variables. While the analyses of the whole sample of votes and 
three committee subsamples (Environment, Legal Affairs, Regional Policy and Transport) 
identify the common position of the national party group representatives in committee as the 
most potent predictor of voting patterns on the floor, the findings from the subsample consisting 
of votes from a variety of different committees suggest that the common position of party group 
representatives may be relatively more potent. Future analyses of larger number of votes from 
these committees may shed light on this issue. 
 
The Question of Selection Bias: My data raises some questions with regard to selection bias 
arising from the use of roll-call vote data. As discussed mentioned above, Carrubba et al. (2004) 
show that the recorded votes in the EP differ along several dimensions from the remaining votes 
in the EP (for example, by requesting party group and substantive issue area), indicating that the 
roll-call vote sample in the case of the EP may be severely biased. They also show that this bias 
touches directly on the issues of party group cohesion and the dimensionality of policy conflict. 
First, the analysis of the roll-call vote sample illustrates that the votes appear to be requested 
disproportionately by the party groups, meaning that these requests are likely selective and 
strategic either for contentious decisions or to discipline the party rank-and-file. As a result, 
findings of party cohesion must be regarded with skepticism, and results about the 
dimensionality of the political space are questionable since not all party groups all have identical 
policy agendas. Second, studies using roll-call votes have likely misrepresented the policy space 
because the sample of votes is not representative by issue area, either; as a result, dimensions of 
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conflict from issue areas under-sampled might be disregarded, while those over-sampled would 
be exaggerated.138  
While instructive and pointing out very real potential problems associated with analyzing 
roll-call votes, a number of issues cast doubt on the validity of Carrubba et al.’s claims. First, the 
authors draw conclusions concerning the biasedness of roll-call votes on a sample of votes that is 
likely biased itself. They are relying on a dataset that includes all votes in the EP plenary 
sessions from July 1999 to June 2000 without taking into account that during the first year of a 
new legislative term, the number of roll-call votes taken may be significantly lower than in 
succeeding years, since the amount of legislative activity may be lower during the first months in 
office. Much time is spent on the allocation of official positions and the determination of 
committee responsibilities, size, and membership, for example. My own set of data used in the 
analyses above also suggests that the number of roll-call votes taken between July 1999 and June 
2000 may indeed be much lower than in later years. Of the total number of 122 votes on 
legislative reports collected for the 1999-2004 term, only 17 fall into the time period examined 
by Carrubba et al., while the average number of roll-call votes is 26.25 for the other four years of 
the fifth EP. It is thus questionable if the set of votes included in their analysis is, in fact, a 
representative sample of the total universe of roll-call votes. Instead, it appears that the time 
period covered is an “outlier” in its distribution of roll-call versus unrecorded votes. 
More importantly, Carrubba et al. are also not asking the right counterfactual question to 
truly make a causal statement about the biasedness of roll-call vote samples. If they want to 
claim that the outcomes we witness when analyzing roll-call votes are contaminated by the bias 
                                                 
138 Simon Hug (2005) presents evidence for selection bias in recorded vote in the Swiss lower house, illustrating to 
what extent commonly used figures on party discipline are biased because of the selective nature of roll call votes. 
James M. Snyder (1992) examines similar issues of selection bias for the U.S. Congress. 
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of the sample used, they need to demonstrate that in a world in which all roll-call votes were 
unrecorded, people would actually be voting differently (at least by and large) than they are now. 
This assumption is merely implicit in their argument, however, which exaggerates the 
importance of party control in that it emphasizes that party leaders strategically request roll-call 
votes to enforce party discipline. The authors thus assume that MEPs would vote differently if a 
given vote was unrecorded. My own research shows that this counterfactual is, in fact, unlikely. 
I argue that MEPs rely on trusted specialists when taking positions on issues that fall 
outside their own realms of expertise. In search for reliable information, they are most likely to 
turn to their party colleagues who happen to be experts in a given policy area. If this is true, 
which my research strongly suggests is the case, then the counterfactual Carrubba et al.’s 
propositions are based on is incorrect, because party cohesion is not a function of party control 
but of policy expertise, information, shared ideology, and interpersonal trust. In this scenario, 
MEPs are no more or less likely to follow their party experts in roll-call votes than in unrecorded 
ones. In counterfactual terms, then, what Carrubba et al. need to show to make their case is that 
legislators would—to a significant degree and in substantial numbers—vote differently if a given 
vote is a roll-call vote versus an unrecorded vote. The evidence presented here critically 
undermines this proposition, however. 
Unfortunately, the next step in adjusting for potential biases in roll-call vote analyses by 
incorporating an explicit model of roll-call vote requests, for example in a Heckman selection 
bias model, has not yet been taken. Therefore, the question of selection bias in using EP roll-call 
vote data remains unanswered in both theoretical and empirical terms. Future research in this 
direction holds much promise, and it will be instructive to re-run the analyses presented here 
with an adjustment for potential bias in roll-call votes. 
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5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
These results show that the positions of EP committee members are significant predictors of 
MEP voting patterns in the plenary. MEPs rely primarily on their national party delegation 
colleagues in the committee responsible for a piece of legislation when making their vote choices 
on the EP floor, if they have national party representatives sitting in the committee. When this is 
not the case, that is, more than 40 percent of the time, they follow their party group 
representatives. This pattern is evident with regard to votes in favor of and opposition to a 
proposal, as well as abstentions. 
The results also suggest that MEPs “triangulate” the information they receive by 
comparing the positions of their different representatives in the committee. Most importantly, 
they evidently compare the positions of party group and national delegation members. When 
these positions diverge, the resulting vote in plenary is quite uncertain. When both share a 
common position, however, the probability of a backbencher voting accordingly in plenary is 
very high indeed: as columns 7 in Figure 13, Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 demonstrate, 
this probability is 97 percent for a Yes vote, 98 percent for a No vote, and 80 percent or 81 
percent in the case of an abstention. 
These results mirror one of the key findings of Hix (2002), who argued with regard to 
voting patterns in the EP that when the national parties in the same parliamentary group decide to 
vote together, the EP parties look highly cohesive, but that this cohesion breaks down when 
national party delegations take opposing policy positions. Here, I find that when the committee 
members of the national party delegations share the common position of their EP party groups, 
their national party colleagues are almost certain to follow their lead. However, while Hix makes 
a principal-agent argument and maintains that MEPs respond to the principals who control their 
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election (the national parties) rather than the principals who control their influence in the EP (the 
EP party groups), this and the previous chapter suggest that the key to these patterns of behavior 
is information. MEPs are more likely to follow their national party colleagues because they trust 
the information they receive from their national party experts on specific policy issues more than 
that of their party group experts from different national party delegations. Only if they are not 
represented by “one of their own” do they rely more heavily on party group experts. When both 
national party and EP party group experts agree, however, and provide a common set of 
information, these two bases of trust combine and make it almost certain that the individual MEP 
will follow their lead. 
Thus far, the empirical analyses have focused on the broader patterns of information 
provision in the EP, linking individual level voting patterns in the EP plenary to the parliament’s 
standing committees. These analyses show that EP backbenchers rely primarily on their 
committee representatives for information about particular legislative proposals, and that the 
positions of committee members constitute a highly statistically and substantively significant 
predictor of voting patterns on the EP floor. This evidence disconfirms the proposition of the 
exogenous preference model (H1b), since outcome-equilibria in EP decision-making are far from 
predetermined. 
The question that remains, however, is to what extent outcome-equilibria are the random 
results of decision-making processes. While the garbage-can model suggests that particular 
outcomes are largely due to chance, as problems, actors, and opportunities converge (H2b), the 
focal point model considers this process to be much more structured. Outcomes may not be 
predetermined, but they are not random either (H3b). The model maintains that focal points 
provided by committee specialists constitute the basis of policy preferences and thus create 
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opportunities for policy choice by making certain outcome equilibria more likely than others. To 
test this proposition and to examine the role of focal points as the mechanism translating 
outcome preferences into policy preferences, the following chapter examines a series of six 
legislative proposals from different policy areas as case studies. 
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6.0  MECHANISMS OF PREFERENCE FORMATION: CASE STUDIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters provided two critical insights into EP decision-making. First, they 
established that the policy preferences of MEPs are endogenous to legislative decision-making 
processes, as legislative backbenchers rely on their specialized colleagues for information about 
a given legislative proposal prior to taking a position on the issue. Second, the chapters 
demonstrated that outcome-equilibria in the EP are a function of the decision-making process, 
and thus far from predetermined. Hence, both propositions of the exogenous preference model 
(H1a and H1b) are disconfirmed at this point. 
This chapter considers if decision-making outcomes in the EP are the random results of 
decision-making processes (H2b), as the garbage-can model suggests, or the result of more 
structured decision-making processes where committee specialists create opportunities for policy 
choice by providing informational focal points that serve as the bases of policy coalitions. If this 
latter scenario were true, outcome equilibria would be neither predetermined nor random, but 
predictable on the basis of the prevailing focal points (H3b). This hypothesis is based on the 
following logic: a focal point affects how actors in plenary perceive a specific policy proposal, 
which, in turn, affects their policy preferences. These policy preferences provide the basis of 
multi-actor policy coalitions, the constellation of which determines plenary voting patterns and 
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thus policy outcomes. Hence, the identification of the dominant focal point(s) in the deliberation 
of individual policy proposals allows for predictions concerning the expected policy outcomes. 
Moreover, the characteristics of focal points provide the basis for a set of specific 
expectations concerning the way in which their provision by specialized committee members 
impacts the policy preferences of other legislators. If the focal point model were correct, the 
analyses of the individual legislative proposals would have to show that certain broad 
representations of the specific issues involved in a legislative dossier, rather than technical 
aspects of the proposal, dominate the decision-making process; that this focus serves to 
unambiguously emphasize one (or very few) consequences of a policy proposal; and that this 
emphasis constitutes a broad categorization of what a legislative proposal is “all about,” i.e. what 
outcome preference it targets. In contrast, the applicability of the focal point model would be 
called into doubt if these proposition did not hold true, specifically if committee members 
provided detailed, technical information to their fellow colleagues; if they simply supplied voting 
instructions without any necessary element of persuasion; or if there already were predetermined 
positions prior to committee deliberation. 
This chapter investigates the mechanism of information provision by analyzing a series of 
recent legislative proposals as case studies. The cases are analyzed using interview data, basic 
content analysis of parliamentary debates, and multinomial logit analysis of individual roll-call 
votes. The legislative proposals analyzed concern:  
 
6.2. EU takeover legislation 
6.3. the statute and financing of EU-level political parties 
6.4. proposals on fuel quality and emissions from motor vehicles 
6.5. liability for environmental damage 
6.6. the liberalization of port services in the EU 
6.7. EU citizenship and the free movement of people 
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 In what follows, the case studies serve as illustrations of how political processes and 
outcomes differ depending on how a legislative proposal is presented by committee specialists. 
Strategically deployed focal points influence the variable interpretation of what the issue at hand 
is “all about,” thus shifting policy preferences during the process of parliamentary deliberation, 
with important consequences for legislative outcomes.  
The analysis of each case study shares a common structure. A first section provides a 
brief overview of the content of the legislative proposals and an outline of the course of events of 
the decision-making process. The subsequent qualitative analysis of the decision-making process 
is based on interviews with MEPs and EP officials that were closely involved in the deliberation 
and/or the negotiation of the proposal. This part of the analysis serves a number of functions. 
First, it offers important details regarding the content of the proposal. Second, it provides 
insights into the deliberation and negotiation process concerning each proposal, and the roles of 
key legislators in steering the decision-making process. Finally, it provides critical insight into 
how the content and implications of the proposed legislation were presented to the MEPs not 
directly involved in the decision-making process. This is particularly important because it allows 
for the identification of the prevalent focal points dominating the discussion. 
Next, I conduct simple content analyses of the EP debates concerning each legislative 
proposal. I first identify a series of keywords in each set of debates, which I then code consistent 
with the dominant focal points identified in the preceding qualitative analysis. I then use a 
content analysis program named TEXTPACK to provide frequency-of-use details for each 
category, and to identify keywords-in-context to check for systematic errors and inconsistencies.  
Finally, I examine the outcomes of the legislative decision-making processes by 
analyzing the final votes taken on the EP floor, subject to the availability of recorded votes by 
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name. These analyses are performed in a logit analysis framework. The possible outcome 
categories are votes in favor of the legislation (where the categorical variable assumes a value of 
1), votes against (0), or abstentions (2). Some cases suffer from within-group multicollinearity 
with regard to the abstention category, however, as there is usually only a small number of 
abstentions for each vote. Hence, in most cases I treat abstentions as de facto votes against the 
proposed legislation (since under absolute majority rule, abstaining has the same effect as voting 
against) and use binary logit analysis instead of multinomial logit. If both options are feasible, I 
conduct binary logit as well as multinomial logit analyses and point out any substantively 
different results. For the sake of consistency of presentation across all six case studies, however, 
I only discuss the results of the binary logit analyses in the text and, where applicable, provide 
the results of the multinomial logit analyses in an appendix. Using CLARIFY, the raw output of 
the logit regressions is converted into substantively meaningful predicted probabilities. 
The dependent variables in all of these analyses are the individual votes on the legislative 
report in the EP plenary. The independent variables fall into three categories. First, I use MEP 
NOMINATE coordinates on the two primary dimensions of the European political space to 
account for individual-level positions on the Left-Right and sovereignty-integration dimensions. 
These coordinates represent the classic economic Left-Right dimension and pro-/anti-integration 
divisions in the European Parliament, respectively (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005). The variables 
range from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates an extreme leftist position on the Left-Right dimension 
and an anti-EU position on the sovereignty-integration dimension. 
Second, to determine if representation in the Council of Ministers or national-level 
Government-Opposition dynamics affects voting behavior in the European Parliament, I include 
a dichotomous variable based on the national government or opposition status of particular 
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national party delegations, where a value of 1 means that a party was part of the national 
government. 
Finally, I include different measurements for “national interests” with regard to each 
legislative proposal. For instance, I include “type of capitalism” dichotomous variables in the 
case of the proposals that would have economic implications for EU member states at the 
national level;139 a dichotomous variable indicating if member states have national legislation 
allowing same-sex marriages for the Union Citizenship proposal; and a variable accounting for 
national party finance rules for the legislation on an EU party statute. 
The propositions of the focal point model find support in these analyses, as focal points 
are shown to significantly affect how legislative backbenchers interpret the content and 
consequences of the proposed legislative proposals. As such, they shape policy preferences and 
evidently influence vote patterns on the EP floor.  
In each case, it is possible to predict voting patterns on the basis of the focal points 
dominating the deliberation process. This finding confirms hypothesis H3b, and thus supports the 
contention of the focal point model. It also undermines the suggestion of the garbage-can model 
that policy outcomes are the result of a random decision-making process, and thus disconfirms 
H2b. In fact, specialized legislators have a considerable influence on the policy preferences of 
their less-informed colleagues. They can, and do, provide the bases for policy coalitions and, in 
turn, legislative outcomes. 
                                                 
139 This set of variables falls into four categories: liberal market economy (Ireland and the United Kingdom); partial 
or family-oriented coordinated market economy (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal); sectoral coordinated 
market economy (Germany, Austria and Benelux countries); national coordinated market economy (Scandinavian 
countries) (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1997). 
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6.2 THE EU TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE 
The “13th directive on company law: takeover bids, protection of shareholders, workers’ rights to 
information” (COD/1995/0341)” constituted one of the most high-profile pieces of legislation 
ever to pass through the EP. Its purpose was to establish common European-wide rules 
regulating the rights of shareholders and the use of defensive measures in the event of corporate 
takeover bids. By the time it was introduced by the European Commission in 1996, the idea of 
establishing a European level framework governing cross-border corporate takeovers had been 
on the EU agenda for many years. Early attempts to introduce Europe-wide takeover regulation 
date back to the early 1970s, when the Commission drafted its first directive for takeover bids.140 
The proposal was discussed for some time with representatives from the member states, but the 
project was ultimately abandoned due to limited interest. The directive resurfaced ten years later, 
but the Commission draft was once again criticized widely and met with little attention on the 
part of the member states. 
Over time, however, a considerable void in cross-border regulation in the European 
Union became increasingly apparent. Under mounting pressure, also from the European 
Parliament, the Commission presented another proposal for a takeover directive in January 1989. 
The proposal triggered intense debate and was criticized principally for not leaving enough 
latitude to national authorities. By the end of 1991, the Commission announced its intention to 
prepare yet another draft proposal, taking into account these arguments. 
This new proposal, the 13th Directive, was presented five years later. It was made more 
consistent with existing national regulation than was the case in previous attempts of reform and 
                                                 
140 For more complete information and discussion of the directive’s history and content, see the Web site of the EP 
(http://www.europarl.eu.int) and Berglöf and Burkart (2003). 
 97 
proposed a ‘framework directive,’ containing general principles that member states would be 
obliged to follow when drafting their national takeover codes. As such, the legislation was less 
ambitious than previous proposals. It stipulated five general principles (Hix et al., forthcoming: 
270): (1) equal treatment for all shareholders; (2) that the target of the takeover bid receives the 
necessary time and information to make a educated decision on the matter; (3) that the 
management board of the offeree company acts in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders; (4) that it be prohibited to create false markets in the securities of the offeree 
company; and (5) that offeree companies must not be hampered in the conduct of their business 
for any longer than necessary for a bid to purchase their shares. Another key element of the 
proposed legislation, following the British model of corporate governance, was a ‘neutrality rule’ 
whereby companies would not be allowed to take defensive measures against a takeover bid once 
a bid had been launched without gaining the specific approval of shareholders for the action. 
The proposed legislation was deliberated in the EP for a period of five years. While a 
compromise agreement between Council and EP seemed quite possible in the initial stage of the 
decision-making process, controversy concerning the proposed legislation increased dramatically 
over time. In first reading, which took place in June 1996, the EP approved the report of the 
rapporteur in the responsible Legal Affairs Committee, Nicole Fontaine, a French member of the 
European People’s Party group (EPP). It thus followed the recommendation of the committee, 
which had voted almost unanimously in favor. The EP proposed 22 amendments to the 
Commission proposal, including demands for definitional clarifications and measures to 
strengthen the rights of employees and their representatives. The Commission’s amended 
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proposal, as well as the Council’s unanimous Common Position, incorporated most EP 
amendments without challenging the proposal’s general principles.141 
Following the EP election in June 1999, Ms. Fontaine became the President of the 5th 
European Parliament and passed the rapporteurship of the 13th Directive to her German EPP 
colleague Klaus-Heiner Lehne. The new rapporteur, however, assumed a position in the second 
reading that was “180 degrees opposite to the first reading,” according to a Commission official 
involved in the dossier.142 Under Mr. Lehne’s leadership, the EP amended the Council’s common 
position substantially with measures discouraging hostile takeover bids. Most importantly, it 
proposed amendments making it easier for the boards of target companies to use defensive 
measures, effectively replacing the British-style ‘neutrality rule’ with the German practice 
(Berglöf and Burkart, 2003: 187; Hix, Noury, and Gerard 2005). Due to this rejection of the 
Council’s common position, the legislation went into conciliation. Following a long and intense 
conciliation procedure and an 8-7 vote by the EP delegation in favor of a compromise agreement, 
the takeover directive was rejected in July 2001. With the major EP party groups deeply divided, 
the vote had been declared ‘free.’ In the end, and based on the fact that the Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure state that a tied vote equals a rejection, the EP rejected the conciliation with a tied vote 
of 273 in favor, 273 against and 22 abstentions. 
6.2.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
The qualitative analysis of the decision-making process concerning the takeover directive 
supports the proposition that strategically deployed focal points shifted policy preferences of 
                                                 
141 EP Legislative Observatory. 
142 Respondent #12. 
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those MEPs not directly involved in the deliberation of the legislation. This shift in policy 
preferences, in turn, critically shaped policy outcomes. In the case at hand, three focal points 
shaped the process of contention surrounding the 13th directive. These focal points took 
prominence at different points in time. In the early stages of the deliberation process, a focal 
point relating to the sovereignty-integration dimension was particularly pronounced. This focal 
point stressed the significance of completing the European single market in the realm of 
company law and was particularly notable during the first reading stage. It was gradually 
replaced, however, by two alternative focal points in the second and third reading stages, namely 
the issue of workers’ rights and the notion of creating a “level playing-field” across the EU. The 
first of these two elements relates to the Left-Right divide by emphasizing the question of 
employee information and consultation in the case of a takeover or merger. The second raises 
concerns about the impact of the proposal on businesses in the different member states, a core 
constituency of all MEPs, by suggesting that the takeover directive would favor businesses in 
certain countries while putting others at a comparative disadvantage.  
These focal points were introduced strategically at different stages of the proposal’s life-
cycle by the primary legislative actors in the European Parliament, who framed the political 
process in ways advantageous to their objectives. These actors were in principal members of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, and especially the two rapporteurs handling 
the dossier. 
Early on in the legislation decision-making process, the proposal was considered by the 
4th European Parliament (1994–99) and treated by rapporteur Nicole Fontaine. Ms. Fontaine was 
strongly in favor of the directive. Upon presenting her report to the plenary on June 25, 1997, she 
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declared that she hoped “with all my heart” that the EP would vote in favor of the proposal.143 
She presented the dossier as a necessary step toward the completion of the European single 
market with due consideration to the principle of subsidiarity.144 Accordingly, and as the focal 
point model would predict, deliberation in the Parliament under her rapporteurship was 
dominated by the issues of harmonization and subsidiarity, with a particular focus on the 
question of what type of directive would best ensure an appropriate balance between the two.  
Klaus-Heiner Lehne, however, the new rapporteur who replaced Ms. Fontaine before the 
second reading, presented the proposal to the incoming parliament in a dramatically different 
fashion. He portrayed the issue as being about the creation of a “level playing-field” across the 
EU, rather than about completing the single market. Thus simplifying the technical content of the 
proposal for his fellow parliamentarians, he shifted attention toward imbalances with regard to 
defensive measures that companies could take to protect themselves against hostile takeovers,145 
despite the fact that the essence of the proposal was the same as in first reading stage. While the 
takeover directive required shareholders to approve any defensive measures enacted by 
managerial boards, the position of the rapporteur stressed the German corporate tradition giving 
the board of the target company substantial autonomy and authority to frustrate a takeover 
attempt. Mr. Lehne maintained that the directive, as proposed by the Commission, would put 
certain national companies at a disadvantage both relative to companies from other European 
countries and from the United States, allowing some corporations to initiate cross-border 
takeovers while being protected against hostile takeover bids themselves.146  
                                                 
143 Debate of the European Parliament, June 25, 1997. 
144 Subsidiarity is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its 
exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. 
145 Respondent #27. 
146 Debates of the European Parliament, December 12, 2000 and July 3, 2001. 
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The second issue gaining prominence throughout the political process was that of 
employee information and consultation in takeover and merger activities. The discussion 
revolved around the specific question of employee consultation and information in the event of 
mergers and takeovers, but also featured an ever more prominent discussion about the 
desirability of mergers, and the question of shareholder versus stakeholder value. Once again, the 
complex repercussions of the legislative proposal were simplified, this time in terms of 
“workers’ rights.” The issue continuously gained in visibility throughout the legislative 
process,147 which was somewhat surprising from the Commission’s point of view since the issue 
had been discussed early on in the informal trialogue meetings between Commission, Council, 
and Parliament. According to a senior Commission official, a member of the Socialist group in 
the EP had been invited to the meetings specifically to ensure the coverage of issues relating to 
the consultation and information of employees.148 In these meetings, the issue was thought to 
have been taken care of by means of cross-references to existing legislation, to which the 
Socialist EP representative did not object.149 
Rather than driven by major exogenous events or changes in the policy proposal, 
individual-level perceptions of the takeover directive changed as a result of deliberate lobbying. 
Rapporteur Lehne and the Socialist shadow rapporteur in the Legal Affairs Committee, Willy 
Rothley, played critical roles in this regard. According to Mr. Rothley, he and Mr. Lehne put a 
lot of energy into finding a majority against the proposal.150 Their efforts were aimed in two 
directions: the workers’ rights focal point explicitly targeted the Left, while the level playing-
field focal point was emphasized for the political Right, which was thought to be more concerned 
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148 Respondent #50. 
149 Respondent #50; Respondent #65. 
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with national businesses.151 While Mr. Lehne stressed the level playing-field argument, Mr. 
Rothley emphasized the workers’ protection side of the story in the Socialist group—despite his 
conviction that the directive, in reality, did not infringe on workers’ rights.152 
The findings of this qualitative analysis also confirm that focal points were not created 
from thin air, but reflected existing ideological preferences. The increasing discussion about 
“workers’ rights” shifted attention toward an aspect of the proposal that could prominently place 
the issue on the Left-Right divide. It also emphasized to the Left that the proposal might 
negatively affect their core constituencies across the continent. At the same time, the “level 
playing-field” issue emphasized the repercussions of the directive for national businesses, 
another core constituency of most MEPs. 
It is, moreover, evident that the focal points observable in the case of the takeover 
directive were indeed decision-making shortcuts, making a complex and technical proposal more 
tangible. Initially, the majority of parliamentarians were quite uninformed about the highly 
complex and technical takeover directive,153 and opinions were “all over the place.”154 Therefore, 
MEPs had to rely on the few people who could evaluate the implications of the directive to lead 
them through the process, according to a Commission official.155 
Hence, focal points appear to have a mediating impact on already existing ideological 
preferences. While ideological preferences and constituency concerns did not change, opposition 
to the directive emerged as the policy process progressed.156 Following the suggestions of the 
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dominant focal points, everybody started to discover that they had something to protect,157 be it 
“the pearls of their national industries,”158 or the employees of target companies.159  
6.2.2 Content Analysis 
The shift in focal points during the course of the decision-making process concerning the 
takeover directive should also be evident in the parliamentary debates in first reading (June 25, 
1997), second reading (December 12, 2000), and third reading (July 3 and 4, 2001). I test this 
proposition by coding a series of words and phrases consistent with the three focal points 
(“single market,” “workers’ rights,” and “level playing -field”) and by determining their 
frequency of use with the help of TEXTPACK.160 
Based on the analysis above, we should expect to find that the single market focal point 
gets sidelined throughout the decision-making process, meaning that the number of references to 
this focal point decreases with each debate. At the same time, the workers’ rights and level 
playing-field focal points gained in prominence over time, meaning that the number of references 
to these two focal points should increase between the first and third reading stage. 
The results of the content analysis confirm these expectations, as Table 12 shows. 
 
[Table 12 here] 
 
In first reading, the “single market” focal point was referred to 64 times per 10,000 input 
words. This number drops to eleven references in second reading and 7 references in third 
                                                 
157 Respondent #24. 
158 Bouwman MEP, Debate of the European Parliament, July 3, 2001. 
159 Respondent #74. 
160 Coding details can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 6.2. 
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reading.  Also as expected, the shift in focus toward the level playing-field and workers’ rights 
focal points is evident in the debates preceding the second and third readings in the European 
Parliament. While there had not been a single mention of the “level playing-field” in the first 
reading debate in 1997, it was referred to 30 times per 10,000 input words in both the second and 
third reading debates. Finally, the workers’ rights focal point was referenced 34 times per 10,000 
input words in the first reading phase. This number increased to 39 in second and 46 in third 
reading. 
6.2.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
On the basis of the qualitative analysis above, it is possible to formulate a series of hypotheses 
concerning the expected outcome of the decision-making process in the case of the takeover 
directive.  
In the first reading stage, the single market issue was most prominent in the debate about 
the takeover directive. Accordingly, we should find that pro-/anti-integration positions should be 
significant predictors of voting behavior, with pro-European MEPs voting in favor of the 
directive. As established above, however, the focal point revolving around the completion of the 
single market became increasingly marginalized throughout the political process and was 
replaced by concerns about the level playing-field and workers’ protection. I therefore 
hypothesize that pro-/anti-integration positions should not be significant predictors of voting 
behavior in the third reading stage. 
Following Hooghe and Marks (1999, 2001), we may hypothesize that the political Left 
was initially in favor of the takeover directive, as it constituted a matter of market regulation at 
the EU level in the area of corporate governance. The political Right, on the other hand, wishing 
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to combine a continent-wide market with minimal regulation at the EU level, should be more 
hesitant in its support for the directive. I thus hypothesize that more Leftist positions on the Left-
Right dimension should increase the probability of support for the directive in the first reading 
stage. Given the rising focus on the workers’ rights issue in later stages of the discussion, these 
tendencies should be reversed in the third reading stage: in the 2001 vote, more Leftist positions 
should decrease the probability of support for the directive.  
Finally, since the level playing-field focal point was entirely absent from the debate in the 
first reading stage, constituency interests related to the comparative gains of national businesses 
should not constitute a significant predictor of voting behavior in the first reading stage. As a 
result of the rise of the issue throughout the process, however, we should expect to find that in 
the third reading stage, national considerations had a substantial impact on voting patterns. 
Specifically, we should find that parliamentarians from member states with liberal market 
economies supported the directive, since their equity-based systems already placed the 
shareholder at the center of regulatory and legal protections against hostile takeover bids 
(Berglöf and Burkart 2003). For these MEPs, the level playing-field argument actually 
highlighted perceived gains from the takeover directive. MEPs from countries with national 
coordinated market economies should also be expected to favor the directive, for similar reasons. 
In Sweden, for example, regulations dating back to the early 1970s already required defensive 
actions to have shareholder approval. Moreover, the most widespread defensive practice in the 
Scandinavian countries is a system of dual class shares (Bennedsen and Nielsen 2004), which the 
takeover directive did not actually prohibit. For similar reasons, we should also observe that 
MEPs from partial coordinated market economies should be concerned about the impact of the 
legislation on the defensive actions available to their nations’ companies.  Finally, 
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parliamentarians from sectoral market economies should largely opposed the directive on the 
basis of the level playing-field argument, which was perceived as a threat to established neo-
corporatist traditions at the national, sectoral, and firm levels. 
The dependent variables in this analysis are the votes in the first and third readings.161 
These variables are dichotomous. A value of zero equals a vote against the directive and a value 
of one means a vote in favor.162 
The independent variables are the two ideology variables (Left-Right and sovereignty-
integration), the government status dichotomous variable, and a set of dichotomous variables for 
type of capitalism.163 Formally, the regression model can be expressed as: 
 
VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right  + β2 Sovereignty-Integration + β3 Government Status + β4 
Liberal Market Economy + β5 Partial Coordinated Market Economy + β6 Sectoral 
Coordinated Market Economy.164 
 
 
The results in Table 13 show that this regression model explains a substantial part of the 
variance with a pseudo-R2 of 0.39. Also, as predicted on the basis of the dominant focal point in 
the first reading stage, positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension constitute a highly 
statistically significant predictor of voting behavior in the roll-call vote of the first parliamentary 
                                                 
161 The vote in the second reading was not a roll-call vote and is thus not considered here. 
162 The results of the multinomial logit analysis of the plenary vote in first reading can be found in the Appendix of 
Chapter 6.2. Due to the small number of abstentions in the third reading vote a multinomial logit analysis of this 
vote is not possible. 
163 The “type of capitalism” variables fall into four categories: liberal market economy (Ireland and the United 
Kingdom); partial or family-oriented coordinated market economy (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal); 
sectoral coordinated market economy (Germany, Austria and Benelux countries); national coordinated market 
economy (Scandinavian countries). 
164 “National Coordinated Market Economy” serves as the reference value; it is, however, possible to calculate 
predicted probabilities for this category using CLARIFY, which will be reported below. 
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reading. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient indicates that a more pro-European attitude 
correlates positively with the probability of a Yes vote. 
 
[Table 13 here] 
 
Figure 29 presents the predicted probabilities of a Yes vote given levels of EU support. 
This figure illustrates the substantial impact of more pro-European positions on the probability of 
a vote in favor of the directive, across different types of capitalism.165 
 
[Figure 29 here] 
 
  
The results in Table 13 also show that, as expected, positions on the Left-Right 
dimension are statistically significant and negatively related to the dependent variable: leftists 
were more likely to vote in favor of the directive. This finding is evident in the downward-
sloping lines in Figure 30, which represent the mean predicted probabilities of a Yes vote given 
positions on the Left-Right dimension, again differentiating between different types of 
capitalism. 
 
[Figure 30 here] 
 
  
Finally, Figure 31 shows the modest impact of government- or opposition-status of MEPs 
in their national member states, and thus their representation in the Council, which is not 
                                                 
165 To calculate the probabilities presented in the following figures, I used CLARIFY and held the remaining 
variables constant at their means. 
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surprising since the coefficient in Table 13 does not achieve statistical significance. The slope of 
the graphs is surprising, however, since representation in the Council of Ministers evidently 
decreases the probability of MEPs voting in favor of the takeover directive in first reading. 
 
[Figure 31 here] 
 
Contrary to our expectations, national economic considerations are highly statistically 
significant predictors of voting behavior, as the type of capitalism variables are significant and 
their coefficients quite substantial. Specifically, Figure 29, Figure 30, and Figure 31 demonstrate 
that MEPs from member states with partial coordinated market economies were most likely to 
support the legislation in first reading, followed by MEPs from sectoral and national coordinated 
market economies. Members from countries with liberal market economies were least likely to 
vote in favor of the takeover directive in first reading. 
Comparing these results with the analysis of the third reading vote on the takeover 
directive demonstrates that preferences concerning the takeover directive were not stable across 
both votes. All predictor variables switch signs, as Table 14 illustrates. 
 
[Table 14 here] 
 
These results are consistent with the expectations of the focal point model, which can 
account for these switches in the signs of the coefficients. The sign of the sovereignty-integration 
variable, for example, switches from positive to negative: while pro-Europeans strongly 
 109 
supported the directive in the first reading stage, the relationship between support for the EU and 
support for the takeover directive is now reversed (compare Figure 29 and Figure 32). 
 
[Figure 32 here] 
  
One possible interpretation of this curious finding is that pro-European MEPs actually 
began to consider the directive to be harmful to the integration process as the level playing-field 
argument began to dominate the discussion. As a result, positions on the dimension did not 
become insignificant during the decision-making process. Yet, as the single market focal point 
was marginalized in the third reading stage, the slope of the graphs representing the changes in 
predicted probabilities along the sovereignty-integration dimension is less steep than in first 
reading, indicating its decreasing importance over time.  
The simultaneous rise of the workers’ right focal point also entails a switch in the 
direction of the Left-Right variable, as predicted above and illustrated in Figure 30 and Figure 
33: while left-leaning MEPs had a greater probability of voting in favor of the directive in the 
first reading vote, they now show a greater probability to vote against. As Figure 33 shows, the 
mean predicted probability of a vote in favor of the directive increases as values on the Left-
Right divide shift toward the Right. 
 
[Figure 33 here] 
 
Figure 34 shows that representation in the Council of Ministers, i.e., affiliation with a 
national party in government at home, entails a greater probability of MEPs supporting the 
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takeover directive in third reading. This impact is especially pronounced for MEPs from liberal 
and partial coordinated market economies. 
 
[Figure 34 here] 
 
At last, considerations about the impact of the proposed legislation on national economic 
interests are indeed statistically significant in predicting voting behavior in the third-reading 
stage, when the level playing-field issue was especially prominent. The findings also support our 
expectations. As proposed above, members of parliament from liberal market economies were 
indeed very likely to vote in favor of the directive, as were MEPs from countries with national 
coordinated market economies. In contrast, members from partial coordinated market economies 
were less likely to support the proposed legislation, while parliamentarians from sectoral 
coordinated market economies were very unlikely to support the proposal.  
In sum, a critical preference shift with regard to the ideology variables was a decrease in 
the perceived salience of the sovereignty-integration dimension by legislative backbenchers 
between the first and third reading stages, paired with a simultaneous increase in the perceived 
salience of the Left-Right divide. Figure 35 illustrates this shift spatially for a given legislator 
MEPx. The takeover directive (i.e., the “New Policy”) fell inside the elliptically shaped 
indifference curve in first reading (the solid line), when the sovereignty-integration dimension 
was perceived to be more salient with regard to the legislative proposal. In contrast, it was the 
status quo point that was the more preferred alternative in third reading, when the indifference 
curve is “squeezed” from the sides, indicating the greater salience of the Left-Right divide. 
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Accordingly, the takeover directive passed through the EP plenary in first reading, but was 
rejected in favor of the status quo in third reading. 
 
[Figure 35 here] 
 
There was not simply a shift in the perceived salience of the two ideology dimension, 
however, but also a critical shift in the directional impact of the two dimensions. While the more 
pro-EU position entailed a greater probability of voting in favor of the takeover directive in first 
reading, its impact in third reading was reversed. Similarly, a more leftist position in first reading 
was associated with a greater probability to support the proposed legislation and a decreased 
probability of support in third reading. This impact cannot be shown spatially, but clearly 
influenced the outcome of the legislative decision-making process. A similar shift occurred in the 
case of the type of capitalism variables representing national economic interests. 
6.2.4 Conclusion 
The qualitative analysis of the takeover directive established that the interpretation of what 
constitutes the dominant aspect of a given legislative proposal can be traced back to one (or 
more) exogenously provided focal point(s). The analysis identified three competing focal points 
that took prominence at different points in time: the “single market” focal point, the “workers’ 
rights” focal point, and the “level playing-field” focal point. Appealing to existing ideological 
predispositions, these strategically deployed focal points influenced the variable interpretation of 
what the issue at hand “was all about,” thus shifting policy preferences during the process of 
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parliamentary deliberation. Critical, in this regard, were a small number of specialized actors in 
the Legal Affairs Committee. 
Subsequently, the quantitative analysis of voting behavior established that the 
strategically deployed focal points significantly shaped voting outcomes in the case of the EU 
takeover directive. It is thus evident that the outcome of the decision-making process was not due 
to the random confluence of problems, participants, preferences, and opportunities, but the result 
of a more structured process where strategic actors shaped policy preferences, thus providing the 
basis for policy outcomes. As hypothesized, these outcomes are indeed predictable on the basis 
of the prevalent focal point, which confirms Hypothesis 3b and disconfirms Hypothesis 2b.  
The analysis also confirms some of the central characteristics of focal points and the 
fashion in which they are employed in legislative decision-making. The prevailing focal points 
constituted very general representations of content and consequences of the particular policy 
issue under consideration, while the discussion of technical details of the legislation was kept at a 
minimum. There was also a distinct element of persuasion involved in the deliberation of the 
legislation, which defies the notion of predetermined positions. Finally, each focal point 
highlighted the importance of a specific consequence of the legislation and tied it to one 
particular outcome preference: the single market focal point emphasized the desirability of the 
legislation as a step toward further integration, making it pro-/anti-EU issue. The workers’ rights 
focal point stressed the potential negative impact on employment and social fairness; as such, the 
issue as a Left-Right question. Finally, the level playing-field focal point highlighted how 
unbalanced the distribution of benefits of the legislation would be across member-states and thus 
targeted concerns about national constituents. Moreover, the case of the takeover directive 
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demonstrates that focal points not only affect the salience of the ideological dimension, but can 
even influence the direction in which the dimensions matter. 
6.3 THE STATUTE AND FINANCING OF EU-LEVEL POLITICAL PARTIES 
Going back to the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has recognized the importance of European political 
parties in developing political debate in Europe, enhancing the quality of EU democracy, and 
improving the functioning of EU institutions. Building on this recognition, the purpose of the 
legislation titled “Political parties at European level: statute and financing” (COD/2003/0039) 
was to define the exact nature and purpose of EU-level political parties and to create a financing 
framework whereby EU-level political parties would be funded in part from the Community 
budget. 
The legislative proposal was introduced by the Commission on February 19, 2003 and 
proposed a total annual budget of 8.4 million Euros for party funding. It stipulated that each 
European party would receive a flat-rate basic grant from the EU budget, plus a second 
component based on its number of MEPs. 25 percent of the budget of each party would still 
come from autonomous financing, including donations, which would have to be specified when 
exceeding EUR 100 and could not exceed EUR 5,000 a year per person or organization. To 
assure the transparency of party accounts, the Commission proposal specified that European 
parties that receive financing must provide annual records of their revenues, expenditures, 
statements of assets, and liabilities.166 
                                                 
166 European Commission, RAPID Press Release: “Commission proposes rules on statute and financing of European 
political parties.” February 19, 2003. 
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Eligibility for financing from the EU budget was tied to certain “minimum requirements” 
of democratic conduct, including provisions that EU parties must participate in elections to the 
EP, have clearly defined bodies responsible for financial management, and “respect [for] the 
basic purposes of the Union” with regard to freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law. Eligibility was also dependent on a certain degree of representativeness in the EP or in a 
reasonable number of member states. Specifically, a European political party must have elected 
members in the EP, or be represented in national or regional parliaments in at least one third of 
the EU member states, or it must have obtained at least five percent of the votes in the most 
recent EP election in at least one third of the member states.  
6.3.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
The proposal was treated in the EP by a German Social-Democrat, Jo Leinen (PES), on behalf of 
the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. In first reading, in June 2003, the EP decided to limit 
the scope of the directive to the question of party financing, leaving aside the issue of 
establishing a genuine legal statute for EU parties. It merely stipulated that EU parties must have 
a legal personality in the member state in which its seat is located (i.e., Belgium, for most 
parties).167 In this respect, it emphasized the urgent need for rules on party funding, given recent 
criticism by the EU Court of Auditors of the existing financing system.168 The Court had 
suggested that the current structure where the political parties were financed through a budget 
                                                 
167 Having a legal personality allows a group of persons to act as if it were an individual for purposes such as 
lawsuits, property ownership, and contracts. This allows for easy conduct of business by having ownership, lawsuits, 
and agreements under the name of the legal entity instead of the several names of the people making up the entity. 
Here, a European-level legal personality would have entailed, for example, that European parties could hire their 
own staff, signs their own contracts, and be tax and criminally liable. 
168 The Court of Auditors checks EU revenue and expenditure for legality and regularity and ensures that financial 
management is sound. 
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line that belongs to the EP party groups was questionable, because it violated the division 
between party and parliamentary faction.  
The EP also amended the Commission proposal to be more inclusive of smaller parties by 
lowering the threshold for funding eligibility from one-third of the EU member states to one-
quarter and proposed that parties must have received at least three percent (rather than five 
percent) of the votes cast in those member states in the most recent EP election to receive 
funding. The EP report further specified that European parties must specify donors and donations 
exceeding EUR 500, as opposed to the EUR 100 proposed by the Commission. It also increased 
the threshold above which donations should not be accepted from EUR 5,000 to EUR 12,000 and 
proposed that European political parties should be allowed to charge membership fees, as long as 
they do not exceed 40 percent of the party’s annual budget. 
Finally, the EP position emphasized that funding provided by the EU budget should not 
be used for the direct financing of national or regional political parties, except for the financing 
of EP election campaigns or “party activity at any level directly associated with the politics of 
the EU.” 
Council accepted these changes in its common position, and the legislation entered into 
force on February 15, 2005.  
The criticism of the Court of Auditors put a distinct time pressure on the European 
Parliament to get the finances of its parties in order and to establish European parties that were 
autonomous from their EP party groups before the end of the 2004 legislative term.169 Especially 
at a time when the financial structures of the European Parliament and its members had become 
                                                 
169 Respondent #67, Respondent #40, Respondent #23. 
 116 
under increasing scrutiny in the eye of the public, the need for legislation that would put 
European parties on a firmer, more defined, more transparent, and more accountable basis was 
widely acknowledged to make the system less vulnerable to attack.170 
Yet, despite the broad recognition that a statute dealing, in particular, with the financing 
of European parties was urgently needed, there was considerable controversy within the EP with 
regard to the specifics of the proposal. Especially contested were the thresholds establishing the 
eligibility of parties for EU funding,171 the extent to which donations would be permitted,172 the 
purposes for which EU funding could be used,173 and the issue of tying funding to minimum 
democratic requirements.174 There was a relative consensus with regard to these issues among 
the three largest EP party groups (EPP, PES, Liberals), while the Greens were initially divided 
and the smaller groups, who felt disadvantaged by the Commission proposal, were largely 
opposed.175 With regard to the permissibility of donations, there was also a national aspect to the 
proposal, since certain member states put an upper limit on direct donations.176 
The discussion at the plenary level did not, however, reflect the complexity of the issue at 
hand,177 either with regard to the question of financing or the legal status of EU parties, since 
MEPs “only have a general idea of how financing works.”178 Instead, the issue was treated by a 
relatively small number of experts in the responsible Constitutional Affairs committee,179 who 
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“knew what they were talking about.”180 There was close cooperation among those specialists 
from a range of party groups, who “made their own agreement, which they then took to their 
groups,” as one EP official remembers.181 But cooperation also extended beyond the EP to 
representatives from the European parties and from the Council.182 For example, the Socialist 
rapporteur closely conferred with the leader of the PES, Robin Cook, and its secretary general, 
Antony Beumer.183 In fact, the secretary generals of the main party groups played an important 
role in the negotiation process, while the rapporteur, Jo Leinen, was critical in forging the final 
compromise.184 
As rapporteur, Mr. Leinen emphasized the role of European parties as building blocks of 
a federalist EU and as symbols of a politically integrated Europe.185 Hence, he considered the 
financing scheme as a first step toward genuine party organizations, a democratic infrastructure, 
and democratic political processes at the European level.186 The party directive was thus an issue 
that was discussed in reference to the sovereignty-integration dimension,187 and proponents and 
opponents of the proposal fell squarely into the pro- and anti-EU camps, respectively. Opposition 
against the proposal was based on resistance against anything that might constitute a building 
block of a transnational polity and transnational democratic processes.188 MEPs taking this 
position emphasized that EU parties were artificially constructed bodies that should not be 
subsidized with public money.189 Accordingly, two focal points dominated the process, both 
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relating to the sovereignty-integration dimension: the EU Democracy and artificial constructs 
focal points. 
As a result of this focus on the role of parties in facilitating European democracy, as well 
as the close cooperation between key actors across party lines who managed to find agreement 
on the details of the proposal, there was broad support for the directive. It was, in fact, the 
strategy of the rapporteur to be as inclusive as possible.190 One key element ensuring a broad 
consensus was that potentially controversial aspects of the directive were deliberately removed 
from the agenda by the active participants in the deliberation process, and the rapporteur in 
particular. Specifically, it was argued that the “the time was not yet ripe” for a genuine party 
statute which would require the specification of the legal status or a European-level legal 
personality of EU parties.191 There was a distinct sense of uncertainty and insecurity about what 
it would mean if a European party would become active across member-state borders based on 
its European legal personality,192 as well as concern about the co-existence of national and EU-
level parties with regard to both European and domestic member state politics.193 Hence, in order 
to avoid splitting up the existing coalition in favor of the financing scheme or postpone the 
decision on the minimal solution focusing on party financing,194 it was decided in the 
Constitutional Affairs committee to keep the issue off the table and to view the proposal of EU 
party financing as a first step toward a genuine European party statute.195 Given the need for 
some legal status of EU parties, the final compromise stipulated that EU parties must have legal 
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personality in the member state in which its seat is located, which essentially referred to 
Belgium.196 
Therefore, the “real controversies” were effectively excluded from the final text, 
according to one EP official closely involved in the decision-making process,197 allowing the 
party experts to convince their party colleagues of their positions.198 As a result, the final 
agreement was not a genuine party statute, but merely a financing scheme addressing the 
immediately pressing issue of establishing an acceptable framework for the financing of EU 
parties.199 Given the controversy surrounding the issue of EU parties, however, and the long-
standing skepticism toward the very concept paired with national concerns about the impact of 
establishing transnational parties with any legal status, it has been described as a “miracle” that 
the directive came into existence at all.200 
6.3.2 Content Analysis  
Since both focal points prevalent in the deliberation of the party directive related to the impact of 
EU level party financing on the democratic governance of the EU, we ought to find that 
references to the pros and cons of the directive in this regard should dominate the plenary debate 
in the first (and only) reading stage. This is indeed the case, as Table 16 shows.201 During the 
debate, speakers made 70 references (per 10,000 input words) to the “EU democracy” focal 
point, while the “artificial constructs” focal point was referred to only 30 times. 
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The debate also shows that the issue of legal personality was, indeed, almost non-existent 
during the plenary debates, as only four references were made to the fact that the directive does 
not, in fact, constitute a genuine party statute providing EU parties with a European legal 
personality. 
 
[Table 16 here] 
 
6.3.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
The content analysis illustrates that the decision-making process in the case of the EU Party 
Statute was dominated by two focal points that relate to the sovereignty-integration dimension, 
as both the issue of EU democracy and the claim that EU parties are artificially constructed 
entities lacking legitimacy relate to this ideological dimension. Accordingly, we should expect to 
find that MEPs voted based on their positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension, with 
pro-European MEPs voting in favor and EU-skeptics against. In contrast, the Left-Right divide 
should be insignificant in explaining voting patterns, since the deliberation process did not 
feature any focal points relating to the Left-Right dimension. 
The dependent variable in this binary logit analysis is the EP plenary vote in first reading, 
in which the Party Statute was adopted. These variables are dichotomous. A value of zero equals 
a vote against directive and a value of one means a vote in favor.202 The recurrent dependent 
variables are the two ideology variables (Left-Right and sovereignty-integration) and the 
                                                 
202 The results of the multinomial logit analysis of the plenary vote in first reading can be found in the Appendix of 
Chapter 6.3. 
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government status dichotomous variable. Additionally, I include a dichotomous variable that 
assumes a value of 1 if national party finance rules specify a ceiling on individual annual 
donations to political parties. I control for this factor because the most contentious issue 
providing for nationally-based divisions in the EP concerned the legality of party donations and 
the question of limiting donations to particular levels.203 My regression model is expressed 
formally as: 
 
VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right + β2 Sovereignty-Integration + β3 Government-Opposition + β4 
National Ceiling on Party Donations. 
 
The results of the analysis show that, as predicted, pro-European MEPs voted in favor of 
the EU Party Statute, as the highly statistically significant, positive coefficient of the 
sovereignty-integration variable in Table 17 shows. Also as expected, the Left-Right variable 
does not achieve statistical significance, at least when the other predictors are held constant at 
their means. The table also indicates that MEPs from member states that specify ceilings on party 
donations were more likely to support the legislation (a result that makes sense given that the 
new legislation at the EU level also sets such limits), while government or opposition status at 
the national level does not account for positions toward the Party Statute. Finally, the regression 
model explains a substantial 45 percent of the variance in the voting patterns, as the pseudo-R2 
suggests. 
 
[Table 17 here] 
                                                 
203 EU member states with a ceiling on how much an individual donor can contribute to a political party per year are: 
Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. All other member states do not have a ceiling in place. 
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 Figure 39, Figure 40 and Figure 41 display the predicted probabilities of voting in favor 
of the Party Statute.204 The two graphs in Figure 39 confirm that the Left-Right divide was 
insubstantial in explaining votes in favor of the legislation, as MEPs on the Left were no more or 
less likely to support the Party Statute than MEPs on the Right.  
 
[Figure 39 here] 
 
In contrast, Figure 40 illustrates the substantial impact of positions on the sovereignty-
integration dimension in explaining vote choice. In fact, the probabilities of supporting the 
legislation as a function of pro-/anti-EU attitudes range from zero on the extreme EU-skeptic 
side of the spectrum to 100 percent at the pro-EU end. 
 
[Figure 40 here] 
 
Finally, Figure 41 shows that government or opposition status in the national arena, and 
thus representation in the EU Council, barely affects the probability of MEPs voting in favor of 
the Party Statute. 
 
[Figure 41 here] 
 
                                                 
204 To calculate the probabilities presented in the following figures, I used CLARIFY and held the remaining 
variables constant at their means. 
 123 
In sum, the Party Statute was adopted by the European Parliament on the basis of MEP 
positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension, which confirms our expectations. Pro-
Europeans voted in favor of the legislation, while EU-skeptics opposed it. It was thus possible to 
predict voting patterns on the basis of the focal points dominating the deliberation of the 
legislative proposal, as hypothesis H3b maintained. This pattern is illustrated spatially in Figure 
42, where MEPx1 represents any given pro-European MEP and MEPx2 represents an EU-skeptic 
MEP. The Party Statute (“New Policy”) falls inside MEPx1‘s (solid) indifference curve and thus 
constitutes her preferred alternative. In contrast, the status quo point lies inside MEPx2‘s 
indifference curve (represented by the dashed line), making it his preferred alternative.  
 
[Figure 42 here] 
6.3.4 Conclusion  
The EU Party Statute does not constitute a case in which there was a measurable shift in policy 
positions over time, as the legislative proposal was accepted in first reading and, for this reason, 
involved only one final roll-call vote. It does provide for a study in consistency of our key 
expectations, however, most importantly by confirming the hypothesis that it is possible to 
predict voting patterns on the EP floor on the basis of the focal points prevailing in the 
deliberation of the dossier (H3b). This was indeed the case with the Party Statute, where the 
discussion centered on the implications of the legislation for the development of EU democracy 
and the role of transnational political parties in this process. The discussion took place at a very 
general level, however, and was characterized by broad representations of content and 
consequences of the particular policy issue under consideration. These findings derive from the 
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qualitative analysis of the case at hand and the content analysis of the EP debate in first reading. 
Accordingly, vote choice in the EP plenary was based in principal on MEP positions along the 
sovereignty-integration dimension, as the quantitative analysis shows, while there was neither a 
Left-Right nor a distinct national interest component influencing how MEPs voted on the floor. 
The emphasis on the sovereignty-integration dimension provided the basis of a broad 
cross-party coalition supporting the legislation, as the majority of MEPs shares a pro-EU 
sentiment. As discussed above, one factor ensuring this broad consensus was that potentially 
controversial aspects of the directive, most importantly the definition of a “legal personality” for 
EU parties, were deliberately kept off the agenda. As long as the time was perceived not to be 
“ripe” for the establishment of a genuine European-level legal personality, it was deemed 
preferable by the key actors to establish a pure party financing scheme presented as a first step 
toward a genuine European party statute. It was this minimal solution that secured the necessary 
support for the legislation. 
6.4 PROPOSALS ON FUEL QUALITY AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
In 1997, the European Parliament began discussing three legislative proposals regarding 
emission standards of both personal and non-personal motor vehicles and the quality of petrol 
and diesel fuels. While technically three separate proposals, the EP treated them as one bloc of 
legislation aimed to reduce emissions and improve air quality. The legislation followed and was 
introduced by the Commission on the basis of the “Auto-Oil program,” established in 1994, 
which was to develop scientific methods to establish emission standards for vehicles. The Auto-
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Oil program involved an intense series of studies and negotiations between the Commission, auto 
manufacturers, and the oil industry focused on tougher standards for vehicle emissions and fuel 
quality. The idea was to use the expertise of these industries to establish the most cost-effective 
way to reduce the impact of pollution on air quality and human health.205 
Two proposals concerned emission standards. The first, COD/1996/0164A, was supposed 
to tighten emission standards applicable to private cars and add new requirements, all in 
accordance with the results of the Auto-Oil program. The initial Commission proposal provided 
for a two-stage reduction in exhaust emissions: a first reduction in various pollutants was to be 
applied from the year 2000 onward to new types of vehicles and from 2001 onward to all new 
vehicles. In 2005, the second stage was to be implemented on the basis of industrial feasibility 
and technological progress. Additionally, the proposal included provisions to improve emissions 
test procedures, required petrol-driven cars to be equipped with an on-board diagnostic system 
(OBD), and provided new measures to enhance the testing of the conformity of the vehicles with 
durability requirements. The second proposal, COD/1996/0164B, targeted light commercial 
vehicles and also featured a two-stage approach. The first target dates ranged between the years 
2000 and 2002 for different classes of non-personal vehicles and aimed to significantly reduce 
emissions of different pollutants against 1997 standards. A second regulatory stage was to be 
applied from 2005 onward, based on a new Commission proposal to be submitted to Parliament 
and Council in 1998. 
The third element of the emissions package sought to improve the quality of fuel with a 
view to reducing emissions from automobiles (COD/1996/0163). It was to harmonize limit 
                                                 
205 Commission of the European Communities (1996) “The European Auto Oil Programme” A report by the 
Directorate Generals for Industry, Energy and Environment, Civil Protection and Nuclear Safety (XI/361/96) para 
2.2. 
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values for different parameters of lead-free petrol and diesel in the year 2000 and stipulated that 
afterwards, only those fuels complying with the specifications of the directive would be 
authorized for sale in the Member States. Furthermore, it provided for the development of a 
uniform system to monitor the quality of fuels distributed, as well as the gradual elimination of 
all leaded petrol by January 1, 2000. The initial proposal allowed for temporary exceptions from 
the limit values under specific circumstances, however, such as “serious socio-economic 
problems” or a “sudden change in the supply of crude oil.” Moreover, all new fuel specifications 
were to be reviewed in light of the Community air quality objectives and the economic viability 
of the measures in the near future.  
6.4.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
In its first reading reports on the emission standard proposals, the EP amended the Commission 
proposals to include a two-stage approach to the imposition of binding emission limits in 2000 
and 2005, rather than indicative specifications for 2005, as favored by the Commission. The 
reports also called for tighter limits on exhaust emissions, the replacement of old vehicles or the 
retrofitting of anti-pollution devices, stricter emission control procedures, and the promotion of 
substitute fuels. Notably, the EP advocated the tool of tax incentives to encourage immediate 
compliance with stricter limits on pollutant emissions, which was one of the first times the use of 
such incentives was discussed as a genuine environmental instrument. The ultimate goal was to 
regulate the reduction of CO2 emissions to effectively make mandatory the 5-liter average car by 
2005 and the 3-liter average car by 2010.  
Regarding the proposal on fuel quality, the EP also called for tighter mandatory minimum 
specifications than those proposed by the European Commission for petrol and diesel, as well as 
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for the active use of tax incentives to facilitate the introduction of improved fuels. Parliament 
also introduced the possibility of derogation and a “phased-in approach,” to enable Member 
States facing serious economic difficulties to continue to authorize use of fuels not complying 
with the strict levels suggested by the EP until January 1, 2005. 
The modified Commission proposal and the Council’s common position accepted some 
of these requests, such as the use of tax incentives and measures to encourage faster progress 
towards replacing existing vehicles with low-emission vehicles. However, it rejected the EP’s 
key demands for tighter limit values and the replacement of indicative with mandatory values for 
2005, both with regard to emissions and fuel quality standards. 
Parliament re-tabled most of the amendments adopted in first reading that were not 
incorporated in the common position in second reading, insisting on stricter limits and mandatory 
values, despite the insistence of Commission and Council that they could not accept these 
demands. Accordingly, the matter went into conciliation at the end of June 1998, where 
agreement was reached on all the outstanding points. The key compromise lay in the Council 
delegation agreeing to compulsory limit values for 2005; in exchange, Parliament accepted the 
less stringent figures proposed by the Council for the specifications themselves (which were, 
however, a considerable improvement on the figures originally put forward by the 
Commission).206 The compromise was widely viewed as a success for Parliament, as it achieved 
the a adoption of a broader approach to the question of emissions and fuel quality whereby 
benefits to health and the environment were taken into account when assessing the cost of 
measures to improve air quality. 
                                                 
206 The EP agreed to the Council’s suggestions with the exception of Amendment 27 in the fuel quality directive, 
where limit values were left unchanged by the Council. 
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Parliament subsequently adopted all three reports on September 15, 1998. It voted 454 to 
three, with seven abstentions, in favor of the proposal to reduce air pollution from passenger 
motor vehicles; 465 to eleven, with 3 abstentions, in favor of the emissions proposal concerning 
light commercial vehicles; and 474 to ten, with 3 abstentions, in favor of the proposal on fuel 
quality. 
The treatment of these three proposals by the European Parliament began in late 1996 and 
early 1997, although the issues of fuel quality and emission standards had been on the table 
already for a number of years. The Commission proposal came out of the auto-oil program, 
where Commission, automobile manufacturers, and the oil industry had shared ideas while 
excluding other stakeholders, such as social associations, non-governmental organizations or 
representatives of the European Parliament. The Commission proposal was thus viewed with 
suspicion in the EP and perceived to be heavily biased in favor of the industry, at the expense of 
environmental standards. 
Despite much controversy in the early stages of the proceedings and throughout the 
decision-making process,207 the emissions package was adopted by the European Parliament by 
overwhelming margins. The great majority of my respondents, when asked about this 
development, highlighted the role of the two rapporteurs in creating this result. These two 
individuals were Bernd Lange, a German member of the Socialist group, who was in charge of 
the legislation concerning emission standards (COD/1996/0164A and 0164B), and Heidi 
Hautala, a Finish Green, who became responsible for the fuel quality proposal (COD/1996/163). 
                                                 
207 Respondent #22, Respondent #18, Respondent #51. 
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The two rapporteurs had a very close working relationship, coordinated their efforts, and 
were “very serious, very committed”208 to their objective of realizing an emissions proposal that 
was balanced and not as slanted toward the industry, as the Commission proposal was viewed.209 
Their strategy revolved around three elements: to provide sound data challenging the dire cost 
estimates of the industry and the Commission, to seek a broadly acceptable compromise across 
all party lines, and to get the right people involved in the effort. According to a number of 
respondents, finding a compromise began even before the first reading.210 This effort “took a 
very, very long time,” and involved a great number of technical meetings where the rapporteurs, 
EP officials, and representatives from the Council Presidency would “work and work and 
work.”211 
The emissions directives were very heavily lobbied, not just in the context of the auto-oil 
program, but also during the parliamentary deliberation process. Both the oil and the car-
manufacturing industries were pressing hard for the Commission proposal, which they saw as 
beneficial to their aspirations, and floated numbers underscoring the great costs they saw 
themselves facing if the EP proposals were accepted. To counter these suggestions, the 
rapporteurs sought to back up their argumentation with detailed economic calculations, 
according to an EP official.212 Realizing that they would never get their proposals through 
otherwise, the rapporteurs had to provide “sound data to counteract”213 the Commission proposal 
and were markedly successful, since the information was perceived as “great,” in the words of 
                                                 
208 Respondent #51. 
209 Respondent #18, Respondent #51. 
210 Respondent #18, Respondent #62. 
211 Respondent #51. 
212 Respondent #18. 
213 Respondent #18. 
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one respondent, and “costs were acceptable according to that.”214 Moreover, the intrusive 
lobbying tactics of the industry, in combination with the evidently greatly exaggerated cost 
estimates,215 ultimately proved counterproductive for the industry’s desired outcomes, as one EP 
official remembers.216 
The efforts of the two rapporteurs were targeted at a broad, cross-party coalition. 
Accordingly, both rapporteurs took realistic positions and did not “ask for the earth in the 
end.”217 Mr. Lange, in particular, was perceived to be a very consensual rapporteur, who was 
cooperative and had a good working relationship with other actors across party lines.218 While 
pushing in the direction of less pollution, he always tried to bring on board the other political 
groups.219 He was also perceived to be “extremely competent on the subject matter, which got 
him the reputation where he had good arguments, and in the end, people wouldn’t question 
him.”220 He was, in sum, trusted across party lines,221 because he was, according to one member 
of the  environment committee, 
 
“perfectly capable of speaking without any hypocrisy at a conference of industrialists or 
automobile manufacturers, but also at a conference of environmentalists – and making 
the same speech!”222 
 
                                                 
214 Respondent #4. 
215 Respondent #4, Respondent #18. 
216 Respondent #18. With hindsight, a number of respondents highlighted the great discrepancy between what the 
cost estimates of the industry at the time and the actual costs of the legislation upon its implementation (Respondent 
#4, Respondent #77, Respondent #42). 
217 Respondent #51. 
218 Respondent #9, Respondent #42, Respondent #47, Respondent #51, Respondent #77. 
219 Respondent #62, Respondent #77. 
220 Respondent #42. 
221 Respondent #47. 
222 Respondent #77. 
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Despite some initial suspicion toward Ms. Hautala, as a Finish member of the Greens,223 
at the end both rapporteurs had proved their consensual credentials and were considered to be 
reliable and trustworthy, rather than partisan actors. They initiated numerous informational 
meetings and engaged in their own “discreet lobbying” so that in the end “people felt that they 
were not getting any nasty surprises.”224 They were “very astute” in getting the right people on 
board, according to one EP official, thus playing the political game while backing up their 
positions with the necessary data. Involving the right mix of participants was critical, as the 
following excerpt from an interview with an EP official highlights: 
 
“We got the right people to be on the conciliation committee, the right people to sit in the 
final conciliation meetings from the EP side. You know, not too radical, people who 
could get it through, good negotiators.”225 
 
This perception is confirmed by another official, who remembers the group of 
participants as “well-informed, not extremist and, as such, reliable. So therefore, people would 
follow.”226 This very cooperative group included Ms. Hautala from the Greens, Mr. Lange and 
David Bowe (UK) from the PES, as well as Horst Schnellhardt and Karl-Heinz Florenz 
(Germany) from the EPP.227 The arguments put forth by this group of actors revolved around the 
question of “cost-effectiveness” (the principle favored by the industry) and “best available 
technology” (the principle advocated on the EP side). Politically, the proponents of more 
stringent environmental standards emphasized issues such as the impact of air quality and 
climate change on public health, a discussion that, in later stages of the legislative process, also 
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225 Respondent #18. 
226 Respondent #51. 
227 Respondent #4, Respondent #22. 
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referred to the recently negotiated Kyoto Protocol.228 The focal point presented by this group of 
individuals was thus one of consumer protection. 
This consumer protection focal point so dominated the debate outside of the committee, 
where the technicalities of the proposal were discussed critically and controversially, that one 
MEP maintains that the business- and industry points of view and the “restrictions that [the 
legislation] would put in place” were not at all taken into account at the plenary level. There was, 
accordingly, a “lack of knowledge” concerning these implications of the legislation among 
regular parliamentarians, since “a lot of the reasoning arose from the committee and did not take 
account of different factors that we have across Europe.”229 The opponents of the proposal thus 
presented an alternative focal point by emphasizing the potential negative impact of the 
legislation on industries across the EU. 
In sum, the rapporteurs made sure that the process of decision-making in the EP was 
based on solid data and information disseminated across party groups by the right group of 
people, while their reputations as real environmental experts made a significant difference in 
creating the right context for compromise, according to one EP official.230 Furthermore, this 
effort took place in an atmosphere where the EP was only starting to use its new powers of 
legislation in the context of the co-decision procedure, which provided the institution and its 
members with a new sense of assertiveness vis-à-vis Council and Commission. As a result, the 
emissions issue is remembered as one of the first cases “where the EP took a strong stance early 
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in the co-decision procedure,”231 and it was described by Ken Collins (PES, UK), chairman of 
Committee on the Environment of the European, as “a triumph for Parliament.”232 
6.4.2 Content Analysis 
For the content analysis of EP debates concerning the emissions proposals, I coded a series of 
keywords consistent with the two focal point identified above focusing on consumer protection 
and industry interests, respectively.233 We should expect to find that the consumer protection 
focal point gains in prominence throughout the course of the decision-making process, as it was 
emphasized by the primary actors in the environment committee, while the question of the 
impact of the proposal on EU industries was sidelined over time, meaning that the number of 
references to the industry interest focal point should decrease. 
The analysis focuses on three debates in the EP plenary in April 1997, February 1998, 
and September 1998. These debates concerned the three proposals jointly, with the result that 
they do not correspond directly to the first, second, and third parliamentary readings. 
Specifically, the first debate concerned the EP’s report in the first readings of the directives on 
emissions from private motor vehicles (COD/1996/0164A) as well as the fuel quality proposal 
(COD/1996/163). The second debate took place at the second reading stage for those two 
proposals, but also concerned the first reading EP report of the proposal on emissions from non-
personal motor vehicles (COD/1996/164B). Finally, the third debate followed the conciliation 
procedures for all three proposals. 
                                                 
231 Respondent #42. 
232 See OEIL. 
233 See the Appendix of Chapter 6.4. for a complete coding list. 
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The content analysis confirms the expectation that there was an increase in references to 
the consumer protection focal point over time, which increasingly dominated the discussion. 
Table 19 shows that while there were only 133 references per 10,000 input words in the April 
1997 debate, MEPs referred to the consumer protection issue 158 and 148 times per 10,000 input 
words in the second and third debates, respectively. At the same time, there were 69 references 
per 10,000 input words to the industry interest focal point in the first debate, a number that drops 
to 52 in the second debate. In the third debate, the number of references drops substantially to 
only 28 per 10,000 input words, indicating the decreasing importance of the industry interest 
issue. 
 
[Table 19 here] 
6.4.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
Based on these results, we should expect to find that in first reading, the positions of MEPs on 
both ideological dimensions should be significant predictors of voting choice in the EP plenary. 
With the industry interest focal point in particular playing a prominent role in the discussion of 
the proposals at that point in time, we should expect to find two voting patterns. First, members 
of the political Right should be less likely to support the proposals, since they ought to be more 
concerned with the perceived negative impact of the legislation on businesses. Second, 
Euroskeptics should be less inclined to support the legislation, as they are unlikely to support 
environmental regulation at the EU-level. 
In contrast, the decreasing emphasis on the industry interest focal point should reduce the 
impact of the Left-Right and pro-/anti-EU dimensions in third reading, especially in combination 
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with the ideologically more neutral consumer protection focal point dominating the debate, 
which should undermine ideology-based divisions. 
Due to collinearity issues between certain vote outcomes and the type of capitalism 
variables,234 however, neither multinomial nor binary logit analyses are straightforward with 
regard to the emissions proposals. Table 20 and Table 21 show the frequencies of vote outcomes 
by type of capitalism for the first reading votes of proposals 163 and 164a. Of concern for this 
analysis are the empty cells, for example in the sectoral and national coordinated market 
economy categories for the 163 proposal, which indicate perfect collinearity between the 
predictor variable and certain vote outcomes (i.e., the sectoral coordinated market economy 
variable predicts the absence of abstentions perfectly, and the national coordinated market 
economy variable predicts the absence of No votes and abstentions perfectly). Also 
methodologically problematic are the cases of almost perfect collinearity, where the cell value is 
very small, such as the two instances of No votes for the liberal and sectoral market economy 
categories; here, the two variables almost perfectly predict the occurrences of No votes.235 
 
[Table 20 here] 
 
[Table 21 here] 
 
                                                 
234 The “type of capitalism” variables fall into four categories: liberal market economy (Ireland and the United 
Kingdom); partial or family-oriented coordinated market economy (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal); 
sectoral coordinated market economy (Germany, Austria and Benelux countries); national coordinated market 
economy (Scandinavian countries). 
235 In situations where an independent variable almost perfectly predicts the occurrence of a certain outcome, 
STATA reports neither the standard error of that variable nor the chi-squared statistics for the whole model, making 
the substantive interpretation of the model impossible.   
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As a result, I have to exclude the types of capitalism variables from this analysis to focus 
on the impact of the ideology variables. This simplified model is expressed as: 
 
VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right + β2 Sovereignty-Integration. 
 
The results of the simplified model, with only the two ideology variables as predictors, 
must be viewed with caution and serve here merely as illustrations of the likely impact and 
direction of the Left-Right and sovereignty-integration variables. Table 22 and Table 23 shows 
the result of the binary logit analyses for the first reading votes regarding proposals 163 and 
164a.236 The results suggest that in first reading, the expected significances of the predictors and 
the directions of their relationships with the dependent variables find confirmation in the 
empirical data. As hypothesized, both ideology variables are statistically significant in the two 
votes. The Left-Right variable correlates negatively with the dependent variable, indicating that 
MEPs on the political Right were more likely to oppose the legislative proposals; and the 
sovereignty-integration variable is positively related to the dependent variable, meaning that 
more pro-European MEPs were more likely to support the legislation. 
 
[Table 22 here] 
 
[Table 23 here] 
 
                                                 
236 The results of the multinomial logit analysis, which mirror those of the binary logit analysis, are presented in the 
Appendix of Chapter 6.4. 
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This vote pattern is also evident in the graphs presenting the predicted probability of 
votes in favor of the proposals. Figure 46 displays the predicted probability of a Yes vote given 
Left-Right positions, which decreases as we move toward the political Right.237 
 
[Figure 46 here] 
 
Figure 47 shows that the probability of voting in favor increases with the pro-integration 
stance of MEPs. 
 
[Figure 47 here] 
 
In third reading, the EP adopted the joint proposal on the quality of petrol and diesel fuels 
(163) with 474 votes to ten with three abstentions; the proposal to reduce air pollution from 
motor vehicles (164a) with 454 votes to three with seven abstentions; and the proposal to reduce 
air pollution from light commercial vehicles (164b) with 465 votes to 11 with three abstentions. 
Due to this overwhelming majority in favor of the three legislative proposals, there is insufficient 
variance in the dependent variables to run meaningful statistical analyses, making a direct 
comparison with vote patterns in first reading impossible. Instead, I provide descriptives of the 
MEPs who voted against the proposals or abstained.  
Of the 15 MEPs who did not support the set of legislative proposals, 11 were French, 
three were Belgian, and one was Italian. Except for one member of the Union for Europe (UEP), 
all were non-attached MEPs. All are far to the political right, with an average score of 0.60 on 
                                                 
237 To calculate the probabilities presented in the following figures, I used CLARIFY and held the remaining 
variables constant at their means. 
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the Left-Right dimension, and all are pronounced Euroskeptics, with an average score of -0.78 
on the sovereignty-integration dimension. Hence, aside from a very small group of non-attached, 
politically conservative, Euroskeptic MEPs, the rapporteurs actually managed to get the entire 
EP behind their positions in the final vote on the three proposals; the apparent left-right and pro-
/anti-EU divisions observable in first reading disappeared in third reading as the consumer 
protection focal point became prevalent.238 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the emissions and fuel quality directives demonstrates the substantial impact 
individual MEPs can have on a legislative outcomes, since the EP’s campaign for tighter 
emissions and fuel quality standards was successful despite significant opposition in both 
Council and Commission. A cohesive EP, however, which supported the more stringent 
guidelines with an overwhelming majority under the leadership of a group of legislative 
specialists from different party groups, ultimately succeeded in securing its most important 
objectives. 
The role of the two rapporteurs in securing this outcome constitutes an important reason 
for Parliament’s achievement, according to the majority of my respondents, who highlighted 
their expertise, abilities, and willingness to seek a broad compromise across party lines as their 
recipe for success. The compromise was established between party experts in the responsible 
environment committee, and this “right mix” of people constituted the basis for people following 
the committee position. 
                                                 
238 This reality precludes the spatial illustration of the shift in policy preferences over time. 
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The proponents of the legislation advocated its merits by providing a “consumer 
protection” focal point that resonated with a large number of MEPs. This focal point affected 
voting behavior in first reading in the expected direction, which provides support for hypothesis 
H3b.  Unfortunately, the data limitations for this set of proposals do not allow for as detailed an 
analysis as in other chapters.   
The content analysis demonstrates, however, that the consumer protection focal point 
became increasingly dominant over time at the expense of a second focal point emphasizing the 
perceived negative impact of the legislation on the competitiveness of national industries. 
Accordingly, MEPs voted overwhelmingly in favor of the legislative proposals in third reading, 
while there had been substantial divisions earlier on. 
6.5 LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
The purpose of the legislative proposal on “liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage” (COD/2002/0021), introduced by the Commission in January 2002, 
was to create a regulatory framework that would establish an EU-wide system of liability for 
environmental damage. In the context of the proposed legislation, “environmental damage” 
included damage to wildlife and natural biodiversity protected at EU and national levels, to the 
water courses regulated by the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), as well as land 
contamination which causes serious harm to human health. The basis for the legislation was the 
“polluter-pays principle,” according to which the operator who has caused the damage, or who is 
faced with an imminent threat of such damage occurring, should ultimately bear the cost 
associated with clean-up measures. Dating back almost a decade, when a Green Paper on 
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Environmental Liability first introduced the principle in 1993, the polluter-pays principle was to 
provide the foundation for EU-level harmonization and regulatory control within the 
environmental field. The legislation was also building on a number of Parliamentary resolutions 
on the matter and a White Paper on Environmental Liability published in 2000.239 
At the time the legislation was introduced, not all member states actually had legislation 
in place to address the issue of environmental liability, which was the case in Portugal and 
Greece, for example, and some member states’ legislation did not adequately address the 
legislation’s primary objective of “site clean-up” following pollution. The Commission proposal 
highlighted the need for this legislation by estimating that around 300,000 sites were already 
identified as contaminated or potentially contaminated across the EU, with clean-up costs 
estimated to total between EUR 55 and 106 billion. The lack of a harmonized framework at the 
EU level facilitated the exploitation of differences in national-level legislation and loopholes in 
the existing regulatory frameworks by economic actors, meaning that the cost of cleaning it up 
would come from public finances. 
The objective of the liability legislation was to establish a framework that would either 
prevent or remedy environmental damage by forcing negligent operators to clean up polluted 
sites at their own expense, or to reimburse public authorities who may have taken restorative 
measures. Taking account of the subsidiarity principle,240 the directive aimed to provide a 
minimum standard for restoring damaged sites, while leaving particular decisions regarding the 
measures to be taken by or on behalf of such operators to national authorities. The Commission 
                                                 
239 Green Papers are documents drafted by the European Commission that are intended to stimulate debate and 
launch a process of consultation at European level on a particular topic. These consultations may then lead to the 
publication of a White Paper, which are Commission documents containing proposals for Community action in a 
specific area.  
240 Subsidiarity is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its 
exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. 
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proposal did, however, provide for the possibility that private actors or parties with a sufficient 
interest (such as environmental NGOs) could request appropriate action by the competent 
authorities at the national level and challenge their subsequent action or inaction. 
The critical controversies regarding the environmental liability directive concerned the 
question of the Directive's scope, that is, what environmental damage and which occupational 
activities should be covered, and where they should apply;241 the exemptions and defenses 
available to alleged polluters;242 and the question of voluntary or compulsory insurance.243 In 
terms of scope, the directive included practices or activities involving heavy metals, dangerous 
chemicals, landfill sites and incineration plants, but explicitly excluded other risky activities, 
such as oil transport and drilling operations. With regard to exemptions, the Commission 
proposal excluded "damage caused by an emission or event expressly authorized in a permit" and 
activities which are believed to be safe for the environment according to "the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge" when they occur (“state of the art exception”). Finally, the 
Commission proposal sought to “encourage” operators to invest in prevention by making 
insurance against environmental damage voluntary, rather than compulsory. 
6.5.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
Deliberation of the environmental liability directive in the EP was preceded by an unusually 
controversial conflict between the Environment and Legal Affairs Committees over which 
committee should be in charge of the proposal.244 The dossier was first given to the Environment 
Committee, but this decision was challenged by the Legal Affairs Committee. While the 
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Environment Committee emphasized that the liability scheme concerned legislation specific to 
the environment and was being reviewed by the Council of Environment Ministers, the Legal 
Affairs Committee argued that it should be responsible because the issue concerned third party 
liability matters irrespective of the area of application.245 The conflict culminated in the 
extraordinary decision to have a plenary vote on the issue, rather than leave the decision to the 
conference of committee chairmen, which normally resolves competency conflicts but could not 
find agreement regarding this particular dossier.246 On July 3, 2002, the EP voted by 266 to 241 
with 12 abstentions in favor of the Legal Affairs Committee. Toine Manders (ELDR, 
Netherlands) was chosen as the rapporteur. The Environment Committee would provide an 
opinion, with Mihail Papayannakis (GUE, Greece) as its rapporteur. Moreover, the Conference 
of Presidents decided to invoke Rule 47 of the EP’s rules of procedure.247 Rule 47 describes the 
“enhanced cooperation procedure,” which applies when the Conference of Presidents decides 
that a legislative proposal falls almost equally within the competence of two committees, or 
when different parts of the issue under consideration fall under the competence of two 
committees. Under the procedure, the two committees set a common time table and the 
rapporteur of the lead committee is supposed to seek agreement with the opinion draftsman on a 
joint text. Moreover, the amendments adopted in the opinion committee can be adopted by the 
lead committee without a vote.  
Mr. Papayannakis was the first to table his report on the Commission proposal on behalf 
of the Environment Committee. In his report, he harshly criticized the proposal, starting with 
what he identified as inadequate definitions of key concepts such as biodiversity, land 
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contamination, or soil and subsoil contamination. Also within the realm of definition, he 
highlighted that according to the Commission proposal, liability to restore "environmental 
damage" was triggered only above a degree of "seriousness," but that the proposal failed to 
define how the seriousness of damage was to be measured. In the opinion of the environment 
committee, measurement standards should include the extent and duration of the polluting 
impact, whether pollution is reversible or irreversible, and the sensitivity and rarity of the 
resources damaged. 
The environment committee also wanted to extend the scope of the directive to include 
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), cover damages associated with air pollution, and 
extend to all activities subject to Community environmental legislation, rather than the limited 
number of practices identified in the Commission proposal. It was also to include oil pollution 
and nuclear damage, which were excluded on the grounds that they are already covered by other 
international conventions.248 The Environment Committee rejected the "compliance with permit" 
and the "state of the art" exceptions specified in the Commission proposal, arguing that they 
undermined the effective implementation of the polluter-pays principle. Finally, the Environment 
Committee report demanded that insurance against environmental damage should be mandatory, 
rather than voluntary, to ensure that costs associated with clean-up measures would not, 
ultimately, fall upon taxpayers.249 
                                                 
248 This question raised some distinct national concerns and positions. Many Spanish members, for example, favored 
a strict liability framework that included both preventive and remediary measures following the recent “Prestige” oil 
spill, when an oil tanker sank in 2002 off the Galician coast, causing a massive oil spill. Thousands of kilometers of 
Spanish and French coastline were polluted and the local fishing industry devastated. The Prestige spill was the 
largest environmental disaster in Spanish history. Similarly, for MEPs from Austria and Ireland the question of 
including or excluding nuclear technologies in the scope of the directive was of special interest, because neither 
country uses nuclear energy for industrial purposes (Respondent #35, Respondent #2, Respondent #6).  
249 European Report, “Environment: Eurochambers and Parliament critical of Environmental Liability Directive.” 
January 22, 2003. 
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Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, which defines the enhanced cooperation 
procedure, the lead committee can accept, without a vote, amendments from the opinion 
committee  
 
“where they concern matters which the chairman of the committee responsible considers 
[…], after consulting the chairman of the committee asked for an opinion, to fall under 
the competence of the committee asked for an opinion, and which do not contradict other 
elements of the report.”  
 
With regard to the environmental liability dossier, this meant in practice that most 
amendments proposed in the opinion report of the Environment Committee were not included in 
the first reading report tabled by the Legal Affairs Committee, since the report drafted by 
rapporteur Toine Manders aimed to strike a balance between conflicting interests of industry and 
environmental concerns and significantly watered down the proposal by reducing the total 
number of amendments from 303 to 12.250 According to one respondent from the EPP, this was 
the result of the environment committee overstepping its competences by amending aspects of 
the reports that fell within the jurisdiction of the Legal Affairs Committee.251 Another respondent 
close to the rapporteur, however, explained that the enhanced cooperation procedure proved to 
be an exercise in “window-dressing” in the case of the environmental liability dossier, because in 
practice, it was the responsible rapporteur who decided what amendments “fall under the 
competence” of the opinion committee.252 This meant that Mr. Manders decided “strategically” 
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252 Respondent #71. Internal communication between the chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee, Guiseppe 
Gargani, and the chairwoman of the Environment Committee, Caroline Jackson, also indicates that the Environment 
Committee did not feel properly consulted with regard to the timetable, which according to Rule 47 of the Rules of 
Procedure ought to be jointly drawn up by the two committees (Jackson letter to Gargani, January 31, 2003). 
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what amendments should be sent to the plenary.253 Another respondent confirmed this reality by 
acknowledging that the decision is a political one in the end,254 while an EPP member of the 
Legal Affairs committee explained:  
 
“It is a huge advantage to be the main committee, and the rapporteur of the main 
committee, if he is arrogant enough, can bypass all the opinions. You have no legal 
obligation to take opinion amendments on board. You can practically say: let’s reject all 
the amendments of the environment committee, and no one can blame you.”255 
 
Members of the Environment Committee did blame the rapporteur for his decision to 
include only one of every four amendments they introduced, however. In fact, the issue triggered 
an angry exchange of letters between the chairmen of the two committees.256 There was no way 
of standing up against a majority of EPP and Liberals in the Legal Affairs Committee, however, 
of which the proponents of a less stringent framework for environmental liability were well 
aware.257 Accordingly, the Manders report was adopted in first reading by an 18 to 11 margin, 
against the votes of committee members from the Left. 
The Manders report centered on a series of “compromise” amendments. These 
amendments broadened the definition of the term "European biodiversity" to all protected 
species and sites where they live; extended the Directive's scope to include nuclear and marine 
pollution (but only at the end of a transitional five-year period in the event that the relevant 
international agreements have not been ratified by the member states and/or the EU); sought to 
reduce the number of exemptions specified in the Commission proposal; and made financial 
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security systems mandatory. Nevertheless, the report was perceived to be too lenient for more 
environmentally-minded MEPs. Most importantly, the "compliance with permit" and the "state 
of the art" exceptions remained part of the proposal, while scope and definitions concerning 
environmental damage were seen as unclear and arbitrary.258 Effectively, the Manders report was 
perceived to exclude some of the greatest perceived threats to the environment, such as air 
pollution and genetically-modified organism, while providing exemptions that would allow 
operators to dodge the polluter-pays principle in practice. As a result, proponents of the stricter 
framework laid out in the report of the Environment Committee voted against the Manders report 
in committee and re-tabled their amendments in plenary.259 
A number of the amendments seeking to strengthen the proposal were adopted in the EP 
plenary’s first reading vote on May 14, 2003, if by very small margins.260 The EP thus adopted 
amendments broadening the definition of the term “biodiversity” to cover habitats and species 
protected under European as well as national legislation, and stipulated that those who are, or 
could be, responsible for potentially damaging activities should take preventive or restorative 
measures without governments requesting them to do so. Others amendments reduced drastically 
the number of exemptions permitting operators to avoid bearing the costs of environmental 
damage they have caused (by limiting these to cases of armed conflict and terrorist acts, 
exceptional and unavoidable natural phenomena, and to activities carried out within the 
framework of good agricultural and forestry practice). Finally, financial insurance systems for 
cases in which an operator cannot be held responsible would be mandatory, rather than 
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voluntary, within six years after the directive enters into force.261 The complete report, which 
significantly strengthened the directive from an environmental perspective vis-à-vis the report of 
the Legal Affairs Committee, was adopted by 310 in favor, 177 against with 23 abstentions.  
Accordingly, plenary actually departed from the position of the lead committee.262 This is 
quite unusual, since plenary follows the recommendation of the responsible committee most of 
the time. Instead, plenary followed the line of the Environment Committee and thus adopted the 
more stringent proposal.263 For example, there were two voting lists in the Liberal Group, that is, 
the document suggesting how Liberal MEPs should vote in plenary actually had two columns 
providing contradictory voting instruction. One was the vote suggestion of the rapporteur in the 
lead committee, Toine Manders, the other one the proposed positions of a senior Liberal member 
of the Environment Committee, Chris Davies. Liberal MEPs not familiar with the details of the 
dossier could then decide which one of their colleagues they trusted more when making their 
own vote choice.264 More environmentally-minded MEPs in the Liberal group would follow Mr. 
Davies, while others could decide to follow Mr. Manders’ “industry-prone” approach. With a 
split voting list proposed by those two MEPs, “you know immediately whom to follow, 
irrespective of the topic that will be voted on,” according to one Liberal respondent.265 
The common position of the Council of Ministers was adopted on September 19, 2003, 
by qualified majority against the votes of Austria, Germany, and Ireland. The Council's common 
position accepted 26 of the EP’s 48 amendments to the proposal, but leaned decisively toward 
the Commission proposal, rather than the more stringent EP position, with regard to the key 
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issues. Most importantly, it provided for member states to  include the "compliance with permit" 
and the "state of the art" exemptions if they so chose, stipulated a voluntary rather than 
compulsory insurance regime, and excluded emissions and nuclear activities from the scope of 
the directive.266 
Unlike in first reading, the EP did not take a strong environmental stance in the second 
reading, where it followed the recommendation of the rapporteur and adopted his report.267 The 
proponents of the Manders report were aided by the EP’s decision-making rules, however, which 
stipulate the need for absolute majorities in second reading, that is, more than 50 percent of the 
total number of members. The rules of procedure thus made it less likely that the controversial 
amendments from first reading, in which a simple majority suffices, would be adopted in second 
reading. 
While the Manders report in second reading proposed some measures that went beyond 
the Council’s position (for example by including environmental damages linked to maritime 
navigation accidents in the directive's field of application), it actually weakened the overall 
stringency of the proposed legislation in other key areas. Most importantly, it accepted the 
Council’s position of a voluntary, rather than mandatory, insurance scheme, but it left open the 
future possibility of a compulsory system of financial guarantees by asking the Commission to 
evaluate the insurance situation five years after the legislation’s entry into force. If proper 
instruments of financial guarantee were not adopted by then, the EP would ask the Commission 
to submit proposals for an obligatory insurance scheme, first for water and soil damage, and later 
for damage to biodiversity and natural habitats. With regard to the second question of 
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controversy, the Legal Affairs Committee also accepted "permit" and "state of the art" defenses. 
The environmental liability legislation nevertheless went into conciliation, due to the small 
adjustments the EP made to the Council’s common position. 
The overall tone of the second reading report contradicted the more environmental line 
propagated by those in favor of a more stringent environmental framework for the liability 
legislation. In effect, it was an attempt by the political Right, under the leadership of rapporteur 
Toine Manders, to outvote the opposition, rather than to seek a broadly acceptable compromise. 
This step was preceded by extensive negotiations across party and committee lines, which 
proved to be unsuccessful. The reasons for this failure to build consensus are unclear, as 
respondents provide different accounts for the circumstances under which negotiations broke 
down. Some indicate that the compromise proposals made by the rapporteur were derived from 
negotiations that involved the opinion rapporteurs from the opinion committees, including Mr. 
Papayannakis.268 Others are more skeptical of Mr. Manders’ motives and his abilities to forge a 
broad political compromise; one respondent describes Mr. Manders’ handling of the dossier as 
“an example of how not to do legislation.”269 Despite any early attempts to arrive at a 
compromise, it is quite evident is that Mr. Manders eventually gave up on the idea of consensus-
building and merely tried to push through his own agenda with the help of the EPP.270 
Conciliation opened on January 27, 2004. The most important issue remained the 
question of voluntary versus obligatory insurance and when a voluntary system should be re-
evaluated. In this regard, the conciliation compromise of February 19, 2004, stipulated that the 
Commission would conduct an evaluation after six years from the legislation’s entry into force 
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and to determine the need for a harmonized mandatory financial securities framework. It would 
also address the issue of a ceiling for liability and the exclusion of low-risk activities from the 
mandatory insurance scheme.271 The EP accepted this compromise on March 31. The legislation 
was to enter into force by the end of the year, and national law would have to be introduced 
within three years. This outcome was significantly closer to the positions of the political Right, 
while some of the less stringent requests of the Environment Committee were included in the 
legislation.272 In the end, it was an outcome with which nobody was very content.273 
One question that remains is whether this outcome would have been different had the 
environment committee been the lead committee. When asked directly, respondents provided 
contradictory assessements. Some maintained that the outcome would very likely have been 
different,274 while others acknowledge that this may have been the case.275 A third group—
notably all members of the EPP, whose positions regarding the issue were more or less realized 
in the final legislation—, maintain that the outcome would have been the same, since it is the EP 
plenary that has the final say with regard to any committee report.276 
In reality, much would support the conclusion that there was at least a good chance the 
outcome would have been different with Environmental Affairs in charge. There even seems to 
have been such an assumption in parliament prior to the actual legislative process, since both 
committees competing for the lead lobbied hard, which is unlikely to have been just to gain 
prestige. In fact, the EPP chairman of the committee, Giuseppe Gargani, went against the 
chairwoman of the Environment Committee, Caroline Jackson, who was a British Conservative 
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and thus a colleague from his own party group. Especially the conservatives and liberals in the 
Legal Affairs Committee assumed that their policy agenda was more likely to succeed with their 
committee in the lead.277 One EPP member explains:  
 
“We are stronger in legal affairs, because we have a strong alliance with the Liberals, but 
in Environmental Affairs, the Socialists are stronger, because they have an alliance with 
the Greens and the smaller groups, and the Liberals in that committee are maybe more 
left-leaning.”278 
 
The Legal Affairs Committee had two critical advantages as the lead committee. First, it 
could, and did, suppress those amendments from the Environment Committee that it viewed as 
politically undesirable.279 This authority was especially important in second reading, when a 
simple majority suffices to adopt amendments in committee, but an absolute majority is needed 
in plenary. The Legal Affairs committee thus had the de facto ability to decide what amendments 
had a good chance to stand or fall.280 This, in addition to the possibility of setting the tone of the 
debate,281 resulted in an increasing capacity for the Legal Affairs Committee to dominate the 
decision-making process after first reading. 
Despite the evident disagreements over the content of the proposal, it was the initial 
conflict of competences that critically set the tone of the debate concerning the environmental 
liability legislation. As one EP official working closely with the rapporteur explains, at first, 
“nobody was interested” in this “technical, legally complex dossier that could only be understood 
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by a few experts.”282 Over the course of the debate, however, the dossier was “made 
controversial” and “blown out of proportion. It was a hype!”283 The dossier was very heavily 
lobbied,284 and ultimately, there were a large number of people who were interested in the 
dossier.285 Nonetheless, it was only the key players who actually knew about the content and the 
potential implications of the dossier.286 Many other actors 
 
“jumped in at a very late stage not knowing what it is all about, and these people are very 
easy targets for sentiments […] If you use sentiment, if you avoid the debate on 
substance, it is very easy to convince people and drag them into your camp […] It was a 
disadvantage in finding a compromise that this dossier was so politicized.”287 
 
Three focal points dominated the debate concerning the environmental liability directive. 
The proponents of the legislation emphasized that the legislation would have to be realistic in 
striking a balance between environmental and industry concerns. This issue was summarized by 
references to the need for “workability,” or implementability, of the legislation.288 A second 
focal point emphasized the desirability of the legislation from a pro-European point of view by 
emphasizing the need for “harmonization” of environmental regulation at the EU level. Finally, 
opponents of the legislation presented the dossier as a de facto “license to pollute,” due to its 
limited scope and important exceptions to the rules. 
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6.5.2 Content Analysis  
For the content analysis, I coded a series of keywords consistent with the three focal points 
prevalent in the debate of the environmental liability dossier, that is, the “workability,” 
“harmonization,” and “license to pollute” focal points.289 Given the course of the deliberation 
process, we should expect to find that the license to pollute focal point should be referenced most 
during the first reading stage, when the conflict of competences between the Legal Affairs and 
Environment Committees was in full swing and the Environment Committee played a critical 
role in debate. This focal point should remain important across the three reading stages, since 
there was no broadly acceptable compromise agreement even at the end, but it should become 
less visible with the decreasing role of the Environment Committee at the later stages of the 
decision-making process. 
The “workability” focal point should also feature prominently in all three reading stages. 
In contrast to the “license to pollute” focal point, however, it should increase in importance over 
time, since it constituted the primary element of argumentation in the Legal Affairs Committee. 
As the Legal Affairs Committee managed to sideline the Environment Committee, its own 
presentation of the issue should become increasingly dominant. 
Finally, the number of references to the “harmonization” focal point should also increase 
over time, for the same reason as the “workability” focal point: the increasing dominance of the 
Legal Affairs Committee should result in an increase in references to one of its central lines of 
argument. 
These expectations are generally confirmed in the TEXTPACK analysis, as Table 26 
shows. 
                                                 
289 Coding details can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 6.5. 
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 [Table 26 here] 
 
As expected, the “license to pollute” focal point was marginalized during the course of 
the deliberation process. While it was referred to 123 times per 10,000 input words in the first 
reading debate, this number drops continuously to 74 references in second and 35 references in 
third reading. At the same time, the “workability” focal point gained in prominence between the 
first and second readings, when it was referred to 77 and 96 times, respectively, per 10,000 input 
words. Hence, it replaced the license to pollute focal point as the dominant focus of the 
discussion. However, it was mentioned only 43 times in third reading, when the third focal point 
centering on the subject of “harmonization” was much more prominent than in previous 
readings, especially in comparison to the number of references to the other two focal points. 
There were only 14 and nine references to the harmonization focal point in first and second 
reading (when the number of references to the other focal points was many times that amount), it 
was referred to 23 times in third reading (when the number of references to the other focal points 
was only slightly higher). 
6.5.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
As nobody requested a roll-call vote in the third reading stage of the legislative process, this 
quantitative analysis is limited to only one vote, namely the vote on the first reading EP report. 
At that point in time, the Environment Committee still played a critical role under the enhanced 
cooperation procedure. Moreover, the conflict of competences between the Legal Affairs and 
Environment Committees had reached a second climax, following the initial EP vote putting the 
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Legal Affairs Committee in charge of the legislation, as the Legal Affairs Committee had 
rejected the majority of amendments proposed in the Environment Committee opinion report. 
The Environment Committee re-introduced its amendments in the EP plenary, however; 
accordingly, the first reading report prescribed a strict liability framework that would not leave 
negligent operators much leeway in terms of scope and possible exemptions. 
All three focal points identified in the qualitative analysis above were part of the 
deliberation process during the first reading stage. The “workability” and “license to pollute” 
focal points were presented as almost directly contradictory to one another, with the political 
Right emphasizing the need for a balanced framework that would take both environmental and 
business interests into account, and the political Left arguing that the proposed framework 
directive watered down the “polluter-pays” principle beyond recognition. The directive was thus 
discussed in a Left-Right context and, accordingly, we would expect the analysis to show that 
MEP positions on the Left-Right are statistically significant predictors of vote choice. In 
particular, legislators from the political left should be more likely to support the stringent first 
reading proposal, while those on the Right should oppose it. 
At the same time, the ‘harmonization’ focal point constituted an emphasis on the need for 
an EU-level regulation facilitating the harmonization of environmental policy across the member 
states. Accordingly, we should expect MEP positions on the Sovereignty-Integration dimension 
to be statistically significant as well, with pro-Europeans more likely to support the legislation 
and EU-skeptics likely to oppose it. 
The formal regression model is expressed as: 
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VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right  + β2 Sovereignty-Integration + β3 Government Status + β4 
Liberal Market Economy + β5 Partial Coordinated Market Economy + β6 Sectoral 
Coordinated Market Economy.290 
 
I conducted both binary logit and multinomial logit analyses, the results of which are 
almost identical. In what follows, I will present the results of the binary logit analysis.291 
The results of the binary logit analysis confirm the expectations from above. As 
hypothesized, the coefficients of the two ideological variables are both statistically significant in 
the expected direction: Leftists and pro-Europeans are more likely to support the legislation. This 
result is evident in Table 27, which presents the raw binary logit estimates. 
 
[Table 27 here] 
 
Figure 50 provides the predicted probability of a vote in favor of the liability legislation 
given MEP positions on the Left-Right dimension.292 
 
[Figure 50 here] 
 
According to Figure 50, the probability of MEPs from the far Left, center-left, and even 
the political center supporting the legislation was quite high in the first reading vote, with some 
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291 Multinomial logit results can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 6.5. 
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variation between the four different types of capitalism. As we move further to the political 
Right, however, the probability of a vote in favor of the legislation drops substantially. 
Figure 51 displays the predicted probabilities of a Yes vote given positions on the 
Sovereignty-Integration dimension. The figure demonstrates that vote choice in first reading was 
also a function of positions on this dimension, with pro-Europeans much more likely to support 
the legislation than EU-skeptics. 
 
[Figure 51 here] 
 
Figure 52 demonstrates that government status at home increased the probability of an 
MEP supporting the proposal, meaning that MEPs whose national parties were represented in the 
Council were more likely to vote in favor. This trend is most pronounced for legislators from 
sectoral coordinated market economies, who had the smallest initial inclination to support the 
legislation. 
  
[Figure 52 here] 
 
Finally, both figures show that MEPs from liberal market economies were most likely to 
support the legislation, followed by MEPs from member states with national and partial 
coordinated market economies. Members from sectoral coordinated market economies, in 
contrast, were relatively less inclined to support the strict liability framework. 
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6.5.4 Conclusion 
This analysis of the environmental liability legislation highlights the importance of the key 
participants in the legislation decision-making process, their configuration, and their interaction. 
It demonstrates, furthermore, that the level of controversy concerning particular pieces of 
legislation is difficult to forecast, since the initial conflict of competences between the Legal 
Affairs and Environment Committees set the stage for an unusually controversial deliberation 
process. 
The role of the Environment Committee was critical indeed and shows what can happen 
in a legislative process when two competing sets of specialists are involved in the deliberation of 
a dossier. The Environment and Legal Affairs Committees presented the legislation in two 
fundamentally different fashions, and the Environment Committee, despite losing its initial role 
as the lead committee, succeeded in shaping vote choice during the first reading plenary vote. 
The legislative rules limited its role in second reading, however, where the Legal Affairs 
Committee had more leeway in drafting a report along the lines of its political objectives. As a 
result, the final piece of legislation reflects the position of the Legal Affairs Committee more 
than that of the Environment Committee. 
Unfortunately for this analysis, the final vote in third reading was not recorded, making 
an explicit comparison between the first and third reading votes on the EP floor, and thus a direct 
evaluation of Hypotheses 3b impossible. The qualitative analysis suggests, however, that 
positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension became more potent predictors over time, at 
the expense of the salience of the Left-Right divide. This is for two reasons. First, with the 
decreasing involvement of the Environment Committee, the “license to pollute” focal point 
played a gradually less important role in the deliberation process. This trend is confirmed in the 
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content analysis and would likely entail a decrease in the perceived salience of the Left-Right 
dimension. Simultaneously, the prominence of the other two focal points increased, as the 
content analysis shows. The growing importance of these focal points likely entailed an increase 
in the salience of the sovereignty-integration dimension. While the harmonization focal point 
emphasized the desirability of a harmonized framework for environmental legislation at the EU 
level and thus explicitly stressed a pro-EU element in the policy proposal, the workability focal 
point underlined that it may be better to have a sub-optimal legislative framework than none at 
all. 
All this is speculative, but the evidence presented in previous case studies supports the 
likelihood of this scenario. If this were indeed the case, the shape of a given legislator’s (MEPx) 
indifference curves would resemble the illustration in Figure 53, meaning that focal points 
critically affected the policy preferences of EP backbenchers.  
 
[Figure 53 here] 
 
In first reading, the status quo point falls inside MEPx‘s elliptically shaped indifference 
curve (the solid line), when the Left-Right divide is perceived to be more salient than the 
Sovereignty-Integration dimension. Accordingly, the EP tightens the provisions of the legislation 
considerably to make it more environmentally conscious. In contrast, it is the proposed 
legislation (i.e., the “New Policy”) that constitutes the more preferred alternative in third reading. 
At this point in time, the indifference curve is “squeezed” from above and below (the dashed 
line), indicating the greater salience of the Sovereignty-Integration dimension. As a result, the 
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directive on a common EU environmental liability framework is heavily amended in first 
reading, but adopted without these amendments in third reading. 
6.6 THE LIBERALIZATION OF PORT SERVICES IN THE EU 
The purpose of the directive on “port services: market access and financing of maritime ports” 
(COD/2001/0047), often referred to as the “port package,” was to establish a legal framework 
that would ensure fair access to the port services market across the EU, where port services 
refers to technical-nautical pilotage services; towage and berthing; all cargo handling operations 
(including loading and unloading, stevedoring, stowage, transhipment and other intra-terminal 
transport); and passenger services (including embarkation and disembarkation). The opening of 
the port services market was to be achieved while providing member states with the opportunity 
to create specific rules within this framework that would take account of the ports’ geographic 
characteristics as well as local, regional, and national singularities. The legislation was thus 
supposed to combine the principle of subsidiarity with the recognition and enforcement of the 
four freedoms (freedom of goods, persons, services, and capital) and existing EU competition 
rules.293 
At the time when the port services legislation was proposed by the Commission in early 
2001, there was a great divergence of practice in the member states. While breaches of the 
existing regulations had been treated on a case-by-case basis in the past, the port package was to 
ensure a more systematic application of rules in the port sector to guarantee that all service 
providers would have a fair chance of entering the port services market. The overall goal was to 
                                                 
293 Subsidiarity is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its 
exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. 
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avoid distortion of competition by improving and harmonizing national rules, regulations and 
practices. 
6.6.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
The port services directive was one of the most controversial legislative proposals before the 
European Parliament during its 5th term (1999-2004). The two most contested aspects of the 
proposal concerned the transparency of financial relations between member states and their ports 
and the range of services covered by the directive. The first was discussed in the context of 
“competition between harbors” (the financing of ports and port-related investments), while the 
second issue related to “competition within harbors” (the question of opening up the access to 
services in individual ports). 
While the question of competition between ports was principally a source of inter-
institutional disagreement between the EP on the one side and Council and Commission on the 
other, the question of services covered by the directive constituted a considerable source of 
controversy within the European Parliament. Two types of port services took center-stage, 
namely pilotage (the guiding of vessels in and out of port) and “self-handling” (the situation 
where a port user provides for its own port services personnel, rather than buying services from 
dock workers in the port, for example by using its own land-based personnel or sea-faring crew 
and equipment for cargo handling operations). 
During the first parliamentary reading in November 2001, the EP amended the 
Commission proposal substantially. First, it included a provision requiring greater transparency 
with regard to public funding and the financial structures of European seaports. It also excluded 
pilotage from the directive, and restricted self-handling to port users whose vessels fly the flag of 
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am EU member state. This was to decrease the risk of social dumping, where specialized dock 
workers would be replaced by under-qualified seafaring personnel not covered by existing social, 
safety, training, and environmental regulations. By authorizing only ships flying EU member 
state flags, the EP sought to prevent the use of “flags of convenience” to minimize self-handling 
costs. 
Commission and Council did not accept the critical EP amendments concerning the 
transparency of financial relations and the scope of the directive, however, which the EP then 
reintroduced in second reading in March 2003. With regard to the question of self-handling, the 
EP sought to restrict authorization to seafaring crew members, rather than allowing the use of 
land-based personnel, and confirmed its insistence on permitting self-handling only for vessels 
flying the flag of an EU member state. It also insisted that self-handlers should be treated in the 
same way as other port service providers, meaning the same social standards and professional 
qualification requirements would apply. Once again, pilotage was to be completely excluded 
from the directive. 
Following the EP’s rejection of the Council’s common position, the port package went 
into conciliation at the end of September 2003. The conciliation agreement outlined that self-
handling would be allowed only in cases where shipping companies use their own sea-faring 
crew and their own equipment. The agreement also stipulated that a member state may require 
self-handling to be subject to prior authorization in accordance with criteria relating to 
employment and social aspects, professional qualifications and environmental considerations, 
and that national rules on training requirements, professional qualifications, employment and 
social matters would not be affected directly by the legislation. 
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With regard to pilotage, the compromise provided that this service should remain within 
the scope of the directive, but that the special importance of these services for the safety of 
maritime traffic would be emphasized. Moreover, the conciliation agreement specified that the 
national competent authorities may recognize the "compulsory nature" of pilotage and set rules 
for the service deemed necessary for reasons of safety and of public service requirements, 
including limiting pilotage services to a single provider. Hence, the compromise agreement left 
the question of prior authorization for both services to the discretion of the member states, thus 
confirming the position of Council and Commission on both issues. 
Concerning financial relations, the compromise extended the directive to include the 
establishment of "fair and transparent conditions of competition both in and between Community 
ports." To that end, every port and port service provider would be required to disclose its 
financial relations to the member states and the Commission. The Commission and the member 
states would use this information to evaluate the need for fair competition, and the Commission 
would draft a set of common guidelines on state funding for ports within one year of the 
directive’s entry into force. 
The EP’s conciliation delegation had passed the conciliation compromise with a very 
narrow majority, but the EP plenary rejected the agreement on November 20, 2003, with 209 
MEPs voting in favor, 229 against, and 16 abstentions. 
While the question of financial relations and public funding of ports constituted an 
immediate source of conflict between EP, Commission, and Council, the controversy within 
Parliament did not materialize until after the first parliamentary reading, which a number of 
respondents involved in the deliberation of the proposal remember as relatively easy.294 During 
                                                 
294 Respondent #70, Respondent #78, Respondent #19, Respondent #25, Respondent #1. 
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the first reading, there was “some debate, but nobody was interested,” according to one member 
of the responsible Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism; it was “a technical 
debate by those colleagues who have an interest in harbors or come from harbor areas.”295 
Moreover, since the inclusion of measures to improve the transparency of public funding of ports 
into the scope of the directive was broadly favored across party lines,296 the proposal passed 
smoothly through first reading. 
Two developments, however, changed this dynamic during the process of deliberation in 
the later legislative stages. On the one hand, there was unquestionably an external factor, namely 
increasing pressure from stakeholders concerned about the effects of the legislation on existing 
structures, in particular from port authorities, who wanted to keep control of their ports, and port 
workers. In particular, the labor unions in the North Sea harbors in Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium, representing the highly organized dock-workers, increasingly showed their 
opposition publicly, the climax being a number of strikes, as well as vocal and unruly 
demonstrations at the EP in Brussels and Strasbourg. Secondly, there was a change of mood 
within the EP, with the political left becoming more skeptical toward what was increasingly 
perceived to be one of many EU “liberalization initiatives.”297 This new focus on the merits of 
liberalization and privatization, placed in the broader context of globalization, constituted a 
significant change of focus from the first reading, where it played no role whatsoever.298 Now, 
the political Left maintained that the proposal was setting conditions for competition amongst 
service providers within harbors at the expense of highly qualified dock workers and, as a result, 
                                                 
295 Respondent #78, also: Respondent #19. 
296 Respondent #32, Respondent #55, Respondent #1. 
297 Respondent #78. 
298 Respondent #78. 
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of “safety standards and security norms.”299 Hence, “liberalization” and its negative implications 
for dock workers and maritime safety became an increasingly prevalent focal point for the 
opponents of the directive. 
The proponents of opening up European ports to competition, in contrast, maintained that 
ports were too expensive and a burden on the EU economy as a whole. In their view, the 
European economy could become more competitive by cutting excessive costs caused by rigid 
and protectionist structures. Operating ports could be more transparent, efficient, and less 
expensive, which would, according to the proponents, benefit the overall aim of the Lisbon 
Agenda to make the EU the most competitive economy in the world by 2010. Therefore, the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the EU economy would improve if the port package were 
approved, which was the principal focal point for those in favor of the proposal. 
This latter position was the one shared and promoted by the rapporteur responsible for the 
port services directive, the German Christian-Democrat Georg Jarzembowski. As a German 
Christian-Democrat, Mr. Jarzembowski was not perceived to be a pure economic liberal, but a 
socially-oriented politician who in principle favored the involvement of social partners and trade 
unions in economic governance. With regard to liberalization issues, however, he was always 
considered to be “the first to propose liberalization on transport issues.”300 As a result, the 
political Left maintained that "when the rapporteur speaks of reducing the cost of port services 
he really means cutting wages, jobs and social protection."301 
Mr. Jarzembowski enjoys a reputation across party lines as one of the principal specialists 
on transportation issue. He is also known and respected as a skillful politician and tough 
                                                 
299 Respondent #78. 
300 Respondent #78. 
301 Arlette Laguiller (GUE/NGL, France), as cited in European Report: “Shipping: Parliament excludes pilotage 
from liberalisation of port services.” March 12, 2003. 
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negotiator with strong principles and objectives. While generally not perceived as dogmatic, 
even some of his party colleagues view him as headstrong and insistent on his own positions, 
making it difficult at times to pursue an agenda of compromise across party lines.302 At the same 
time, Mr. Jarzembowski does consider what is feasible politically and often walks a fine line 
between what is desirable from his personal point of view and acceptable to others. Respondents 
generally characterized him not as the kind of rapporteur who instinctively seeks a compromise 
that is broadly acceptable across party lines, but one who sticks to his own positions when 
possible and is willing to take political gambles if he sees the odds to be in his favor. As some 
respondents indicated, however, Mr. Jarzembowski occasionally underestimates the extent of the 
opposition to his proposals at times,303 and this was also the case with regard to the port services 
directive.304 He evidently misjudged the majorities he could muster in the EP plenary, especially 
in the decisive third reading vote following the conciliation procedure between EP and Council. 
While a time period of six weeks, with a possible two week extension, is officially 
allocated to a conciliation between EP and Council, the process in the case of the port package 
took a single day until the issue was put to a vote in the conciliation committee. There was 
concern among the proponents of the proposal that a drawn-out negotiation process would 
undermine existing support for the directive, and the “right side of the room was really pressing 
for an immediate solution,” according to an EP official.305 The rapporteur pursued the strategy of 
finding a compromise with the Council of Ministers, which was not willing to give into the 
demands of the Left, and once he realized that there was probably no possibility of “finding an 
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303 Respondent #55. 
304 Respondent #19, Respondent #32, Respondent #44, Respondent #70. 
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agreement with the Socialists,”306 he negotiated a compromise solution with the Council and 
tried to push it through in parliament. Hence, much negotiation took place behind closed doors 
throughout the summer months preceding the conciliation procedure. While there had been no 
official exchange of text between Council and EP, just hours before the first conciliation meeting 
on September 29, 2003, a working document suddenly appeared “out of the blue,” as one 
respondent remembers.307 Evidently, Mr. Jarzembowski speculated that he had the necessary 
majority in plenary to push this text through plenary with the votes of the Liberals, in particular, 
once it was accepted in the conciliation procedure. He was even willing to give up the support of 
a portion of his EPP colleagues, since he expected defectors from other party groups to make up 
for this loss.308 
The most contested element in the conciliation text concerned the authorization 
procedure in the case of self-handling. The question was whether prior authorization by national 
authorities was to be voluntary, as the compromise agreement stipulated, or mandatory, as the 
critics of the proposal demanded. The conciliation committee voted in favor of the conciliation 
result to be forwarded to the EP plenary in a contested 8-7 vote. This outcome came as a surprise 
to the opponents of the directive in the committee, since the Socialist Vice President of the EP, 
Mr. Imbeni, unexpectedly voted in favor of the conciliation result. Mr. Imbeni justified this 
stance arguing that, for institutional reasons, he wanted to leave the final vote to the EP plenary 
and not bring the proposal down himself.309 To many of his party colleagues, however, this 
explanation was unacceptable; one Socialist remembers having been furious at the time.310 Mr. 
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308 Respondent #32. 
309 Respondent #28. 
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Imbeni’s Socialist colleagues suspected that he had cut a deal with the negotiators from the 
Parliament’s Right and the Council behind their backs.311 
The outcome of the vote in the conciliation committee was extremely close and in part 
due to some political maneuvering on the part of the rapporteur. As one respondent present in the 
conciliation meetings maintains,312 a number of Flemish and Dutch EPP members who were to 
vote on the compromise agreement and would have rejected it were substituted, at the very last 
minute, by the rapporteur and group coordinator to ensure the approval of the compromise 
agreement. This type of maneuvering explains why in the case of the port services directive, the 
committee position in favor of the proposal did not translate into a positive vote in the EP 
plenary, where the proposal was defeated with 209 MEPs voting in favor, 229 against, and 16 
abstentions. Mr. Jarzembowski arranged for his position to pass through conciliation rapidly and 
took a gamble in plenary, where he believed he had the majority necessary for the proposal to 
pass, rather than continuing to negotiate a compromise text that might have satisfied some of his 
opponents. This compromise may well have been possible, however, especially with regard to 
the authorization procedure that could have been made “a little more water-proof.”313 While this 
is purely speculative, two respondents from opposite sides of the political spectrum did indicate 
in interview that they would have been willing to accept a compromise where the opening of the 
self-handling sector to competition was coupled with strict mandatory prior authorization. One 
economic liberal from the EPP side, though not satisfied even with the conciliation compromise 
“from a competitive perspective,” indicated that he would have allowed “self-handling with or 
without the prior authorization,”314 while a Socialist from a North-Sea country maintains that she 
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313 Respondent #28. 
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would have supported a compromise providing for self-handling with prior authorization.315 But 
according to the critics of the directive, the rigid positions of the key actors in committee on the 
conservative side made this agreement impossible.316 
The Socialists had two primary objectives in the second and third reading stages: to 
exclude both pilotage and self-handling from the scope of the directive317 and they felt that in 
second reading, they were “almost there.”318 This sense made them fairly optimistic for the 
conciliation procedure and the third reading vote, but the strategy by the rapporteur to push the 
compromise agreement, including a provision for the liberalization of self-handling, through the 
conciliation committee spoiled their efforts before genuine negotiations even started.319 The fact 
that a Socialist Vice-President was the one breaking the tie in favor of sending the compromise 
agreement to the plenary caused a particular stir among the Socialists dealing with the directive. 
The perception that a deal had been cut behind the Socialists’ back between the rapporteur, the 
responsible Commissioner Ms. De Palacio, the Council negotiators, and Mr. Imbeni, intensified 
the opposition to the directive among the Socialist members handling the dossier on behalf of 
their party group.320 The firm positions of Mr. Jarzembowski and Ms. De Palacio in particular 
angered the opponents of the directive, as they were perceived to be unresponsive to their 
arguments.321 
As a result, the active participants from the political Left began lobbying heavily to 
ensure a cohesive party line against the directive in the third reading vote,322 an effort facilitated 
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by the increasing outside pressure against the proposal by the dock workers, a key constituency 
of the Left.323 One official from the Greens remembers that he mobilized his faction strongly: 
“We made sure that everybody takes part in the vote.”324 Similarly, a Socialist respondent 
described her efforts to bring the proposal down as follows:  
 
“I wrote to them [the Socialist MEPs] saying ‘be there! Don’t lose this, this is a major 
fight.’ […] I worked like hell to get a position with everyone. […] Normally we try to 
handle the discussions in the committee working group, because it is difficult on very 
technical issues to take positions in the big group. But on this ports thing, we had a very 
heavy discussion in the group and got the group’s support to do it like this. It was 
absolutely a convincing effort.”325 
 
This reality is especially noteworthy because transport issues usually do not get much 
exposure in the PES group,326 where deliberation and positioning is usually left to the experts.327 
Here, as in other groups, it was the policy experts and other legislators with a particular stake in 
the issue328 who led the effort to establish a firm and cohesive line with regard to the port 
package.329 This effort was especially directed at those MEPs on the political Left from the 
Southern EU member states,330 who thought that opening their port services to competition 
would give their ports a competitive advantage over the highly structured ports in the Northern 
member states.331 In the end, however, the lobbying campaign on the principle of anti-
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liberalization paid off: “We won over most of our comrades from the Southern countries on the 
principle of liberalization,” one Dutch Socialist remembers.332 
This principle was communicated in a quite emotional fashion, however.333 Even one 
opponent of the directive acknowledges that the anti-liberalization drive was at least in part 
based on mistaken interpretations of the directive’s consequences, which would have coupled 
liberalization with “very strong” elements of regulation.334 Instead, critical nuances were 
excluded from the discussion. As a result, a “vulgarized debate” ultimately turned an issue of 
“liberalization of services with regulation both at the European and the national level” into one 
of “complete liberalization.” Discussion centered on a number of emotional key phrases like 
“social dumping” and featured frequent references to a symbolic busload of Bulgarians, Chinese, 
Africans, Argentineans, Malaysians, or Filipinos “coming to self-handle ships, while the others 
would be fired from their very secure jobs.”335 As one member of the leftist GUE group 
explained in interview:  
 
“I imagine it like this: some seaman from Burundi climbs in Piraeus [i.e. the harbor of 
Athens] on a crane and has to read the instruction manual in Greek, which he can’t. So 
the whole thing is absurd!”336 
 
Partially due to this simplified debate, one member of the transportation committee 
suspects that MEPs lacking the necessary expertise with regard to transport issues to genuinely 
evaluate the actual extent of the “liberalization” instituted by the port services directive opposed 
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a policy proposal that they may have supported if they had the necessary background knowledge 
and considered the dossier more carefully.337 Another respondent maintains, quite similarly, that 
despite the substantial degree of public attention to the issue and the high level of controversy in 
the EP, the majority of MEPs voting had no substantiated opinion regarding the port package.338 
6.6.2 Content Analysis 
This shift in the discussion of the port package should also be evident in the parliamentary 
debates in first reading (November 13, 2001), second reading (March 10, 2003), and third 
reading (November 18, 2003), a proposition tested using content analysis. As in previous 
sections, a series of words and phrases was coded consistent with the two focal points (the 
consequences of “liberalization” on the one hand, and the improvement of “EU competitiveness” 
on the other) to determine their frequency of use.339 
Based on the qualitative analysis above, we should expect to find that the question of the 
competitiveness of the European economy should be sidelined by an increasing focus on the 
negative impact of the liberalization of port services. References to the competitiveness focal 
point should thus decrease over time, while the liberalization issue should be raised increasingly 
in the later stages of the legislative process. 
The results of the content analysis confirm these expectations, as Table 29 shows. 
 
 
[Table 29 here] 
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339 Coding details can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 6.6. 
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 The first reading debate featured 114 references per 10,000 input words to the EU 
competitiveness focal point, a number that declines steadily to 77 references in second and only 
69 references in third reading. In contrast, the liberalization focal point is referenced 135 times in 
first, 283 times in second, and 292 times in third reading (all per 10,000 input words), showing 
its increasing dominance in the discussion concerning the port services directive. 
Moreover, a second content analysis shows that that the liberalization issue not only 
moved to the center of the debate, but was also discussed in a more emotional and severe 
fashion. For this analysis, I coded references to the liberalization issue by intensity. The most 
extreme references include such terms as “abuse,” “cowboy ports,” “crooks,” “pirate workers,” 
“ultra-liberal,” “slavery,” as well as references to the symbolic “bus load” of Africans, 
Argentineans, or Malaysians. Table 30 shows that the use of such extreme terminology jumped 
from three incidents per 10,000 input words in first reading to 21 and 20, respectively, in the 
second and third reading stages. 
 
[Table 30 here] 
6.6.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
It is hypothesized (H3b) that we should be able to predict voting patterns in plenary on the basis 
of the dominant focal points. This quantitative analysis tests this proposition and serves to 
determine if prevailing focal points actually provided the basis for the formation of policy 
coalitions, i.e., if they supplied a mutually acceptable equilibrium providing the basis for policy 
coalitions. 
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On the basis of the qualitative analysis above, it is possible to formulate a series of 
specific hypotheses regarding the outcomes of the decision-making process in the case of the 
port package. We should expect to find that in first reading, MEPs vote based on their positions 
on the Left-Right divide as well as the sovereignty-integration dimension, since both the 
liberalization and the competitiveness focal points were important elements of parliamentary 
deliberation. Specifically, due to the emphasis on the competitiveness of the EU economy, pro-
European MEPs should be more likely to support the proposal. Moreover, legislators from the 
political right should be more likely to support the proposal, since the question of liberalization 
did factor into the discussion of the port package. 
By the time of the third parliamentary reading stage, however, the focus of the debate had 
shifted substantially away from the question of EU competitiveness toward the liberalization 
issue and its perceived implications. As a result, the impact of MEP positions on the sovereignty-
integration dimension should be less pronounced in third reading. Instead, the port package 
should be more of a left-right issue than it was in first reading, meaning that MEP positions on 
the Left-Right dimensions should be more potent predictors of voting patterns. Specifically, the 
political Left should be strongly opposed to the proposal, while the political Right should be 
strongly in favor. 
The dependent variables in this analysis are the votes in the first and third readings.340 
These variables are dichotomous. A value of zero equals a vote against the directive and a value 
of one means a vote in favor.341 The predictor variables in this analysis, as described above, are 
MEP NOMINATE scores on the two ideological dimensions, the government-opposition 
                                                 
340 The vote in the second reading was not a roll-call vote and is thus not considered here. 
341 The results of the multinomial logit analysis of the plenary vote in first reading can be found in the Appendix of 
Chapter 6.6. Due to the small number of abstentions in the third reading vote a multinomial logit analysis of this 
vote is not possible. 
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dichotomous variable, and dichotomous variables accounting for “type of capitalism.”342 
Formally, the regression model reads: 
 
VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right  + β2 Sovereignty-Integration + β3 Government Status + β4 
Liberal Market Economy + β5 Partial Coordinated Market Economy + β6 Sectoral 
Coordinated Market Economy.343 
 
The results of the binary logit analysis confirm the expectations from above. In first 
reading, as hypothesized, the coefficients of the two ideological variables are statistically 
significant in the expected direction, with pro-Europeans and legislators from the political Right 
more likely to support the port package. Moreover, the pseudo-R2 of 0.30 suggests that the 
regression model accounts for a respectable level of the variance in voting patterns. This result is 
evident in Table 31, which presents the raw binary logit estimates. 
 
[Table 31 here] 
 
To facilitate the interpretation of these results, I calculated predicted probabilities using 
CLARIFY, which are presented in graphical form. Figure 57 displays the predicted probabilities 
of a vote in favor of the proposal along given Left-Right positions.344 
 
                                                 
342 The “type of capitalism” variables fall into four categories: liberal market economy (Ireland and the United 
Kingdom); partial or family-oriented coordinated market economy (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal); 
sectoral coordinated market economy (Germany, Austria and Benelux countries); national coordinated market 
economy (Scandinavian countries). 
343 “National Coordinated Market Economy” serves as the reference value; it is, however, possible to calculate 
predicted probabilities for this category using CLARIFY, which will be reported below. 
344 To calculate the probabilities presented in the following figures, I used CLARIFY and held the remaining 
variables constant at their means. 
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[Figure 57 here] 
 
This figure confirms that the probability of supporting the proposal in first reading 
increases the further to the right an MEP is located on the Left-Right dimension, for all four 
types of capitalism. The impact of Left-Right positions increases across the range of the Left-
Right dimension by about 50 percent for MEPs from member states with liberal market 
economies, about 70 percent for MEPs from partial and coordinated market economies, and a 
little more than 60 percent for MEPs from member states with sectoral coordinated market 
economies. 
Moreover, Figure 57 demonstrates that MEPs from liberal market economies are least 
likely to vote in favor of the port package, while legislators from sectoral coordinated market 
economies are most likely to support it. This trend is also evident in Figure 58, which presents 
the predicted probabilities of Yes votes along the sovereignty-integration dimension. 
 
[Figure 58 here] 
 
The figure demonstrates that the probability of supporting the proposal rises with 
increasing pro-EU attitudes of legislators. It also shows that the impact of positions on the 
sovereignty-integration dimension is quite substantial: the probabilities of voting in favor of the 
port package increase by about 60 percent across the range of the sovereignty-integration 
dimension for MEPs from liberal market economies, by about 80 percent for MEPs from partial 
and national coordinated market economies, and by almost 80 percent for MEPs from sectoral 
coordinated market economies. 
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Finally, Figure 59 shows that government status at the national level entails a slightly 
decreased probability of supporting the port package in first reading.  
 
[Figure 59 here] 
 
The impact of a shift in focal points between first and third reading is evident in the 
analysis of the third reading vote, the results of which are presented in Table 32. It shows that the 
coefficient of the Left-Right variable increases from 1.91 in first reading to 6.45 in third reading, 
while the coefficient of the sovereignty-integration variable not only decreases from 2.31 to 0.70, 
but actually becomes statistically insignificant when the other independent variables are held 
constant at their means.  
 
[Table 32 here] 
  
This trend is also evident in the predicted probabilities, for the Left-Right and 
sovereignty-integration dimensions in the EP’s third reading vote. Figure 60 demonstrates that 
the probability of voting in favor of the directive increases dramatically across the Left-Right 
divide. 
 
[Figure 60 here] 
 
As hypothesized, the impact of positions on the Left-Right divide is much more 
pronounced in third than in first reading. The probability of voting in favor of the port package 
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increases by 100 percent across the range of the Left-Right variable, meaning that MEPs on the 
far left end of the spectrum have a 100 percent probability of voting against the proposal, while 
those on the far right have a 100 percent probability of voting in favor. This applies for all four 
types of capitalism. In fact, even MEPs on the moderate left, with NOMINATE scores around -
0.5, are almost certain to oppose the port package in third reading, while MEPs on the center-
right, with NOMINATE scores of 0.5, are almost certain to support it. 
Meanwhile, the impact of positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension is moderate 
and much less than in first reading, as Figure 61 demonstrates. The probability of voting in favor 
of the port package increases by only around 30 percent as we move from the anti-EU to the pro-
EU side of the spectrum. 
 
[Figure 61 here] 
 
Figure 62 displays the predicted probabilities of voting in favor of the proposal as a 
function of national party government status. It shows that being in government at home, which 
at the EU level means being represented in the Council of Ministers, slightly increases the 
probability of supporting the port package in third reading across the four “types of capitalism.” 
 
[Figure 62 here] 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that MEPs from member states with partial and sectoral 
coordinated market economies are less likely to support the port package in third reading than 
they were in first reading. While this result is not surprising for members from sectoral 
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coordinated market economies, since the voluntary nature of the authorization procedures for 
self-handling stipulated in the conciliation compromise threatens existing structures in the North 
Sea ports in particular, this finding is less expected for members from partial coordinated market 
economies. It does confirm, however, that the political left was evidently successful in 
convincing their members from the Southern EU countries to oppose the port package in the 
final EP vote. 
To summarize, the critical preference shift among legislators not directly involved in the 
deliberation of the port package was an increase in the perceived salience of the Left-Right 
divide between the first and third reading stages, at the expense of the salience of the 
sovereignty-integration dimension. This trend is illustrated in Figure 63 for a given legislator 
MEPx. 
 
[Figure 63 here] 
 
In first reading, the port package (the “New Policy”) fell inside the elliptically shaped 
indifference curve (the solid line), when the sovereignty-integration dimension was perceived to 
be more salient than the Left-Right divide. In contrast, it was the status quo point that was the 
more preferred alternative in third reading, as it falls inside the dashed indifference curve. At this 
point in time, the indifference curve is “squeezed” from the sides, indicating the greater salience 
of the Left-Right divide. Accordingly, the directive on market access to port services passed 
through the EP plenary in first reading, but was rejected in favor of the status quo in third 
reading. 
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6.6.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the decision-making process in the case of the port services directive supports the 
expectations of the focal point model. First, it is evident that there was a distinct set of focal 
points emphasizing the perceived impact of the proposed legislation upon its implementation. As 
suggested by the focal point model, these focal points constituted broad representations of the 
content and consequences of the proposed legislation. As such, technical aspects of the proposal 
were largely absent from the discussion on the EP floor, where broad categorizations of what the 
legislation was “all about” dominated the deliberation. The focal points highlighted, on the one 
hand, the perceived positive impact of the port package on the competitiveness of the European 
economy by making port services less expensive and increasing the efficiency of the port sector 
across the EU, as well as within individual ports. This emphasis was fairly pronounced in first 
reading, but was sidelined by an increasing focus on a second aspect of the port services 
directive when the focal point emphasizing the perceived impact of “negative liberalization” on 
the job security of port workers and maritime safety gained prominence. Both focal points were 
provided by committee experts and picked up in the general discussion regarding the port 
package, as the content analysis demonstrates. 
The quantitative analysis of EP votes in the first and third reading stages of the co-
decision procedure provides evidence for the proposition that a shift in focal points entails a shift 
in policy-preferences, and thus affects political outcomes. Accordingly, it was possible to predict 
voting patterns on the basis of the prevailing focal points, which confirms hypothesis H3b. While 
the positions of individual MEPs on the sovereignty-integration ideological dimension were 
potent predictors of voting patterns when the competitiveness of the European economy was 
perceived to be at stake in first reading, these positions became less salient over time. Therefore, 
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pro-European MEPs had a greater probability of voting in favor of the directive in first reading, 
while a pro-EU attitude had little effect in third reading. 
Positions on the Left-Right divide constitute statistically significant predictors of voting 
behavior in both the first and third reading stage, but the rising perception of the legislation at 
hand as a Left-Right issue also substantially increased the impact of Left-Right positions on vote 
choice in third reading. This impact is so pronounced in third reading that even a moderate left-
of-center MEP was almost certain to oppose the directive, while a moderate right-of-center MEP 
was equally assured to vote in favor. 
The case of the port service directive also emphasizes how the political process and its 
participants play a significant role in affecting policy outcomes. Particularly noteworthy is the 
fact that the perceived lack of willingness on the part of the rapporteur to cooperate and actively 
seek a compromise across party lines backfired in the end. Mr. Jarzembowski’s strategy of trying 
to narrowly outvote the opponents of the proposal, rather than seek a compromise agreement that 
would be broadly acceptable, not only failed, but actually incensed the opponents of the 
directive. The perception that a deal had been struck between Commission, Council, the political 
Right in the EP, and one Socialist EP Vice-President created a special motivation for the active 
opposition to defeat the proposal completely. The fact that the rapporteur failed to get his own 
party on board while irritating the skeptics with supposedly furtive dealings ultimately brought 
the legislation down. 
In sum, as long as the port package was viewed at least in part in terms of its European 
merit, as was the case in first reading, the policy coalition in favor of the legislation was in the 
majority. This changed over the course of the decision-making process, and in third reading, a 
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leftist policy-coalition in combination with a small number of defectors from the EPP ultimately 
defeated the proposal. 
6.7 EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 
The purpose of the legislative proposal titled “Union citizenship: free movement and residence 
for citizens and their families within the Member States' territory” (reference number 
COD/2001/0111) was to enhance the rights of movement and residence of EU citizens across the 
European Union member states. Based on the premise that the freedom of movement constitutes 
an integral part of the European integration process, the legislation was to create a common 
framework of legislation to harmonize the legal status of the EU citizen into a single set of 
rules.345 
The underlying concept of the proposal was to enable EU citizens to move between 
member states on similar terms as the citizens of each member state. Moving around across the 
EU for the purpose of changing residence or jobs was to become comparable to nationals moving 
around within their own member state. Accordingly, administrative and legal hurdles should be 
kept at a minimum. 
The proposal was to form a single instrument streamlining the arrangements for 
exercising the freedom of movement within the EU while providing for legal clarity. In this 
                                                 
345 EU citizenship is based in principal on four Treaty articles. Article 14 enshrines the “four freedoms” for the 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Article 17 confers EU citizenship to all nationals of a member 
state. Article 18 grants EU citizens the “right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States," 
while Article 39 bans employment and payment discrimination on grounds of nationality. It also allows member 
state workers to travel and work freely across the EU and to reside in all member states for job purposes. 
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effort, it was to fuse existing regulations and legislation into one coherent whole, thus replacing 
two existing regulations and nine directives. In this process, it was supposed to: 
• streamline the arrangements for exercising freedom of movement; 
• extend the right of residence without formalities to six months; 
• grant the right of permanent residence after four years of residence in the host 
member state; 
• make it easier for Union citizens' family members to exercise the right to move and 
reside freely, irrespective of nationality; 
• tighten up the definitions of restrictions on the right of residence.346 
 
While the existing legislation was based on different parts of the EC Treaty as their legal 
foundation and concerned particular categories of people (e.g. legislation applying specifically to 
students), the new, comprehensive directive was to pertain more broadly to all citizens of the EU 
and their families – regardless of nationality. In sum, the proposal was to substantially simplify 
the formalities for EU citizens and their families to exercise their rights of movement and 
residence across member states, cutting back barriers to the bare essentials.  
6.7.1 Qualitative Analysis: Focal Points and the Legislative Process 
The directive on Union Citizenship constitutes a case where the level and nature of controversy 
would have been difficult to foresee prior to the start of the political deliberation and decision-
making process. On the face of it, the directive was about the free movement of people across the 
EU and the integration of existing legislation covering different aspects of the free movement of 
citizens. It was supposed to attach a practical value to the concept of EU citizenship by fusing 
                                                 
346 European Commission, RAPID Press Release: “Commission wishes to enhance Union citizens' right of 
movement and residence.” May 23, 2001. 
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different existing aspects of EU citizenship into a cohesive whole.347 This fundamental purpose 
was hardly controversial in view of the general pro-European outlook in the EP,348 since the 
great majority of MEPs agrees with and favors the principle of dual national and EU 
citizenships.349 
Several aspect of the proposal exhibited initial potential for controversy, such as 
immigration and the coordination of social security systems, but it was difficult to anticipate that 
the key issue would turn out to be one of family definition, and specifically the extension of 
citizenship rights to non-traditional and same-sex couples. In fact, the initial resistance on the 
part of the EU member states, for example, centered around their reluctance to enhance the 
residence rights of family members who are not EU citizens, not the definition of what 
constitutes a family.350 While the relevance of the gay rights issue may have been obvious to 
those directly concerned with the issue, it was not apparent to most. Uninvolved members of 
parliament only realized the significance of the issue once the process had started.351 
Throughout the decision-making process, two opposing groups of committee members 
emphasized what they perceived to be the critical aspects of the Union Citizenship directive. For 
the center-left, joined by the committee members from the Liberals, the most important angle of 
the debate was that the extension of the citizenship rights should not exclude those not covered 
by traditional definitions of what constitutes a family. To them, it was obvious that if you 
broaden citizens’ rights, “you have to say to whom,” as one MEP stressed in interview. This 
group of committee members argued that the principle of mutual recognition, extended to issues 
                                                 
347 Respondent #59. 
348 Respondent #66. 
349 Respondent #11. 
350 European Report: “Free Movement: Member states wary of plan to boost EU citizens’ residence rights.” 
February 23, 2002. 
351 Respondent #59. 
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in the realm of Justice and Home Affairs, constituted a reasonable basis for this process.352 In 
effect, they provided a focal point emphasizing the question of family definition. 
In response, the political right argued that the principle of subsidiarity bestowed the EU 
member states with the prerogative of defining marriage, and that EU level definitions should not 
be “imposed” upon the member states. Most importantly, committee members from the 
conservative spectrum framed the issue in terms of the practical value of the legislation to the 
every-day life of EU citizens. 
There is a general consensus among the respondents interviewed that without the family 
definition issue assuming such a prominent role, the directive would have been much less, or not 
at all, controversial. Even issues such as the circumstances allowing for the forceful expulsion of 
EU citizens and the time frame for achieving permanent residency ,353 which were of special 
importance to the Council throughout the co-decision procedure and were initially considered to 
be crucial issues by EP insiders,354 proved to be all but irrelevant in the deliberations of the 
EP.355 
The configuration of actors was crucial in bringing these issues to the forefront of the 
debate. The question of family definition in particular became so prominent in the debate 
because of the presence of a number of MEPs in the responsible committee for whom gay rights 
were of critical, if not primary, importance. Moreover, these members sat in the key groups of 
the EP and together formed a strong, intergroup lobby for the extension of the directive to same-
                                                 
352 Respondent #7. 
353 The question of expulsion refers to the circumstances under which EU citizens can be expelled from the territory 
of a host member state if they have resided there for many years, in particular when they were born and have resided 
there throughout their life. The final compromise allowed such expulsion only where there are imperative grounds of 
public security, while the right of permanent residence applied to all Union citizens and their family members who 
have resided in the host member state during a continuous period of five years without becoming subject to an 
expulsion measure. 
354 Respondent #8. 
355 Respondent #11. 
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sex couples. This group consisted of Mr. Cashman and Ms. Swiebel for the PES, Ms. Buitenweg 
and Ms. Lambert for the Greens, and Ms. Ludford for the Liberals. These members represented a 
majority in the EP at the time that took a progressive approach with regard to value politics such 
as civil liberties, where the Liberals consistently backed the political Left in the Civil Liberties 
committee.356  
The delegates pushing the initiative constituted the key people of the parliamentary 
majority coalition in this particular policy area in the responsible committee and were able to 
muster a majority across party groups. This particular configuration of individuals was critical, 
according to one EP official, who maintains with regard to the gay rights issue that “if Cashman 
had been sitting with the UEN and Buitenweg had been unattached, it would not really have 
mattered.” Instead, as one official explains, the debate was dominated by the right “mixture of 
people for making a difference in terms of policy outcome.”357 
This group of people stood in sharp opposition to the rapporteur in the responsible 
committee, an Italian MEP from the EPP, whose handling of the dossier constitutes an important 
aspect of the deliberation and decision-making process. From the beginning, there was a strong 
perception on the part of the gay rights proponents that appointing Mr. Santini as a Catholic, 
Italian conservative was not a sensible decision in the case of this particular dossier. At that point 
in time, however, it was not yet apparent that the family definition issue would be so high on the 
agenda, and one MEP suggests that Mr. Santini himself might have been unaware of what “he 
put his hands on.”358 Mr. Santini looked at the issue from a very narrow perspective, and it may 
have never occurred to him that this issue might involve the question of family definition and 
                                                 
356 Respondent #59, Respondent #7. 
357 Respondent #59; also: Respondent #66. 
358 Respondent #38. 
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same-sex couples. As the deliberation process unfolded, he began “to discover that EU 
citizenship involved all kinds of other questions,” in the words of one MEP. 359 
Mr. Santini thus appeared hardly open for compromise on the family definition question 
in first reading, at least in the perception of his political opponents. This view is confirmed by 
the fact that Mr. Santini insisted in his explanatory statement to the first reading report that 
“‘spouse’ must necessarily mean a heterosexual spouse” and that he “considers it preferable to 
state this explicitly in the directive itself.”360 One Socialist MEP sums up this sentiment as 
follows: 
“[The issue] could have been less controversial if somebody else had written it, 
somebody else who might not have aroused the controversies that were there in the 
committee and was not going to stake them up. You can never prove that, but there were 
certain people who had given up taking reports on immigration, because they knew they 
were not going to get them through, because they know the way the committee was 
thinking. And I think Santini in some ways was a bit naïve in his approach, and ill-
advised in terms of what he could get through committee and what he couldn’t.”361 
 
Mr. Santini indeed tried to push through his position in committee, without realizing that 
he did not have the majority support for it, and the discussion in first reading was very harsh and 
even poisonous. It went beyond issues and took on a combative personal tone aimed at Mr. 
Santini by some of the proponents of the family definition issue, who openly called him “Padre,” 
in reference to his Catholicism and conservatism.362 
                                                 
359 Respondent #21. 
360 Explanatory Statement to the First Reading “Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states (COD/2001/0111); available at http://www.europarl.eu.int.  
361 Respondent #21. 
362 Respondent #8. 
 188 
Mr. Santini’s position, which was shared by his party colleagues, was that it was not up 
to Europe to define what constitutes a family, but that these types of definition should be the 
responsibility of the member states.363 In this sense, he was the representative of his party group, 
rather than an agent of committee or parliament as a whole.364 Initially, this position meant that 
Mr. Santini was unwilling to include any definition of family whatsoever, and he argued that the 
proposal as amended by the center-left majority in committee would have entailed “reverse 
discrimination,” where Europeans would enjoy more rights than the nationals of a member state. 
One result of Mr. Santini’s perceived stubbornness was that there were actually separate 
coordinating meetings between the responsible people of PES, Greens, ELDR, and GUE, which 
were kept purposely secret from the rapporteur himself.365 
In first reading, Mr. Santini was outvoted both in committee (by a 23-16 margin, with one 
abstention, in favor of the report including the broad definitions of family) and in plenary (where 
269 MEPs voted in favor, 225 voted against, and 46 abstained). Unhappy with this outcome, the 
rapporteur considered withdrawing his name from the procedure but decided to stay on, also in 
view of the second reading, where the gay rights proponents were unlikely to achieve the 
qualified majority necessary to force through their position against the opposition of the EPP.366 
Moreover, neither the Commission in its modified legislative proposal, nor the Council in its 
Common Position, accepted the radical amendments giving the right of residence to the same-sex 
spouses and the registered or unmarried partners of EU citizens. Mr. Santini did realize, 
however, that he needed to be fairly neutral in second reading and to try not to upset anybody 
unnecessarily, and also that he might need to make some concessions on the family definition 
                                                 
363 Respondent #64, Respondent #11. 
364 Respondent #21. 
365 Respondent #7. 
366 Respondent #8. 
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issue.367 Even some of his political opponents acknowledge that he moved away from his initial 
stance of representing his party group toward the wider job of legislating for the Parliament as a 
whole.368 
In second reading, Mr. Santini advocated a compromise package that allowed some 
mutual recognition, despite his personal beliefs and his stance in first reading that all definitions 
should be left to the member states. The compromise stipulated that the definition of "family 
member" also includes the registered partner if the legislation of the host member state treats 
registered partnership as equivalent to marriage, meaning that same-sex partnerships would be 
recognized across the borders of member states whose national status quo recognized these types 
of partnerships. Moreover, Article 3 of the second reading report was made to state that member 
states should “facilitate entry and residence” for “the partner with whom the Union citizen has a 
durable relationship, duly attested,” and that the burden of proof when denying entry or residence 
lay with the member state. This article was left purposely vague to allow for an ultimate 
interpretation by the European Court of Justice.369 Moreover, the compromise could be regarded 
as a first step toward the full recognition of the citizenship rights of same-sex couples in that it 
automatically expanded its scope once national authorities passed regulations inclusive of these 
partnerships. 
This compromise hardly satisfied anybody, despite the understanding of many involved 
that the proposal, in fact, constituted a major step forward in terms of citizenship and the free 
movement of people across the Union.370 Its practical implications with regard to the conciliation 
of existing legislation were quite substantial, and it promised to make life easier for citizens 
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368 Respondent #38. 
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moving across the EU, since the movement of people was no longer to be bound to the 
professional status of the person anymore but simply to his status as an EU citizen. In fact, the 
compromise could be interpreted as a broad reinterpretation of what constitutes a “foreigner” in 
the EU member states, as one EP official maintains. 
Yet, the prominent role of the family definition issue throughout the process did not lead 
many members of Parliament to perceive the compromise package as a particularly satisfying 
outcome. This perception was exacerbated by the distinct sense of victory of the center-left after 
the first parliamentary reading, and the expectation to achieve the same result in second reading. 
Given the mechanics of the co-decision procedure this was unlikely, however, since the 
proponents of a broad family definition needed a qualified majority of 314 votes in second 
reading for their amendment to stand. In order to succeed, they actually would have had to win 
over some members from the EPP, which appeared to stand solidly behind their rapporteur. Also 
important was the prospect of imminent enlargement, and specifically the accession of Poland to 
the EU,371 since the center-left suspected that Poland would under no circumstances agree to a 
compromise deal in the Council that included any concession to same-sex couples, such as the 
watered down compromise package. Moreover, the compromise with the Council was negotiated 
with the then-Italian Council Presidency, which had identified the issue as one of its key 
priorities and was very keen to push through the directive. The Italian was followed by the Irish 
Presidency, however, and there was a realization that the Irish had “no intention of touching this 
with a very, very long pole,” according to one respondent.372 
Hence, there was growing sense in the cross-party coalition pushing for a broad family 
definition that an agreement might not be possible under the terms spelled out in first reading. 
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For this reason, the group coordinators of PES and Liberals, Anna Terron and Sarah Ludford, 
decided that it was preferable to achieve a compromise result that did not go as far as had been 
hoped. They decided to promote the improved proposal, rather than go into conciliation and take 
the risk of letting the entire procedure lapse, and were able to convince their party groups of the 
merit of this decision. The selling point was that it was better to have some result than no result. 
Therefore, the emphasis put on the two focal points from the previous reading stage began to 
shift, with the family definition issue becoming less salient for some critical committee members 
who had previously supported the extension of citizens’ rights to non-traditional partnerships. At 
the same time, the question of facilitating mobility through the dismantling of existing barriers, 
and the fusion of existing legislation into one coherent whole, increased in importance. 
In the end, providing legislation for the free movement of citizens across the EU had 
priority. Hence, the responsible committee passed the compromise agreement by a broad 23-4 
margin; the plenary followed suit by rejecting all amendments to the Council’s common position, 
thus adopting the proposal in second reading excluding the broad definition of what constitutes a 
family. 
6.7.2 Content Analysis 
To test the proposition that the way issues were presented shifted between the first and second 
reading stages, I conduct a simple content analysis of the EP debates at both points in time.
 I coded a series of words and phrases as consistent with either one of the two prevalent 
focal points, i.e., the question of family definition and the practical value of the legislation.373 
                                                 
373 Coding details are provided in the Appendix of Chapter 6.7. 
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Based on the analysis above, we should expect the family definition question to dominate 
the discussion in the first reading debate, with the practical value issue of secondary, yet 
noteworthy, importance. In second reading, this trend should be reversed. The TEXTPACK 
output confirms these expectations, as Table 34 shows. 
 
[Table 34 here] 
 
MEPs referred to the family definition issue 95 times per 10,000 input words in the first 
reading debate, while the practical value issue yields only 73 references. In second reading, this 
pattern is reversed: the question of family definition was raised only 52 times per 10,000 input 
words, while the practical value issue was referred to 87 times. We can thus see that the total 
number of references to the family definition question drops from 95 to 52 in first reading, while 
the number of references to the practical value issue increases from 73 to 87. 
6.7.3 Voting Patterns: The Impact of the Legislative Process on Voting Outcomes 
Hypothesis 3b maintains that we should be able to predict voting patterns in plenary on the basis 
of the prevailing focal points. This quantitative section, using logit regression analysis, will test 
this proposition. Overall, the analysis will determine if the prevalent focal points actually 
provided the basis for the formation of policy coalition, that is, if they supplied a mutually 
acceptable equilibrium around which policy coalitions revolved. 
On the basis of the qualitative analysis above, it is possible to formulate a series of 
hypotheses concerning the expected outcome of the decision-making process in the case of the 
Union Citizenship directive. Since the family definition issue dominated the deliberation process 
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during the first reading stage and relates to the Left-Right dimension, we should expect to find 
that MEPs voted based on their positions on the Left-Right dimension. Specifically, MEPs from 
the political left should vote in favor and MEPs from the political right against the proposal 
including the broad definition of what constitutes a family. The practical value question was not 
absent from the debate in first reading, however, and relates to the sovereignty-integration 
dimension. Therefore, positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension should also matter in 
explaining vote choice, but to a lesser degree. Specifically, we should expect that pro-European 
MEPs voted in favor of the directive. 
Unfortunately, the Union Citizenship dossier was adopted in second reading, where there 
are no final votes on legislative resolutions. The critical amendment extending citizens’ rights to 
non-traditional partnerships and families, however, was voted on by roll-call vote in second 
reading. This amendment (Amendment 4) constituted the most controversial aspect of the 
legislative proposal throughout the decision-making process. In fact, its inclusion in the first 
reading draft determined the major dividing lines in the EP. Therefore, we can compare the 
positions MEPs assumed toward the legislative resolution in first reading with their positions 
toward the family definition amendment in second reading. The vote on Amendment 4 thus 
serves as a proxy for the non-existent vote on the final legislative resolution in second reading. 
Since the focus of the debate shifted away from the family definition issue toward the 
practical implications of the Citizenship dossier, we should expect to find that MEP’s positions 
on the Left-Right dimension are irrelevant as predictors of voting patterns in second reading. 
Positions on the sovereignty-integration dimension, in contrast, should become the critical 
explanatory variable. Since pro-Europeans should now be inclined to reject the family definition 
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amendment, we should expect to find that a more pro-European position entails a greater 
probability of voting against the amendment.  
The dependent variables in this analysis are the individual votes on the legislative report 
in first reading and on Amendment 4 in second reading. These variables are dichotomous. A 
value of zero equals a vote against directive and a value of one means a vote in favor.374 
MEP NOMINATE coordinates account for individual-level positions on the Left-Right 
and sovereignty-integration dimension. A dichotomous variable based on the national 
government or opposition status of particular national party delegations measures representation 
in the Council of Ministers. Finally, I include a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for MEPs 
from member states where national legislation allows same-sex marriages. This variable assumes 
a value of 0 for all member states except Denmark and the Netherlands. 
My regression model is expressed formally as: 
 
VOTE = a + β1 Left-Right + β2 Sovereignty-Integration + β3 Government-Opposition + β4 
Same-Sex Marriage. 
 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 35, which suggests that the regression 
model explains a substantial part of the variance, with a pseudo-R2 of 0.55. It also shows that, as 
predicted, MEPs from the political left voted in favor of the legislative report including the broad 
family definition in first reading, while MEPs from the political right strongly opposed it, as the 
negative coefficient of the Left-Right variable demonstrates. 
                                                 
374 The results of the multinomial logit analysis of the plenary vote in first reading can be found in the Appendix of 
Chapter 6.7. Due to the small number of abstentions in second reading, where only two MEPs abstained with regard 
to Amendment 4, a multinomial logit analysis of this vote is not possible. 
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 [Table 35 here] 
  
Figure 67 illustrates the impact of the Left-Right predictor. The predicted probability of 
MEPs voting in favor of the proposal declines the more they are positioned toward the political 
Right.375 This decline is very substantial, as MEPs on the far left had a 100 percent probability of 
voting in favor of the directive, and MEPs on the far right had a 100 percent probability to vote 
against. Not surprisingly, MEPs from countries that allow for same-sex marriages are more 
inclined to support the proposal. 
 
[Figure 67 here] 
 
The positive sign of the sovereignty-integration variable in Table 35, as well as the scope 
of the graphs in Figure 68, confirms the expectation that MEPs with more pro-EU attitudes are 
more likely to support the legislation. Moving from the EU-skeptics on the left of the x-axis 
toward the Europhiles on the right increases the probability of a yes vote by close to 100 percent. 
Once again, this trend is consistent for all MEPs, but more pronounced from member states with 
national legislation allowing same-sex marriage. 
 
[Figure 68 here] 
  
                                                 
375 To calculate the probabilities presented in the following figures, I used CLARIFY and held the remaining 
variables constant at their means. 
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Finally, the negative coefficient of the government status variable in Table 35 and 
downward sloping graphs in Figure 69 demonstrates that MEPs from parties that are in 
opposition in their national political arenas have a greater probability of voting in favor of the 
legislation in first reading, which makes sense given that the Council, where government MEPs 
are represented, opposed the broad family definition. 
 
[Figure 69 here] 
 
Table 36 displays the results of the binomial logit regression result of the second reading 
vote on Amendment 4. The negative coefficient of the Left-Right variable shows that MEPs 
from the political right remained strongly opposed to the broad definition of what constitutes a 
family. Similarly, government status at home still results in a smaller probability of voting in 
favor of the same-sex family definition amendment, which was opposed by the Council. Unlike 
in first reading, however, a more pro-European attitude now entails a smaller probability of 
supporting the legislation: the coefficient of the sovereignty-integration variable now features a 
negative sign. Finally, unlike in first reading, MEPs from countries that allow same-sex 
marriages actually have a smaller probability to vote in favor of the amendment. This is likely 
because their status quo was not affected by the compromise agreement providing for “mutual 
recognition” between those member states already providing for same-sex marriages. 
 
[Table 36 here] 
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Figure 70 displays the predicted probabilities of votes in favor of the legislation in second 
reading. It shows that Left-Right positions were not irrelevant in explaining positions toward the 
family definition amendment in second reading, but that only the very far left voted in favor. The 
probability of supporting the amendment already drops substantially when moving from the far 
to the center-left. MEPs to the right of the center-left were certain to vote against the amendment. 
In fact, the probability of voting in favor of the amendment decreases by 100 percent between 
NOMINATE scores of -1 and 0 on the Left-Right divide, that is, along half of the range of the 
variable. 
 
[Figure 70 here] 
 
Figure 71 illustrates the expected shift in the policy preferences of pro-European MEPs. 
While pro-EU attitudes entailed a greater probability of supporting the proposal in first reading 
including the broad family definition, this trend is now reversed, as the downward slopes 
indicate. 
 
[Figure 71 here] 
 
Finally, Figure 72 shows the minimal impact of government or opposition status in the 
second reading vote. For opposition as well as government parties, the probability of voting in 
favor of amendment 4 was small or even insubstantial. 
 
[Figure 72 here] 
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 In sum, the critical change between the first and second reading stages was a shift in the 
positions of the political center and the center-left. While the political right consistently opposed 
a broad family definition, and the far left consistently promoted it, the center and center-left 
switched from a position of support to one of opposition. Specifically, the analysis suggests that 
the policy preferences of MEPs shifted as the sovereignty-integration dimension became more 
salient during the second-reading stage. Figure 73 and Figure 74 illustrate this shift spatially for 
the Liberals (ELDR) and Socialists (PES). Both figures show that the broad definition of what 
constitutes a family (labeled Policy I) lies inside the indifference curves of ELDR and PES in 
first reading, which are represented by the solid lines. These indifference curves have an 
elliptical shape and are “squeezed” from the sides, indicating that the horizontal Left-Right 
dimension is more salient (because the more important a dimension is to an actor, the more small 
changes in the policy affect her satisfaction). In contrast, the second reading indifference curves, 
represented by the dashed lines, are “squeezed” from above and below. These curves illustrate 
that when the vertical sovereignty-integration dimension is more salient, as was the case for 
ELDR and PES in second reading, it is Policy II that lies inside the indifference curves and is 
thus their preferred alternative. Policy II, in the case at hand, is the final compromise agreement 
stipulating that same-sex partnerships would be recognized across the borders of member states 
whose national status quo recognized these types of partnerships. 
 
[Figure 73 here]  
 
[Figure 74 here] 
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 Figure 75 and Figure 76 display and confirm the voting patterns in more detail: while 
pro-EU legislators, especially from the political center and the center-left, were very likely to 
support the radical Union Citizenship proposal in first reading, they were very unlikely to 
support the broad definition of what constitutes a family in second reading. These MEPs 
evidently followed their political leaders in the responsible committee when choosing to support 
a diluted legislative proposal over the alternative of letting the entire procedure lapse. The shift 
in focal points thus entailed a critical change in voting patterns, which confirms Hypothesis 3b. 
As a result, the only MEPs in favor of the radical definition of what constitutes a family in 
second reading were those on the far left, as well as Euroskeptic left-of-center MEPs. 
 
[Figure 75 here] 
 
[Figure 76 here] 
6.7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter provides solid evidence in favor of the focal point model. It shows that policy 
preferences shift even when outcome preferences remain stable, and that in the case of the Union 
Citizenship directive, policy preference shifts were the result of a change in the way critical 
actors on the political center and the center-left viewed and presented the proposal to their 
colleagues. While they initially assumed positions toward the proposal based on their outcome 
preferences on the Left-Right divide, they decided during the second-reading stage that realizing 
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a proposal establishing a comprehensive notion of EU citizenship broadly favorable for a 
majority of EU citizens took precedence over the definitional issues propagated in first reading. 
The transmission mechanism for these positions from committee to plenary is also 
noteworthy in view of the general findings in the preceding chapter. While Socialists, Liberals, 
Greens, and members of the GUE faction voted solidly in favor of the report including the 
amendment establishing a broad family definition in first reading, only Greens and GUE MEPs 
stuck to this position in the committee vote on the compromise report in second reading. 
Following their committee representatives throughout the procedure, 84 percent of all Socialists 
and Liberals voted in favor of the proposal in the first reading plenary vote (with 15 percent 
abstaining and only 1 percent voting against), while in second reading, 97 percent voted against 
Amendment 4 and only 3 percent in favor. This demonstrates that when committee members 
shift their own policy preferences and the focus of the debate, they affect the policy preferences 
of their party members in plenary. We can thus predict voting patterns on the basis of the 
prevailing focal points, which confirms Hypothesis 3b. 
In sum, the first reading stage of the legislative process featured a dominant Left-Right 
focal point, which provided the basis for a policy coalition of Socialists, Greens, Liberals, and 
the far left. The family definition focal point provided a basis for this policy coalition because it 
appealed to the outcome preferences of MEPs on the Left-Right divide. In second reading, the 
focal point, and thus the general direction of the debate, shifted away from the Left-Right 
conceptualization of the Citizenship issue toward a pro-/anti-EU view. As a result, MEPs in 
plenary, following their committee representatives, perceived their positions on the sovereignty-
integration dimension as more salient to the decision at hand, and a new policy coalition of pro-
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Europeans consisting of political right, center, and center-left pushed the proposal through 
against the votes of the far left. 
The qualitative analysis confirms our expectations about the characteristics of focal 
points and how they are disseminated among MEPs not directly involved in the dossier. It 
demonstrates that deliberations were dominated not by technical details of the proposal, but by 
broad representations of what the legislative proposal was all about, since the prevalent focal 
points emphasized the question of “citizenship for whom” (the family definition question) and 
the actual implications of the legislation (the practical value issue). These focal points 
emphasized the perceived consequences of the proposal, rather than its technical details, and 
targeted the outcome preferences of the EP’s backbenchers: the family definition issue was a 
clear left-right issue, while the practical value of the legislation to EU citizens was an issue 
relating broadly to the question of EU integration and, consequently, the outcome preferences of 
other MEPs with regard to the integration process as such. The focal points were provided and 
propagated by the members of the responsible committee, and the configuration of the key 
players was critical in shaping the decision-making process. These actors did not simply provide 
voting instructions, however; in fact, even the powerful group coordinators had to “sell” the 
compromise package to their party groups. This was especially noticeable on the political left, 
where support for the broad definition of what constitutes a family was deep rooted. As a result, 
party positions toward the proposal were not predetermined, but actually shifted during the 
deliberation process. 
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6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to evaluate the merits of two competing 
explanations for decision-making processes in the EP. The first explanation builds on the 
garbage-can theory and emphasizes that policy outcomes are the random results of decision-
making processes as problems, solutions, participants, (problematic) preferences, and choice 
opportunities converge. According to this model, outcome-equilibria are random (H2b). 
The focal point model, in contrast, suggests that policy outcomes are the result of a more 
structured process in which legislative specialists create opportunities for policy choice through 
the provision of focal points. These focal points shape the normative evaluation of the legislative 
proposal by those legislators not directly involved in the deliberation and negotiation process, 
which in turn affects policy preferences, policy coalitions, and policy outcomes. Outcome 
equilibria are thus neither predetermined nor random, but predictable on the basis of the 
prevailing focal points (H3b). 
The case studies broadly support the propositions of the focal point model as they 
demonstrate that focal points significantly affect how legislative backbenchers perceive the 
content and implications of different legislative proposals, shape policy preferences, and 
influence vote patterns on the EP floor. In fact, the quantitative analyses of plenary voting show 
that it was possible in each case to predict voting patterns on the basis of the prevailing focal 
points, which confirms hypothesis H3b and undermines the suggestion that policy outcomes are 
largely due to an unstructured and random decision-making process (H2b). Strategic and 
specialized actors in the EP are capable of shaping the policy preferences of their less-informed 
colleagues, thus providing the basis for policy coalitions and legislative outcomes.  
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Each case study featured a set of distinct focal points emphasizing the perceived impact 
of the proposed legislation upon its implementation; these provided the bases of the general 
normative interpretations of what constituted the dominant aspects of each policy proposal. As 
expected, these focal points were broad representations of the content and consequences of the 
proposed legislation, while technical details were largely absent from the discussion outside the 
responsible committee. Focal points broadly highlighted the potential consequences of the 
legislation, thus appealing to the existing outcome preferences of EP backbenchers. They were 
not created from thin air, but reflected and targeted stable ideological predispositions in an effort 
to sway policy preferences one way or another. As a result, the level of controversy concerning 
particular pieces of legislation was difficult to forecast, because deliberation and decision-
making processes depended to a substantial extent on the configuration and interactions of key 
actors. In the case of the Union Citizenship proposal, for example, the presentation of the issue in 
terms of family definition and non-traditional partnerships provided for a level of contention that 
was unexpected even by other MEPs. 
Finally, the case studies reveal a level of importance of persuasion in EP decision-making 
that defies the notion of predetermined individual and party positions. Rather, policy preferences 
can and do shift even when outcome preference remain stable and are the result of a change in 
the way critical actors present a piece of legislation to their non-specialized colleagues. 
Therefore, if the issue specialists modify their own positions and the focus of the debate, or when 
new actors enter the stage and gain prominence, policy preferences and outcomes shift 
accordingly. 
While the case studies share a great number of characteristics—such as the importance of 
particular actors and their configuration in shaping decision-making processes, the absence of 
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detailed and technical discussions on the EP floor, and the possibility of predicting voting 
patterns on the basis of the dominant focal points—each legislative proposal also features 
particularities that shed additional light on the nature of deliberation and policy making in the 
EP. The analysis of the Union Citizenship proposal, for example, demonstrates that a seemingly 
non-controversial issue becomes highly contested when certain aspects of it are highlighted by a 
key group of committee specialists. In contrast, the Party Statute analysis shows how controversy 
is stifled when contentious issues, such as the legal personality of EU-level political parties, are 
deliberatively kept off the agenda. 
The Emissions chapter illustrates that legislation can pass with an overwhelming margin 
when critical actors steer it successfully through both the committee and plenary stages, even if 
there appears to be an “objective interest” not to support legislation that evidently hurts key 
industries. The Port Package, in contrast, featured a rapporteur that was perceived as 
uncooperative and thus faced an uphill battle that he ultimately lost. A similar lesson can be 
drawn from the Environmental Liability proposal, which also demonstrates the importance of 
which committee handles the legislation and shows that two distinct set of specialists in separate 
committees may provide competing focal points. If this is the case, a high level of controversy is 
the obvious result. 
Finally, the analysis of the Takeover Directive demonstrates that focal points not only 
affect the salience of the two ideology dimensions when decisions are made on the EP floor, but 
that they may even influence the direction in which the dimension matter. 
To review, Chapters 4 and 5 examined broad patterns of information provision in the EP 
and linked the positions and vote choices of legislative backbenchers to the positions of their 
specialized colleagues in the responsible EP committee. These analyses demonstrate that 
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legislators in plenary follow their committee specialists when taking a position toward the issue, 
and that the positions of committee members are powerful predictors of voting patterns on the 
EP floor. Accordingly, it was concluded that outcome-equilibria in EP decision-making are far 
from predetermined. 
We were left wondering if outcome-equilibria were the random results of decision-
making processes or the product of a more structured process where certain outcome-equilibria 
were more likely than others. The examination of the six case studies provides evidence for the 
latter, as the provision of focal points creates opportunities for policy choice by making certain 
outcome equilibria more likely than others. The focal point model thus constitutes the only 
model whose propositions finds empirical support in the analyses. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation introduced and tested a model of policy preference formation that emphasizes 
the dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and political process in legislative decision-
making. The theory tied the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative 
political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposed that 
structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative 
specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of 
informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a 
legislative proposal, thus shaping the normative interpretations of its content and consequences. 
This, in turn, affects the policy preferences of legislators not directly involved with a particular 
policy proposal. The dominant focal points provide the basis for the formation of policy 
coalitions and, as such, they critically affect policy outcomes.  
The empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4-6 supports the propositions of the focal 
point model outlined in the theory chapter (Chapter 3). It allowed for the dismissal of both the 
exogenous preference and garbage can models, whose hypotheses were systematically 
disconfirmed. 
Chapters 4 (Information Flow and the Role of Specialized Committees) and 5 (Committee 
Positions and Voting on the Floor) made a general case for the impact of committee deliberation 
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and decisions on EP decisions by examining the broader patterns of information provision in the 
EP. In particular, they linked individual-level voting patterns in the EP plenary to the positions of 
members of the parliament’s standing committees. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the specialized 
members of the EP’s standing committees serve as the principal providers of information to EP 
legislators not directly involved with a given legislative proposal. Limited by time and resource 
constraints, and lacking information about the content and consequences of the proposal and the 
necessary expertise to form well-grounded judgments on detailed legislation, these backbenchers 
adopt the positions of their specialized party colleagues. This strategy is evidently based on the 
assumption that these positions most closely resemble what they would favor if they possessed 
the resources and expertise required to genuinely judge the content and likely implications of a 
specific policy proposal. 
In this process, much depends on the configuration of actors involved, their reputations, 
and their interaction. Consequently, policy outcomes are uncertain and cannot be predicted a 
priori, which contradicted the first proposition of the exogenous preference model (H1a). 
Instead, both individual and party positions were found to be the endogenous product of the 
information provision and decision-making process, which lent support to hypotheses H2a and 
H3a. 
The analysis of the roll-call vote data in Chapter 5 demonstrated that backbenchers 
follow their committee representatives when voting in plenary, since the positions of EP 
committee members are shown to be significant predictors of MEP voting patterns on the EP 
floor. MEPs rely primarily on their national party delegation colleagues in the committee 
responsible for a piece of legislation when making their vote choices on the EP floor, if they have 
national party representatives sitting on the committee. This is not the case more than 40 percent 
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of the time, however, meaning that in the majority of cases, MEPs follow the representatives of 
their EP party group when voting on the EP floor. National affiliation, in contrast, barely matters 
when predicting plenary votes on the basis of the preceding committee vote. This pattern is 
evident with regard to votes in favor of and opposition to a proposal, as well as abstentions. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that MEPs compare the positions of their different 
representatives in the committee, that is, committee members who share their national affiliation, 
transnational party group affiliation, or national party affiliation. When choosing their own 
positions toward a policy proposal, members “triangulate” the information they receive, in 
particular from their party group and national delegation representatives. When these positions 
diverge, the resulting vote in plenary is quite uncertain. When both share a common position, 
however, the probability of a backbencher voting accordingly in plenary is 97 percent for Yes 
votes, 98 percent for a No votes, and 80 percent for abstentions 
The roll-call vote evidence thus undermined hypothesis H1b of the exogenous 
preferences model, which stated that outcome-equilibria are predetermined, since voting patterns 
in plenary are shown to be quite uncertain. Depending on the configuration of committee actors 
and the pattern of who is represented by whom, individual-level positions and collective voting 
patterns on the EP floor varied substantially. Accordingly, both hypotheses derived from the 
exogenous preference model were now disconfirmed.  
This left us to consider the respective validity of the garbage-can and focal point models. 
The critical question concerned the extent to which outcome-equilibria were the random results 
of decision-making processes. While the garbage-can model suggested that particular outcomes 
are due to a largely random process through which problems, actors, and opportunities converge 
(H2b), the focal point model considered outcomes to be neither predetermined nor random. 
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Instead, focal points provided by committee specialists constitute the basis of policy preferences. 
They create opportunities for policy choice by making certain outcome equilibria more likely 
than others, thus making outcome-equilibria non-random (H3b). 
In an effort to evaluate these two rival hypotheses, the case studies in Chapter 6 examined 
EP decision-making processes in more detail, with a special focus on the role of focal points as 
mechanisms of information provision. The detailed investigation of a series of legislative 
proposals from different policy areas demonstrated that policy making processes and outcomes 
are, at least in part, a function of how a legislative proposal is presented by committee specialists 
in relation to the two dominant ideological dimensions in the EP. Strategically deployed focal 
points influenced the prevailing normative interpretation of the proposals at hand, which in turn 
impacted the policy preferences of legislative backbenchers. The qualitative and quantitative 
evidence in each of the case studies demonstrated that focal points influence policy preferences, 
which evidently shaped voting patterns in the plenary, since it was possible to predict voting 
patterns on the basis of the focal points dominating the deliberation process. This finding 
confirmed hypothesis H3b and undermined the contention of that garbage-can model that policy 
outcomes are the result of a random decision-making process (H2b). Accordingly, only the 
propositions of the focal point model were found to hold, as Table 38 illustrates. 
 
[Table 38 here] 
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7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO EU STUDIES 
This research demonstrates that the two-dimensional structure of the European ideological space 
notably influences political behavior in the European Parliament, but that it does so via a 
dynamic agent-structure relationship. While the political choices of European parliamentarians 
are indeed critically influenced by their locations on both the sovereignty-integration and the 
Left-Right dimensions, the respective salience of these dimensions is determined by the process 
of political contestation and the strategic behavior of key legislators such as rapporteurs, shadow 
rapporteurs, and party coordinators in the responsible committees. The interplay of structure, 
actors, and process decisively influences voting patterns in the EP plenary, and thus legislative 
outcomes. 
The analysis also sheds light on the nature and extent of party control in the EP. Past 
research has emphasized the role of EP party groups in establishing and enforcing common and 
cohesive party positions when examining policy preferences and voting patterns in the EP. Of 
particular interest has been the empirical puzzle of why MEPs generally follow the party line 
given that the transnational EP party groups do not possess the sanctioning powers available to 
party organizations at the national level, most importantly the possibility of barring defectors 
from re-election. The most common explanation emphasizes the role of “soft power,” such as the 
carrot-and-stick approach of granting or refusing committee membership or the responsibility for 
drafting legislative reports. These studies share a common assumption that MEPs would vote 
differently in the absence of party control. 
My research offers an alternative explanation not only to the question of party cohesion, 
but also for processes of legislative decision-making in the EP more generally. Most importantly, 
it rejects the basic assumption that policy choice in the EP is simply a matter of party control. 
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Instead, I identify policy expertise, asymmetrically distributed information, shared ideology, and 
interpersonal trust as the basis for decision-making in the EP. My analysis shows that legislative 
backbenchers respond to their lack of expertise in many policy areas—which is exacerbated by 
time and resource constraints—by delegating decision-making authority to a subset of 
specialized legislators, making them the agents of the chamber as a whole. They follow the 
specialized colleagues they consider closest to their own preference ideal points, usually fellow 
party members, essentially “trusting” their judgment when forming their own policy preferences. 
This is based on the assumption that the positions of these experts approximate the positions they 
would take if they possessed perfect information about a given legislative proposal. 
If this is indeed the case, party control and sanctioning powers have little to do with 
levels of party cohesion in the EP, as common and unified party positions are the by-product of 
an information provision process where less-informed MEPs simply adopt the positions of their 
well-informed party colleagues in committee. 
This proposition touches upon one of the key conclusions in Chapter 5 concerning Simon 
Hix’ argument that party cohesion breaks down when national party delegations in the same EP 
party group take opposing policy positions (Hix 2002). While my analysis confirms this pattern, 
it is not simply the result of national party delegations being the principal with the most potent 
threat of sanction. Instead, the key to this pattern is once again the asymmetric distribution of 
information among MEPs: members are most likely to adopt the positions of their national party 
colleagues because they trust the information they receive from these experts more than that of 
their party group experts from different national party delegations, or their national 
representatives from different parties. Only if they are not represented by a national party 
member do they rely more heavily upon EP party group experts. Finally, when both national 
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party and EP party group specialists agree and provide a common set of information, these two 
bases of trust combine and make it almost certain that EP backbenchers will follow their lead.376 
These conclusions raise important questions about the nature of party control in the EP 
that ought to be addressed in future research. While party control in the EP is not simply a matter 
of the degree of sanctioning power, there is a high likelihood of cohesive party positions as only 
a small number of active participants deliberate and negotiate on behalf of their uninvolved party 
colleagues. Moreover, the structure of the EP party groups as a series of information filters 
facilitates a smooth transmission of this position from the committee to the floor, making the 
formation of a common party position quite likely in most cases (see section 4.5., The Creation 
of a Party Line, in Chapter 4). It is, once again, important to emphasize in this context that a 
party line in the EP is not usually imposed from above by the party group leadership, but is 
endogenous to the deliberation process. Party leadership in the EP is a fluid concept, as those 
members actively participating in the decision-making process regarding a legislative proposal 
act as the de facto leaders of their parties. 
In sum, this dissertation adds to our knowledge of law-making in the EU and advances 
our understanding of political contestation and voting behavior in the European Parliament. As 
such, it contributes to the recent and increasingly prevalent literature on the EP, as well as to the 
body of more general studies focusing on EU ‘politics’ rather than ‘integration’ as the principal 
dependent variable. 
                                                 
376 This triangulation of information also means that MEPs who lack expertise in the specific policy area under 
consideration (the principals) can avoid abdicating control over legislative outcomes by comparing the information 
they receive from different agents (legislative experts in the responsible committee). Competition between 
information providers is thus institutionalized in the patterns of EP decision-making (see Lupia and McCubbins 
1994: 370). 
 213 
7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 
As direct representatives of the people with a mandate to make decisions on their behalf, 
legislators are assumed to make informed choices when deliberating and passing new laws. In 
this sense, legislative decision-making appears to be an example of “committee voting,” where 
there are “few voters, participants can propose new alternatives, the individual implications of 
the decisions may be very large, and participants are well informed about the alternatives” 
(Hinich and Munger 1997: 12). My research challenges one central part of the conceptualization 
of legislative decision-making as committee voting, however, namely the assumption that 
legislators are necessarily well informed about the policy alternatives on the table. In this regard, 
policy choice in legislative politics more closely resembles a mass elections model, where voters 
are assumed to possess only a limited amount of information on the choices they face.  
Accordingly, my model of legislative decision-making exhibits characteristics of both 
committee voting and mass elections. The critical difference, of course, is that the element of 
choice for legislative backbenchers is not a candidate (as in mass elections), but a policy being 
decided under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. The role of ideology in 
both mass elections and legislative decision-making may be quite similar, however, according to 
my research.  
Hinich and Munger (1997: 180-211) articulate a mass election model that recognizes the 
utility of ideology as a decision-making “short-cut” or heuristic that helps voters choose among 
complicated alternatives. Ideology is conceived of as a shared belief system that reduces the 
number of conflict dimensions from an n-dimensional issue-space into an ideological space with 
many fewer dimensions. In this ideological space, issues cluster along the dominant ideological 
dimensions, which reduces the voters’ costs of gathering information by “summarizing” a large 
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number of potential dimensions of conflict. My theory and empirical results suggest that 
ideology can serve a similar function for legislative backbenchers confronted with a number of 
complex policy alternatives, a possibility that ought to be specified and examined in future 
research. 
This dissertation makes an additional contribution to the legislative studies literature by 
emphasizing the demand for a greater focus on the interaction of structures, agents, and decision-
making processes when examining law-making in different legislative settings. Most 
importantly, it emphasizes the significance of the normative dimensions of collective action, 
while stressing the conscious interaction of these structural elements with distinctly strategic 
considerations in the legislative process: the provision of focal points is constrained by the 
normative and political context within which the provider operates. In order for focal points to be 
effective in shaping policy choice, they must reflect already existing outcome preferences, that 
is, they have to appeal to the other legislators’ exogenous sets of norms and values. The 
provision of focal points is thus constrained by the existing ideological space; as argued above, 
focal points cannot be “free-floating.” Within these constraints, however, strategically provided 
focal points serve as intervening variables linking outcome preferences with specific policy 
proposals.  
The research thus questions the conceptualization of preferences as exogenous inputs into 
legislative decision-making processes. It emphasizes the endogeneity of preferences under 
conditions of uncertainty and conflicting objectives and thus challenges the assumption that the 
conversion of policy-makers’ ideological and constituency interests into policy preferences is 
direct and automatic. Instead, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the policy preferences of 
legislators are neither fixed nor exogenous. 
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While the “objective interests” of policy-makers (such as the ideological predispositions 
and constituency concerns of legislators) serve as the basis for the decisions they make in 
supporting or opposing particular policies, these objective interests can be at odds with each 
other. As a result, policy-makers do consider different policy outcomes as desirable, especially 
when they lack the expertise and resources to build genuine cause-and-effect knowledge 
concerning specific legislative proposals. In taking a position toward the Union Citizenship 
directive, for example, most Christian-Democrats in the EP favored the implementation of a 
genuine and tangible concept of EU citizenship, but opposed the broadly inclusive definition of 
what constitutes a family. In this case, as in many others, the translation of objective interests (or 
outcome preferences) into policy preferences and actual policy choice was a complicated process 
involving complex decisions under conditions of competing interests, substantive uncertainty, 
and asymmetric information. 
Therefore, it is important for researchers interested in questions of policy choice—in 
legislative settings as well as other arenas of political decision-making—to make a strict analytic 
distinction between outcome and policy preferences, and to expound the problems associated 
with the translation of the former into the latter. Conceptualizing outcome preferences as an 
exogenous “input” into decision-making processes is warranted as these preferences are largely 
fixed or generally stable. It is, however, critical to identify the policy preferences of decision-
makers and the process by which these policy preferences come about; in this context, 
consideration of the interaction between structure, actors, and processes is imperative. 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to explain decision-making in the European Parliament 
and to determine how the outcome preferences of its members translate into the positions they 
take toward particular legislative proposals. The focal point theory provides a compelling 
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account for this process. Scholars seeking to better understand the politics in the European 
Union, as well as those interested in legislative decision-making, will be able to use this research 
as a spring-board for their analyses. 
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APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER 2 
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Figure 1: The Co-Decision Procedure377 
 
                                                 
377 Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/codecision/images/diagram_en.gif 
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APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Figure 2: Ideological space Π 
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Figure 3: Policy space P1. 
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Figure 4: Policy space P1, with indifference curves. 
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Figure 5: Policy space P2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Policy space P3. 
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Figure 7: Policy space P1, greater salience of sovereignty-integration dimension, x2. 
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Figure 8: Policy space P1, greater salience of sovereignty-integration dimension, x1, x2, x3. 
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Figure 9: Policy space P1, greater salience of sovereignty-integration dimension, x1, x2, x3. 
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Figure 10: Policy space P1, greater salience of Left-Right dimension, x1, x2, x3. 
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Figure 11: Policy space P4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Policy space P5. 
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER 5 
Table 1: Frequencies and Descriptives. 
 
 Frequencies N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Yes Votes: 32,674 
No Votes: 5,656 
Abstentions: 2,244 
Missing: 0 
Vote 
Total: 40,574 
40,574 0 2 .92 .433 
Yes Votes: 33,678 
No Votes: 4,419 
Abstentions: 927 
Missing: 1,550 
EP Party 
Group 
Total: 40,574 
39,024 0 2 .91 .359 
Yes Votes: 29,860 
No Votes: 2,946 
Abstentions: 453 
Missing: 7,315 
National 
Group 
Total: 40,574 
33,259 0 2 .93 .311 
Yes Votes: 19,399 
No Votes: 2,923 
Abstentions: 946 
Missing: 17,306 
National Party 
Delegation 
Total: 40,574 
23,268 0 2 .92 .399 
Missing: 907 Left-Right 
Dimension 
(NOMINATE) Total: 40,574 
39,667 -.886 .862 -.02 .49 
Missing: 907 Sovereignty-
Integration 
Dimension 
(NOMINATE) 
Total: 40,574 
39,667 -.934 .944 .10 .42 
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Table 2: Multinomial logit regression estimates. 
 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
EP Party Group -5.27*** 
(.37)  
-1.83*** 
(.28)  
National Group -.27 
(.29)   
-.02 
(.20)    
National Party Delegation -8.53*** 
(.27)    
-3.79*** 
(.17)   
Constant 13.96*** 
(.47)    
9.79*** 
(.36)   
Number of cases 20,027  
Log pseudo-likelihood -3546.82              
Pseudo R2 0.57  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column is “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Probability of YES Vote When...
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5 EP Group = No, National Group = Yes, National Delegation = Yes
4 EP Group = Yes, National Group = No, National Delegation = No
3 EP Group = No, National = No, National Delegation = Yes
2 EP Group = No, National Group = Yes, National Delegation = No
1 EP Group = No, National Group = No, National Delegation = No
 
 
Figure 13: Probabilities of a YES vote, missing cases deleted listwise. 
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Probability of NO Vote When...
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Figure 14: Probabilities of a NO vote, missing cases deleted listwise. 
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Figure 15: Probabilities of abstaining when others vote NO, missing cases deleted listwise. 
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ure 16: Probabilities of abstaining when ot te YES, missing cases deleted listwise. 
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Table 3: Multinomial logit regression estimates excluding “National Party Delegation.” 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
 
   
EP Party Group -6.01*** 
(.23) 
-2.12*** 
(.19) 
National Group -1.02*** 
(.16)   
.02 
(.12)    
Constant 6.74*** 
(.30)  
4.70*** 
(.26)   
Number of cases 11,822  
Log pseudo-likelihood -5560.67            
Pseudo R2 0.28  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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igure 17: Probabilities of a YES vote, excl. “National Party Delegation,” listwise deletion. 
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F ure 18:  Probabilities of a NO vote, excl. “National Party Delegation,” listwise deletio
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gure 19: Prob. of abstain. when others vote NO, excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” listwise deletion. 
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Figure 20: Prob. of abstain. when others vote YES, excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” listwise deletion. 
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Probability of YES Vote When...
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Figure 21: Probabilities of YES vote, Committee subsample 1. 378 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
378 Votes from the following committees are included in this subsample: Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and 
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs; Committee on Constitutional Affairs; Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, 
the Media and Sport; Committee on Development and Cooperation; Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy; 
Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities. 
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Figure 22: Probabilities of YES vote, Environment Committee. 
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Figure 23: Probabilities of YES vote, Legal Affairs Committee. 
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Figure 24: Probabilities of YES vote, Transport Committee. 
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Figure 25: Probabilities of YES vote when excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Committee subsample 1. 379 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
379 Votes from the following committees are included in this subsample: Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and 
Rights, J d Home Affairs; Committee on Constitutional Affairs; Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, 
the Media and Sport; Committee on Development and Cooperation; Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; 
Committ  on Employment and Social Affairs; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy; 
Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities. 
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igure 26: Probabilities of YES vote when excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Environment Committee. 
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Probability of YES Vote When...
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igure 27: Probabilities of YES vote when excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Legal Affairs Committee. 
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Figure 28: Probabilities of YES vote when excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Transport Committee. 
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ble 4:Multinomial logit regression estimates, Committee subsample 1. 380 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
Ta
 
 
   
EP Party Group -10.60*** 
(.99)   
-1.62*** 
(.27)   
National Group .56 
(.51)   
.19 
(.24)   
National Party Delegation -10.00*** 
(.72)  
-4.67*** 
(.27) 
Constant 19.59*** 
(1.28)    
10.02*** 
(.49)   
Number of cases 5,218  
Log pseudo-likelihood -1006.23  
Pseudo R2 0.60  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Table 5: Multinomial logit regression , Environment Committee
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
 estimates . 
 
   
EP Party Group -8.67*** 
(.71) 
-4.38*** 
(.49)   
National Group .25 
(.41)   
1.85*** 
(.28)    
National Party Delegation -6.32*** 
(.62)  
-1.73*** 
(.49)   
Constant 14.32*** 
(.84)  
8.81*** 
(.57) 
Number of cases 7,221  
Log pseudo-likelihood -876.41  
Pseudo R2 0.65  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit regression es, Legal Affairs Committee. 
 
 
 estimat
 
No Vote Yes Vote 
   
EP Party Group -.19 
(.79)    
.90 
(.75)   
ational Group .43 -1.66 
Constant 4.26*** 
(1.13)  
2.53* 
(1.17)    
Number of cases 3,109  
Log pseudo-likelihood -676.44  
Pseudo R2 0.52  
   
N
(1.21)    (1.25)   
National Party Delegation -4.33*** 
(.90)   
2.22* 
(.94)    
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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able 7:  Multinomial logit regressi
 No Vote Yes Vote 
T on estimates, Transport Committee. 
 
 
   
EP Party Group -6.23*** -2.50 
(1.74)  (1.69)  
National Group -1.48 
(.95)  
-.56 
(.88)   
National Party Delegation -9.10*** 
(1.13) 
-3.74*** 
(1.05)    
Constant 16.93*** 
(1.60)   
11.34*** 
(1.53)   
Number of cases 4,479  
Log pseudo-likelihood -672.03  
Pseudo R2 0.61  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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ultinomial logit estimates excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Committee subsample 1.  
 No Vote Yes Vote 
Table 8:  M  381
 
 
   
EP Party Group -6.34*** -1.69*** 
(.39)  (.30)   
National Group .16 
(.26)   
.40* 
(.20)   
Constant 5.44*** 
(.51)  
3.58*** 
(.42) 
Number of cases 3,451  
Log pseudo-likelihood -1651.26  
Pseudo R2 0.35  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Table 9: Multinomial logit estimates excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Environment Committee. 
 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
EP Party Group -8.29*** 
(.41) 
-3.53*** 
(.28)  
National Group -2.68*** 
(.38)  
-.50 
(.28)    
Constant 10.15*** 
(.58) 
7.20*** 
(.48) 
Number of cases 3,911  
Log pseudo-likelihood -1204.36  
Pseudo R2 0.36  
   
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column is “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Table 10: Multinomial logit estimates excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Legal Affairs Committee. 
 
 
 Yes Vote No Vote 
   
EP Party Group -1.30*** 
(.38) 
.99* 
(.41)   
National Group -.53* 
(.25)   
Constant 2.72*** 
(.37)  
1.90*** 
(.38) 
Number of cases 1,874  
og pseudo-likelihood -1269.65  
2 0.12  
   
-.90*** 
(.27)  
L
Pseudo R
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column is “Abste tion.” Ro rd  is  is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
 
 
n bust standa  errors appear in parentheses. Stat tical significance
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Table 11: Multinomial logit estimates excl. “Natl. Party Del.,” Transport Committee. 
 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
EP Party Group -8.20*** 
(.44) 
-3.89*** 
(.31)  
ational Group -1.94*** 
(.37)  
-.18 
(.30)  
onstant 10.21*** 
(.62) 
7.05*** 
(.50) 
umber of cases 2,586  
-1075.79  
seudo R  0.39 
  
N
C
N
Log pseudo-likelihood 
2P  
 
Note: ultinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
d errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
Table entries are m
column is “Abstention.” Robust standar
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APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 6.2. 
 
Table 12: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis 6.2. 
 # of input 
word
# of references 
market. 
# of references 
 workers’ 
rights. 
# of references 
to level 
playing-field. 
 
s to single to
1stReading  
(adjusted by # of 
put words) 
4,067 
(10,000) 
10 speakers
26 
(64) 
5 speakers 
14 
(34) 
4 speakers 
 
in
2nd Reading Debate 
(adjusted by # of 
put words) 
5,593 
(10,000) 
15 speakers
6 
(11) 
4 speakers 
22 
(39) 
8 speakers 
17 
(30) 
5 speakers in
3rd eading Debate 
(adjusted by # of 
put words) 
11,94
(10,00
26 speakers 7 speakers 
55 
(46) 
18 speakers 
36 
(30) 
11 speakers 
0 
0) 
8 
(7) 
 R
in
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Table 13: Binomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.2. 
 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-1.83*** 
(.41)     
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
2.57*** 
(.53)      
Government Status 
 
-.53 
(.50) 
Liberal Market Economy 
 
-3.20*** 
(.69) 
Partial Coordinated Market Economy 
 
3.01*** 
(.60) 
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy 1.13* 
(.48)    
Constant 1.01* 
(.47) 
Number of cases 359 
Log pseudo-likelihood -118.29 
Pseudo R2 0.39 
 
 
 
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 29: Probabilities 6.2. A 
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Figure 30: Probabilities 6.2. B 
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1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
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Figure 31: Probabilities 6.2. C 
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Table 14: Binomial logit regression estimates, third reading vote, 6.2. 
 
 Floor Vote, Third Reading 
 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
2.13*** 
(.33)      
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension -.76* 
(.30)  
Government Status 2.42*** 
.36)   
Liberal Market Economy .03 
(.59)   
Partial Coordinated Market Economy -2.38*** 
(.48)  
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy -4.77*** 
(.54)   
Constant 
 
1.59*** 
(.44)  
Number of cases 560 
Log pseudo-likelihood -237.50 
Pseudo R2 0.39 
  
 
 
 
 
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 32: Probabilities 6.2. D 
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Figure 33: Probabilities 6.2. E 
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Figure 34: Probabilities 6.2. F 
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Figure 35: Policy Space 6.2. 
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 Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
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icipation , the tenth dire 
 
ment , w 
and will und 
 0001 000006 000002 00002 osed a classic harmonization directive , but 
 0001 000003 000002 00002 ng less than a harmonization d
 0001 000003 000003 00006  felt that the harmonization initially suggested wen 
 0001 000003 000003 00002 hieve detailed harmonization of the rules in force i 
 0001 000006 000002 00004 d , and a mild harmonization 
 0001 000003 000005 00003  an attempt at harmonization – even with limited obj 
 0001 000004 000004 00003 ot possible to harmonize everything and the example
 0001 000004 000004 00004 be practically harmonized throughout almost all the
 0001 000009 000002 00002 o complete the internal market . 
 0001 000009 000002 00004 st spur to the internal market . 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 as regards the internal market for the past twenty y 
 0001 000003 000008 00002 n the European single market . 
 0001 000006 000002 00003 hen , when the single market
 0001 000005 000001 00004 tection in the single market in the event of a takeo 
 0001 000005 000001 00002 e principle of subsidiarity , on the basis of the ex 
 0001 000009 000003 00004  this – one is subsidiarity and , paradoxically , th 
 0001 000003 000003 00004 e principle of subsidiarity and leave the Member Sta 
 0001 000004 000003 00001 e principle of subsidiarity has been used in a rathe
 0001 000004 000002 00005 e principle of subsidiarity is applied to overcome t 
 0001 000009 000003 00004 rogress of the vessel of the European Union and ther
 0002 000003 000007 00005 gned to enable employee information to be improved 
 0002 000003 000007 00004 mation for the employees . 
 0002 000003 000005 00002 olders and the employees of the companies targeted . 
 0002 000007 000004 00003     This gives employment but not real competitive j 
 0002 000007 000004 00002 er showing how employment has progressed . 
 0002 000010 000002 00002 nd workmanlike job . 
 0002 000008 000004 00001 alone 12 , 500 job losses were due to takeovers and 
 0002 000007 000004 00003 al competitive jobs . 
 0002 000010 000003 00001 ust look after jobs and so on . 
 0002 000010 000003 00002            But jobs will be much more in peril unles 
 0002 000003 000008 00001 ean Union that social dimension which it so grievous
 0002 000003 000008 00002 y , equity and social equilibrium in the European si 
 0002 000003 000006 00001 h directive on worker part
 0002 000010 000003 00003 the savings of workers all over Europe . 
 
 
 
EP Debate, second reading (December 12, 2000): 
 
 Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
  
 0001 000011 000001 00002 ed by a useful framework directive , although , as M
 0001 000001 000001 00009 pposed to be a framework directive . 
 0001 000015 000004 00001 objective of a framework directive on employ
 0001 000015 000001 00004  not achieve a single market in capital 
 265 
 0001 000003 000002 00003     Within the single market investors , be they pri 
rke 
 
ncies and so o 
y to build that 
e widening ever 
 
hion t 
d employees w 
 
 
 representatives 
 
003 000010 000003 00001 the changes in Article 9 to allow company boards the 
003 000004 000008 00002 carry out some defensive manoeuvres when it is not p 
003 000009 000004 00002 en the door to defensive measures , we shall perhaps 
003 000010 000003 00001 s the right to defensive measures to frustrate takeo 
003 000015 000002 00001 s the right to defensive measures to frustrate takeo 
003 000010 000002 00004  be blocked by hostile action or poison pills . 
003 000001 000004 00002 be to create a level playing field in Europe . 
003 000001 000005 00001 at there is no level playing field in Europe either 
003 000001 000004 00003  we not have a level playing field with North Americ 
003 000009 000004 00001 nd the duty of neutrality , there will be no point t 
003 000004 000008 00001 to the duty of neutrality . 
003 000001 000004 00007  obligation of neutrality in Europe . 
003 000009 000002 00002 mplete duty of neutrality recommended by the Council 
003 000010 000002 00004 tile action or poison pills . 
 0001 000003 000002 00002   The European single market is a pan-European ma
 0002 000015 000004 00001 while employee consultation is the objective of a fr 
 0002 000015 000004 00001 ear that while employee consultation is the objectiv 
 0002 000006 000003 00001 he position of employees . 
 0002 000007 000001 00003 echnicians and employees who actually turn the wheel 
 0002 000013 000001 00006 om my previous employer . 
 0002 000015 000004 00001 k directive on employment , we also believe that a s
 0002 000012 000001 00002  up this whole job again . 
 0002 000007 000001 00004 ttle about the job losses and closures caused by alm 
 0002 000004 000005 00002 s which affect jobs . 
 0002 000003 000004 00002 ll be European jobs and European prosperity . 
 0002 000012 000002 00007 ow that 70% of mergers go wrong . 
 0002 000004 000005 00002 there is staff restructuring , redunda
 0002 000010 000002 00003 t of corporate restructuring necessar
 0002 000012 000003 00007 ed Kingdom the social differences ar
 0002 000012 000002 00001 ny hint of the social model that keeps being paraded
 0002 000012 000002 00005 become a major social problem if we do not cus
 0002 000010 000005 00002 in to keep the socialists happy and he is prepared t 
 0002 000007 000002 00002 soever for the workers , it would at least prevent t 
 0002 000007 000001 00003 mention of the workers , technicians an
 0002 000004 000005 00003 important that workers and their representatives sho
 0002 000004 000005 00001 rticipation of workers when there is a takeover bid
 0002 000015 000004 00001 ded to consult workforces and their
 0003 000001 000004 00001 s directive is Article 9 . 
 0003 000001 000005 00004    That is why Article 9 also needs to be amended . 
 0003 000001 000005 00003  end result of Article 9 as it now stands would be t
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
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EP Debate, third reading (July 3, 2001)): 
at    ID1       ID2       ID3 
001 000031 000002 00003 ad day for the internal market , and a bad day for E 
001 000010 000001 00003 talk about the internal market , but also about the 
001 000011 000001 00002 ing within the internal market . 
001 000004 000002 00003 eration of the internal market may be impeded . 
001 000037 000001 00004 tortion of the internal market principles . 
001 000030 000001 00003 f the European single market . 
001 000008 000002 00006 mponent of the single market and is in the interests 
001 000008 000002 00005 rds creating a single market in corporate ownership 
002 000010 000002 00002 ore , but also consultation . 
002 000028 000003 00002 nformation and consultation . 
002 000036 000001 00004 sion of worker consultation and indeed , in some Mem 
002 000010 000002 00001 nformation and consultation are also currently under 
 0002 000010 000004 00003 say and better consultation as a matter of principle 
 0002 000010 000004 00005 regulated this consultation aspect properly from the 
 0002 000028 000002 00001 o real genuine consultation of the workforce . 
 0002 000036 000 01 00005 vote for fewer con ights than we
002 000028 000 03 00006 nformation and consultation with rights for workers 
00003 00004 the Council on em ati
p epresentatives w e 
o those of the employees , that the new proposal cre 
  often also be empl
 000001 00005 anisations and employees . 
4 000002 00001 e interests of employ
01 00004 e interests of employees and consumers . 
02 00002 s and needs of employees and consumers in conjunctio 
formation to employees at three points in the dire 
interests of employees in a takeover bid . 
terests of employees in a takeover bid . 
view of the employees is . 
02 000006 000003 00002  unionists and employees of companies throughout Eur 
pl t , social cohesi  ar 
37 000001 00003 view to future emplo t . 
0003 00003 mmunautaire of em t rights in the EU or in t 
0002 00004 obligations to infor nsult under either atio 
0 2 000013 000001 00002 resident , the job Par nt has here today is quit 
odel , as opposed to the Angl 
002 000003 000003 00001 tions of their social organs . 
002 000011 000002 00002 dvice from the social partners in the Netherlands kn 
002 000010 000001 00004 ssioners about socially responsible entrepreneurship 
  
 C
  
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
0
0
sultation r  wish to s 
 0
 0002 000002 0
 0002 000006 000003 00006 nions or other em
ployee rights to inform
l
on . 
oyees ' r ill hav
 0002 000033 000002 00004 
002 000005 000004 00005 0 oyees . 
 0002 000010
002 00003 0 ees . 
 0002 000038 0000
002 000034 0000 0
 0002 000013 000002 00002 in
002 000013 000002 00001 e  0
 0002 000028 000001 00003 e in
002 000006 000003 00007 he  0
 00
 0002 000038 000001 00007 nsequences for em oymen on in an
 0002 0000 ymen
 0002 000028 00
2 000013 00
ploymen
m o
, 
 000
0
 and c
lia e
 n
 0 m
 0002 000005 000001 00003 d a marvellous job in very difficult circumstances . 
 0002 000006 000003 00005 s in regard to jobs and the location of work . 
 0002 000038 000001 00007 r employment , social cohesion in an area around the 
002 000010 000001 00003 t the European social m 0
 0
 0
 0
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 0002 000010 000003 00004 s councils and trade unions , when I encountered dif 
002 000027 000001 00005 nts , that the trade unions and economic organisatio 
002 000006 000003 00006            The trade unions or other employees ' rep 
002 000004 000002 00003 ing workers to unemployment , is much greater than t 
002 000036 000001 00004 e extension of worker consultation and indeed , in s 
002 000037 000001 00003 the benefit of workers , and openness must be offere 
002 000028 000003 00006 ith rights for workers , even though mergers and tak 
002 000007 000001 00002 an companies , workers and savers urgently need a Eu 
002 000009 000003 00003  Parliament on workers and their representatives bei 
002 000004 000003 00005            The workers are invited to the table but 
002 000004 000003 00004 irective , the workers are the unwanted guests . 
002 000036 000001 00005 rights of some workers at the expense of others , no 
002 000004 000003 00007 rovided by the workers is just seen as another docum 
002 000035 000002 00001 information of workers mandatory , the situation sti 
002 000004 000002 00003 ely condemning workers to unemployment , is much gre 
002 000035 000002 00001 all aspects of workers’ and minority shareholders’ a 
002 000009 000003 00001 t two issues : workers’ participation and the obliga 
 0002 000028 000002 00001 ltation of the workforce . 
002 000036 000001 00003 de to give the workforce greater access to informati 
 0002 000028 000002 00002 rmation to the workforce in the process of a takeove 
 0002 000010 000003 00004  as advisor to works councils and trade unions , whe 
003 000013 000002 00002 le 6 ( 2 ) and Article 9 ( 1d )  . 
003 000013 000003 00001 no secret that Article 9 , and the right of boards t 
003 000013 000004 00005 ieve a deal on Article 9 : we forced the Commission 
003 000002 000004 00003      However , Article 9 and Amendments Nos 20 and 1 
 0003 000013 000004 00003                Article 9 and restrictions on frustra 
 0003 000013 000004 00006 y of reviewing Article 9 in the light of the finding 
 0003 000003 000001 00004 ically changed Article 9 of the common position , en 
 0003 000011 000004 00002                Article 9 only prohibits the legal pr 
 0003 000013 000004 00007 ompliance with Article 9 until 2006 . 
 0003 000007 000001 00005 he directive – Article 9 – is a step in the right di 
 0003 000007 000002 00002  subsidiary of Electricité de France to take control 
 0003 000013 000003 00001 boards to take defensive action without shareholder 
 0003 000009 000004 00001 ainst allowing defensive manoeuvres , far from deser 
 0003 000009 000004 00001 ow any type of defensive manoeuvring as was suggeste 
 0003 000008 000001 00003 e able to take defensive measures , but when managem 
 0003 000002 000003 00002 f contention : defensive measures , squeeze-out and 
 0003 000003 000001 00005            The defensive measures could have been su 
 0003 000003 000002 00003 ned to discuss defensive measures to the introductio 
003 000003 000001 00004  board to take defensive measures without consulting 
 0003 000039 000002 00001  , while other defensive techniques or instruments a 
 0003 000001 000003 00002  do not have a level playing field , if national leg 
mon 
003 000002 000003 00002 olders and the level playing field . 
003 000006 000002 00001 e absence of a level playing field . 
003 000006 000002 00003 nywhere near a level playing field . 
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0003 000003 000002 00003 ting a sort of level playing field , that is com
 0
 0
 0
 268 
 0003 000006 000002 00002 ve closer to a level playing field by throwing out t 
003 000003 000003 00001 is to create a level playing field does exist : the 
003 000011 000005 00006 deed provide a level playing field in Europe and cou 
 0003 000001 000001 00005 ed to create a level playing field in Europe as rega 
003 000001 000003 00002 know where the level playing field is . 
 0003 000001 000001 00009 rective on the level playing field to come into forc 
 0003 000031 000001 0000 the interests of owners 
003 000009 000003 00001  obligation to neutrality imposed on boards of manag 
003 000001 000004 00011 troduce strict neutrality which would ultimately lea 
003 000006 000002 00001 es , about the unfairness of the absence of a level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0
 0
 0
6 ired to remain neutral , as 
ain neutral or passive .  0003 000013 000003 00002 iged to rem
 0
 0
 0
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Table 15: Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.2. 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
Left-Right Dimension 
 
74*** 
(1.03) 
-.23 
(.59) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
-3.53** 
(1.19) 
.81 
(.82) 
Government Status 
 
.62 -.21 
(.53) 
Liberal Market Economy 
 
.51 
(.91) 
-2.45** 
(.90) 
Partial Coordinated Market Economy 
 
-2.72 
(1.46) 
2.05* 
(.92) 
ectoral Coordinated Market Economy 
 
.10 1.50 
(.91) 
Constant 
 
.10 1.96** 
Number of cases 
Log pseudo-likelih
Pseudo R2 0.42 
3.
(.82) 
S
(1.14) 
(.85) 
359 
-144.57 
(.75) 
 
 
 
ood 
   
N e ent ltinom ates. or each 
co Abs ust st  appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ote: Tabl
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andard errors
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Figure 36: Probabilities 6.2. G 
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Figure 37: Probabilities 6.2. H 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 38: Probabilities 6.2. I 
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APPENDIX E 
CHAPTER 6.3. 
 
Table 16: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis 6.3. 
 
 # of input 
words 
# of references to 
EU Democracy. 
# of references to 
artificial 
constructs. 
# references to 
legal 
personality. 
Debate 
First 
Reading 
9,916 
(10,000) 
23 speakers 
69 
(70) 
2
31 
(31) 
akers 
4 
(4) 
2 speakers 0 speakers 14 spe
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ing vote, 6.3. 
 
Table 17: Binomial logit regression estimates, first read
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
  
Left-Right Dimension -.08 
(26   
Sovere 5.30*** 
(63)   
Govern
g on Party Donations .75* 
(.31)    
Constant .84*** 
(.23)     
Number of cases 457 
Log ps -150.99                 
Pseudo R  0.45 
 
 
ignty-Integration Dimension 
 
ment Status 
 
.58 
(35)   
National Ceilin
 
 
eudo-likelihood 
2
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 39: Probabilities 6.3. A 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Levels of EU Support
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Figure 40: Probabilities 6.3. B 
 
 
 
1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES Vote Given 
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Figure 41: Probabilities 6.3. C 
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Figure 42: Policy Space 6.3. 
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TEXTPACK Analysis 
  
ocal Point 1: EU Democracy 
ccountability, clarity, constitutionalisation, integration, legitimacy, unification, democr- 
(and relevant endings), transparen- (and relevant endings), European ideal, European objectives. 
ocal Point 2: EU Parties as Artificial Constructs 
rtificial, banquets, beanfeasts, corruption, opaque, secret, totalitarian, discriminat- (and 
relevant endings), tax- (and relevant endings), pile of cash, so-called European political parties, 
Warsaw Pact. 
lternative (hypothetical) issue presentation: Legal Personality. 
ctual European statute, legal personality, legal persons 
eywords-in-context 
at = focal point category: Cat 0001 = EU democracy, Cat 0002 = artificial constructs, 
at 0003 = legal personality  
1: Speaker ID 
2: Paragraph ID 
3: Line ID 
P Debate, first reading (June 18, 2003): 
at   ID1       ID2       ID3 
  
001 000016 000002 00012 e light of the European ideal it is not very fair , 
001 000005 000002 00005 al and serious European objectives . 
001 000005 000003 00003 ansparency and accountability . 
001 000018 000002 00002 upport for the clarity and even-handedness with whic 
001 000010 000003 00004 , openness and clarity in political work and in the 
001 000011 000002 00003 plement to the constitutionalisation of the Treaties 
001 000005 000003 00002            The constitutionalisation process in whic 
001 000020 000001 00002  , there is no democracy , and to that I have to add 
 0001 000005 000003 00001 vital sinew of democracy , articulating the anxietie 
 
F
 
a
 
 
F
 
a
 
 
A
 
a
 
 
 
K
 
C
C
 
ID
ID
ID
 
 
E
 
 C
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
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 0001 000015 000003 00003 es not promote democracy , it reduces it . 
 0001 000015 000001 00002 n contemporary democracy , the role played by them i 
 0001 000014 000003 00004    I know that democra  serves the pu
001 000001 0000 1 00002 be no European democracy . 
00007 00006 o for European democra
00003 00001 cy of national democrac
       Is that democracy ?
ce of European democra European pub
 000004 00003 nition dilutes democracy ntilises the vote
 000003 00002 that a working democrac pean Union lev
an artificial democracy tch . 
parliamentary democracy in Europe . 
01 000009 000001 00003 aging a living democrac  of creating an
01 000010 000001 00005  parliamentary democra cterised by p
19 000002 00001 hat a European democra ropean public 
0003 00001 which European dem
0003 00003      In a pure democracy there should be as few rest 
1 000020 000001 00002 at there is no democracy without gender equality . 
c . 
001 000017 000004 00007  than with the democratic Europe to which we are not 
001 000016 000001 00011 as presented a democratic argument in favour of this 
001 000011 000002 00001            The democratic benefits of giving Europea 
001 000011 000001 00005 strengthen the democratic character of the European 
001 000012 000002 00001 laced over the democratic element in this proposal . 
001 000010 000004 00004 equirement for democratic legitimacy , both of which 
001 000010 000004 00005 hich it enjoys democratic legitimacy and has partner 
001 000019 000002 00001 ite wrong in a democratic perspective . 
001 000010 000002 00006 nd loophole in democratic politics . 
001 000010 000004 00006 ng loophole in democratic politics and thereby to en 
001 000010 000003 00001 is loophole in democratic politics closed . 
001 000003 000005 00001       In every democratic state the world over , thi 
ocratic system was not great , but 
001 000017 000005 00005 peans , honest democrats and sincere lovers of freed 
001 000006 000001 00004 nced that , as integration continues to progress , t 
001 000010 000004 00004 for democratic legitimacy , both of which must be pr 
001 000010 000004 00005 oys democratic legitimacy and has partners . 
001 000011 000002 00002 epening of the legitimacy of the European institutio 
 0001 000014 000003 00002  evade all the transparencies . 
 0001 000004 000002 00001 an exercise in transparency , no more , no less . 
001 000010 000003 00004 eating greater transparency , openness and clarity i 
001 000002 000003 00001 s of financial transparency . 
001 000010 000004 00006 ensure greater transparency and 
001 000005 000003 00003  principles of transparency and accountability . 
cy , which blic s 
 0 0
 0001 000001 0
0001 000017 0
cy . 
y  . 
 0001 000016 000001 00013 
0001 000019 000002 00003 
 
c y and a 
 a infa
lic gives 
r 0001 000017
0001 000017
nd  
 y at Euro
ra
el is 
 0001 000009 000001 00003  
0001 000005 000002 00007  
 from sc
 
 00
00
y inste
c
ad  arti 
ol y is chara
c a Eu
itic 
can be  0001 0000 y or  
 0001 000018 00
1 000017 00
ocracy rests . 
 000
000 
 0001 000014 000002 00003 me , as a mere democrat , that when an elected repre 
 0001 000010 000001 00004  efficient and democratic , and to bring it closer t 
 0001 000010 000003 00005 ean level more democratic . 
 0001 000017 000003 00002 sals are truly democrati
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0001 000022 000001 00002 he thought the dem
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 278 
 0001 000011 000002 00007 ng , it brings transparency and protection of the pa 
001 000001 000005 00005  provided that transparency exists and controls are 
001 000001 000001 00003 one of greater transparency in European politics can 
001 000014 000002 00005  not sure that transparency in corruption is a great 
001 000018 000003 00004 parties , with transparency of financing as its prin 
001 000006 000003 00002  safeguard the transparency of party finances , whic 
001 000010 000001 00004 ke Europe more transparent , efficient and democrati 
001 000013 000001 00005 hat the aid is transparent . 
001 000014 000002 00004 but it will be transparent . 
001 000004 000003 00003 that a clear , transparent and limited system where 
001 000001 000005 00003  to be made as transparent as possible . 
001 000004 000002 00002 on a clear and transparent footing the method by whi 
001 000012 000001 00002 mple , clear , transparent ground rules for the poli 
001 000012 000002 00003 avour of clear transparent rules , but I am not in f 
002 000023 000001 00004 s particularly artificial . 
 0002 000009 000001 00003 of creating an artificial democracy from scratch . 
002 000012 000001 00007  I see it , an artificial need . 
002 000008 000001 00002 al parties are artificial products that are in no po 
002 000017 000001 00003  synthesise an artificial sense of European identity 
002 000013 000001 00003  all manner of banquets held by European political p 
002 000013 000002 00006 od junkets and beanfeasts around Europe at the taxpa 
002 000014 000002 00003 that is called corruption . 
002 000014 000002 00005 ransparency in corruption is a great step forward . 
002 000021 000003 00001 proposed rules discriminate against political partie 
 0002 000007 000003 00002 ts is actively discriminated against by a criterion 
 0002 000017 000002 00002             It discriminates overtly against some pa 
 0002 000020 000002 00005 d refrain from discrimination , if we ourselves are 
 0002 000017 000002 00001 e of political discrimination . 
 0002 000010 000004 00005  not amount to discrimination against small groups , 
 0002 000015 000002 00002 prohibits ‘any discrimination based on any grounds s 
 0002 000013 000002 00002 are closed and opaque affairs . 
 0002 000016 000002 00005 g to receive a pile of cash for what are really meet 
002 000016 000001 00005         and in secret . 
002 000016 000002 00005 not join these so-called European political parties 
oney used to ensure that the pol 
 0002 000017 000001 0000  order to synthesise an ar 
 0002 000017 000001 00004 arn that their taxes were subsidising European polit 
 0002 000012 000001 00009 the individual taxpayer , it exists solely on paper 
 0002 000013 000001 00003 hen , that the taxpayer will have to finance and pay 
 0002 000023 000001 00003  from European taxpayers are deployed to accelerate 
 0002 000013 000002 00006  Europe at the taxpayers’ expense . 
 0002 000012 000001 00003  to the use of taxpayers’ money for political partie 
 0002 000012 000002 00002 tely must give taxpayers’ money to European parties 
 0002 000008 000002 00003 e proposal has totalitarian features . 
 0002 000017 000004 00007 g with the old Warsaw Pact than with the democratic 
 0003 000001 000006 00002 the form of an actual European statute , perhaps yet 
 0
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 0
 0
 0
 0
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 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0002 000022 000002 00002  to have their tax m
3  money through taxation in
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 0003 000001 000006 00002 onfer European legal personality , but the financing 
 0003 000018 000002 00003 f the parties’ legal personality , clarification of 
 0003 000018 000002 00001 cal parties as legal persons has not yet been confir 
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Table 18: Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.3. 
 
 
 YesNo Vote  Vote 
   
Left-Right Dimension
 
1.17** 
(.39)      
.74 
(.41)
vereignty-Integration Dimension -1.57* 
(.75)     
4.18*** 
(.63)     
overnment Status 
 
.54 .90 
(.63)      
National Ceiling on Party Donations 
 
-1.19** 
(.44)   
-.05 
(.42)     
Constant 
 (.46)      
36*** 
(.43)      
Number of cases 457  
-212.075  
seudo R2 .38  
  
 
     
So
 
G
(.69)     
1.17* 2.
Log pseudo-likelihood 51     
P
 
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
 “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
Figure 43: Probabilities 6.3. D 
column is
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Figure 45: Probabilities 6.3. F 
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Figure 44: Probabilities 6.3.
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APPENDIX F 
CHAPTER 6.4. 
Table 19: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis, 6.4. 
 # of input words # of references to 
consumer protection. 
# of references to 
industry interest. 
 
Debate 1 
(April 1997) 
 
15,326 
(10,000) 
32 speakers 
204 
(133) 
31 speakers 
106 
(69) 
31 speakers 
Debate 2 
(Febr. 1998) 
13,216 
(10,000) 
29 speakers 
210 
(158) 
29 speakers 
68 
(52) 
27 speakers 
Debate 3 
(Sept. 1998) 
6,502 
(10,000) 
13 speakers 
96 
(148) 
13 speakers 
18 
(28) 
12 speakers 
 
 
 
Table 20: Frequencies of vote outcomes by type of capitalism, multinomial logit, 6.4. 
Liberal Partial Sectoral National
 
 
0 
1 
163 
2 
2 
53 
10 
34 
75 
39 
2 
155 
 
42 
0 
1 
164a 
2 
3 
52 
8 
29 
99 
22 
4 
149 
5 
 
40 
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nary logit, 6.4. 
Liberal Partial Sectoral National
Table 21: Frequencies of vote outcomes by type of capitalism, bi
 
 
0 163 
1 
12 
53 
73 
75 
2 
155 
 
42 
0 164a 
1 
11 
52 
51 
99 
9 
149 
 
40 
 
 
 
Table 22: Binomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.4., 1996/163. 
 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-3.24*** 
(.50)     
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
.75** 
(.27)    
Constant 1.98*** 
 (.24)     
Numbe 412 
Log ps -159.43 
Pseudo
r of cases 
do-likelihood eu
 R2 0.25 
  
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
 
Dependent Variable
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Table 23: Binomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.4., 1996/164a. 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading  
  
Left-Ri
 
Sovere
Consta
Numbe
Log ps
Pseudo
ght Dimension -3.27*** 
(.65)    
ignty-Integration Dimension 2.11*** 
 (.37) 
nt 2.13*** 
 (.31)  
r of cases 411 
eudo-likelihood -128.88 
 R2 0.32 
  
*** = ignificant at 0.05 level 
Depend
significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = s
ent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 46: Probabilities 6.4. A 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Levels of EU Support, Binary Logit
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Figure 47: Probabilities 6.4. B 
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TEXTPACK Analysis 
  
 
Focal Point 1: Consumer Protection. 
 
acid, alternative, asthma- (and relevant endings), cancer- (and relevant endings), 
carcino  relevant 
endings  endings), 
energy, , health- 
(and re ngs), 
Kyoto, safety, 
sustain feasible, toxic, WHO, 
World 
 (and 
relevan , flexibility, 
Japanes inesses, 
monop  social, solidarity, south- (and 
relevan orld markets 
try interest 
ce commitment – to be rev 
ards . 
h Organization . 
s 
genic, cardio-vascular, children, clean- (and relevant endings), crop- (and
), death- (and relevant endings), die prematurely, disease, ecolog- (and relevant
 environment- (and relevant endings), eutrophication, greenhouse effect, harm
levant endings), human, illness- (and relevant endings), innovati- (and relevant endi
 lung complaints, mortality, pollut- (and relevant endings), quality, Rio, 
able, technical development, technical feasibility, technically 
Health Organization 
 
 
Focal Point 2: Industry Interest. 
 
American- (and relevant endings), closures, competit- (and relevant endings), cost-
t endings), economic- (and relevant endings), egalitarianism, employment
e, jobs, Korean, labour market, manufacturers, small and medium-sized bus
oly, north- (and relevant endings), shareholder value, SMEs,
t endings), unemployment, United States, US legislation, w
 
 
Keywords-in-context 
 
Cat = focal point category: Cat 0001 = consumer protection, Cat 0002 = indus
 
ID1: Speaker ID 
ID2: Paragraph ID 
ID3: Line ID 
 
 
Debate 1 (April 9, 1997): 
  
 Cat  ID1    ID2    ID3 
  
 0001 000004 000004 00002 ot taken , the Rio Conferen
 0001 000003 000004 00002 d laid down by WHO . 
 0001 000003 000003 00004 cording to the WHO stand
 0001 000003 000003 00001  values of the World Healt
 0001 000024 000005 00005 an be no other alternative . 
 0001 000009 000003 00004  research into alternative car engines and measure
 0001 000009 000002 00003 on systems and alternative energy sources . 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 or , examining alternative fuels , alternative propu 
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 0001 000009 000002 00003 native fuels , alternative propulsion systems and al 
 
 incr 
 
ndly fuel 
 te 
e 
 
air in Europe and achieving t 
rs to be developed and also 
ironment . 
ironment and the saving of 
l . 
fuels . 
els . 
 
o 
en , the R 
e health of our peopl 
 of 
 the consumer , so 
mbi 
t 
 our cit 
 saving of lives . 
is Parliament had t 
r 
p 
put 
 0001 000009 000003 00004 , we also want alternative solutions set out for the 
 0001 000029 000003 00003 ffocating from asthma , with waiting rooms full of c
 0001 000029 000003 00003  the number of asthma patients in Amsterdam had
 0001 000021 000002 00006 ces are highly carcinogenic . 
 0001 000029 000003 00003  rooms full of children where the doctors told me th
 0001 000003 000006 00005 it can develop clean , environmentally frie
 0001 000001 000006 00006 iesel which is clean and respects our health . 
 0001 000001 000006 00003 ries producing clean diesel , but not for Europe . 
 0001 000019 000004 00002 ines , we need clean directors too , because they do 
 0001 000019 000004 00002  ' t just need clean engines , we need clean directo 
 0001 000014 000006 00002  catalysts and clean fuels are introduced . 
 0001 000014 000001 00004 ight , because clean fuels enable advanced engine
 0001 000018 000002 00001 to develop the clean technologies more swiftly if w
 0001 000016 000002 00004 advantages for clean vehicles could then be introduc
 0001 000008 000003 00006 ens will enjoy cleaner , healthier air and lives wil 
 0001 000008 000003 00001  two bonuses : cleaner 
 0001 000010 000002 00005 at will enable cleaner ca
 0001 000030 000001 00005 will lead to a cleaner env
 0001 000030 000002 00001  in terms of a cleaner env
 0001 000010 000002 00004 t will give us cleaner fue
 0001 000006 000003 00002 t of producing cleaner 
 0001 000031 000001 00007 endly cars and cleaner fu
 0001 000001 000007 00004 ople with lung disease , fewer people in receipt of
 0001 000001 000007 00001 ith is what we ecologists call the internalization o 
 0001 000032 000003 00003 ing sources of energy , such as solar power or hydr
 0001 000004 000004 00002 lieves that if energy measures are not tak
 0001 000032 000002 00002  importance of energy saving and reduction of emissi 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 nd alternative energy sources . 
 0001 000032 000003 00003  or hydrogenic energy sources . 
 0001 000022 000004 00001 e of renewable energy sources for vehicles . 
 0001 000010 000003 00002 protecting our environment , th
 0001 000002 000002 00005 terests of our environment . 
 0001 000019 000005 00002  thing for the environment . 
 0001 000030 000001 00005 d to a cleaner environment . 
 0001 000018 000001 00002  improving the environment and enhancing the role
 0001 000002 000005 00005 tors , for the environment and for
 0001 000014 000003 00002 nefits for the environment and human health of co
 0001 000009 000003 00005 tection of the environment and public health canno
 0001 000023 000002 00002 tection of the environment and the health of
 0001 000010 000002 00003 tection of the environment and the public health of 
 0001 000030 000002 00001 s of a cleaner environment and the
 0001 000018 000004 00001 to improve the environment and th
 0001 000030 000001 00002 mitment to the environment as far as cars are conce
 0001 000017 000004 00002 d consider the environment but also oppose certain 
 0001 000030 000002 00002 uestioning the environment committee that new com
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 0001 000020 000001 00004            The environment is , perhaps , the first 
ithout cons 
i 
use they con 
tor vehicles a 
n 
 and the health 
al organizations and 40 mi 
 creates or 
y othe 
c 
onmental sense , and fail to tak 
mental solution . 
 the three 
e be 
 
 
n 
t an 
k it is necessa 
, 
te 
 em 
 0001 000020 000004 00003            The environment is improving w
 0001 000029 000001 00005 ne priority in environment policy and climate policy 
 0001 000025 000001 00002 to improve the environment proposed in the Auto / O
 0001 000002 000006 00004  claimed to be environment-friendly beca
 0001 000022 000003 00001 ote the use of environment-friendly engines and fuel 
 0001 000020 000001 00006 e increasingly environment-friendly mo
 0001 000032 000002 00002 l , as well as environmental , importance of energy 
 0001 000009 000003 00002 : the views of environmental NGOs should be taken i
 0001 000029 000001 00009 izations , the environmental experts
 0001 000030 000002 00003 o has a strong environmental impact . 
 0001 000030 000004 00006 ant to look at environmental issues as a whole . 
 0001 000021 000003 00002 ontrary to all environmental logic , France , which 
 0001 000030 000002 00002 more extensive environmental measures . 
 0001 000002 000008 00005 major European environment
 0001 000004 000001 00002  political and environmental package of great merit 
 0001 000019 000006 00001 e can cure our environmental patient without doing t 
 0001 000014 000006 00003             An environmental policy which
 0001 000027 000001 00002 unemployment , environmental pollution and man
 0001 000009 000001 00002 n proposals on environmental protection , taking ac
 0001 000020 000003 00001 r economic nor envir
 0001 000011 000001 00005  an acceptable environ
 0001 000027 000004 00003 ere the better environmental standards in
 0001 000011 000003 00003  the necessary environmental standards which hav
 0001 000008 000003 00001 eading edge of environmental technology . 
 0001 000027 000001 00003 ion to be made environmentally compatible , turning
 0001 000002 000009 00004 ars must be as environmentally compatible as we can
 0001 000002 000009 00003 green light to environmentally compatible cars ! 
 0001 000003 000006 00005 evelop clean , environmentally friendly fuels , its 
 0001 000031 000001 00007 re calling for environmentally more friendly cars a
 0001 000022 000003 00005 lution and the greenhouse effect . 
 0001 000021 000002 00006 , reducing the greenhouse effect linked to the carbo 
 0001 000014 000004 00004 o where is the harm in that ? 
 0001 000018 000001 00002 eness , public health , improving the environmen
 0001 000001 000006 00006 d respects our health . 
 0001 000001 000007 00004 ss spending on health . 
 0001 000003 000002 00005 ity and public health . 
 0001 000008 000002 00002 ed to costs to health . 
 0001 000016 000002 00008 tice to public health . 
 0001 000031 000001 00005 es a danger to health . 
 0001 000018 000003 00001 sons of public health because we thin
 0001 000009 000003 00005 ent and public health cannot be cost-effectiveness 
 0001 000001 000007 00004  impact on the health economy must also be calcula
 0001 000018 000003 00001 lly recognized health hazard . 
 0001 000010 000002 00003 and the public health of Europe ' s citizens , but a 
 0001 000014 000003 00002 ment and human health of combining strict vehicle
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 0001 000023 000002 00002 onment and the health of our citizens , who can only 
 
 gu 
r air and lives will be saved 
r air to breathe and call , h 
 
i 
s 
 it had two problems : 
 
n 
 seem too high . 
on , an improvement in fuel qu 
 
h cars are clearly 
 0001 000010 000003 00002 ironment , the health of our people and the future p 
 0001 000024 000002 00002 to give to the health of this generation and the fut 
 0001 000003 000006 00007            The health of those we represent in this 
 0001 000029 000001 00009 xperts and the health specialists ? 
 0001 000007 000002 00006 Fourthly , the health studies commissioned by the Co
 0001 000001 000004 00005 ality of human health unless we base ourselves on
 0001 000029 000003 00002  pollution and health – I certainly have done . 
 0001 000008 000003 00006 njoy cleaner , healthie
 0001 000010 000002 00008 ive our people healthie
 0001 000025 000001 00003 the social and human costs of the current level of p
 0001 000014 000003 00002 nvironment and human health of combining strict veh
 0001 000001 000004 00005 the quality of human health unless we base ourselve
 0001 000024 000002 00002 e prospects of human life on earth . 
 0001 000013 000003 00001 om respiratory illness . 
 0001 000023 000001 00003 causes serious illnesses and therefore triggers high 
 0001 000026 000005 00003 the future and innovation . 
 0001 000027 000003 00002  reduction and innovation . 
 0001 000013 000002 00001  Programme was innovative but
 0001 000027 000001 00003 o come up with innovative ideas and technically soun
 0001 000016 000005 00002 e emissions of pollutants , not forgetting CO2 . 
 0001 000002 000005 00001 e particles of pollutants by comparison with a diese 
 0001 000004 000006 00004 ours those who pollute least . 
 0001 000004 000006 00006 ful cars which pollute more . 
 0001 000017 000003 00005  vehicles only pollute towns and there are many othe 
 0001 000004 000007 00001 ansforming the polluted air we now have in Europe i
 0001 000002 000009 00001 e most heavily polluted city , Athens , and confirme 
 0001 000003 000001 00006 r is seriously polluted on days like this . 
 0001 000031 000001 00005                polluted urban air which poses a dang 
 0001 000004 000006 00005 ghter and less polluting , should have tax exemption 
 0001 000004 000007 00001 king fuel less polluting . 
 0001 000021 000001 00003  , or use less polluting fuels , and they are more s 
 0001 000009 000003 00006 etter and less polluting fuels : the effort should b 
 0001 000022 000001 00003  , namely less polluting motor vehicles . 
 0001 000022 000002 00002  vehicles less polluting
 0001 000020 000001 00005 ions to combat polluti
 0001 000032 000003 00003 ms of reducing pollution , but that new engines shou
 0001 000029 000003 00003 o with the air pollution , of whic
 0001 000002 000007 00005  times as much pollution . 
 0001 000008 000001 00002 of atmospheric pollution . 
 0001 000009 000002 00001 r for reducing pollution . 
 0001 000017 000003 00005 other forms of pollution . 
 0001 000028 000001 00002 st atmospheric pollution . 
 0001 000031 000001 00002 of atmospheric pollution . 
 0001 000025 000001 00003 rrent level of pollution ; second , the objectives t 
 0001 000023 000001 00002 ce atmospheric pollution and based on a different ap 
 290 
 0001 000029 000003 00002 to do with air pollution and health – I certainly ha 
 0001 000027 000001 00002  environmental pollution and many others , too . 
 0001 000022 000003 00005 prime cause of pollution and the greenhouse effect . 
 0001 000001 000004 00005 e fighting air pollution and therefore we will not b 
 0001 000023 000001 00003 s , levels are pollution are increasing , especially 
a 
 
healthy to live 
 
ai 
 i 
 
001 000020 000001 00005 vement in fuel quality and control of emissions from 
001 000021 000003 00004  to better air quality and encourage the use of bio- 
001 000003 000002 00005 ulture , water quality and public health . 
 better air quality are disturbing problems calli 
001 000031 000002 00002 eve better air quality at a reasonable price . 
0009 ls , urban air quality can be improved more rapidly 
001 000002 000005 00002 we need better quality fuel for all vehicles , new o 
 Finnish fuels already exce 
ban air quality 
bas 
ir . 
 
 0001 000020 000002 00001  last 20 years pollution caused by motor vehicles h
 0001 000023 000001 00003  , atmospheric pollution causes serious illnesses an
 0001 000016 000002 00007  permitted air pollution is much too low . 
 0001 000003 000003 00004 city where air pollution makes it un
 0001 000031 000001 00003 this source of pollution which must be tackled if we
 0001 000016 000002 00008  mean value of pollution within an area of 4 km2 f
 0001 000015 000003 00003 for better air quality , because above 200 ppm this 
 0001 000004 000003 00001  relate to air quality , carbon dioxide emissions , 
 0001 000027 000004 00003 roving of fuel quality , incidentally , is one of th 
 0001 000009 000003 00004 ovement of air quality , like support for research
 0001 000001 000001 00002 report on fuel quality , on behalf of the Committee
 0001 000006 000003 00001  issue of fuel quality , since this has a prompt imp 
 0001 000003 000005 00007 l of the right quality . 
 0001 000004 000003 00001 ons , and fuel quality . 
 0001 000014 000001 00004  improving air quality . 
 0001 000015 000006 00002 ovement of air quality . 
 0001 000021 000001 00002 to improve air quality . 
 0001 000024 000003 00006 f gains in air quality . 
 0001 000027 000004 00001 ovement in air quality . 
 0001 000009 000003 00007 oth for better quality / less noxious fuels and for 
 0
 0
 0
 0001 000015 000002 00001 for
 0
 0001 000031 000001 0
 0
 0001 000001 000004 00001 target for air quality in 2010 . 
 0001 000008 000003 00004 for better air quality in Northamptonshire . 
 0001 000002 000005 00002 ard to the air quality in cities like Athens and Mad 
 0001 000003 000001 00006 rements of air quality in the city tell us that the 
 0001 000028 000001 00003 l you that the quality of
 0001 000001 000006 00005 efit from this quality of diesel ? 
 0001 000030 000002 00003 applies to the quality of fuel , where it is possibl 
 0001 000031 000001 00009 to improve the quality of fuels , ur
 0001 000031 000002 00004 vements in the quality of fuels in Finland . 
 0001 000001 000004 00005  improving the quality of human health unless we 
 0001 000006 000003 00001  impact on the quality of the air . 
 0001 000031 000001 00006  improving the quality of the a
 0001 000028 000001 00002 vements in the quality of the air and to protect peo 
 0001 000001 000004 00008 nterest in the quality of the product served to them
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 0001 000001 000003 00002  measuring air quality over 4 square kilometres , in 
n 
 is 
of vehicles and 
ern 
r 
e g 
 
no 
s a strong enviro 
irectly on the consumers 
sport to society at 2 
ng cleaner fuels . 
erent measures is req 
tion is exorbitan 
. 
sumer and industry , a 
it . 
 
 
 0001 000014 000001 00003 o propose fuel quality specifications . 
 0001 000023 000001 00002 nance and fuel quality specifications . 
 0001 000008 000002 00004 ement for fuel quality were all included in my opini 
 0001 000003 000003 00002  measuring air quality which conflicts with our ow
 0001 000020 000004 00004 e principle of sustainable development . 
 0001 000012 000001 00005 move towards a sustainable society , the use of cars 
 0001 000011 000002 00001 n research and technical development . 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 mmission , but technical development in this area
 0001 000031 000001 00008 e issue of the technical development 
 0001 000019 000001 00005 efit ratio and technical feasibility . 
 0001 000019 000003 00002        This is technically feasible even today , and 
 0002 000017 000002 00003 ency low , the American , Japanese and Korean gov
 0002 000017 000002 00004            The American government goes even furthe
 0002 000017 000002 00003 the American , Japanese and Korean governments ar
 0002 000006 000002 00004  rapidly , the Japanese will . 
 0002 000017 000002 00003 , Japanese and Korean governments are giving their m
 0002 000002 000002 00003 t company with US legislation we shall be the losers 
 0002 000001 000006 00004        For the United States and Japan . 
 0002 000013 000003 00006  Thirdly , the cost , as passed to customers , is 
 0002 000030 000002 00003 els at a lower cost , which also ha
 0002 000020 000002 00002 t a reasonable cost . 
 0002 000031 000002 00005 ely reasonable cost . 
 0002 000019 000006 00001  damage to the cost / benefit principle . 
 0002 000019 000001 00005  arises of the cost / benefit ratio and technical fe 
 0002 000022 000004 00001 ded to promote cost / benefits , energy-saving and r 
 0002 000003 000002 00002 se most of the cost calculations came from industry 
 0002 000005 000004 00001 ciation of the cost differential impact by Member St 
 0002 000003 000002 00003 account in its cost estimates the external costs of 
 0002 000009 000003 00005 r part of that cost falls d
 0002 000010 000003 00002  it is a small cost for protecting our environment , 
 0002 000005 000004 00001 fferentials in cost for the refining industry betwee 
 0002 000010 000003 00001  at an average cost of ECU 10 per year , per motoris 
 0002 000003 000002 00004 ission put the cost of car tran
 0002 000006 000003 00002 restimated the cost of produci
 0002 000030 000002 00001 nalysis of the cost of the diff
 0002 000021 000002 00001            The cost of the first op
 0002 000014 000004 00002 sing , it will cost them ECU 0 
 0002 000025 000001 00003 , the economic cost to the con
 0002 000015 000005 00003 olve excessive cost without appreciable benef
 0002 000001 000007 00003  to talk about cost-benefit . 
 0002 000003 000002 00001 ther than true cost-benefit analysis . 
 0002 000032 000002 00001 the need for a cost-benefit analysis linked to the r
 0002 000002 000003 00004 ant to adopt a cost-effective , practical approach h 
 0002 000009 000003 00005 alth cannot be cost-effectiveness , because the grea
 0002 000001 000007 00002  , the idea of cost-effectiveness . 
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 0002 000032 000002 00001 ne itself to a cost-effectiveness analysis , but emp 
ese 
 
ig 
s , and , in a 
 of polluti 
 of 
 
r 
 ind 
ur 
y and the indispens 
an 
rea 
p 
job 
y which would be determined 
o meeting increasingly st 
 market . 
turers , and , in a Europe uni 
urers and oil refiners , and 
f bi 
w 
naturally keen not 
towards Eur 
 0002 000015 000006 00002 0 , based on a cost-effectiveness analysis , repr
 0002 000008 000002 00003 romise between cost-effectiveness and the best avail 
 0002 000003 000002 00001 e principle of cost-effectiveness rather than true c 
 0002 000015 000003 00003 account of the cost-effectiveness relationship in th 
 0002 000002 000007 00007 tests , a very costeffective measure because manufac 
 0002 000032 000002 00001 on of external costs , a matter which we have , more
 0002 000023 000001 00003 rs high social costs , and , unfortunately , despite 
 0002 000010 000003 00001 we examine the costs , they will be recouped from th 
 0002 000001 000007 00001 rnalization of costs . 
 0002 000013 000003 00003 the grounds of costs . 
 0002 000020 000001 00010 ot respected , costs are increased , leading to a do 
 0002 000003 000002 00002 an interest in costs being high , measures which m
 0002 000023 000002 00001 oubtedly imply costs for manufacturer
 0002 000014 000004 00001 e today – that costs increase as a result . 
 0002 000003 000002 00003 s the external costs of motor vehicle transport . 
 0002 000025 000001 00003 cial and human costs of the current level
 0002 000022 000002 00002  view that the costs projected by the Commission for 
 0002 000020 000001 00011 reased vehicle costs slow down sales and renewal
 0002 000008 000002 00002  as opposed to costs to health . 
 0002 000008 000002 00002 alance between costs to industry as opposed to costs
 0002 000020 000002 00003  deadlines and costs which , ultimately , the consum 
 0002 000020 000004 00003  , and without costs which have to be borne by moto
 0002 000001 000004 00007 I say that the economic basis of this Auto / Oil stu 
 0002 000025 000001 00003  , fifth , the economic cost to the consumer and
 0002 000010 000002 00003 ens , but also economic development and ensuring E
 0002 000010 000002 00003 ope ' s future economic development and progress . 
 0002 000015 000006 00002 imperatives of economic efficienc
 0002 000022 000003 00001 lief and other economic incentives to the industry t 
 0002 000020 000003 00001 s make neither economic nor environmental sense , 
 0002 000017 000002 00001 lways had this economic system imposed on us in a
 0002 000023 000002 00001 solidarity and egalitarianism , these should not im
 0002 000020 000001 00011 d consequently employment , without creating new 
 0002 000028 000002 00009 uate degree of flexibility should be introduced into 
 0002 000028 000002 00009  , a degree of flexibilit
 0002 000017 000001 00002 esents 10 % of jobs . 
 0002 000020 000001 00011 t creating new jobs . 
 0002 000024 000003 00005  giving people jobs but als
 0002 000020 000001 00002 nology and the labour
 0002 000023 000002 00001 mply costs for manufac
 0002 000001 000002 00004 l groups , car manufact
 0002 000021 000002 00004 e European car manufacturers and the advocates o
 0002 000001 000003 00001 ps , the motor manufacturers and the oil companies 
 0002 000002 000007 00007 easure because manufacturers are 
 0002 000002 000008 00002  that some car manufacturers are unenthusiastic , an 
 0002 000002 000005 00006 one , and that manufacturers are working 
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 0002 000017 000002 00003 e giving their manufacturers considerable assistance 
 0002 000009 000003 00003 rovided by the manufacturers themselves , as has alr 
 0002 000020 000001 00003  motor vehicle manufacturers to take on additional c 
 of cours 
 North Sea fuels . 
ean 
 unfortunately , 
s : the views of environ 
esponsibilities as well . 
pean countries will have 
 their fuel sup 
ve to 
 
99 
d . 
 mean that we need clear , 
e fuels . 
eet 
 
atic 
 0002 000019 000005 00004 loitation of a monopoly position , which is
 0002 000028 000002 00008 000 km further north , this is certainly not the cas 
 0002 000028 000002 00006 anced , but in northern Finland , i . 
 0002 000005 000004 00001 dustry between northern and southern countries . 
 0002 000009 000003 00008 ntries , while northern ones use
 0002 000028 000002 00002 Finland as the northernmost country in the Europ
 0002 000026 000005 00002 s to have been shareholder value . 
 0002 000032 000002 00002 mphasis to the social , as well as environmental , i 
 0002 000025 000001 00003    First , the social and human costs of the current 
 0002 000017 000001 00002 nd the ensuing social cataclysm , especially in our 
 0002 000023 000001 00003  triggers high social costs , and ,
 0002 000009 000003 00002 o involve more social player
 0002 000020 000001 00003 them to assume social r
 0002 000001 000007 00004  in receipt of social security and less spending on 
 0002 000023 000002 00001  on a basis of solidarity and egalitarianism , these 
 0002 000009 000003 00008 point out that southern Euro
 0002 000028 000002 00006             In southern Finland , spring may already 
 0002 000005 000004 00001 n northern and southern countries . 
 0002 000009 000003 00008  we all know , southern countries get
 0002 000005 000004 00002 nal period for southern states , because we ha
 0002 000027 000001 00002 e at present : unemployment , environmental pollutio
 0002 000027 000001 00003 be sold on the world markets , relying on the abilit 
 0002 000008 000003 00002 ur cars to all world markets and set a standard for 
 
 
 
Debate 2 (February 17, 1998): 
 
 Cat  ID1    ID2    ID3 
  
 0001 000012 000003 00001 ally after the Kyoto Summit . 
 0001 000009 000001 00002 king about the Kyoto Summit and CO2 emissions . 
 0001 000009 000001 00004 ication on the Kyoto Summit issued at the end of 1
 0001 000010 000003 00008   That way the Kyoto agreements might be achieve
 0001 000002 000001 00004 cording to the WHO . 
 0001 000026 000001 00002 dations of the World Health Organization . 
 0001 000008 000001 00003 mage caused by acid rain –
 0001 000009 000002 00002 t networks and alternativ
 0001 000004 000001 00002 suffering from asthma caused by car fumes if we m
 0001 000001 000003 00009 ar disorders , asthmatic conditions , especially in 
 0001 000026 000002 00001 nesses such as cancer ; and the Lange report propose
 0001 000021 000002 00003 ion are highly cancerogenic . 
 0001 000001 000003 00009 traffic causes cardio-vascular disorders , asthm
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 0001 000021 000002 00002 ead content in children ' s blood in risk zones and 
 0001 000020 000001 00006 om lead reduce children ' s intelligence levels . 
 0001 000001 000003 00009  especially in children , and there are lung complai 
 0001 000004 000001 00003 ch to bring up children , to live and to work . 
 0001 000020 000001 00005 ory disease in children and 19 % of cases of pulmona 
m asthm 
 
 in Europe . 
in their cities , and the A 
ls would bring this investme 
 up , opposition to cars on th 
ealthier places in which 
ities in which children and 
gines and also oblige oil c 
r fuels , especially with so ma 
 fuels must be on the market e 
petrol and diesel fuels . 
duction technology . 
oducts . 
since 1970 – not voluntarily 
r example , in terms 
serious harm caused by air 
 p 
r L 
try and for em 
 fa 
cit 
 0001 000004 000004 00003 ities in which children and adults can live free of 
 0001 000004 000001 00002 fewer European children will be suffering fro
 0001 000001 000009 00011 ause they want clean , environmentally friendly cars
 0001 000018 000001 00010           Only clean , safe cars can legitimize rene 
 0001 000012 000001 00002 ght to breathe clean air and protect their health . 
 0001 000001 000002 00002 oner , we need clean air
 0001 000026 000001 00002 ble to breathe clean air 
 0001 000013 000005 00004     Demand for clean fue
 0001 000002 000002 00002 ssions are not cleaned
 0001 000004 000001 00003 ll be better , cleaner and h
 0001 000004 000004 00003  we have those cleaner c
 0001 000004 000001 00008 turers to make cleaner en
 0001 000002 000001 00008 s down we need cleane
 0001 000002 000003 00007 convinced that cleaner
 0001 000004 000001 00008 panies to make cleaner 
 0001 000002 000003 00005 e to invest in cleaner pro
 0001 000022 000002 00003 uce better and cleaner pr
 0001 000001 000003 00008 rs have become cleaner 
 0001 000022 000003 00002 he adoption of cleaner technology will not serve to 
 0001 000002 000002 00007 of making fuel cleaner were , fo
 0001 000004 000004 00002 e avoidance of crop damage and eutrophication . 
 0001 000008 000001 00003 high number of deaths and 
 0001 000002 000001 00004  40 000 people die prematurely every year from air
 0001 000020 000001 00005 of respiratory disease in children and 19 % of cases 
 0001 000017 000001 00002 President , in ecological terms Mrs Hautala and M
 0001 000016 000002 00003 ble sources of energy . 
 0001 000029 000001 00002 take , for the environment , for indus
 0001 000021 000001 00003 health and the environment , maintaining the values 
 0001 000003 000002 00003 ortance of the environment , we should not go too
 0001 000001 000003 00009 ication of the environment . 
 0001 000012 000004 00003 health and the environment . 
 0001 000013 000004 00004 enefit for the environment . 
 0001 000015 000002 00001 nature and the environment . 
 0001 000019 000003 00004 to improve the environment . 
 0001 000025 000003 00003 out Europe ' s environment . 
 0001 000007 000004 00004 ovement of the environment again by years . 
 0001 000006 000002 00005 ovement of the environment against pollution . 
 0001 000006 000002 00006 harmful to the environment and , consequently , the 
 0001 000003 000003 00003 ess , help the environment and create new jobs . 
 0001 000027 000003 00006 protecting the environment and enhancing our capa
 0001 000007 000004 00003 t both for our environment and for the economy . 
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 0001 000016 000001 00002  improving the environment and human health . 
nd public health . 
et 
 
 
ent is not the enemy of emplo 
ges of unleaded 
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th society a 
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d 
 m 
l 
o high and , as regar 
it is also one of the Co 
oidance of crop 
 0001 000005 000003 00004 onomy , on the environment and on health . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 e issue of the environment a
 0001 000014 000003 00001 at the working environment and the ability to comp
 0001 000026 000002 00001  impact on the environment as well as on the industr 
 0001 000014 000002 00001  best possible environment for each of our citizens 
 0001 000019 000003 00006 antee that the environment has been manifestly impro
 0001 000006 000005 00003 h for a better environment is a battle that may leav
 0001 000018 000003 00001  Finally , the environm
 0001 000017 000001 00009  , neither the environment nor the car or oil indust 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 espect for the environment with respect for work and 
 0001 000013 000004 00011 o what are the environmental advantages ? 
 0001 000020 000003 00002 s aware of the environmental advanta
 0001 000029 000003 00003 ties , both at environmental and industrial level . 
 0001 000013 000004 00015 l that a major environmental benefit . 
 0001 000002 000003 00002 fair to ignore environmental concerns , just be
 0001 000020 000003 00003 industry to an environmental contract wi
 0001 000017 000001 00006 the number one environmental enemy . 
 0001 000020 000003 00006 the absence of environmental investment in the secto
 0001 000003 000003 00001 go all out for environmental objectives the n
 0001 000019 000003 00002       From the environmental point of view the sulph
 0001 000001 000002 00003 ty of life and environmental quality in Europe , an
 0001 000018 000003 00003 ide behind the environmental question to justify the 
 0001 000001 000003 00004 ake the car as environmentally friendly as possible 
 0001 000024 000001 00006 etter and more environmentally friendly car on the
 0001 000001 000009 00011 y want clean , environmentally friendly cars . 
 0001 000011 000005 00001 concentrated , environmentally friendly diesel oil . 
 0001 000022 000003 00004 ies which make environmentally friendly products . 
 0001 000004 000004 00002 rop damage and eutrophication . 
 0001 000018 000001 00005 e and that the greenhouse effect is threatening us . 
 0001 000008 000001 00003 hs and serious harm caused by air pollution , large
 0001 000002 000002 00007 rms of risk to health , 55 % to
 0001 000024 000003 00001 population ' s health , and 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 hreaten public health , and that recent studies conf 
 0001 000012 000001 00004  right to good health , as provided for by the Treat 
 0001 000002 000001 00009 for people ' s health . 
 0001 000005 000003 00004 ronment and on health . 
 0001 000012 000001 00002  protect their health . 
 0001 000016 000001 00002 ment and human health . 
 0001 000016 000001 00003 cts people ' s health . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 ent and public health . 
 0001 000022 000001 00003 and people ' s health . 
 0001 000020 000001 00005 tial to public health : 7 to 10 % of cases of respir 
 0001 000004 000004 00002 ty , in public health and also the av
 0001 000014 000002 00001 ull freedom of health and safety . 
 0001 000021 000001 00003  defend public health and the environment , maintain 
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 0001 000012 000004 00003 , that is , of health and the environment . 
 0001 000025 000003 00004  to people ' s health by emissions from leaded petro 
 0001 000002 000001 00005 reness of this health hazard has only grown in recen 
 0001 000018 000001 00006 ty of life and health of our people . 
 0001 000024 000001 00007 market and the health of our population . 
 0001 000012 000002 00001 fuels when the health of their shareholders and clie 
 0001 000002 000002 00001 ed to see that health organizations have recently be 
 0001 000027 000004 00004 European Union health policy , thanks to this Parlia 
normous pr 
f n 
 
emands were made on in 
om motor vehicles . 
m 
, it is the peo 
shed 
001 000008 000002 00002  goods to less polluting means of transport . 
001 000011 000003 00002  supply a less polluting product should be rewarded 
001 000002 000001 00004  year from air pollution , according to the WHO . 
sed by air pollution , largely due to vehicle tr 
001 000021 000004 00001 tely mean less pollution , since even today ' s cars 
00001 esponse to air pollution , when traffic is not banne 
001 000006 000002 00005 onment against pollution . 
 
n caused by road traffic . 
 0001 000012 000003 00003 o this serious health problem . 
 0001 000021 000004 00002 inue to breath health-threatening , polluted air . 
 0001 000004 000001 00003  , cleaner and healthier places in which to bring up 
 0001 000024 000002 00005 are remarkably healthy ; they are making e
 0001 000006 000005 00004 annot stop the healthy ones who want to move ahead . 
 0001 000015 000002 00001 xploitation of human beings and the destruction o
 0001 000016 000001 00002 nvironment and human health . 
 0001 000001 000003 00003  system is the human lung . 
 0001 000004 000004 00003 of respiratory illness . 
 0001 000020 000001 00005 s of pulmonary illnesses are but a few figures that 
 0001 000026 000002 00001 ausing serious illnesses such as cancer ; and the La
 0001 000027 000003 00006 r capacity for innovation . 
 0001 000016 000002 00002 ould encourage innovation if d
 0001 000005 000005 00004 ssible for our innovation-minded industry . 
 0001 000005 000003 00006 ch will assist innovative industries . 
 0001 000008 000002 00001 ith the use of innovative transport systems . 
 0001 000001 000003 00009  and there are lung complaints caused by particles i 
 0001 000016 000001 00004 een increasing mortality and air pollution caused by 
 0001 000013 000002 00005 nology so that pollutants are reduced ; and second , 
 0001 000013 000002 00005 uality so that pollutants are totally eliminated or 
 0001 000013 000002 00001 e emissions of pollutants fr
 0001 000021 000002 00003 ne , and other pollutants produced by automobile co
 0001 000021 000004 00002 -threatening , polluted air . 
 0001 000015 000002 00007         If the polluter does not pay 
 0001 000015 000002 00005  But it is the polluter who should pay . 
 0001 000010 000003 00004 sions of heavy polluting chemicals have been pu
 0
 0
 0
 0001 000008 000001 00003  cau
 0
 0001 000020 000002 
 0
 0001 000020 000001 00005 ributed to air pollution . 
 0001 000016 000001 00003 shown that air pollution affects people ' s health . 
 0001 000021 000003 00003 nsumers , less pollution and less CO2 emissions – th
 0001 000029 000002 00004 a worsening of pollution and safety risks , along wi 
 0001 000011 000001 00002 roblems of air pollutio
 297 
 0001 000016 000001 00004 tality and air pollution caused by road traffic . 
 0001 000012 000001 00003 ncrease in air pollution due to our traffic using tw 
y 
ding L 
n the increase and that 
n public health and also t 
ffic management , t 
en the health of thei 
irect impact on air qu 
 
heir vehicles ' 
l qua 
 0001 000011 000006 00002 oped to combat pollution effectively : I am referrin 
 0001 000006 000005 00001 duction in the pollution generated by vehicles toda
 0001 000021 000002 00002 enied that air pollution in our cities , inclu
 0001 000012 000003 00002 ncrease in air pollution in urban areas . 
 0001 000018 000001 00005 pers that town pollution is o
 0001 000001 000002 00003 ssue , because pollution knows no borders . 
 0001 000015 000002 00010 he cost of the pollution of the natural world deserv 
 0001 000011 000002 00001 to improve air quality , establishing two deadlines 
 0001 000004 000004 00002 ovement in air quality , i
 0001 000001 000005 00003  impact on air quality . 
 0001 000002 000001 00002 ons , and fuel quality . 
 0001 000006 000002 00006 ould invest in quality . 
 0001 000010 000001 00006  vital for air quality . 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 w to improving quality . 
 0001 000015 000001 00006  improve their quality . 
 0001 000015 000002 00012 to improve air quality . 
 0001 000016 000001 00005 set for petrol quality . 
 0001 000019 000002 00003  to better air quality . 
 0001 000022 000003 00007 of the highest quality . 
 0001 000023 000001 00002 rned about air quality . 
 0001 000023 000002 00003 ovement of air quality . 
 0001 000023 000003 00002 vements in air quality . 
 0001 000029 000002 00001 to improve air quality and to promote new technologi 
 0001 000016 000001 00007 ieving the air quality desired . 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 such as better quality fuel , tra
 0001 000022 000002 00004  to use better quality fuel . 
 0001 000012 000002 00001 n offer better quality fuels wh
 0001 000001 000005 00003 hown that fuel quality has a d
 0001 000014 000003 00002 mple , the air quality in Dublin , the capital city
 0001 000001 000002 00003  environmental quality in Europe , and it is a Europ 
 0001 000028 000001 00002 ogramme on air quality in Europe . 
 0001 000003 000002 00002  improving air quality in European centres of popula 
 0001 000023 000001 00005 ovement of air quality in terms of t
 0001 000028 000001 00005 ent in the air quality in the towns of Europe . 
 0001 000028 000002 00005 o that the air quality in the towns of Europe is imp 
 0001 000020 000001 00005            Air quality is essential to public health 
 0001 000026 000001 00002 e specific air quality objectives , in line with the 
 0001 000023 000002 00001 ovement in the quality of fuel . 
 0001 000021 000001 00003  values of the quality of fuels and continuing to ca 
 0001 000011 000002 00001 s by which the quality of fuels and the limit values 
 0001 000011 000002 00002  improving the quality of fuels will have immediate 
 0001 000001 000002 00003 ornerstone for quality of life and environmenta
 0001 000018 000001 00006 civilization , quality of life and health of our peo 
 0001 000003 000003 00003  improving the quality of life of our fellow citizen 
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 0001 000012 000003 00001 dence over the quality of the air we breathe , espec 
 0001 000012 000001 00003 to improve the quality of the air we breathe . 
 
ring , whe 
mediate effects 
d 
h they had – unfortunate 
ut ECU 10 a year . 
nnigs a litre . 
ar w 
e 
al 
motor industry , particul 
x 
e 
0 per motor vehicle 
lved in the 
le 
or the manufac 
 0001 000001 000002 00006 f Europe : the quality of their life is at stake , w
 0001 000015 000002 00009 bsidizing poor quality oil . 
 0001 000013 000002 00005 improving fuel quality so that pollutants are totall 
 0001 000016 000002 00001 the new petrol quality standards and emission limits 
 0001 000002 000001 00006 goals for fuel quality than we did last sp
 0001 000009 000003 00001 vement in fuel quality would have im
 0001 000006 000004 00001 t above all in quality – think of vocational trainin 
 0001 000014 000002 00001  of health and safety . 
 0001 000029 000002 00004  pollution and safety risks , along with economic di 
 0001 000019 000002 00001 t to stimulate technical development towards more a
 0001 000026 000003 00001  realistic and technically feasible space of time , 
 0002 000005 000007 00005 as good as the Americans for once ? 
 0002 000013 000005 00001 eaten refinery closures because of the Auto-Oil prog 
 0002 000018 000003 00003 to justify the closures whic
 0002 000002 000004 00002 aps twice this cost , or abo
 0002 000005 000008 00004 e petrol would cost 18 pfe
 0002 000014 000004 00001 ted there is a cost factor built into this : costs t 
 0002 000002 000004 00001 that the added cost for a normal petrol-driven c
 0002 000005 000008 00007 es – about the cost of catalytic converters ? 
 0002 000013 000004 00006 icate that the cost of desulphurizing fuels and oth
 0002 000015 000002 00010  except at the cost of the pollution of the natur
 0002 000005 000008 00008 s – today they cost ten times less than the DM 5 000 
 0002 000004 000003 00002 As regards the cost to the general consumer , the or 
 0002 000011 000005 00001 ls at no extra cost to the 
 0002 000002 000004 00002 car owners the cost will work out at perhaps twice t 
 0002 000005 000008 00009 s to money and costs , because I have learnt from e
 0002 000027 000003 00006 our production costs , but rather a sensible means o 
 0002 000016 000001 00010 mean increased costs , but the first thing to do is 
 0002 000004 000003 00001  us that those costs are in fact 17 % cheaper for p
 0002 000013 000004 00004 d involve high costs for the oil industry with littl 
 0002 000015 000002 00003 meet these new costs itself . 
 0002 000005 000008 00001 ike to turn to costs now . 
 0002 000021 000003 00004 culated annual costs of ESC 1 00
 0002 000015 000002 00008 petitive , the costs of investment should not get pa 
 0002 000002 000002 00007 ted that their costs of making fuel cleaner were , f 
 0002 000017 000001 00007 about the true costs of road traffic will have to be 
 0002 000014 000004 00001 e consumer and costs that will affect our industrial 
 0002 000014 000004 00001 lt into this : costs that will be passed on directly 
 0002 000004 000002 00002 cates that the costs they are suggesting are not qui 
 0002 000002 000004 00001  If we look at costs to the motorist , then I trust 
 0002 000016 000002 00001 exaggerate the costs which would be invo
 0002 000020 000001 00002 Mr President , economic arguments have long prevai
 0002 000016 000001 00009 uld ignore the economic aspects . 
 0002 000029 000002 00004 s , along with economic difficulties f
 299 
 0002 000019 000003 00007 so easy to use economic means of control and to prev 
ve 
e 
ecause European manufac 
olution of the car 
002 000003 000003 00003 and create new jobs . 
002 000003 000003 00001  make securing jobs and creating new ones a priority 
002 000001 000009 00004 d 15 , 000 new jobs over the last 10 years – it did 
002 000023 000001 00004 at the vehicle manufacturers . 
002 000029 000002 00004 ulties for the manufacturers . 
002 000018 000001 00008  Of course the manufacturers are somewhat hesitant , 
002 000004 000001 00008 ll require car manufacturers to make cleaner engines 
002 000001 000007 00002 ow independent manufacturers to produce spare parts 
002 000001 000009 00001 cause European manufacturers will gain some competit 
002 000006 000004 00001 s of small and medium-sized businesses alongside the 
002 000004 000001 00003 berdeen in the north of Scotland and Athens in Greec 
002 000006 000002 00005 g an intrinsic social commitment : the protection an 
002 000006 000004 00001 nally , in the social field . 
002 000005 000006 00007 he devotees of social policy in this House , but one 
002 000012 000003 00004 located in the south of the Union . 
002 000020 000002 00002 also exists in southern Europe . 
002 000007 000002 00003 eople from the southern Member States along with the 
002 000003 000002 00003 a time of mass unemployment all over Europe . 
ebate 3 (September 15, 1998): 
at  ID1    ID2    ID3 
001 000003 000003 00001 suffering from asthma caused by car fumes if the tar 
001 000004 000004 00006 he sake of our children , because they need a health 
001 000003 000002 00001 o bring up our children and go about our daily lives 
 0001 000003 000003 00001 fewer people – children and older people – suffering 
 0002 000019 000003 00004 e right to use economic means of control to improve 
 0002 000006 000002 00006        From an economic point of view , it should be 
 0002 000011 000004 00001 d lead to some economic problems which , we belie
 0002 000021 000001 00004 sures from the economic sectors involved ? 
 0002 000002 000001 00009 nce considered economical , but which have now prov
 0002 000001 000009 00001 islation helps employment , b
 0002 000006 000004 00001 r product : in employment , no longer in terms of qu 
 0002 000022 000003 00002 t serve to aid employment . 
 0002 000029 000001 00002 dustry and for employment . 
 0002 000018 000003 00001 t the enemy of employment : the ev
 0002 000029 000002 00001 titiveness and employment in the European vehicle an 
 0002 000018 000001 00010  thus reviving employment in this sector . 
 0002 000022 000003 00006 The effects on employment of this are unfathomable . 
 0002 000005 000003 00001 ty , providing flexibility for goods , services and 
 0002 000005 000003 00002    Of course , flexibility includes the free movemen 
 0002 000001 000009 00003 and preserving jobs , and whole new industries are e 
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 0001 000009 000001 00002 eeping our air clean . 
 0001 000011 000002 00001 al benefits of clean air are to be achieved then str 
 0001 000007 000 04 00004  , in future , clean  cause less p
001 000004 000 03 00006 o that we have clean en ines and clean exhaus emiss 
00002 00004  is to produce clean  emissions , it
00003 00006 an engines and clea emissions . 
nsider whether cle ailable in suf
incentives for clea
01 000012 000001 00004 ntroduction of clean  been under  
01 000002 000002 00003  really become clean o that indust
03 000004 00001 companies made cle re efficient engines and 
0002 00008 s to make cars clea
0004 00009 re efficient , cleane ss fuel . 
1 000003 000002 00002 Athens will be clea ealthier places to ve 
uels and cleaner vehicles ca 
001 000002 000006 00002 ket that these cleaner fuels are actually being awai 
001 000003 000004 00011 lready putting cleaner fuels on the market now that 
001 000002 000003 00003 industry needs cleaner fuels to be able to keep up w 
 0001  the 
001 000002 000003 00002 e on producing cleaner industrial technology . 
ake cleaner petrol and diesel , whilst at 
 0001 000002 000004 00002 n to invest in cleaner technologies . 
 0001 000008 000001 00006 aner fuels and cleaner vehicles cannot be underestim 
001 000003 000003 00002 mage caused to crops by pollution . 
00004 00006 need a healthy envi  . 
001 000013 000001 00002 health and the envir
wards a better env  
001 000013 000003 00002 nterest of the enviro
01 000003 000003 00003 protecting the env nd public hea
001 000010 000001 00006 account of the envir nd recognising d 
12 000005 00001 tion where the enviro t is concerned . 
0003 00003 y coupled with env icy , or rather viro 
1 000010 000001 00005 licy is really enviro olicy . 
001 000009 000002 00005 ar of European environ ent policy ; at some point in 
001 000008 000002 00005  together with environmental and consumer organisati 
001 000011 000002 00001 al , human and environmental benefits of clean air a 
001 000002 000004 00003 more stringent environmental demands could not be bl 
001 000007 000001 00003 by pushing its environmental demands to the limit wh 
001 000011 000004 00003 y with the new environmental specifications . 
001 000001 000002 00005 r to guarantee environmentally acceptable mobility . 
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 0001 000002 000003 00003 gent calls for cleaner exhaust emissions , but it is 
 0001 000002 000006 00003 age the use of cleaner fuels . 
 0001 000003 000004 00010 y will produce cleaner fuels ; indeed some of them a 
0001 000008 000001 00006 ation aimed at cleaner f 
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 0001 000001 000005 00003 en the helm in environment policy ; it has combined 
 0001 000010 000003 00003 cy , or rather environment policy which determines i 
 0001 000008 000001 00005  threat to the environment will be worldwide , as a 
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 0001 000001 000001 00003 t a course for environmentally friendly mobility . 
001 000013 000004 00002 safer and more environmentally friendly motor cars . 
001 000003 000003 00003 ent and public health . 
001 000013 000001 00002 mpact on human health and the environment . 
001 000010 000001 00006  protect human health from possible damage can an in 
001 000008 000001 00004 ations for the health of humans , plants and animals 
001 000003 000002 00001 e and work and healthier places to bring up our chil 
001 000003 000002 00002 be cleaner and healthier places to live . 
001 000004 000004 00006 se they need a healthy environment . 
001 000011 000002 00001 erall social , human and environmental benefits of c 
001 000013 000001 00002 ajor impact on human health and the environment . 
001 000010 000001 00006 and to protect human health from possible damage can 
001 000002 000005 00003 stained out of human illness have to be taken into a 
001 000010 000001 00006 foundations of human life and to protect human healt 
 0001 000002 000005 0000 e to be taken into account 
 0001 000006 000004 00007  produces more pollution , we must remain particular 
 0001 000003 000003 00002 ed to crops by pollution . 
001 000007 000004 00008 0 % of all car pollution . 
001 000012 000001 00006 o reducing air pollution . 
001 000008 000002 00003 m , namely air pollution from traffic and transport 
001 000008 000001 00003            Air pollution is a particularly intractab 
001 000011 000001 00002 guarantee that pollution is defeated once and for al 
001 000011 000002 00001 r reducing air pollution must be an imperative . 
001 000007 000004 00004 ill cause less pollution than unleaded petrol . 
001 000007 000004 00007 problem of car pollution until we have dealt with th 
001 000007 000003 00005 wer to the air pollution which has become the major 
001 000005 000002 00004 ovement in air quality . 
001 000001 000003 00002  improving air quality : we have succeeded in introd 
001 000001 000006 00001 ll improve air quality and a success for our institu 
001 000001 000003 00001 f improved air quality and employment in Europe ; se 
001 000013 000001 00004 tions and fuel quality by the years 2000 and 2005 . 
001 000002 000003 00001 tions for fuel quality for the year 2005 as well . 
001 000002 000002 00003 conditions for quality for the year 2005 too , so th 
 0001 000006 000004 00002 ce of superior quality fuel from the year 2005 , or 
 0001 000013 000002 00001         Higher quality fuels automatically lead to l 
 0001 000005 000001 00003 rds better air quality in Europe . 
 0001 000006 000001 00002 tives , on the quality of fuels and the reduction of 
 0001 000002 000002 00001 itions for the quality of fuels only for the year 20 
 0001 000008 000001 00007 ssions and the quality of petrol and diesel fuels fo 
 0001 000011 000004 00001 to improve the quality of petrol and diesel fuels in 
 0001 000002 000006 00004  hope that the quality of the air will start to impr 
 0001 000001 000004 00008 ss because air quality will be improved , but also b 
 0001 000001 000004 00005 to improve air quality will have a direct and unprec 
 0001 000008 000002 00004 h is geared to sustainable development . 
 0001 000008 000002 00005 sations , to a sustainable technology which can resp 
 0001 000013 000002 00001  lead to lower toxic emissions and encourage the dev 
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 0002 000003 000004 00002 ssed about the cost , it is not great . 
 0002 000007 000004 00013 g aware of its cost . 
 0002 000003 000004 00004 Europe it will cost only Ecu 5 to Ecu 8 more every y 
 0002 000002 000005 00002  a very narrow cost-effectiveness analysis , but Par 
 0002 000002 000005 00003 e to show that costs sustained out of human illness 
 0002 000002 000005 00002  brought other economic arguments to the discussion 
 0002 000013 000001 00005 e to introduce economic incentives to speed progress 
 0002 000001 000004 00004 ide-effects on employment . 
 0002 000001 000003 00001 ir quality and employment in Europe ; secondly from 
 0002 000001 000004 00005  the number of jobs created in the motor vehicle ind 
 0002 000001 000004 00008 t also because jobs will be safeguarded and the sect 
 0002 000001 000004 00006 , up to 6 % of jobs will disappear . 
 0002 000007 000004 00003 ss made by car manufacturers to comply with European 
 0002 000001 000004 00002 that small and medium-sized businesses can also be i 
 0002 000004 000004 00003 have prevented medium-sized businesses from carrying 
 0002 000001 000 sses in this secto 
002 000004 000004 00005 I am glad that medium-sized businesses will , in man 
002 000011 000002 00001 If the overall social , human and environmental bene 
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Tabl
No V  
e 24: Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading, 6.4. , 1996/163. 
 
 
 ote Yes Vote
   
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-3.18* 
(1.38)     (1.30)   
-1.45*** 
(.44)     
-.10 
(.33)  
1.50 
(.78)      
3.87*** 
(.73)      
412  
Log pseudo-likelihood -208.88        
0.2320  
  
-5.42*** 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
Constant 
 
Number of cases 
Pseudo R2 
 
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
 
Table 25: Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading, 6.4. , 1996/164a. 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
 i
indicated 
 
 
 
 
   
Left-Ri ht Dimension 9.30** 
(3.04)      
-1.78*** 
(.54) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension -3.79*** 
(.79)     
.95* 
(.38)     
Constant -5.19*** 
(1.88)    
2.25*** 
(.21)    
Number of cases 411  
Log pseudo-likelihood -140.40        
Pseudo R2 0.4110  
  
g
 
 
 
 
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
 
 i
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Figure 48: Probabilities 6.4.C 
 
 
Figure 49: Probabilities 6.4. D 
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APPENDIX G 
CHAPTER 6.5. 
Table 26: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis, 6.5. 
 
 # of input 
words 
# of references to 
Workability. 
# of references to 
License to Pollute.
# references to 
Harmonization. 
Debate 
First 
Reading 
14,619 
(10,000) 
35 speakers 
112 
(77) 
31 speakers 
180 
(123) 
34 speakers 
21 
(14) 
11 speakers 
Debate 
Second 
Reading 
9,574 
(10,000) 
20 speakers 
92 
(96) 
18 speakers 
71 
(74) 
16 speakers 
9 
(9) 
4 speakers 
Debate 
Third 
Reading 
3,968 
(10,000) 
8 speakers 
(43) 
5 speakers 
 
(35) 
6 speakers 
9 
(23) 
4 speakers 
17 14
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ial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.5. 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
Table 27: Binom
 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-5.29*** 
(.55)   
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
4.11*** 
(.80)    
Government Status 
 
1.18*** 
(.33)   
Liberal Market Economy 1.17 
(.77)     
Partial -.47 
(.49)  
Sectora
 
Coordinated Market Economy 
 
l Coordinated Market Economy 
 
-1.18* 
(.53)  
Constant 
 
1.07* 
(.47)   
Number of cases 485 
Log pseudo-likelihood -131.78 
Pseudo R2 0.59 
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
 
Figure 50: Probabilities 6.5. A 
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1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES Vote 
Given Levels of EU Support
Liberal Market
Economy
 
Figure 51: Probabilities 6.5. B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Probabilities 6.5. C 
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Figure 53: Policy Space 6.5. 
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TEXTPACK Analysis 
 
efficient, gain, implementable, 
impractical, incalculable, moderate, patchwork, pragmatic, profit, proportional, realistic, 
reasona t- (and 
relevan tical- 
(and relevant endings), relocat- (and relevant endings), workab- (and relevant endings), direct 
proport , small 
companies, United States 
 
 
ment, 
environmentally-friendly, Erika, fauna, flora, forest, GMOs, health, biological diversity, ecolog- 
(and re mental 
responsibilities, Exxon Valdez, genetic- (and relevant endings), green fundamentalists, habitat- 
(and re atura 
2000, nuclear accidents, oil, pesticides, precautionary, Prestige, Priolo, public funds, public 
health, public purse, radiation, radioactive, Seveso, species, sustainab- (and relevant endings), 
tax- (an
ying 
field, v ndards, 
the whole of the European Union, European society, citizens of the European Union, European 
citizens
at 0002 = license to pollute, Cat 
0003 =
ID1: Speaker ID 
  
 
Focal Point 1: Workability. 
achievable, business, companies, competition, distortions, 
ble, sensible, unworkable, well-balanced, America- (and relevant endings), cos
t endings), econom- (and relevant endings), industr-, (and relevant endings), prac
ion, in proportion, scientific knowledge, small- and medium-sized small businesses
 
Focal Point 2: License to Pollute. 
agricult-, AZF, Aznalcoyar, biodiversity, dangerous, dumping, ecosystem, environ
levant endings), environmental objectives, environmental protection, environ
levant endings), human lives, licence to pollute, loopholes, maritime disaster, N
d relevant endings), Tricolor, vague 
 
 
Focal Point 3: Harmonization. 
 
Lisbon, harmonis- (and relevant endings), European model, internal market, level pla
iability of Europe, people of Europe, uniform European framework, European sta
, European principle, European model 
 
 
Keywords-in-context 
 
Cat = focal point category: Cat 0001 = workability, C
 harmonization. 
 
ID2: Paragraph ID 
ID3: Line ID 
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EP Debate, first reading (May 13, 2003): 
 
  Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
  
ment . 
hi 
kening the in 
take on this respons 
ental damage , giving 
 
v 
 
ntal 
ronmental damag 
 0001 000016 000003 00005 but if all the costs were to be charged on , includi 
 0001 000014 000002 00004 ur anger is in direct proportion to the extent of th 
 producing goods o 
 
hat polluting doe 
 0001 000005 000003 00003 urable for the economic sectors or whether it will r 
 0001 000013 000003 00002  time when the United States is putting pressure on 
 0001 000005 000003 00002 hether this is achievable at the mo
 0001 000016 000001 00004 easier for the business community to comply with t
 0001 000035 000002 00001 with regard to business interests , wea
 0001 000030 000003 00004 the event that companies become insolvent . 
 0001 000025 000003 00002  the insurance companies cannot 
 0001 000020 000002 00004 ility of small companies is not jeopardised . 
 0001 000020 000001 00010 that insurance companies need a certai 
 0001 000004 000003 00005 at managers of companies that put the environment at 
 0001 000002 000005 00005  distortion of competition . 
 0001 000014 000001 00003  distortion in competition . 
 0001 000033 000002 00003  distortion of competition in the internal market , 
 0001 000002 000001 00003 bility and the cost and pollution is prevented , not 
 0001 000035 000001 00003 hese disasters cost human lives and lead to serious 
 0001 000011 000001 00004 y have time to cost it properly . 
 0001 000029 000001 00006 r to carry the cost of cleaning up the site . 
 0001 000035 000002 00002 uters bear the cost of environm
 0001 000012 000002 00004 lities and the cost of insurance premiums reward tho
 0001 000020 000002 00003 portioning the cost of restoring ecological damage t 
 0001 000020 000001 00002 portioning the cost of restoring the damage . 
 0001 000023 000003 00004 ll pick up the cost of that ? 
 0001 000022 000003 00004   What will it cost when two wild hamsters are remo
 0001 000004 000004 00007 at assigns the costs fairly and at the same time act 
 0001 000004 000004 00006 elves or incur costs in advance , which may be consi
 0001 000023 000001 00004 ctual clear-up costs of a site . 
 0001 000033 000002 00001 r will pay the costs of remedying future environment 
 0001 000015 000003 00002  who bears the costs of remedying the environme
 0001 000016 000003 00005  including the costs relating to envi
 0001 000032 000002 00004 means that the costs will be split in cases where th 
 0001 000020 000001 00003 and to prevent distortions of the market . 
 0001 000012 000002 00002 are engaged in economic activities
 0001 000006 000002 00004 ts the various economic activities which are covered 
 0001 000015 000004 00001 ry for all the economic activities which could resul 
 0001 000006 000003 00001 ability of the economic activity in question . 
 0001 000002 000007 00001 eping with the economic and social objectives of the
 0001 000030 000001 00004 ear message to economic operators t
 0001 000005 000002 00001  interests and economic sectors involved in this sub 
 0001 000001 000005 00001 is part of our economy . 
 0001 000014 000001 00002 e agricultural economy . 
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 0001 000032 000001 00005  social market economy . 
 0001 000002 000005 00006  impact on the economy that we hope for . 
easonable , and theref 
 0001 000020 000001 00007 ne qua non for efficient environmental protection . 
le , one that will ultimat 
olution to what is alrea 
o the acknowledged fau 
them . 
 
 agricultural econom 
ark is built ; who can pa 
rs , the extent of th 
lear industry – is 
 0001 000028 000001 00003 ts of European industry . 
 0001 000001 000004 00003 fically favor industry and does not specifically fa 
ental organi 
 
 0001 000011 000001 00004  the insurance industry has said that it can make it 
e preventiv 
anders 
ral producers 
r industry or w 
cover 
lluter 
 0001 000002 000006 00006 dustry and the economy as a whole to turn green . 
 0001 000031 000002 00006 e , workable , efficient and r
 0001 000001 000004 00004 – workable and implementab
 0001 000034 000001 00003 unworkable and impractical s
 0001 000014 000003 00001 bility must be in proportion t
 0001 000005 000003 00003 it will remain incalculable for 
 0001 000016 000002 00006  located in an industrial area .
 0001 000014 000001 00002 ing either the industrial or the
 0001 000022 000003 00004 emoved when an industrial p
 0001 000005 000001 00006 ion of certain industrial secto
 0001 000022 000002 00004 tors – the oil industry , the nuc
 0001 000017 000002 00004 consumer goods industry . 
 0001 000024 000002 00001 sibilities for industry . 
 0001 000028 000004 00002 alise European industry . 
 0001 000025 000001 00002 ssure from the industry and from governm
 0001 000033 000003 00002 e interests of industry and of environmental players 
 0001 000002 000006 00006 rope , we need industry and the economy as a whole t
 0001 000034 000003 00004 erests of both industry and the environment . 
 0001 000024 000001 00008             If industry has an environmental permit 
 0001 000017 000001 00004 grettable that industry has managed to insert a seri 
 0001 000017 000003 00003 ch are to give industry incentives to tak
 0001 000024 000001 00007 t the whole of industry is rallying round Mr M
 0001 000011 000002 00003 ing burdens on industry or on agricultu
 0001 000004 000002 00005 sed by the oil industry or the nuclea
 0001 000004 000002 00005 or the nuclear industry or why it should not apply t 
 0001 000029 000001 00003 mber States of industry polluting an area and then m 
 0001 000024 000001 00004 is not getting industry to pay , however , but the n 
 0001 000007 000003 00001  pressure from industry to too great an extent . 
 0001 000022 000002 00004  , the nuclear industry – is sufficiently well 
 0001 000003 000003 00002 sued a clear , moderate and practicable opinion . 
 0001 000002 000001 00003            The practical application of the po
 0001 000019 000003 00001 pollution is a practical problem , remedial actions 
 0001 000009 000002 00002             In practical terms , a farmer might be f 
 0001 000011 000003 00011 o do something practical to protect it and to put al 
 0001 000019 000003 00001 ctions must be practical too . 
 0001 000006 000003 00002 principle then practically all related activities wo 
 0001 000010 000001 00004 ns , making it practically impossible to demand that 
 0001 000028 000003 00005 a reference to proportional liability , not joint an 
 0001 000001 000003 00006 e workable and realistic . 
 0001 000031 000001 00004 , workable and reasonable , and it provides for upda 
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 0001 000031 000002 00006  efficient and reasonable , and therefore I am prepa 
ted by the 
e , we n 
e t 
 t 
b 
ced report and a well-balan 
 
d reasonable , 
tect the envir 
 
t 
ov 
in a 
 
 . 
2 or the Erika 
 0002 000024 000002 00003 estige and the Erika , as well as nuclear accidents 
 0002 000035 000001 00003 in 2002 or the Erika and Prestige oil tankers , thes 
th ab 
 0002 000001 000003 00003 Valdez and the Erika and then the Prestige , but the 
n t 
 
th 
 of 
l 
o 
r th 
is 
 0001 000034 000003 00004  Thanks to the reasonable approach advoca
 0001 000002 000001 00003  which is only reasonable because , of cours
 0001 000012 000003 00002 n , which is a reasonable compromise to reach , so w 
 0001 000032 000002 00002 sed on current scientific knowledge . 
 0001 000006 000003 00001 e existence of scientific knowledge which , at th
 0001 000003 000005 00004 ound here is a sensible one . 
 0001 000020 000002 00004 e viability of small companies is not jeopardised . 
 0001 000022 000004 00002 be relevant to small- and medium-sized enterprises i 
 0001 000034 000001 00003 ve produced an unworkable and impractical solution
 0001 000031 000001 00004  presenting is well-balanced , workable and reasona
 0001 000028 000001 00003 lation must be well-balanced and take into considera 
 0001 000005 000002 00001 he result is a well-balan
 0001 000005 000002 00001 d report and a well-balanced result which takes acco
 0001 000031 000002 00006 gally secure , workable , efficient an
 0001 000014 000001 00002  objective and workable , so as to pro
 0001 000011 000002 00003 legislation is workable and does not impose cripplin
 0001 000001 000004 00004 alking about – workable and implementable , one tha
 0001 000001 000003 00006 rules that are workable and realistic . 
 0001 000031 000001 00004 ell-balanced , workable and reasonable , and it pr
 0001 000022 000001 00005 n to achieve a workable compromise . 
 0001 000022 000001 00004 e to be a very workable compromise that should w
 0001 000007 000003 00004 s directive is workable in the European Union . 
 0001 000001 000004 00004 nto a piece of workable legislation that will result
 0001 000032 000001 00002 w , produced a workable proposal
 0002 000035 000001 00003 the example of AZF in Toulouse in 200
 0002 000021 000002 00006 estige and the Erika . 
 0002 000004 000003 00001  not the names Erika and Prestige synonymous wi
 0002 000001 000003 00003 rst we had the Exxon Valdez and the Erika and the
 0002 000023 000004 00001 he question of GMOs , not because we are against GMO
 0002 000013 000003 00002 y must include GMOs , particularly at a time when 
 0002 000008 000003 00004 which includes GMOs , they fall within the scope
 0002 000008 000003 00001 ple is that of GMOs . 
 0002 000013 000002 00002 ydrocarbons or GMOs . 
 0002 000035 000002 00002 mage caused by GMOs . 
 0002 000021 000002 00002 activities and GMOs ? 
 0002 000008 000003 00004                GMOs are certainly covered by this pr 
 0002 000008 000003 00006 in the case of GMOs are clearly resolved in a way th 
 0002 000023 000004 00001 we are against GMOs but because we think this legis
 0002 000006 000003 00002 in the case of GMOs or of pesticides which are , am
 0002 000022 000003 00001 f bringing the GMOs that are permitted back unde
 0002 000008 000003 00002 ate release of GMOs was being discussed , the Comm
 0002 000017 000003 00001  restricted to Natura 2000 areas , but also applies 
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 0002 000013 000002 00001  be limited to Natura 2000 areas and would exclude n 
aster . 
il tanker , which was shipw 
y e 
 
ster two months ago , an 
rsity , which is already gover 
iversity damage 
nion is 
d 
 0002 000028 000002 00002 e particularly dangerous , in that they would make i 
ies , in order to pr 
 wide 
n 
t 
f wat 
002 000020 000003 00001  effective and ecological disasters are to be preven 
002 000002 000006 00004 entlemen , the ecosystem and the flow of matter and 
002 000004 000001 00002 at deal of our environment , often too much . 
 0002 000015 000001 00003 l tanker , the Prestige , and , last but not least , 
 0002 000001 000003 00003 a and then the Prestige , but the report also has po 
 0002 000035 000003 00001  caused by the Prestige , causing amazement and ange 
 0002 000014 000002 00003  affair of the Prestige , when we observe the consta 
 0002 000006 000002 00008 victims of the Prestige accident . 
 0002 000024 000002 00003  involving the Prestige and the Erika , as well as n 
 0002 000021 000002 00006 sters like the Prestige and the Erika . 
 0002 000025 000001 00003  including the Prestige disaster , we must insist on 
 0002 000008 000002 00005  following the Prestige dis
 0002 000033 000001 00002 concerning the Prestige o
 0002 000035 000001 00003  the Erika and Prestige oil tankers , these disaster 
 0002 000004 000003 00001 ames Erika and Prestige synonymous with absolutel
 0002 000015 000001 00003  caused by the Priolo chemical plant , are all incid
 0002 000015 000001 00003                Seveso , the disasters , with which w 
 0002 000016 000003 00002 elating to the Tricolor disa
 0002 000026 000003 00001 ue of reducing biodiversity , I think it important t 
 0002 000002 000002 00002  For example , biodiversity , as defined in the draf 
 0002 000006 000002 00002 In the case of biodiversity , for example , a propor 
 0002 000013 000001 00002 with regard to biodive
 0002 000014 000002 00004 damage done to biodiversity . 
 0002 000028 000002 00003 definitions of biodiversity and biod
 0002 000002 000002 00003  and damage to biodiversity caused by genetically mo 
 0002 000017 000002 00002 that damage to biodiversity caused by the use of lic 
 0002 000028 000002 00003 odiversity and biodiversity damage . 
 0002 000030 000002 00004    The loss of biodiversity in the European U
 0002 000023 000002 00004  definition of biodiversity is a very weak and very 
 0002 000030 000002 00003 e of damage to biodiversity must be clarified but th 
 0002 000021 000002 00003 ect and remedy biodiversity with a directive which e 
 0002 000006 000002 00002 to only 20% of biodiversity would be protected , an
 0002 000003 000002 00004 mage caused to biological diversity , that is , for 
 0002 000003 000004 00001  definition of biological diversity . 
 0002 000030 000003 00004 rators in more dangerous activit
 0002 000017 000002 00004 to the list of dangerous activities in this way mean 
 0002 000015 000003 00001 of some of the dangerous exemptions which allow
 0002 000015 000004 00002 s deemed to be dangerous or not . 
 0002 000001 000005 00005  environmental dumping and we will avoid a situatio
 0002 000014 000002 00003 idents of fuel dumping at sea , we might think tha
 0002 000030 000003 00001  damage to the ecological and chemical makeup o
 0002 000003 000002 00006  liability for ecological damage , even though we ar 
 0002 000003 000002 00004 what is termed ecological damage . 
 0002 000020 000002 00003 t of restoring ecological damage to the operator , p 
 0
 0
 0
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 0002 000004 000001 00003 protecting the environment , such as the uniform pro 
002 000011 000002 00005  danger to the environment , then someone has to pay 
  caused to the environment , which is often cross-bo 
 0002 000001 000004 00003 lly favor the environment . 
. 
nd be more careful . 
 
ote 
 
 , 
 
in 
 
 
 . 
sponsibilities . 
e 
 0
 0002 000008 000001 00003
 0002 000001 000004 00004 ly protect the environment . 
 0002 000001 000005 00005 or protect the environment . 
 0002 000004 000003 00005 oration of the environment . 
 0002 000008 000003 00006 lic and to the environment 
 0002 000012 000001 00005  impact on the environment . 
 0002 000015 000002 00002 es against the environment . 
 0002 000028 000003 00006 ght affect the environment . 
 0002 000029 000002 00002 s to the Irish environment . 
 0002 000033 000001 00006 elating to the environment . 
 0002 000034 000003 00004 dustry and the environment . 
 0002 000004 000002 00003 they treat our environment a
 0002 000031 000002 00001  riches of the environment and even more important t 
 0002 000030 000003 00003 amaging to the environment and international instrum
 0002 000005 000001 00005 protecting the environment and the obligation to rep 
 0002 000001 000004 00004 pproach to the environment and will ultimately pr
 0002 000033 000001 00004  linked to the environment around them . 
 0002 000004 000003 00005 s that put the environment at risk have insurance or 
 0002 000004 000003 00003 eless with the environment because certain polluters 
 0002 000034 000003 00001 protecting the environment because it is inherently 
 0002 000011 000003 00010 ge done to our environment by human activity . 
 0002 000004 000004 00002  restoring the environment by the back door either . 
 0002 000017 000001 00002 rtance of this environment directive . 
 0002 000009 000002 00004  for the rural environment in general . 
 0002 000006 000002 00001 inition of the environment is too restricted . 
 0002 000007 000001 00002  we know , the environment is ‘out’ . 
 0002 000019 000001 00007 be helping the environment itself . 
 0002 000019 000001 00007  threat to our environment may not only be helping m
 0002 000013 000002 00003 e state of the environment where the damage occurs
 0002 000021 000002 00002 we protect the environment while excluding nuclear a 
 0002 000014 000001 00002 to protect the environment without harming either th
 0002 000030 000002 00002  weakening the environmental objectives . 
 0002 000002 000007 00001 arantee better environmental protection , in keeping 
 0002 000020 000001 00007  for efficient environmental protection . 
 0002 000035 000001 00002 uring improved environmental protection and combat
 0002 000003 000003 00003 wards improved environmental protection and therefor
 0002 000028 000004 00002 nal furthering environmental protection but does not
 0002 000026 000001 00005 y to undermine environmental protection in the EU
 0002 000020 000003 00001 ates that , if environmental protection is to be eff 
 0002 000026 000004 00004  base from the environmental protection provisions t 
 0002 000001 000005 00004 legislation on environmental protection throughout E 
 0002 000010 000001 00004 uld meet their environmental re
 0002 000016 000003 00005 ergy and other environmentally-friendly forms of en
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 0002 000018 000002 00003 he large-scale genetic modification of plants . 
 0002 000018 000002 00005  by the use of genetically modified crops . 
 0002 000024 000002 00003 tion caused by genetically modified food . 
 0002 000027 000001 00004 example , with genetically modified organisms , nucl 
 0002 000002 000002 00003 sity caused by genetically modified organisms . 
 0002 000004 000002 00005 the release of genetically modified organisms . 
 0002 000026 000003 00002 countryside by genetically modified organisms . 
 0002 000010 000003 00001  the spread of genetically modified organisms or eve 
 0002 000018 000003 00003 ark to use the genetically modified plants without m 
odified seed is not cove 
odified so that they bec 
ike to 
d by the H 
 
bility is not only restri 
n 
u 
clear industry 
 cause 
rt a 
on 
 
 
 
 0002 000017 000002 00002 se of licensed genetically m
 0002 000018 000002 00004     Plants are genetically m
 0002 000005 000003 00001  including our green fundamentalists , would l
 0002 000022 000003 00003  definition of habitat . 
 0002 000001 000006 00004 tioned sites , habitat and species protected under C 
 0002 000022 000003 00005 e way in which habitat is defined . 
 0002 000011 000003 00006 eguard special habitats and species . 
 0002 000002 000002 00002  restricted to habitats and species covere
 0002 000026 000003 00001 o that all the habitats and species protected by Com 
 0002 000003 000004 00003 e the rules on habitats and species that are already
 0002 000017 000003 00001 o property and health , lia
 0002 000015 000001 00003 stating future health implications of the environmen 
 0002 000033 000001 00004       People’s health is inseparably linked to the e 
 0002 000035 000001 00003 disasters cost human lives and lead to serious , lo
 0002 000015 000003 00001 into a sort of licence to pollute , with the serious 
 0002 000023 000003 00009 d be seen as a licence to pollute . 
 0002 000016 000003 00003 ed and for the loopholes to be closed . 
 0002 000010 000003 00001 transport , by nuclear accidents , by the damage ca
 0002 000024 000002 00003 a , as well as nuclear accidents and pollution cause 
 0002 000017 000002 00004 d drilling for oil and gas , are also excluded , as 
 0002 000022 000002 00004  sectors – the oil industry , the nuclear industry – 
 0002 000004 000002 00005  caused by the oil industry or the nu
 0002 000002 000002 00004      Thirdly , oil pollution and nuclear damage are 
 0002 000008 000002 00003 mage caused by oil pollution and to the damage
 0002 000030 000003 00002 acceptable for oil pollution in maritime transpo
 0002 000015 000001 00003 sinking of the oil tanker , the Prestige , and , las 
 0002 000033 000001 00002 g the Prestige oil tanker , which was shipwrecked 
 0002 000035 000001 00003 a and Prestige oil tankers , these disasters cost hu 
 0002 000033 000001 00003 of some of the oil transporting vessels that sail al 
 0002 000018 000003 00002 umber of these pesticides . 
 0002 000018 000003 00001 portion of the pesticides on the market in the rest
 0002 000006 000003 00002  of GMOs or of pesticides which are , amongst other
 0002 000004 000003 00005 rance or other precautionary financial measures in p 
 0002 000002 000002 00003 d also include radiation , damage to air quality and 
 0002 000029 000002 00002 a sick joke if radiation is not included , as Sellaf 
 0002 000029 000002 00001 le of covering radiation pollution should be include 
 0002 000030 000003 00002  transport and radioactive pollution caused by nucle
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 0002 000011 000003 00006 l habitats and species . 
 0002 000002 000002 00002 o habitats and species covered by the Habitats and B 
 by 
nd leave 
 0002 000015 000003 00002 ible , not the taxpayer , who bears the costs of rem 
 
 0002 000020 000002 00002 shifted to the taxpayer . 
oes not bear the liability 
 
he 
ularly with regard to b 
an environmental an 
 
 
egislation on envir 
ework across the Europ 
, it is important tha 
, that is to say Arti 
 . 
 0003 000001 000005 00005 to promote the internal market nor protect the envir 
 0003 000001 000005 00005  we will get a level playing field , we will avoid e 
rable 
 0003 000016 000001 00003 pleased that a level playing field is being created 
rov 
 0002 000026 000003 00001 e habitats and species protected by Community legisl 
 0002 000001 000006 00004  , habitat and species protected under Community leg 
 0002 000003 000004 00003 n habitats and species that are already protected
 0002 000002 000007 00003  of a model of sustainability and responsibility in 
 0002 000012 000001 00007 out of general tax revenues , with the problems whic 
 0002 000029 000001 00006  most of which tax-free – should walk away a
 0002 000002 000004 00002  burden on the taxpayer .
 0002 000002 000001 00003 ay so that the taxpayer d
 0002 000008 000002 00001 c , unless the taxpayer is called on to make good th 
 0002 000014 000003 00003            The taxpayer should not have to support f 
 0002 000029 000001 00006  and leave the taxpayer to carry the cost of cleanin 
 0002 000012 000002 00003 ir capacity as taxpayers . 
 0002 000030 000003 00004 der to prevent taxpayers having to pay for damage in
 0002 000004 000003 00002 e community of taxpayers should have to pay for t
 0002 000013 000001 00002 irective is so vague , partic
 0002 000023 000002 00002 e have left it vague . 
 0002 000023 000002 00004  weak and very vague description . 
 0003 000015 000001 00002 g point by the European citizens . 
 0003 000032 000001 00005 strengthen the European model of 
 0003 000032 000001 00005 strengthen the European model of an environmental an
 0003 000032 000001 00005 ys principle a European principle that can be assert 
 0003 000009 000003 00002 iple useful to European society in general . 
 0003 000005 000002 00002  with specific European standards and the same rules 
 0003 000010 000003 00003 on , which the citizens of the European Union expect 
 0003 000008 000001 00003 o see European harmonisation in the area of damage c
 0003 000001 000005 00004 ill be issuing harmonised draft l
 0003 000033 000002 00002   This to be a harmonised fram
 0003 000033 000002 00003 etition in the internal market 
 0003 000033 000002 00004 elating to the internal market 
 0003 000026 000004 00004 visions to the internal market
 0003 000001 000005 00001 nt to create a level playing field , because I belie 
 0003 000001 000006 00005 ere would be a level playing field and a compa
 0003 000016 000003 00006 er to create a level playing field for this issue as 
 0003 000005 000002 00002 same rules for the whole of the European Union ; one 
 0003 000005 000002 00002 well-defined , uniform European framework which p
 0003 000002 000006 00006 to protect the viability of Europe , we need industr 
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EP Debate, second reading (December 15, 2003): 
 
  
 here . 
ugh I believe that i 
eir 
riod for adaptation and 
 
 0001 000013 000003 00002 uld allow some companies to escape their duty to pay 
 
 0001 000014 000001 00003 nsequences for companies which are not to blame , Pa 
 between companies . 
 0001 000014 000002 00003 nsurance , the cost must not be passed on to the tax 
t 
ed between severa 
 0001 000020 000005 00003 ty and related costs must , therefore , only be appo 
e 
r 
o 
001 000006 000001 00002 imed at making economic activities compatible with p 
001 000012 000001 00002 been caused by economic activities to the natural he 
001 000011 000003 00002 ere deliberate economic activity aimed quite laudabl 
001 000006 000007 00006 e liability of economic actors . 
 0001 000006 000002 00002 that it offers economic actors several ways out , in 
 Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
 0001 000008 000002 00002 act that their American rivals have enjoyed an arran 
 0001 000015 000002 00004 ssure from the United States , and it should simply 
 0001 000015 000001 00006 ven behind the United States in terms of legislation 
 0001 000016 000001 00002 onment and for business . 
 0001 000002 000002 00004 ourse of their business have to accept responsibilit 
 0001 000018 000003 00003 ing to go into business
 0001 000019 000001 00003 good health of companies , altho
 0001 000013 000002 00003 ters are often companies , and we must ensure th
 0001 000008 000002 00002 ty of European companies , particularly in view of t 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 s and costs on companies , possibly even driving the 
 0001 000020 000002 00001 tition between companies . 
 0001 000019 000003 00003 e need to give companies a pe
 0001 000019 000001 00003  of the effort companies can and must make in order 
 0001 000013 000003 00003  the fact that companies comply with the legislation 
 0001 000001 000005 00009 daries for our companies either , so as far as this 
 0001 000016 000001 00011 errible to see companies in 20 years ' time facing p 
 0001 000013 000004 00003 d during which companies must be held responsible fo 
 0001 000013 000004 00003  represent for companies seems to me to be excessive
 0001 000013 000002 00004 ocation of our companies towards other markets , and
 0001 000020 000002 00001 to trade or to competition
 0001 000017 000001 00004 distortions of competition in the market . 
 0001 000006 000007 00004  station would cost USD 10 billion , and an accident 
 0001 000003 000002 00001 blic funds and cost many people their jobs and livel 
 0001 000006 000001 00003 luter bear the cost of repairing the damage caused 
 0001 000014 000001 00003 erator for the cost of restoring ecological damage . 
 0001 000005 000001 00003 r must pay the cost of restoring the damage which he 
 0001 000005 000002 00002 ce so that the cost of the damage is never passed on 
 0001 000017 000003 00002 e issue of how costs are to be shar
 0001 000017 000001 00003 ood , with the costs being borne primarily by the pe 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 bligations and costs on companies , possibly even dr 
 0001 000020 000005 00001  the burden of costs where the damage has been caus
 0001 000017 000001 00004 e incidence of distortions of competition in the ma
 0001 000020 000002 00001 so as to avoid distortions to trade or to competiti
 0
 0
 0
 0
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 0001 000006 000001 00003 d to encourage economic actors to minimise the risks 
001 000017 000001 00003 sible European economic and environmental policy mus 
3 aintaining the economic good health of companies , a 
 0001 000018 000003 00002 on which , for economic reasons and reasons of fairn 
 
y , and that we find people who 
 
t 
 0001 000001 000003 00007 nowledge-based economy . 
re 
e 
a 
y modified orga 
 , must have time to devi 
realistic and I do not u 
 0001 000016 000003 00004  We need to be moderate in what we try to achieve to 
use exponential 
 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 riving them to relocate to other countries where the 
 i 
001 000009 000003 00002  whether it is sensible to produce a definition whic 
 0
 0001 000019 000001 0000
 0001 000018 000001 00002 djusted market economy , and consequently , a strict
 0001 000018 000003 00003  have a viable econom
 0001 000001 000005 00007  , as does our economy , because we will then have m
 0001 000017 000001 00002 onsible market economy , which makes it clear that 
 0001 000001 000005 00009 onment and our economy . 
 0001 000013 000002 00003 val within our economy . 
 0001 000001 000003 00005 ts neither the economy nor the environment . 
 0001 000001 000004 00004 either for the economy or for the environment . 
 0001 000001 000003 00005 onment and the economy would benefit if we could c
 0001 000011 000003 00002  at profit and gain can cause exponentially spreadin 
 0001 000020 000002 00001 n will have on industrial activity , we deem it nec
 0001 000019 000002 00001 protection and industrial development . 
 0001 000002 000002 00001 ropean Union’s industrial sites are contaminated , 
 0001 000016 000002 00002  the insurance industries are not yet able to offer 
 0001 000011 000002 00004 of the nuclear industry . 
 0001 000003 000002 00003  nuclear power industry or geneticall
 0001 000002 000005 00004  the insurance industry too
 0001 000015 000003 00011 of power , and industry will be grateful to him . 
 0001 000005 000003 00004 is direction , industry will never be persuaded to a 
 0001 000005 000005 00001  exceptionally moderate and 
 0001 000017 000003 00003 e sensible and moderate approach that it has taken . 
 0001 000006 000004 00003 e described as moderate in so far as they stipulate 
 0001 000014 000002 00001           This moderate position on the part of the 
 0001 000001 000003 00005  creating this patchwork of environmental legislatio 
 0001 000004 000002 00001 w me to take a practical example . 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 in danger , in practical terms , of imposing heavy , 
 0001 000002 000005 00006             In practical terms , that means that our 
 0001 000018 000002 00001 n , that it is practically workable , that it is fai 
 0001 000011 000003 00002 te laudably at profit and gain can ca
 0001 000020 000005 00001  several , and proportional liability , according to 
 0001 000006 000004 00001 e learnt to be realistic after several years as a Me 
 0001 000005 000005 00001 y moderate and realistic and I do not understand how
 0001 000020 000005 00003 oned on fair , reasonable bases , with the requireme 
 0001 000014 000002 00004 directive , at reasonable intervals , and to define 
 0001 000013 000002 00004 to promote the relocation of our companies towards o 
 0001 000018 000002 00003 o the state of scientific knowledge , about the excl 
 0001 000008 000001 00005 n the basis of scientific knowledge – and the permit 
 0001 000017 000003 00003 Market for the sensible and moderate approach that
 0
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 0001 000009 000002 00002 beyond what is sensible would be in danger , in prac 
 0001 00 0
001 000016 000002 00004 ble for making small businesses go under because we 
 0001 000016 000002 00001 also about the workability of the compulsory financi 
 0001 000018 000002 00001 is practically workable , that it is fair and that i 
 0002 000019 000002 00004 ts such as the Aznalcoyar accident would once again 
 0002 000019 000001 00002 nt such as the Aznalcoyar accident – which took plac 
00006 00005  mentioned the Eri stige tragedi
002 000003 000002 00001 wo ships , the Erika restige , are sy o 
 0002 000007 000001 00002 ified plants ( GMOs )  . 
002 000007 000001 00003 d labelling of GMO  been clear that 
 000001 00003 correct use of GMOs
 0002 000007 000002 00001 als concerning GMOs by Mr Lannoye and o
02 00002 No 9 to exempt GMOs in advance or to lessen the liab 
002 000003 000002 00001  Erika and the Prest synonymous w
e Erika and Prestig edies . 
002 000005 000003 00001 y can cause to biodiv  the ground and  
   Where biodiversity is concerned , we are la 
002 000017 000002 00002 t actually are danger
02 000012 000002 00001 nsidered to be danger ccording to the  
 0002 000006 000007 00006 pt that such a dangerous activity is exempt from suc 
 0002 000003 000003 00004  those who use dangerous substances should not have 
0001 00003 t of restoring ecolo age . 
2 000002 000003 00004  assess purely ecolog amage and to calculate wh 
002 000018 000001 00002 adherent of an ecologic lly-adjusted market economy 
ent , such as the nuclear pow 
002 000001 000005 00008 ficial for the environment , which does not have any 
002 000001 000003 00005 conomy nor the environment . 
002 000001 000004 00004 omy or for the environment . 
002 000002 000002 00001 tection of the environment . 
002 000006 000001 00002 protecting the environment . 
002 000015 000001 00005 tuation of the environment . 
002 000016 000001 00005 an destroy the environment . 
002 000002 000005 00004 is done to the environment alone , but businesses , 
002 000016 000001 00002 d both for the environment and for business . 
002 000001 000005 00009 efits both the environment and our economy . 
002 000003 000001 00003 caring for the environment and preventing damage to 
002 000001 000003 00005  that both the environment and the economy would ben 
 0002 000009 000002 00001  impact on the environment and the production system 
002 000016 000001 00002 protecting our environment and this is an important 
002 000005 000001 00004 health and the environment and we must not water it 
002 000017 000002 00003 ge done to the environment by wind power , biomass , 
002 000017 000001 00003  damage to the environment can be prevented , and th 
002 000002 000002 00007 protecting the environment in Europe . 
0016 0 0002 00003 nate burden on small businesses . 
 0
 0002 000006 0 ka and Pre es . 
 0  and the P nonym
 0 s , it has there i 
 0002 000007  . 
thers . 
 0002 000012 0000
 0 ige , are ith catast 
 0002 000006 000006 00005  th e trag
 0 ersity ,  water ?
 0002 000015 000001 00006       
 0 ous . 
 00 ous a  state of k
 0002 000014 00 gical dam
 000 ical d
 0 a
 0002 000006 000001 00003  caused to the environment , but also to act pre-emp 
 0002 000003 000001 00002 regard for the environment , for an undamaged enviro 
 0002 000003 000002 00003 uences for the environm
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
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 0002 000002 000007 00002 tection of the environment in the European Union , b 
002 000002 000002 00004  damage to the environment in the course of their bu 
002 000003 000001 00002 r an undamaged environment is one of the most valuab 
002 000002 000004 00003 hat damage the environment must accept liability for 
002 000003 000001 00004  damage to the environment or bear responsibility fo 
002 000001 000005 00007 think that the environment stands to benefit from th 
002 000019 000002 00001 al certainty , environmental protection and industri 
002 000013 000002 00002  importance of environmental protection and the fact 
002 000017 000001 00002 has social and environmental responsibilities and he 
002 000002 000003 00001 with flora and fauna . 
002 000002 000003 00001 erference with flora and fauna . 
 0002 000003 000002 00003 er industry or genetically modified organisms . 
002 000005 000004 00002  nothing about genetically modified organisms and th 
002 000006 000006 00002 s and users of genetically modified organisms in the 
002 000007 000001 00002 rom the use of genetically modified plants ( GMOs ) 
002 000002 000003 00003 cies and their habitats , too . 
 0002 000005 000001 00004 pes for public health and the environment and we mus 
 0002 000019 000001 00003  economic good health of companies , although I beli 
 0002 000005 000003 00001  fertilisers , pesticides and weedkillers when we al 
 0002 000003 000002 00001 ately burdened public funds and cost many people the 
 0002 000005 000001 00004 huge hopes for public health and the environment and 
 0002 000003 000003 00005  by way of the public purse , who is asked to pay up 
 0002 000002 000003 00003 e to protected species and their habitats , too . 
002 000001 000001 00003 ly complex and taxing matter , which is both legally 
 0002 000003 000003 00005  always be the taxpayer , by way of the public purse 
 0002 000014 000002 00003 ssed on to the taxpayer . 
 0002 000005 000002 00002 ssed on to the taxpayer and the polluter can cover t 
002 000016 000002 00005 en made of the taxpayer having to bear the burden , 
ber State taxpayers who eventually would have t 
 0002 000008 000001 00003 ore us far too vague , but I nonetheless believe tha 
 0002 000012 000002 00004 sfied with the vague wording of the current text . 
 0003 000017 000001 00002 pporter of the European model of the environmentally 
 0003 000017 000001 00002 pporter of the European model of the environmentally 
 0003 000001 000003 00007  was agreed in Lisbon that Europe should become the 
 0003 000001 000005 00007 n have minimum harmonisation . 
 0003 000001 000005 00009 k that minimum harmonisation is an excellent startin 
 0003 000013 000002 00004 ible degree of harmonisation within the European Uni 
 0003 000004 000003 00002 , however , be harmonised too far , because we have 
 0003 000001 000005 00009     Within the internal market that we want to optim 
 0003 000001 000003 00005 could create a level playing field instead of creati 
 0003 000001 000003 00006           This level playing field is of huge import 
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 0
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EP Debate, third reading (March 30, 2004): 
 
  Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
  
 0001 000008 000002 00002 er States that companies ' operating processes and a 
 0001 000007 000001 00004 ry restorative costs . 
 0001 000001 000001 00007 nsure that the costs of repairing environmental dama 
 0001 000001 000003 00004 ying field for economic activities , which we are af 
 0001 000007 000001 00003 ecure social , economic and environmental developmen 
 0001 000001 000001 00010  that connects economic and environmental legislatio 
 0001 000001 000002 00002 ularly in more economically difficult times , will f 
 0001 000007 000001 00004 onsible market economy , and so I very much welcome 
 0001 000001 000002 00002  will find the economy more important than environme 
 0001 000001 000002 00002 eate a kind of patchwork quilt in Europe and that th 
 0001 000008 000002 00001 rne out in the practical and pragmatic response that 
 0001 000006 000002 00003         From a practical point of view , therefore , 
 0001 000008 000002 00001  practical and pragmatic response that we have had , 
 0001 000005 000001 00003 of issues in a pragmatic way and to ' take it in sin 
 0001 000006 000002 00004  be completely realistic : there is no real progress 
 0001 000005 000001 00002 ieve this is a reasonable compromise . 
 0001 000008 000002 00001 hink we have a workable proposal . 
 0002 000005 000003 00003 mention of the Prestige . 
 0002 000003 000004 00002 e wreck of the Prestige make it necessary that we ag 
 0002 000002 000003 00003 benefiting the environment , so my group very defini 
 0002 000001 000003 00004 to benefit the environment . 
 0002 000007 000001 00004  damage to the environment and , where they have cau 
 0002 000002 000005 00004 tection of the environment in the European Union in 
 0002 000001 000002 00002 important than environmental protection . 
 0002 000002 000003 00001  great day for environmental protection in the Europ 
 0002 000002 000003 00002 ed species and habitats – what is termed purely envi 
 0002 000002 000003 00003 with liability loopholes whose closure was long over 
 0002 000003 000004 00002  who buy crude oil , for calamities such as the wrec 
 0002 000006 000002 00005  faced with an oil slick which entirely wrecks the a 
 0002 000002 000003 00002 e to protected species and habitats – what is termed 
 0002 000007 000001 00003 velopment on a sustainable basis . 
 0003 000007 000001 00004 mitment to the European model of the environmentally 
 0003 000007 000001 00004 mitment to the European model of the environmentally 
 0003 000001 000002 00005  be too little harmonisation , and during the proced 
 0003 000001 000002 00003 e 95 , maximum harmonisation , has not been adopted 
 0003 000001 000002 00005 upport maximum harmonisation , something which I dee 
 0003 000003 000003 00001 or a system of harmonised mandatory financial securi 
 0003 000004 000002 00005  wanted a more harmonised system , and we could have 
 0003 000004 000002 00003  we now have a harmonised system of liability to pre 
 0003 000001 000003 00004  create in the internal market , by some Member Stat 
 0003 000001 000003 00004 r to upset the level playing field for economic acti 
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Table 28:  Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote 6.5. 
 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
Left-Right Dimension 
 
5.13*** 
(1.53)    
-2.77*** 
(.55) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
-2.46* 
.00)  
2.96*** 
(.69)    
Government Status 
 
.82 
(.66)    
1.67* 
(.68)     
Liberal Market Economy 
 
-1.19 
(1.31)  
.55 
(1.17)     
Partial Coordinated Market Economy 
 
-.93 
(.94)   
-.90 
(.79)  
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy 
 
.27 -.76 
(.85)   
Constant 
 (1.00)     
2.36*** 
(.70)     
Number of cases 
Log pseudo-likelihood -178.76  
Pseudo R2 0.55  
   
(1
(.94)     
.39 
485  
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column is “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.
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Figure 54: Probabilities 6.5. D 
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Figure 55: Probabilities 6.5. E 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 56: Probabilities 6.5. F 
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APPENDIX H 
CHAPTER 6.6. 
Table 29: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis, 6.6. 
 
 # of input words # of references 
to liberalization
# of references to 
EU competitiveness
1st Reading Debate 
(adjusted by # of input words) 
7,397 
(10,000) 
21 speakers 
100 
(135) 
18 speakers 
84 
(114) 
19 speakers 
2n
(adjusted by # of input words) 
10,755 
(10,000) 
28 speakers 
304 
(283) 
28 speakers 
83 
(77) 
25 speakers 
d Reading Debate 
3r
(adjusted by # of input words) 
13,708 
(10,000) 
34 speakers 
400 
(292) 
34 speakers 
94 
(69) 
31 speakers 
d Reading Debate 
 
 
Table 30: Extreme Terminology content analysis, 6.6. 
 # of input words # of extreme terms 
 
1st Reading Debate 
(adjusted by # of input words) 
7,397 2 
(3) 
2nd Reading Debate 
(adjusted by # of input words) 
10,755 23 
(21) 
3rd Reading Debate 13,708 28 
(20) 
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Table 31: Binomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.6. 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
1.91*** 
(.23)   
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
2.31*** 
(.30)    
Government Status 
 
-.43 
(.25)  
Liberal Market Economy 
 
-1.82*** 
(.45) 
Partial Coordinated Market Economy -.03 
(.36) 
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy 1.00** 
(.38)    
Constant 
 
.14 
(.32)     
Number of cases 536 
Log pseudo-likelihood -260.68 
Pseudo R2 0.30 
 
 
 
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 57: Probabilities 6.6. A 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Le els of EU Suppov rt
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Figure 58: Probabilities 6.6. B 
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Figure 59: Probabilities 6.6. C 
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Table 32: Binomial logit regression estimates, third reading vote, 6.6. 
 
 
 Floor Vote, Third Reading 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
6.45*** 
(.68) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
.70 
(.38)      
Government Status 
 
.60 
(.35)   
Liberal Market Economy 
 
-1.63* 
(.69)    
Partial Coordinated Market Economy 
 
-.40 
(.45)   
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy 
 
-1.45** 
(.46)   
Constant 
 
.24 
(.43)    
Number of cases 422 
Log pseudo-likelihood -132.66 
Pseudo R2 0.54 
  
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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 3rd Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Left-Right Positions
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Figure 60: Probabilities 6.6. D 
 
Figure 61: Probabilities 6.6. E 
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 3rd Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 62: Probabilities 6.6. F 
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Figure 63: Policy Space 6.6. 
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p, collective agreements, 
collecti  ports, 
crooks, cutting, dangerous, detriment, developing countries, developing world, developing-
world, disasters, dockers, ecological, economising, employ- (and relevant endings), 
environment- (and relevant endings), Erika, exploit- (and relevant endings), Filipinos, flags (of 
conven tractors, illegal support, 
inexperienced, insecurity, job- (and relevant endings), jungle, Karin Cat, labour, liberal, liberalis- 
(and relevant endings), Malays- (and relevant endings), paid, pay, pernicious, Philippinos, pirate, 
poor, p relevant 
endings), quality, race for profit, ruthless, safety, salar- (and relevant endings), security, slavery, 
social, solidarity, strik- (and relevant endings), subsidiarity, taxpayers’, trade union, train- (and 
relevant endings), Tricolor, unemploy- (and relevant endings), unionist, unions, unsafe, 
unskilled, untrained, wage, well-trained,, workers, working condition, working conditions, 
working environments, ultra-Liberal 
 
 
Focal Point 2: EU Competitiveness. 
business, cheaper services, compete, competition, competitive, economy, effective- (and 
relevant endings), efficien- (and relevant endings, e.g. bureaucracy), entrepreneur- (and relevant 
endings  market, 
investm elevant 
endings
 
veloping 
countri exploit- (and relevant endings), 
Filipino lays- (and relevant endings), 
pernici avery, Tricolor, ultra-Liberal 
 
 
 
 
TEXTPACK Analysis 
 
 
Focal Point 1: Liberalization. 
abuse, accidents, African, anti-social, Argentinians, chea
ve bargaining, collisions, competent pilots, competent port workers, cowboy
ience), globali- (and relevant endings), health, illegal con
oorly organised, ports of convenience, Prestige, privatisation, qualifi- (and 
 
, e.g. bureaucracy), Eurosclerosis, financial, growth, harmonisation, internal
ent, level playing field, levelling, Lisbon, modern, modernise, monopol- (and r
, e.g. bureaucracy), open up, opening up, openness, regulation, single market 
 
Extreme Vocabulary: 
 
abuse, accidents, African, Argentinians, collisions, cowboy ports, crooks, de
es, developing world, developing-world, disasters, Erika, 
s, illegal contractors, illegal support, Karin Cat, Ma
ous, Philippinos, pirate, Prestige, race for profit, ruthless, sl
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Keywords-in-context 
 
Cat = focal point category: Cat 0001 = liberalization, Cat 0002 = EU competitiveness.  
 Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
 0001 000003 000003 00003  the recurrent accidents off the German Baltic coast 
 0001 000020 000002 00002 mendment 52 is dangerous . 
icalism 
 0001 000011 000002 00003 eek to exclude dockers from the directive . 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 conditions for employees in this sector , which is t 
 0001 000011 000001 00004 nvironment and employment . 
 0001 000020 000004 00008 ur to European employment and sustainable developmen 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 ental safety , employment and working conditions . 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 of working and employment conditions for employees i 
he unnecessary pe 
 0001 000011 000001 00005 people and the environment , and have unrivalled kno 
, are appropriate and vit 
 0001 000005 000003 00001 impacts on the environment , it results in an excess 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 respecting the environment . 
 0001 000011 000001 00004 s safety , the environment and employment . 
 0001 000018 000001 00004 ential from an environmental point of view to have s 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 s of safety or environmental protection , it would t 
 0001 000006 000002 00001 s for safety , environmental protection and social s 
 0001 000005 000004 00001 for safety and environmental reasons . 
d 
 0001 000017 000001 00003 ts relating to environmental safety , professional s 
an 
ence are a common phe 
 0001 000007 000002 00004 hes legal from illegal support . 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 conditions and job security . 
 0001 000008 000004 00004 the growth and jobs which it creates . 
 0001 000011 000001 00004 ffects of this liberalisation , in particular with r 
 
ID1: Speaker ID 
ID2: Paragraph ID 
ID3: Line ID 
 
 
EP Debate, first reading (November 13, 2001): 
 
 
 0001 000010 000002 00001 es not lead to dangerous or inappropriate rad
 0001 000021 000001 00006 th sustainable employment without t
 0001 000009 000001 00005 espect for the environment 
 0001 000004 000003 00003  aspects , the environment and public services , as 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 terioration of environmental safety , employment an
 0001 000003 000001 00002 ciple the most environmentally-friendly mode of tr
 0001 000014 000002 00006  the fact that flags of conveni
 0001 000003 000003 00007 ad a difficult job , but his shadow does not always 
 0001 000019 000001 00005  is also about jobs , attractive business propositio 
 0001 000010 000002 00003  Thirdly , the jobs of the port workers affected mus 
 0001 000021 000001 00002  expansion and labour relations in ports . 
 0001 000008 000002 00003 titiveness and liberalisation and apply them to tele 
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 0001 000006 000001 00003 fact mean only liberalisation and privatisation , bu 
 0001 000008 000004 00001 ual message of liberalisation and transparency . 
 0001 000010 000001 00002 the process of liberalisation of access to the marke 
 0001 000002 000003 00002       And this liberalisation proposed by the Commis 
 within those areas pro 
 0001 000019 000001 00003 and white when liberalising and creating free and fa 
 0001 000002 000003 00003 dance with the liberalising approach established at 
 0001 000008 000003 00005 facts are that liberalising port services will have 
 0001 000020 000004 00007 osis’ hits the poor hardest . 
 quality 
t also European har 
 0001 000014 000001 00002 ompetition and privatisation of various services . 
 0001 000014 000001 00003  as such , but quality , greater efficiency and good 
 0001 000015 000001 00003 s of price and quality . 
 0001 000014 000003 00003  I want to see quality and efficiency brought about 
001 000019 000002 00004 gh standard of quality and safety on sea routes . 
 0001 000009 000001 00005 n of workers , quality of service and , of course , 
 0001 000001 000001 00002 on on improved quality of services in ports . 
 0001 000015 000002 00008 ot benefit the quality of the service which ports of 
 0001 000019 000003 00002 ents for which quality rather than competition must 
 0001 000010 000003 00001 n many cases , quality services are already provided 
 0001 000011 000002 00002  environmental safety , employment and working condi 
 0001 000006 000002 00001 quirements for safety , environmental protection and 
 0001 000017 000001 00003  environmental safety , professional standards and c 
 0001 000011 000001 00004 tant issues as safety , the environment and employme 
 0001 000009 000001 00005  The calls for safety , the protection of workers , 
 0001 000002 000004 00002 the grounds of safety , training or anything else , 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 the expense of safety , working conditions and job s 
 0001 000008 000003 00003 age relates to safety . 
 0001 000005 000004 00001 e scrapped for safety and environmental reasons . 
 0001 000017 000002 00002 vices in which safety and professionalism are of par 
 0001 000020 000003 00005    Therefore , safety aspects cannot be used as an e 
y of man a 
 0001 000019 000003 00004  but as far as safety at sea is concerned , there ar 
 0001 000003 000003 00005           So , safety at sea with pilot services mus 
 0001 000011 000001 00005  they know the safety needs of people and the enviro 
 0001 000019 000003 00005 compromise the safety of shipping lanes in the long 
 0001 000019 000003 00001 jeopardised by liberalisation at any cost . 
 0001 000010 000002 00001  philosophy of liberalisation must include making th 
 0001 000008 000002 00001 s based on the liberalisation of port services , whi 
 0001 000019 000002 00002 have long-term liberalisation of the market in port 
 0001 000018 000001 00005  therefore see liberalisation
 0001 000019 000002 00003 should not yet liberalise the pilot services . 
 0001 000014 000001 00003 competition or privatisation , as such , but
 0001 000006 000001 00003 ralisation and privatisation , bu
 0
 0001 000011 000002 00004 still ensuring safety . 
 0001 000003 000003 00002 duty , serving safety at sea and the safet
 0001 000011 000002 00002  to inadequate safety levels and the deterioration o 
 0001 000003 000003 00002 at sea and the safety of man and nature , and the Me 
 0001 000019 000002 00004 of quality and safety on sea routes . 
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 0001 000009 000002 00002  on grounds of safety or environmental protection , 
 0001 000014 000002 00004 n , but from a safety perspective . 
 0001 000017 000001 00003 , that certain social clauses remain untouched , tha 
 0001 000004 000003 00003 ditions in the social field , and give due considera 
 0001 000006 000002 00001 protection and social standards but also the economi 
 0001 000021 000001 00005 ition involves taxpayers’ money , and there is unnec 
oney . 
 0001 000010 000002 00003 bs of the port workers affected must be guaranteed , 
w 
tions . 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 employment and working conditions . 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 se of safety , working conditions and job security . 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 se of safety , working conditions and job security . 
 0001 000011 000001 00003 the living and working conditions of port staff but 
 0002 000002 000003 00003 blished at the Lisbon Council and which has already 
 0002 000009 000002 00001  the volume of business of ports . 
 0002 000019 000001 00005 s , attractive business propositions and public prof 
 0002 000008 000002 00002 about better , cheaper services and improving the co 
 0002 000008 000003 00005 iding better , cheaper services to those who use the 
 0002 000019 000002 00002 rvices creates competition , and transparency is , i 
 re 
 0002 000017 000001 00003 ng elements of competition , provided , as some of t 
 0002 000019 000001 00003  free and fair competition , simply in order to adhe 
 0002 000016 000003 00003 re to increase competition , your entire sustainable 
 0002 000001 000006 00004 conditions for competition . 
 0002 000003 000003 00005 sts exerted by competition . 
 0002 000005 000004 00003 ny way benefit competition . 
 0002 000011 000001 00002 rt services to competition . 
 0002 000005 000003 00002    In terms of competition among ports , we would th 
 0002 000005 000001 00003 eration of the competition among ports instead of in 
 0002 000021 000002 00001 at transparent competition among ports is far more u 
 0002 000017 000002 00001 e opened up to competition are concerned , there are 
 0002 000004 000002 00002  must increase competition at ports . 
 0002 000016 000003 00001 With regard to competition between ports , I feel th 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 itions and job security . 
 0001 000011 000002 00001 te to allowing social dumping . 
 0001 000011 000003 00001 e economic and social effectiveness while respecting 
 0001 000010 000002 00003  well as their social protection . 
 0001 000017 000002 00002 e principle of subsidiarity , certain services in wh 
 0001 000010 000002 00004 e principle of subsidiarity must be taken into accou 
 0001 000021 000001 00005 out the use of taxpayers’ m
 0001 000011 000001 00005 n particular , trade unions ( we can always call the 
 0001 000002 000004 00002 ds of safety , training or anything else , to justif 
 0001 000011 000001 00005 icular , trade unions ( we can always call them ‘lob 
 0001 000009 000001 00005  protection of workers , quality of service and , of 
 0001 000021 000001 00006 vides the port workers with sustainable employment 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 employment and working condi
 0001 000011 000001 00003 the living and working conditions of port staff but 
 0002 000021 000001 00002  is wrong with competition , expansion and labour
 0002 000014 000001 00002 of exposure to competition and privatisation of vari 
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 0002 000012 000001 00004 aracterised by competition between ports , not withi 
 0002 000016 000001 00003 with a text on competition between ports . 
 0002 000003 000002 00004 I think , that competition between ports has to be o 
 0002 000001 000005 00001 tions for fair competition between ports in the EU , 
 0002 000001 000006 00001 conditions for competition between ports is crucial 
 0002 000016 000003 00001 t to decreeing competition between ports without clo 
 0002 000016 000004 00001 ther than just competition between products . 
 0002 000003 000001 00007 ement for fair competition between seaports . 
 0002 000016 000002 00002 would maintain competition for mooring service provi 
 0002 000004 000004 00001 n of ports and competition in and among ports in a c 
 0002 000001 000003 00001 regulations on competition in individual ports and i 
 0002 000005 000003 00003 the opening of competition in ports , which has been 
 0002 000016 000001 00003 s the issue of competition in ports and we are now b 
 0002 000021 000002 00001 han organising competition in the ports . 
 0002 000021 000001 00005           This competition involves taxpayers’ money 
 
 0002 000019 000003 00002 ty rather than competition must come first . 
 0002 000014 000001 00003  really market competition or privatisation , as suc 
 0002 000005 000002 00005 s to distorted competition which does not really ben 
n within ports , as is form 
 0002 000019 000001 00005 establish fair competition within ports and between 
 0002 000019 000003 00005  be subject to competition would , under certain cir 
 0002 000020 000004 00009 Europe towards competitive ports . 
 0002 000008 000002 00002 f the European economy . 
 0002 000020 000001 00002 he dynamics of economy . 
m 
 
 
ed as a criterion 
ort 
 market 
ot . 
 0002 000019 000002 00001 ich works more efficiently . 
h 
as 
h distinguish 
a 
d 
 public au 
 0002 000005 000002 00002  other , where competition is mainly generated from
 0002 000003 000002 00002 enterprises in competition with each other , and so 
 0002 000005 000004 00001 r attention to competitio
 0002 000020 000001 00002 e the European economy is having a coughing fit we 
 0002 000011 000003 00001 mic and social effectiveness while respecting the en
 0002 000014 000001 00003 lity , greater efficiency and good , cleverly design
 0002 000020 000002 00008 hould economic efficiency be accept
 0002 000014 000003 00003 ee quality and efficiency brought about through p
 0002 000012 000001 00004 ing to improve efficiency in a cargo handling
 0002 000001 000006 00005 ncrease in the efficiency of ports . 
 0002 000004 000001 00004 to enhance the efficiency of ports . 
 0002 000018 000001 00005  ports must be efficient , and we must therefore see 
 0002 000020 000002 00008 operations are efficient and when they are n
 0002 000002 000002 00003 ion is to have efficient maritime and port services 
 0002 000015 000002 00001  are important financial channels that run from aut
 0002 000015 000004 00002 parency of the financial flows with regard to infr
 0002 000007 000002 00004 d by a clear , financial framework whic
 0002 000007 000003 00002 e far-reaching financial implications for the relev
 0002 000001 000005 00003 ransparency in financial relations between ports an
 0002 000002 000006 00002 parency in the financial relations between
 0002 000006 000003 00001 parency of the financial relationship between ports 
 0002 000003 000001 00007 ransparency in financial relationships and in State 
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 0002 000006 000003 00001 with regard to financial settlement for investments 
 0002 000003 000001 00006    The present financial structures could be describ 
bs which it creates . 
 g 
 arisen . 
are or w 
to competit 
t a 
ery important if t 
cor 
r 
o 
 
 
cident , an accident that 
ident has already been me 
ccidents , it is not possib 
and finds expression in the 
e and the Erika , pilots have 
s . 
 
greements . 
p , just as w 
 0002 000008 000004 00004 ness , and the growth and jo
 0002 000011 000003 00001 d work towards harmonisation at the top end of worki 
 0002 000006 000001 00003  also European harmonisation with due regard being
 0002 000015 000002 00002 sight into the investment flows has
 0002 000015 000002 00003 n addition , a level playing field is needed for all 
 0002 000015 000001 00003  in the past , modern port users are uncommitted : t 
 0002 000020 000001 00002  to allow port monopolies to remain as they 
 0002 000020 000003 00005 n excuse for a monopoly . 
 0002 000011 000001 00002 n is indeed to open up all port services 
 0002 000017 000001 00003 helped to make opening up the port services marke
 0002 000003 000001 00003            The openness of seaports , though , bears 
 0002 000002 000002 00003  is a positive regulation and is v
 0002 000002 000003 00003  for Community regulation of these services in ac
 0002 000001 000005 00001 proposal for a regulation to create them . 
 0002 000008 000002 00004 he wall of the single market . 
 
 
 
EP Debate, second reading (March 10, 2003): 
 
Cat     ID1       ID2      ID3 
 
 0001 000003 000005 00004 estige and the Erika , pilots have to answer for the 
 0001 000008 000004 00003 Further to the Erika and Prestige accidents , it is 
 0001 000020 000001 00003  involving the Erika and the Prestige and finds exp
 0001 000012 000004 00009 hilippinos and Malaysians , for example , respect s
 0001 000012 000004 00009 s , comprising Philippinos and Malaysians , for exam
 0001 000005 000006 00001  caused by the Prestige , I met with professionals f
 0001 000004 000002 00004            The Prestige ac
 0001 000015 000002 00001            The Prestige acc
 0001 000008 000004 00003  the Erika and Prestige a
 0001 000020 000001 00003  Erika and the Prestige 
 0001 000003 000005 00004 appened to the Prestig
 0001 000005 000006 00003 sinking of the Prestige and the decision taken today 
 0001 000008 000004 00003 a and Prestige accidents , it is not possible to cla 
 0001 000008 000004 00004             If accidents happen , the European Union 
 0001 000015 000002 00002 to see serious accidents like this in the future whe 
 0001 000004 000001 00006  convenience , cheap flags , for ship
 0001 000015 000001 00005 w in favour of cheap prices . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 ntained in the collective agreements . 
 0001 000012 000003 00004 ocial issues , collective agreements and harmonised
 0001 000007 000005 00001  law and under collective bargaining a
 0001 000028 000002 00001 egislation and collective bargaining agreements in f 
 0001 000015 000003 00005 e market , and cowboy ports will develo
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 0001 000020 000001 00004 ing salaries , cutting jobs , increasing work rates 
 0001 000014 000001 00004  was dirty and dangerous and poorly paid then . 
 0001 000023 000003 00003 ort of oil and dangerous goods , has been secondary 
s . 
time transport’s com 
a 
e 
g the Erika and the 
 involving the Er 
al qualifica 
 
d 
tor was demonstra 
hts too , even if n 
ns 
’ associations – and others 
ight . 
 s 
e 
t . 
and 
 
vir 
y . 
port is certainl 
t 
t 
tection are rigorous 
tection standards . 
uirements and have i 
gs , 
 0001 000005 000001 00005 costs , to the detriment of all other factor
 0001 000020 000002 00002 ould be to the detriment of everyone . 
 0001 000026 000002 00004 rsist , to the detriment of mari
 0001 000014 000002 00006 paid crew from developing countries to take over lo
 0001 000021 000001 00011  environmental disasters at sea . 
 0001 000027 000001 00003 n the maritime disasters experienced by Europe in r
 0001 000020 000001 00003  to ecological disasters involvin
 0001 000020 000001 00003 his has led to ecological disasters
 0001 000017 000003 00002 ng and ways of economising on profession
 0001 000005 000003 00009 it possible to employ workers from outside the port
 0001 000005 000003 00009 kers currently employed . 
 0001 000007 000003 00002 rb all workers employed in any capacity in ports an
 0001 000005 000001 00008  against those employed in this sec
 0001 000011 000003 00001 wman – is that employers have rig
 0001 000011 000002 00006 en if the port employers wanted to , it will not be 
 0001 000024 000002 00004      Both port employers’ and workers’ organisatio
 0001 000006 000002 00001 e see what the employers
 0001 000011 000003 00002  I think , the employer’s r
 0001 000011 000003 00002            The employer’s right to know whom he will 
 0001 000028 000002 00001 me gained from employing contracted workers in the
 0001 000005 000003 00001 issues such as employment , safety and the environm
 0001 000004 000002 00003 cial rules and employmen
 0001 000024 000002 00001  conditions of employment and health and safety 
 0001 000028 000002 00001  will endanger employment as well as the social cond
 0001 000005 000003 00010 se working and employment conditions and worse en
 0001 000028 000002 00001 ty for gaining employment in ports , it breaches pri 
 0001 000028 000002 00001 e stability of employment in the sector ; on the sta 
 0001 000020 000001 00003 ression in the employment of seamen at salaries ten 
 0001 000023 000003 00003 of view of the environment , congestion and safet
 0001 000004 000003 00001 ty or with the environment , that a 
 0001 000005 000003 00001 safety and the environment . 
 0001 000023 000003 00002 nship with the environment . 
 0001 000004 000002 00003 safety and the environment to be taken into accoun
 0001 000021 000001 00011  problems with environmental disasters at sea . 
 0001 000017 000003 00005 social rules , environmental protection and safety . 
 0001 000027 000002 00005 ontributing to environmental protection and to safe
 0001 000017 000002 00001 cial rules and environmental pro
 0001 000024 000002 00001 and safety and environmental pro
 0001 000005 000001 00007 the safety and environmental req
 0001 000005 000003 00010 ions and worse environmental safety standards . 
 0001 000024 000002 00002  to extend the exploitation of seamen from the seago 
 0001 000004 000001 00006 nience , cheap flags , for ships . 
 0001 000004 000001 00006 t as there are flags of convenience , cheap fla
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 0001 000018 000001 00007 ty at work and health , social matters and jobs to b 
 0001 000024 000002 00001 employment and health and safety and environmental p 
 
ely because port labou 
 
ty 
ation of ports , 
 – conventions 137 
 usual , 
 
npopul 
a . 
l 
e 
e hav 
 
 0001 000014 000001 00005 rom outside by illegal contractors . 
 0001 000005 000003 00010 will result in insecurity , worse working and employ
 0001 000023 000001 00004 r on doing his job , which is to defend the position 
 0001 000002 000001 00002 mbowski , on a job well done . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 ries , cutting jobs , increasing work rates and doin 
 0001 000003 000002 00001 fear for their jobs , out of fear of social dumping 
 0001 000002 000003 00001 ill create new jobs . 
 0001 000005 000002 00003 rade and their jobs are being destroyed , we cannot 
 0001 000023 000004 00002  the number of jobs in ports . 
 0001 000003 000004 00003 ations for the jobs they do . 
 0001 000018 000001 00007 al matters and jobs to blind liberalisation dogma . 
 0001 000015 000001 00002 espect of port labour , precis
 0001 000014 000001 00005 id , unskilled labour being hired in from outside by 
 0001 000014 000002 00004  aim is to cut labour costs even further . 
 0001 000007 000005 00001  to absorb the labour force contracted to ports on s 
 0001 000014 000002 00005 e cost of port labour forms only a negligible part o
 0001 000015 000001 00002 y because port labour has so much to do with safe
 0001 000007 000004 00001 legislation on labour or on the oper
 0001 000006 000002 00001  international labour organisation
 0001 000005 000003 00006 e text remains liberal . 
 0001 000018 000001 00007 ainst a cold , liberal Europe that subordinates safe 
 0001 000005 000001 00005 e faced with a liberal directive which , as
 0001 000008 000002 00004 xample of this liberal vision . 
 0001 000005 000003 00001 ffects of this liberalisation , especially as regard
 0001 000006 000001 00002 g up markets , liberalisation , port services – thes 
 0001 000008 000004 00002 vious cases of liberalisation , which proved u
 0001 000002 000003 00003 hamper further liberalisation and , by extension , f 
 0001 000023 000004 00004  the idea that liberalisation and lack of safety go 
 0001 000018 000001 00007  jobs to blind liberalisation dogm
 0001 000005 000003 00002 r Hatzidakis , liberalisation is not an aim in itse
 0001 000002 000002 00001 y restrict the liberalisation of port services . 
 0001 000002 000003 00001 nefit from the liberalisation of port services in th 
 0001 000002 000003 00004 spousal of the liberalisation of services , not as a 
 0001 000002 000002 00001 d up to oppose liberalisation or at least make comm
 0001 000023 000004 00005 claim that its liberalisation reduces safety . 
 0001 000012 000004 00003  we should not liberalise everything now that w
 0001 000012 000002 00003 ing a haste to liberalise port services which we fee 
 0001 000011 000004 00003 ber States may liberalise their pilotage services if 
 0001 000027 000003 00001 ferable not to liberalise this service , which is al
 0001 000012 000004 00003 w that we have liberalised one sector . 
 0001 000002 000002 00002 , in favour of liberalising air transport , in favou 
 0001 000002 000001 00002 d road towards liberalising port services , and I th 
 0001 000002 000002 00002  , and against liberalising port services . 
 0001 000002 000002 00002 , in favour of liberalising telecommunications , and 
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 0001 000002 000002 00002 e in favour of liberalising the railways , in favour 
 0001 000014 000001 00005 against poorly paid , unskilled labour being hired i 
 0001 000014 000002 00006  extremely low paid crew from developing countries t 
a c 
s 
l 
onvenience closer . 
n , contractual and socia 
n or safety . 
ns , contractual and soci 
ns . 
 
 a mon 
 
 this is an area wh 
s 
quirements 
ta 
 0001 000014 000001 00004 ous and poorly paid then . 
 0001 000011 000005 00002 viders have to pay when buying themselves out of 
 0001 000014 000001 00005 selves against poorly paid , unskilled labour being 
 0001 000014 000001 00004  dangerous and poorly paid then . 
 0001 000011 000002 00006 e to work with poorly trained , unqualified worker
 0001 000004 000001 00006 s the risks of ports of convenience , ports where a
 0001 000021 000001 00007 rective brings ports of c
 0001 000017 000003 00005 : professional qualificatio
 0001 000017 000003 00002 n professional qualificatio
 0001 000017 000002 00001 , professional qualificatio
 0001 000022 000002 00001 ms of workers’ qualifications , social conditions , 
 0001 000011 000002 00005 d professional qualificatio
 0001 000003 000004 00003 rs , and their qualifications for the jobs they do . 
 0001 000005 000003 00008 afety , to the qualifications required of staff and 
 0001 000011 000004 00004 d professional qualifications that this entails . 
 0001 000025 000002 00004 rmore are duly qualified and have sufficient knowled 
 0001 000009 000001 00004 s that we have qualified and motivated people workin 
 0001 000008 000003 00001 y fulfilled by qualified professionals might , in fu 
 0001 000005 000003 00009 he work of the qualified workers currently employed
 0001 000009 000002 00006  of safety and quality . 
 0001 000013 000002 00001 bout is better quality and more services , but
 0001 000004 000002 00004 e training and quality of ships’ crews , which we ar 
 0001 000020 000001 00002 ompetition and race for profits that you wish to int 
 0001 000028 000002 00001 asing maritime safety , by allowing agencies from ou 
 0001 000017 000002 00001  provided that safety , professional qualifications 
 0001 000018 000001 00007 t subordinates safety , safety at work and health , 
 0001 000022 000002 00001 l conditions , safety , the economic development of
 0001 000005 000003 00008 These refer to safety , to the qualifications requir 
 0001 000017 000003 00002 alification or safety . 
 0001 000017 000003 00005 protection and safety . 
 0001 000023 000003 00003 congestion and safety . 
 0001 000023 000004 00005 sation reduces safety . 
 0001 000027 000003 00001 atures of port safety . 
 0001 000015 000001 00002 uch to do with safety and because
 0001 000024 000002 00001 and health and safety and environmental protection 
 0001 000005 000001 00007 iliar with the safety and environmental re
 0001 000021 000001 00011 re : a lack of safety and problems with environmen
 0001 000009 000002 00006 a guarantee of safety and quality . 
 0001 000005 000003 00001 s employment , safety and the environment . 
 0001 000004 000002 00003 spects such as safety and the environment to be take 
 0001 000018 000001 00007 nates safety , safety at work and health , social ma 
 0001 000005 000006 00002  that maritime safety begins at ports . 
 0001 000002 000004 00002 approaches and safety factors have to be taken into 
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 0001 000023 000004 00004 on and lack of safety go hand in hand . 
 0001 000027 000002 00005 tection and to safety in Community ports , I therefo 
 0001 000015 000001 00005  the fact that safety in the ports will go out of th 
 0001 000008 000003 00005 cceptable when safety is at stake . 
 0001 000025 000002 00004 to ensure that safety is not jeopardised . 
 0001 000023 000004 00005 sport in which safety is vital and nobody can claim 
 0001 000005 000006 00001 nce to discuss safety issues . 
 0001 000008 000001 00004 ervice and the safety of operations are part and par 
 0001 000024 000001 00005 e occupational safety of other dock workers . 
 0001 000009 000002 00001  undermine the safety of our ports , unsettle the so 
 0001 000003 000005 00004 answer for the safety of ships . 
 0001 000011 000002 00006  threat to the safety of the ports . 
 0001 000003 000005 00003 etition , that safety often gets left behind . 
 0001 000004 000002 00005 nisation about safety on ships and in ports – in fac 
 0001 000004 000003 00001 ake risks with safety or with the environment , that 
d three times higher th 
mes lower than Europea 
ial protection , modell 
 
en 
 
n 
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ays of economisin 
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 0001 000001 000006 00004 dance with the safety requirements in force in that 
 0001 000005 000003 00010  environmental safety standards . 
 0001 000005 000005 00001 le maintaining safety standards . 
 0001 000008 000002 00005 nores the high safety standards currently in place . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 ms of lowering salaries , cutting jobs , increasing 
 0001 000012 000003 00006 uce prices and salaries . 
 0001 000020 000001 00003  than European salaries . 
 0001 000007 000005 00001 ed to ports on salaries aroun
 0001 000020 000001 00003 t of seamen at salaries ten ti
 0001 000020 000002 00003  conditions of salary and soc
 0001 000027 000001 00003 ds of maritime security . 
 0001 000003 000004 00003 ction , social security matters , and their qualific
 0001 000009 000002 00004  of modern-day slavery – than to the survival of the 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 h the forms of social and wage protection contained 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 only result in social breakdown and more unemploym
 0001 000018 000001 00008 u pulled their social charter out from under their f 
 0001 000021 000001 00008 tive organises social competition between the Europe
 0001 000022 000002 00001 alifications , social conditions , safety , the eco
 0001 000012 000003 00005 elling-down of social conditions . 
 0001 000025 000002 00003 t for European social conditions . 
 0001 000012 000003 00003 ally different social conditions in different countr 
 0001 000028 000002 00001 as well as the social conditions of port work
 0001 000004 000003 00001 here you allow social dumping , but that a 
 0001 000005 000003 00007  to permitting social dumping , despite the various 
 0001 000003 000002 00001 out of fear of social dumping , taking to the street 
 0001 000012 000004 00005 or significant social dumping . 
 0001 000019 000002 00003  prevention of social dumping . 
 0001 000015 000003 00001 tition through social dumping ? 
 0001 000021 000001 00008 will result in social dumping and also , in time , t 
 0001 000017 000003 00002 oting forms of social dumping and w
 0001 000015 000001 00002  an area where social dumping has occ
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 0001 000013 000001 00008 ns’ fear about social dumping is nonsense . 
 0001 000015 000002 00003 isk is that of social dumping on account of self-han 
 0001 000024 000002 00005 y economic and social dumping that will increase . 
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 0001 000009 000002 00001  the umpteenth social graveyard , but it will also 
 0001 000007 000003 00001  threat to the social harmony that has marked relat
 0001 000012 000003 00004  directives on social issues , collective agreements 
 0001 000012 000004 00004 test amount of social malpractice probably takes pla 
 0001 000018 000001 00007 k and health , social matters and jobs to blind libe 
 0001 000007 000003 00001 ns between the social partners in all Portuguese por 
 0001 000009 000002 00001 , unsettle the social peace that we have , cripple t 
 0001 000020 000002 00003  of salary and social protection , modelled upon the 
 0001 000003 000004 00003 ' benefit – on social protection , social security m 
 0001 000021 000002 00002  favour of the social protection of dock workers , a 
 0001 000004 000002 00001 requirements – social requirements too – on anyone w
 0001 000006 000001 00004 r of affecting social rights .
 0001 000017 000003 00005 ontractual and social rules , environmental protecti 
 0001 000004 000002 00003 t , as well as social rules and employment . 
 0001 000017 000002 00001 ontractual and social rules and environmental protec
 0001 000004 000001 00006  where all the social rules go overboard , just as t 
 0001 000003 000004 00003 l protection , social security
 0001 000012 000004 00008 ompliance with social standards ? 
 0001 000012 000004 00009 mple , respect social standards ? 
 0001 000012 000004 00007  that national social standards will be complie
 0001 000011 000002 00005 r position and social standing is extremely we
 0001 000018 000003 00005 aintaining the social system in Europe . 
 0001 000009 000001 00003 ss my complete solidarity with the workers who have
 0001 000014 000003 00002                Strikes against this unreasonableness 
 0001 000001 000007 00001 nd a number of strikes in European ports , were abou
 0001 000018 000003 00001 ck workers are striking , Mr Jarzembowski . 
 0001 000001 000007 00005 The unions are striking , and I have no idea why . 
 0001 000018 000003 00002  , of course , striking because if you permit self-h 
 0001 000001 000007 00002 scussions with trade unio
 0001 000004 000001 00006            The trade unions are also right to point 
 0001 000014 000002 00008 y clear to the trade unions at the first reading in 
 0001 000010 000001 00003 t managers and trade unions to make this directive i 
 0001 000002 000004 00004 n proper staff training , which is why I think that 
 0001 000011 000002 00005 ht up to their training and professional qualificati 
 0001 000004 000002 00004 tention on the training and quality of ships’ crews 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 kdown and more unemployment as a priority . 
 0001 000021 000001 00006  dock workers’ unions , and I was impressed by their
 0001 000004 000001 00006      The trade unions are also right to point out to 
 0001 000001 000007 00005            The unions are striking , and I have no i 
 0001 000014 000002 00008 r to the trade unions at the first reading in Novemb
 0001 000005 000001 00007 sultation with unions or others involved , despite t 
 0001 000010 000001 00003 gers and trade unions to make this directive into so 
 0001 000014 000001 00005  poorly paid , unskilled labour being hired in from 
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 0001 000020 000001 00004  of social and wage protection contained in the coll 
 0001 000003 000004 00003 touch – to the workers ' benefit – on social protect 
 0001 000016 000002 00001 t only against workers ' expectations but also again 
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 0001 000002 000003 00001 nd to the port workers protesting today – that , in 
 0001 000013 000002 00002 ns of the dock workers themselves . 
 0001 000012 000003 00006       The dock workers understand well that we are n 
 0001 000011 000002 00006  , unqualified workers who could be a threat to the 
efore what 
 0001 000021 000002 00002 ection of dock workers , and I hope that some social
 0001 000007 000004 00001  equipment and workers , and possibly on docks for
 0
 0
 0
 0001 000028 000002 00001 itions of port worke
 0
 0001 000003 000004 0000
 0
 0001 000014 000002 00002  over the dock workers . 
 0001 000024 000001 00005  of other dock workers . 
 0001 000009 000002 00006 e Flemish port workers : working for your own peop
 0001 000012 000004 00010 he port’s dock workers ? 
 0001 000001 000010 00004 e places where workers and entrepreneurs can coexist
 0001 000015 000001 00005  What the dock workers are afraid of , and this is a 
 0001 000018 000001 00004  that the dock workers are
 0001 000012 000004 00012 o why the dock workers are demonstrating their disc
 0001 000018 000003 00001 u why the dock workers are striking , Mr Jarzem
 0001 000003 000002 00001 hise with port workers as they draw attention to the 
 0001 000001 000010 00002 s , and of the workers both on the ships and on land
 0001 000020 000002 00002 of having dock workers compete with one another on
 0001 000005 000003 00009  the qualified workers currently employed . 
 0001 000011 000002 00003 here were dock workers demonstrating 
 0001 000007 000003 00002  to absorb all workers employed in any capacity in 
 0001 000009 000001 00004 ecognised dock workers ensures that we have qualifi
 0001 000005 000003 00009 ible to employ workers from outside the port to do t 
 0001 000005 000005 00001 yees like dock workers fulfil a
 0001 000018 000001 00009  with the dock workers in Antwerp , for example . 
 0001 000008 000003 00001 non-specialist workers in a
 0001 000007 000005 00001  thereby using workers in more favourable conditions 
 0001 000023 000004 00003  the number of workers in ports while making them m
 0001 000014 000001 00003 people are the workers in the ports . 
 0001 000028 000002 00001 ing contracted workers in the sector and on the righ 
 0001 000009 000001 00004 highly skilled workers in the world . 
 0001 000025 000002 00002 tection of the workers involved . 
 0001 000008 000003 00002       The dock workers made their discontent clear t 
 0001 000006 000001 00003 he position of workers may be affected . 
 0001 000028 000001 00002 f thousands of workers who , throughout Europe , hav 
 0001 000020 000003 00001 rd to the dock workers who demonstrated b
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 0001 000021 000001 00003 es of the dock workers w
 0001 000021 000001 00008 on of the dock workers’ 
 0001 000002 000004 00004 hink that port workers’ current demands on the que
 0001 000002 000004 00003  you like , of workers’ demands and the question of 
 0001 000005 000001 00008 ormidable dock workers’ demonstration . 
 0001 000009 000002 00001 m and the dock workers’ monopol
 0001 000024 000002 00004 employers’ and workers’ organisations unanimously
 0001 000022 000002 00001 ns in terms of workers’ qualifications , social cond 
 0001 000011 000003 00001  talking about workers’ rights , Mr Bouwman – is th
 0001 000021 000001 00006  from the dock workers’ unions , and I was impressed 
 0001 000006 000002 00001 h concerns the working conditions for such
 0001 000006 000002 00001 h concerns the working conditions for such port ac
 0001 000013 000002 00002 expense of the working conditions of the dock worker
 0001 000013 000002 00002 expense of the working conditions of the doc
 0002 000002 000003 00005 pean Union can compete with each other . 
 0002 000020 000002 00002 g dock workers compete with one another on the basis 
 0002 000012 000003 00001 e in favour of competition , it must have an equitab 
 0002 000024 000002 00002 r the guise of competition , sh
 0002 000001 000003 00004 conditions for competition , such declarations of in 
 0002 000003 000005 00003 d face so much competition , that safety often gets 
 0002 000008 000002 00002 establish fair competition , which seems to amount t 
 0002 000003 000006 00003  of inter-port competition . 
 0002 000008 000002 00002  profitable to competition . 
 0002 000015 000003 00004  distortion of competition . 
 0002 000017 000003 00003 is transparent competition . 
 0002 000024 000002 00003 t it increases competition . 
 0002 000001 000004 00001 s that distort competition ; and 
 0002 000001 000008 00001 here is fierce competition among ports , and that th 
 0002 000001 000002 00002 clear rules on competition among ports and within ea 
 0002 000001 000008 00003 d between fair competition and entrepreneurial freed 
 0002 000020 000001 00002 resident , the competition and race for profits that 
 0002 000026 000003 00003 nts that limit competition and to support those whic 
 0002 000005 000001 00002 rt services to competition at the first reading . 
 0002 000014 000002 00007 ng flouted and competition being distorted in years 
 0002 000003 000006 00002 ues to be with competition between one port and ano
 0002 000014 000001 00006 ules governing competition between ports , par
 0002 000001 000003 00003 conditions for competition between ports . 
 0002 000006 000004 00002 lation , about competition between ports . 
 0002 000014 000002 00001 to restricting competition between ports but rather 
 0002 000021 000001 00008 ganises social competition be
 0002 000025 000001 00002 opardises free competition be
 0002 000022 000002 00001 distort mutual competition be
 0002 000019 000001 00003 tions for fair competition both
 0002 000012 000003 00006 t implementing competition bu
 0002 000003 000006 00001 f attention to competition in ports . 
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 0002 000011 000001 00002 nteeing honest competition in ports . 
 0002 000012 000002 00001 the problem of competition in ports is certainly not 
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 0002 000006 000004 00002 t directive on competition in ports is completely in 
 0002 000003 000005 00001  keen – to see competition introduced . 
 0002 000014 000002 00002           This competition is trampling all over the 
 0002 000018 000003 00002  of the sacred competition rules , and that is th
 0002 000027 000001 00002 ng respect for competition rules and for economic f
 0002 000015 000003 00001 e aiming for , competition through social dumping ? 
 0002 000012 000003 00005  other words , competition will not be fair but will 
 0002 000024 000002 00004 sly agree that competition will not increase with th
 0002 000012 000004 00010 we ensure fair competition with the port’s
 0002 000027 000003 00002  opening up to competition would be slightly more a
 0002 000009 000001 00005 r ports fast , competitive and in particular safe ha 
 0002 000022 000003 00005 ur of the same competitive conditions existing in al 
 0002 000026 000003 00001 ent , safe and competitive shipping industry and for
 0002 000002 000003 00003 n the European economy . 
 0002 000007 000003 00001 perability and effectiveness of national ports where 
 0002 000008 000002 00003   Although the efficiency and reliability of public 
 0002 000019 000001 00003 heir levels of efficiency throughout the Unio
 0002 000026 000003 00001 trade , for an efficient , safe and competitive ship 
 0002 000023 000004 00003 king them more efficient . 
 0002 000004 000003 00001 tal link in an efficient and sustainable European tr 
 0002 000001 000010 00004 seaports to be efficient and to perform
 0002 000026 000001 00002 industry needs efficient maritime tran
 0002 000026 000001 00004 just such more efficient maritime transport . 
 0002 000013 000001 00012 k smoothly and efficiently and that they can therefo 
 0002 000001 000008 00003 ompetition and entrepreneurial freedom , and so I c
 0002 000001 000010 00002  , of the port entrepreneurs , and of the workers bo 
 0002 000001 000010 00004 re workers and entrepreneurs can coexist amicabl
 0002 000001 000005 00002  to know which financial arrangements regarding por
 0002 000001 000003 00004 details of the financial links that exist betw
 0002 000004 000001 00004 on transparent financial re
 0002 000002 000003 00004 ns to economic growth . 
 0002 000002 000003 00003 oster economic growth ; but they should n
 0002 000002 000003 00003 sion , further growth in the European economy . 
 0002 000001 000008 00002 erated harbour monopoly , nor indeed to 
 0002 000013 000002 00001 rvices , but a monopoly must not be allowed to deve
 0002 000009 000002 00001  dock workers’ monopoly will not only result in th
 0002 000023 000003 00001 ve attempts to open up a European area of trans
 0002 000023 000003 00002 ts proposal to open up the market , attempts to stim
 0002 000005 000001 00002 s directive on opening up all port services to compe 
 0002 000006 000001 00002 , rapporteur , opening up markets , liberalisation , 
 0002 000008 000002 00002 s to amount to opening
 0002 000027 000003 00002             An opening up
 0002 000017 000002 00001 I believe that opening up to the market could be pos 
 0002 000001 000008 00001  there must be openness and a fair balance between t
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 0002 000025 000002 00003 ve , but their regulation
 0002 000001 000007 00006 ed to European regulation of ports , then let them s 
 0002 000001 000001 00002 f the European regulation of sea ports . 
 0002 000001 000004 00002 resident , the regulation on state aid that the Comm 
 0002 000001 000010 00002 t demands is a regulation that holds in a balance th 
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 0001 000009 000002 00004 inians and one African engaged in self-handling will 
 0001 000009 000002 00004 e Malays , two Argentinian
 0001 000009 000002 00004 t called , two Filipinos , three Malays , two Argent 
 0001 000005 000004 00005 h freight ship Karin Cat in February . 
 0001 000009 000002 00004 ipinos , three Malays , two Argent
 0001 000011 000006 00004  caused by the Prestige , that security began in
 0001 000011 000006 00002 inquiry on the Prestige . 
 0001 000009 000001 00002  debate on the Prestige by explaining to us that t
 0001 000018 000002 00010            The Tricolor off the Flemish coast was a 
 0001 000005 000009 00002 l disputes and abuse , particul
 0001 000030 000002 00002 r all sorts of abuse by the crook
 0001 000005 000007 00002  and scope for abuse remained
 0001 000005 000001 00002 more scope for abuse than many other 
 0001 000030 000003 00002 se the risk of accidents and pollution . 
 0001 000005 000004 00005 event shipping accidents as a result of faults durin 
 0001 000005 000003 00002 ys be the most anti-social , the most environmentall 
 0001 000011 000002 00005 e to call upon cheap labour , which would be danger
 0001 000007 000003 00002 tained through cheap labour . 
 0001 000019 000002 00002 nal basis that collective agreements be adhered to 
 0001 000018 000002 00011 e than 60 near collisions . 
 0001 000018 000002 00012 e must be more competent pilots on board , therefo
 0001 000022 000003 00002 eave it to the competent port workers to ensure th
 0001 000030 000002 00002 f abuse by the crooks involved in maritime transpo
 0001 000017 000003 00002 hing more than cutting costs in the economic sphe
 0001 000005 000004 00001 ing unfair and dangerous competition per group of
 0001 000011 000002 00005 which would be dangerous for the ports and their e
 0001 000011 000002 00004 ystem would be dangerous to people because it would
 0001 000011 000001 00003 costs , to the detriment of security , employment an
 0001 000005 000002 00006 eople from the developing world who are not ad
 0001 000005 000002 00001 istration in a developing-world country . 
 0001 000005 000002 00002  hire crews at developing-world salaries . 
 0001 000018 000001 00003 d bad news for dockers , becaus
 0001 000030 000002 00003 nt salaries of dockers , nor even to respect labour 
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 0001 000025 000001 00004  protection of dockers , on safety in ports . 
 0001 000018 000002 00006 h for ordinary dockers . 
 0001 000024 000002 00002 tion for Dutch dockers . 
 0001 000025 000004 00001 especially the dockers . 
 0001 000034 000002 00001 horities , the dockers and the Belgian politicians ? 
 0001 000034 000001 00003 yers , nor the dockers are looking to change this sy 
 0001 000028 000004 00001 an prevent the dockers from being left holding the b 
 0001 000015 000001 00006  for ports and dockers in Europe . 
 0001 000011 000004 00001 security : the dockers who fulfil a very important e 
 0001 000025 000003 00006  for all those dockers who have demonstrated against 
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 0001 000028 000004 00004 ss the Belgian dockers with the following request : 
 0001 000030 000003 00003 s – seamen and dockers – into competition with eac
 0001 000017 000001 00005 economic , the ecological and the social . 
 0001 000025 000003 00001 for social and ecological etiquette that apply to al 
 0001 000031 000002 00003 heir own or to employ people under bad conditions . 
 0001 000007 000003 00001  untrained and employed on a casual 
 0001 000022 000003 00001 re in any case employed on modern sh
 0001 000022 000003 00002 ly many people employed on modern 
 0001 000011 000004 00007 n Strasbourg , employee representatives again met th
 0001 000013 000001 00006  employers and employees . 
 0001 000007 000003 00002  unlikely that employees’ social protection and the 
 0001 000034 000001 00003 ties , nor the employers , nor the dockers are looki
 0001 000034 000001 00005 ialogue offers employers a guarantee that their requ 
 0001 000010 000004 00001 dock workers , employers and dock installations have
 0001 000013 000001 00006 burdens across employers and employees . 
 0001 000007 000003 00001 wners directly employing
 0001 000034 000001 00005 o – as regards employment , social services , safety 
 0001 000033 000002 00004 ia relating to employment , the
 0001 000004 000004 00003 ans growth and employment . 
 0001 000011 000001 00003  of security , employment and the quality of service 
 0001 000011 000007 00001  of security , employme
 0001 000008 000003 00002 veness , their employment and their provision of se
 0001 000017 000002 00002 o achieve full employment by 2012 , 
 0001 000030 000002 00005 sult in secure employment in port areas being axed a 
 0001 000015 000001 00007 arm quality of employment in the ports that do have 
 0001 000015 000001 00009 arm quality of employment in the we
 0001 000002 000002 00003     Protecting employment rights , w
 0001 000011 000004 00003 ts , and where employment too is concerned . 
 0001 000001 000007 00002 tection of the environment , a
 0001 000010 000003 00002 n the areas of environme
 0001 000003 000004 00001 safety and the environment , then you have to reject
 0001 000011 000002 00005 orts and their environment . 
 0001 000016 000001 00005 at sea and the environment . 
 0001 000018 000002 00013  lives and the environment . 
 0001 000020 000001 00004 ers and of our environment . 
 0001 000034 000002 00008 on of work and environ
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 0001 000030 000002 00005 ntails for the environm
 0001 000032 000001 00006 , security and environm
 0001 000009 000001 00002 t the maritime environment was an area of uncontroll 
 0001 000006 000001 00003 etition on the environment when new terminals are b
 0001 000006 000001 00006 rd to social , environmental and other requirements
 0001 000033 000002 00004 ifications and environmental considerations . 
 0001 000021 000003 00001 , and that the environmental contribution of that tr 
 0001 000005 000005 00001 mber of recent environmental measures of the Europe
 0001 000005 000001 00005 al dumping and environmental pollution as ways of
 0001 000012 000001 00004 al dumping and environmental pollution in ports . 
 0001 000005 000001 00004  the extent of environmental protection . 
 0001 000005 000002 00006 y , safety and environmental pr
 0001 000026 000003 00002 r maritime and environmental safety th
 0001 000007 000003 00003 ifications and environmental se
 0001 000007 000003 00001 d , social and environmental sec
 0001 000007 000002 00002 l , social and environmental s
 0001 000016 000002 00001  offers a more environmentally friendly alternative 
 0001 000005 000003 00002 ial , the most environmentally-unfriendly , the mo
 0001 000025 000003 00005 unsafe working environments in our ports . 
 0001 000030 000002 00005 ly paid , over exploited , in
 0001 000009 000003 00003 en it comes to flags and crews reduced to slavery a
 0001 000005 000002 00001  phenomenon of flags of convenience , whereby ship
 0001 000019 000004 00001  sailing under flags of convenience . 
 0001 000022 000001 00007  sailing under flags of convenience . 
 0001 000018 000002 00003 oting negative globalisation and social disintegrati 
 0001 000007 000002 00001 mpetitive in a globalised e
 0001 000027 000001 00003 ocial rights , health , safe
 0001 000007 000003 00001 , who would be inexperienced , untrained and employe 
 0001 000030 000002 00005 er exploited , inexperienced , with all the threats 
 0001 000021 000003 00001 , the enormous insecurity , which is much greater th
 0001 000008 000001 00003 ey will have a job in a few months’ time . 
 0001 000007 000003 00003 cost linked to job losses . 
 0001 000001 000005 00002 one a splendid job of it . 
 0001 000025 000002 00001 al approach to job protection and safety 
 0001 000008 000003 00001  competition , job quality and the provision of serv 
 0001 000015 000002 00007 s case , where job quality is concerned . 
 0001 000026 000002 00002 oblems for the job stability of port service workers 
 0001 000022 000001 00005 ill lose their jobs , simply because seafare
 0001 000004 000004 00004           More jobs , that is the best social policy 
 0001 000029 000004 00001  it to British jobs , the future of investment in ou 
 0001 000005 000002 00006 only temporary jobs , which are dirty and unsafe an
 0001 000030 000002 00005  with insecure jobs , who are badly paid , over exp
 0001 000002 000003 00001 anies mean new jobs . 
 0001 000022 000001 00006 arge number of jobs . 
 0001 000017 000002 00001  , if the same jobs are done by people who alre
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 0001 000017 000001 00010 ument that new jobs will be created is crazy . 
 0001 000005 000002 00003  international jungle . 
 0001 000005 000002 00004 to date , that jungle in the European ports has been 
 0001 000011 000003 00002 the law of the jungle into the whole sector . 
 0001 000009 000002 00002 ing the social jungle of
 0001 000009 000001 00002 om , a kind of jungle that need
 0001 000005 000004 00001 rules for port labour , these must be geared to elim 
 0001 000011 000002 00005 all upon cheap labour , which would be dangerous f
 0001 000005 000001 00004 s of reward of labour , working co
 0001 000007 000003 00002  through cheap labour . 
 0001 000005 000004 00005 qualified port labour across Europe , and which woul 
 0001 000005 000006 00002 egistered port labour against unfair competition at 
 0001 000006 000003 00001 or working and labour conditions , and safety 
 0001 000019 000003 00002  and underpaid labour for loading and unloading ship 
 0001 000003 000002 00004 l security and labour law . 
 0001 000004 000005 00001 ure that Dutch labour law is observed in the ports . 
 0001 000031 000002 00005 the social and labour law regulations governing port
 0001 000030 000002 00003 ven to respect labour legislation . 
 0001 000006 000001 00007 ope in current labour relations at most ports . 
 0001 000022 000003 00004 poorly trained labour that may jeopardise port secur
 0001 000011 000001 00003 k that it is a liberal directive that has one sole p 
 0001 000026 000001 00003 ts emphasis on liberalisation , its position on t
 0001 000015 000001 00008 ention of this liberalisation . 
 0001 000015 000002 00006 bad example of liberalisation . 
 0001 000027 000001 00003 ill-considered liberalisation . 
 0001 000017 000002 00004 ou want to let liberalisation advance . 
 0001 000008 000001 00005  dockworkers , liberalisation in this c
 0001 000012 000002 00004  This push for liberalisation is currently presentin 
 0001 000017 000003 00002 se , for you , liberalisation means nothing more tha 
 0001 000019 000002 00003  Furthermore , liberalisation now also extends to in
 0001 000008 000003 00001            The liberalisation of particu
 0001 000024 000001 00003 ’s aim was the liberalisation of po
 0001 000007 000002 00001 ve : the total liberalisation of po
 0001 000022 000001 00003 o want a total liberalisation of port services and t 
 0001 000008 000001 00002 ’s vote on the liberalisation of port services will 
 0001 000023 000001 00002 rective on the liberalisation of the port services m 
 0001 000031 000001 00004 eralisation or liberalisation of the regul
 0001 000031 000001 00004 ither economic liberalisation or liberalis
 0001 000028 000001 00006  get hurt in a liberalisation process have been file 
 0001 000022 000003 00001 ampaigning for liberalisation say that not so many
 0001 000023 000002 00001 hat this crazy liberalisation will be approved by th 
 0001 000028 000001 00004 lise or not to liberalise , that is not the question 
 0001 000028 000001 00005 tant is how we liberalise and wh
 0001 000028 000001 00004             To liberalise or not to liberalise , tha 
 0001 000021 000002 00001 o regulate and liberalise ports . 
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 0001 000030 000002 00005  who are badly paid , over exploited , inexperienced
 0001 000005 000002 00006 lower level of pay , safety and environmental prote
 0001 000030 000002 00004 , work for low pay and subject them to w
 0001 000030 000002 00003 ship owners to pay their personnel the current sala
 0001 000025 000003 00005 esponsible for pernicious competition via social du
 0001 000025 000001 00004 ation system , pernicious competition will inevitabl
 0001 000008 000003 00002 ind could have pernicious consequences for our por
 0001 000009 000003 00003 ne knows , are pirate countries , no less than th
 0001 000006 000003 00001 with regard to poor working and labour conditions
 0001 000034 000002 00007 strict , where poorly organised , poor-quality dock 
 0001 000022 000003 00004 ng the door to poorly trained l
 0001 000026 000004 00001 , we will have ports of convenien
 0001 000022 000001 00007 We do not want ports of convenience , just as we do
 0001 000006 000003 00002 s turning into ports of convenience . 
 0001 000012 000002 00002 ing faced with ports of convenience . 
 0001 000031 000001 00002 ning so-called ports of convenience . 
 0001 000007 000004 00001 he creation of ports of convenience and self-handli
 0001 000019 000004 00001  together with ports of convenience consonant with o
 0001 000005 000002 00005 rt companies , ports of convenience would have tak
 0001 000011 000002 00004 : insufficient qualifications , ignorance of the loc 
 0001 000033 000002 00004 , professional qualifications and environmental cons 
 0001 000007 000003 00003 f professional qualifications and environme
 0001 000003 000003 00001 ame vocational qualifications as other service provi 
 0001 000011 000002 00003 to staff being qualified . 
 0001 000005 000004 00005 registered and qualified port labour across Europe ,
 0001 000011 000002 00002 ace of current qualified staff . 
 0001 000011 000004 00001 r upon all the qualified s
 0001 000003 000004 00002 tead to enable qualified workers to operate under g
 0001 000034 000001 00007 d of excellent quality . 
 0001 000008 000003 00001 petition , job quality and the provision of services 
 0001 000015 000002 00007 se , where job quality is concerned . 
 0001 000015 000001 00007 which can harm quality of employment in the ports
 0001 000015 000001 00009 his could harm quality of employment in the well-or
 0001 000011 000001 00003 oyment and the quality of services . 
 0001 000004 000004 00005 tle say in the quality of the work . 
 0001 000034 000001 00005 s , safety and quality – will be included in a socia 
 0001 000030 000004 00003 tition and the race for profit 
 0001 000018 000002 00005 tween ports is ruthles
 0001 000018 000002 00013 ake savings on safety , and to play with lives and t
 0001 000001 000007 00002 unds of public safety , continue to restrict pilotag 
 0001 000023 000001 00004 f port traffic safety , pilotage , towing or mooring 
 0001 000026 000003 00001 sons of public safety , recognise the mandatory natu 
 0001 000034 000002 00008 al framework , safety , training , or
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 0001 000003 000002 00002 t committed to safety . 
 0001 000006 000001 00006 ents , such as safety . 
 0001 000006 000003 00001 nditions , and safety . 
 0001 000025 000002 00001 protection and safety . 
 0001 000030 000002 00005 nvironment and safety . 
 0001 000005 000002 00006 level of pay , safety and environmental protection ; 
 0001 000034 000001 00005 ial services , safety and quality – will be included 
 0001 000017 000004 00004 than promoting safety and social standards and there 
orts . 
rts ? 
f . 
ust 
yment and the quality 
ualification 
 
 
 
 
 0001 000003 000004 00001 ns in terms of safety and the environment , then you 
 0001 000005 000001 00004 g conditions , safety and the extent of environmenta 
 0001 000001 000007 00002 es in terms of safety and the protection of the envi 
 0001 000027 000001 00003 hts , health , safety and wellbeing of workers to th 
 0001 000016 000001 00005 ve in terms of safety at sea and the environment . 
 0001 000025 000003 00004 e an essential safety function . 
 0001 000029 000003 00006  voted down on safety grounds alone . 
 0001 000025 000001 00004 f dockers , on safety in p
 0001 000017 000001 00006 e jeopardising safety in po
 0001 000026 000004 00001 d for maritime safety itsel
 0001 000031 000002 00004  ports and the safety of those who work in them m
 0001 000026 000003 00002  environmental safety that this entails , and this i 
 0001 000029 000004 00001  and above all safety to reject this proposal . 
 0001 000005 000002 00002 veloping-world salaries . 
 0001 000030 000002 00003 el the current salaries of dockers , nor even to res 
 0001 000007 000003 00003  environmental security , and would also entail a so 
 0001 000011 000001 00003 e detriment of security , emplo
 0001 000011 000007 00001 e interests of security , employment and the sustain 
 0001 000012 000001 00004 d to a lack of security , social dumping and environ 
 0001 000011 000006 00001 es on maritime security . 
 0001 000022 000003 00004 eopardise port security . 
 0001 000011 000002 00004 prejudicial to security : insufficient q
 0001 000011 000004 00001 ibuted to port security : the dockers who fulfil a v 
 0001 000011 000004 00001  by preserving security ; and nautical services such 
 0001 000011 000006 00003 ur of maritime security and , Commissioner , you hav
 0001 000011 000006 00006 rning maritime security and , on the other hand , ef 
 0001 000032 000001 00006 otect social , security and environment rules . 
 0001 000003 000002 00004 erms of social security and labour law . 
 0001 000011 000004 00002 ve of maritime security and sustainable development 
 0001 000011 000002 00003  references to security and to staff being qualified 
 0001 000019 000004 00002 dermining port security at a time when major investm
 0001 000011 000006 00004 restige , that security began in the ports . 
 0001 000007 000003 00001  environmental security could , in the same way , be 
 0001 000007 000003 00002 nts of optimum security count for very much faced wi
 0001 000022 000004 00001  we talk about security in EU ports , there are two 
 0001 000023 000001 00003 epared to risk security in airports by establishing 
 0001 000007 000002 00002  environmental security must in fact remain the obje 
 0001 000022 000004 00001 d , namely the security of people who work in the po
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 0001 000022 000004 00001  ports and the security of the goods handled . 
 0001 000001 000005 00001 for the social security regulations to apply are not 
 0001 000009 000001 00003 the case where security was concerned is , unfortuna 
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ns ; if you want socia 
ns in all our own coun 
ns of port workers , a 
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 0001 000009 000003 00003 ews reduced to slavery and that it be
 0001 000006 000001 00006 with regard to social , environmental and other requ 
 0001 000032 000001 00006  fully protect social , security and environment rul 
 0001 000017 000001 00005 ogical and the social . 
 0001 000014 000002 00002  and effective social Europe . 
 0001 000027 000001 00002 e we created a social Europe as well as an economic
 0001 000014 000001 00003 re pitting the social Europe of the nineteenth centu 
 0001 000034 000001 00005  included in a social agreement . 
 0001 000025 000003 00001 down rules for social and ecological etiquette that 
 0001 000007 000003 00001 is concerned , social and environmental security cou 
 0001 000007 000002 00002    Technical , social and environmental security mu
 0001 000009 000002 00001 es and also of social and geographic origins . 
 0001 000031 000002 00005 orkers and the social and labour law regulations gov
 0001 000033 000002 00004 ployment , the social aspects , professional qualifi 
 0001 000009 000003 00001 sorting to the social break-up of an entire professi 
 0001 000009 000004 00002 er , a form of social break-up that you are proposin 
 0001 000003 000004 00002 ate under good social conditio
 0001 000009 000004 00001 the fiscal and social conditio
 0001 000001 000005 00002 osition on the social conditio
 0001 000011 000004 00003 t have serious social conseq
 0001 000007 000003 00003  also entail a social cost linked
 0001 000034 000002 00006 proceeding via social dialogue . 
 0001 000034 000001 00004 s achieved via social dialogue and , if necessary , 
 0001 000034 000001 00005           This social dialogue offers employers a gu 
 0001 000034 000001 00004 is adapted via social dialogue to the situation of t 
 0001 000018 000002 00003 balisation and social disintegration . 
 0001 000025 000003 00005 ompetition via social dumping , and unsafe working
 0001 000011 000002 00003 ts to allowing social dumping , even if it is now ac 
 0001 000009 000003 00001 tition through social dumping , that is to say by re 
 0001 000027 000001 00005 pushed down by social dumping . 
 0001 000031 000002 00001 ns may lead to social dumping . 
 0001 000031 000002 00002  and to resist social dumping . 
 0001 000003 000004 00002 u want to deny social dumping a foothold in our port 
 0001 000005 000001 00005  those who see social dumping and environmental poll 
 0001 000012 000001 00004  of security , social dumping and environmental poll 
 0001 000024 000001 00004 as the risk of social dumping arising . 
 0001 000024 000001 00009 nd the risk of social dumping is slight . 
 0001 000017 000001 00008 engthening the social element when you allow self-h
 0001 000034 000002 00008 e field of the social framework , safety , training 
 0001 000003 000004 00002  ; if you want social harmony to be maintained in o
 0001 000009 000002 00002 ntroducing the social jungle of the maritime spher
 0001 000010 000003 00002 ut not least , social legislation . 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 ffect upon the social legislation of the Member St
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 0001 000013 000001 00007 in the area of social maladministration . 
 0001 000008 000001 00005 employment and social misery . 
 0001 000012 000002 00003 oncerned about social peace in our ports , which is 
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 0001 000008 000002 00002 ns of years of social peace in the Flemish ports in 
 0001 000004 000004 00004 at is the best social policy , in general . 
 0001 000003 000003 00001 e standards of social protection and possess the sam 
 0001 000007 000003 00002 hat employees’ social protection and the constraints 
 0001 000025 000001 00004 tions , on the social protection of dockers , on saf 
 0001 000027 000001 00003 bordination of social rights , health , safety and w 
 0001 000009 000002 00003 iance with the social rules of both the recipient co 
 0001 000009 000002 00004 spect the same social rules that apply in the countr 
 0001 000003 000002 00004 ns in terms of social security and labour l
 0001 000001 000005 00001 ion or for the social security regulations to apply 
 0001 000034 000001 00005 s employment , social services , safety and quality 
 0001 000009 000001 00003 he case in the social sphere . 
 0001 000018 000002 00002 thers with our social standards . 
 0001 000017 000004 00004 ing safety and social standards and thereby putt
 0001 000018 000001 00003 are no minimum social standards that are enforceable 
 0001 000012 000002 00001 of a breach in social tradition in our ports . 
 0001 000026 000002 00002 a breakdown in solidarity between the established wo
 0001 000022 000002 00001 et rid of this solidarity by means of a bad piece of 
 0001 000032 000001 00006 that refers to subsidiarity , to what the Me
 0001 000001 000004 00002  to follow the subsidiarity pri
 0001 000008 000001 00006 damn about the subsidiarity pr
 0001 000025 000001 00003 – this form of subsidiarity – makes the whole author
 0001 000030 000001 00002 arge number of trade union organisations . 
 0001 000004 000005 00001  providers and trade unions , I have received writte 
 0001 000005 000002 00005 tles fought by trade unions and without local port c
 0001 000005 000007 00002  as far as the trade unions wanted , and scope for a 
 0001 000034 000002 00008 ork , safety , training , organisation of work and e 
 0001 000011 000002 00004 d insufficient training . 
 0001 000022 000005 00002           What training opportunities do they have ? 
 0001 000008 000002 00002 the name of an ultra-Liberal ideolog
 0001 000019 000004 00001 quence will be unemployed port workers , together
 0001 000022 000005 00001 here would the unemployed port workers go ? 
 0001 000008 000001 00005 hing more than unemployment and social misery . 
 0001 000004 000005 00001 ders and trade unions , I have received written pled 
 0001 000005 000002 00005 ought by trade unions and without local por
 0001 000032 000003 00003 l the workers’ unions in my country , Italy – CGL , 
 0001 000005 000007 00002 r as the trade unions wanted , and scope for abuse r
 0001 000005 000003 00002 dly , the most unsafe , and consequently , the port 
 0001 000018 000001 00002 t not if it is unsafe . 
 0001 000005 000002 00006  are dirty and unsafe and , above all , attract unsk 
 0001 000025 000003 00005  dumping , and unsafe working environments in our 
 0001 000005 000002 00006  all , attract unskilled labourers ; ports where muc 
 0001 000007 000003 00001 nexperienced , untrained and employed on a casual ba
 354 
 0001 000019 000003 00001 and collective wage agreements . 
 0001 000019 000005 00003 tervening in , wage and working conditions . 
 0001 000022 000001 00008 he working and wage conditions were not in order . 
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 0001 000032 000003 00003 mple , all the workers’ unions in my country , Italy 
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 0002 000005 000006 00002 e level , this competition is only set to increase . 
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Table 33: Multinomial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.6. 
 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
Left-Right Dimension 1.61** 
(.61)      
3.33*** 
3) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 3.55*** 
(1.11)      
1*** 
16)     
Government Status .70 
(.70)      
 
2)     
Liberal Market Economy .46 
(1.25)      
4 
.31)     
Partial Coordinated Market Economy -1.35 
(.81)     
0 
(.85)     
Sectoral Coordinated Market Economy -1.66 
(.86)     
 
(.89)   
4.60*** 
(1.14)      
*** 
1.16) 
Number of cases 536  
0  
   
 (.6
 
5.6
(1.
 
.21
(.7
 
-1.3
(1
 
-1.3
 
-.57
Constant 
 
4.78
(
Log pseudo-likelihood -322.96        
Pseudo R2 0.3
Note: Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
column s “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Figure 64: Probabilities 6.6. G 
 
 
 
1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Levels of EU Support
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
EU Support (less <=> more)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 Y
E
S 
Vo
te
 in
 E
P 
(0
=N
o,
 1
= 
Y
es
)
Liberal Market
Economy
Partial Coordinated
Market Economy
Sectoral
Coordinated Market
Economy
National
Coordinated Market
Economy
 
 
Figure 65: Probabilities 6.6. H 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 66: Probabilities 6.6. I 
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APPENDIX I 
CHAPTER 6.7. 
Table 34: Frequencies-of-use, content analysis, 6.7. 
# of input words # of references to 
family definition 
# of references to 
practical value 
 
 
1  Reading Debate 7,401 70 
95) 
54 
(73) 
st
(adjusted by # of input words) (10,000) (
(by 17 of 18 
speakers) 
(by 15 of 18 
speakers) 
2n
(adjusted by # of input words) 
3,452 
(10,000) 
18 
(52) 
(by 8 of 8 
speakers) 
30 
(87) 
(by 7 of 8 
speakers) 
d Reading Debate 
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 Table 35: Binomial log ing vote, 6.7. 
 
 Floor Vote, First Reading 
 
it regression estimates, first read
 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-4.72*** 
(.40) 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
2.93*** 
(.42)      
Government Status 
 
-1.69*** 
(.42)     
National Same-Sex Marriage Legislation 
 
1.88* 
(.74)      
Constant 
 
.33 
(.18)      
Number of cases 514 
Log pseudo-likelihood -159.84 
Pseudo R2 0.55 
  
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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Figure 67: Probabilities 6.7. A 
 
 
 
1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Levels of EU Support.
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Figure 68: Probabilities 6.7. B 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 69: Probabilities 6.7. C 
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Table 36: Binomial logit regression estimates, second reading vote, 6.7. Amend. 4. 
 
 Floor Vote, Second Reading, Am. 4 
 
  
Left-Right Dimension 
 
-8.48*** 
(1.28)     
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension -2.62*** 
(.36)     
Government Status -1.46* 
(.68) 
National Same-Sex Marriage Legislation -1.37** 
(.47) 
Constant 
 
-3.38*** 
(.47) 
Number of cases 476 
Log pseudo-likelihood -59.10 
Pseudo R2 0.72 
  
 
 
 
*** = significant at 0.001 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level; * = significant at 0.05 level 
Dependent Variable: Vote: 1 = for, 0 = against, abstain = 0 
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 Second Reading, Am. 4: Mean Predicted 
Probability of YES Vote Given Left-Right 
Positions.
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Figure 70: Probabilities 6.7. D 
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Figure 71: Probabilities 6.7. E 
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Figure 72: Probabilities 6.7. F 
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Figure 73:  Policy Space 6.7. A 
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Figure 74: Policy Space 6.7. B 
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Figure 75: Probabilities 6.7. G 
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TEXTPACK Analysis 
 
ocal Point 1: Practical value (of legislation) 
dministrative, barriers, burden, bureaucr- (and relevant endings, e.g. bureaucracy), clari- 
bines, common m competitive, content to EU 
citizenship, core of EC law, employment, enlargement, European identity, facilitat- (and relevant 
.g. facilitate), family member, free market for people, historic, hurdles, labour force, 
Lisbon, milestone, mobility, obstacles, one legal instrument, red tape, multiplicity of regulation, 
ns, simplif- (and relevant endings, e.g. 
tep forward, streamline 
 
ination, equal rights, equal treatment 
family, gender, heterosexual, homosexual, immigration, marriage, mutual recognition, mutually 
recognised, non-discriminatory, same-sex, sex, sexual, social rights, two men, two women, 
unmarried 
eywords-in-context 
at = focal point category: Cat 0001 = practical value, Cat 0002 = family definition  
1: Speaker ID 
2: Paragraph ID 
3: Line ID 
EP Debate, first reading (February 11, 2003): 
 Cat    ID1       ID2       ID3 
  
 0001 000005 000002 00001  the idea of a European identity by means of the cre 
 0001 000018 000003 00001 or a system of European identity cards or by arrangi 
 0001 000011 000001 00002 ts political , administrative , judicial , social an 
 0001 000002 000003 00001 rictions of an administrative nature , either for en 
 0001 000004 000001 00003  the remaining barriers and surmount the bureaucrati 
 0001 000015 000001 00003 administrative burden should be reduced to that whic 
 0001 000012 000003 00002 om unnecessary bureaucracy and excessive red tape . 
 0001 000004 000001 00003 d surmount the bureaucratic and political hurdles an 
 0001 000001 000004 00002 he excessively bureaucratic sections as far as is po 
 
 
F
 
a
(and relevant endings, e.g. clarify), com arket, 
endings, e
replace, restrictio simplify), single act, single legal 
instrument, single text, s
 
Focal Point 2: Family definition 
 
civil liberties, cohabit, definition of ‘family', discrim
 
 
 
K
 
C
 
ID
ID
ID
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 0001 000014 000001 00003 ow needs to be clarified is which restrictions are t 
 0001 000001 000004 00002 r merit is its clarity and , in this regard , I feel 
 0001 000001 000004 00001 ive is that it combines all the previous provisions 
 0001 000012 000006 00007 for people , a common market for EU citizens and the 
 0001 000012 000002 00003 much more of a common market for people than it is a 
 0001 000012 000003 00003 Union the most competitive economy in the world by 2 
 0001 000006 000001 00003 s to give more content to EU citizenship and to incr 
 0001 000017 000001 00002 ovement is the core of EC law . 
 0001 000014 000002 00001 ble to take up employment that could provide them wi 
 0001 000017 000001 00005      Following enlargement , it will be still more i 
 0001 000012 000004 00003 our efforts to facilitate freedom of movement for le 
 0001 000017 000002 00003 sed rules that facilitate the freedom of movement of 
 0001 000012 000005 00002 at this report facilitates . 
 0001 000013 000001 00004  was all about facilitating illegal immigration and 
 0001 000015 000001 00002 rucial for the facilitation of the free movement of 
 0001 000011 000003 00005 oad concept of family member , on which I think it w 
 0001 000011 000003 00003 d partner as a family member . 
 0001 000003 000003 00003  definition of family members . 
 0001 000014 000001 00004 zens and their family members . 
 0001 000017 000002 00003 t of different family members . 
 0001 000014 000001 00002 zens and their family members to move freely and res 
 0001 000001 000005 00004 In the case of fam
 0001 000007 000002 00001 xpect ho wish to live outsi 
 0001 000012 000006 00007  they wish : a free market for people , a common mar 
 0001 000004 000001 00003  and political hurdles and obstacles that block the 
 0001 000006 000004 00004 obility of the labour force and , of course , the pr 
 0001 000006 000004 00004 ncrease in the mobility of the labour force and , of 
 0001 000006 000002 00001 of the present multiplicity of regulations , directi 
 0001 000012 000002 00002 ct to too many obstacles , and Mrs Buitenweg has jus 
 0001 000011 000001 00002 faces ny obstacles , with initiatives having t 
 0001 000011 000002 00001  deal with the obstacles still hampering EU citizens 
 0001 000004 000001 00003 al hurdles and obstacles that block the way to freed 
 0001 000003 000001 00002 fied technical obstacles that persist even in united 
 0001 000006 000002 00003  the practical obstacles to people’s freedom of move 
 0001 000012 000003 00002  and excessive red tape . 
 0001 000009 000002 00006 inate a lot of red tape and uncontrollable rules . 
 0001 000001 000005 00001 he proposal to replace the residence card , as the C 
 0001 000014 000001 00003 ified is which restrictions are to be permissible fo 
 0001 000002 000004 00001 moving all the restrictions in terms of administrati 
 0001 000002 000003 00001 tablishment of restrictions of an administrative nat 
 0001 000008 000002 00002 s is now being simplified . 
 0001 000007 000001 00002  moreover , to simplify and streamline a veritable s 
 0001 000001 000004 00002 have helped to simplify the excessively bureaucratic 
 0001 000017 000002 00001  must begin by simplifying the rules . 
 0001 000014 000001 00003  replaced by a single act , conditions and formaliti 
 0001 000011 000002 00002 combining in a single legal instrument the right to 
ily members who are third-country 
ations of family members w
too ma
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 0001 000001 000004 00001 e subject in a single text . 
 0001 000005 000003 00004 o be a genuine step forward . 
 0001 000016 000002 00008  This is a big step forward an 
 0001 000002 000004 00001 t an effective step forward by removing all the rest 
 0001 000007 000001 00002 o simplify and streamline a veritable spider’s web o 
 0002 000007 000002 00001 ne increase in civil liberties , eliminating discrim 
 0002 000001 000008 00002  guarantees of civil liberties . 
 0002 000016 000002 00004  and prefer to cohabit but without losing all their 
 0002 000007 000002 00001 ion or form of cohabitation . 
 0002 000010 000001 00003 r to eliminate discrim e-sex coupl 
 0002 000007 000002 00001  , eliminatin  on the basis of gender 
 0002 000010 000002 00002 treatment , no discrimination on the basis of the fa 
 0002 000015 000004 00007 citizens , not equal rights for some . 
 0002 000015 000004 00007  and affording equal rights to all of our citizens , 
 0002 000001 000002 00003 e principle of equal treatment of third citizens who 
 0002 000015 000002 00001 efinit rtance given to 
 0002 000011 000003 00003 inition of the family , an excessively broad definit 
 0002 000001 000007 00001  Chamber : the family , its composition and the defi 
 0002 000006 000004 00002 inition of the family . 
 0002 000013 000004 00001 c . 
 0002 000017 000002 00004 concept of the family . 
002 000014 000001 0006  we define the family ? 
 0002 000014 000002 00004 s I see it , a family exist  on t 
 0002 000001 000002 y has been established since the 
 0002 000015 000004 00001  definition of family if he were to move with me to 
002 000006 000004 0001 inition of the family incorporated into the proposal 
1  is u  after all 
 0002 0 0008 000004 y lif
 0002 000015 000003 00004 ight of modern family life and the diversity of dura 
002 000012 000006 00003  citizens to family life and we , as a Parliament 
4  life
 0002 000008 000004 00007  , not disrupt family life
 0002 000010 000002 00001 mpose a single family m rope – that 
 0002 000010 000002 00002 mpose a single family m t , 
 0002 000004 000002 00005 inition of the family on all the other states . 
 0002 000006 000004 00004 inition of the family ought not therefore to distrac 
 0002 000001 000005 00004 existence of a family relationship , purely in order 
 0002 000011 000003 00006 ple requesting family reunification . 
 0002 000017 000002 00005 re traditional family structures must have the same 
 0002 000013 000002 00001  definition of family that EU citizens can take with 
 0002 000001 000003 00001 tizen of whose family they are members . 
 0002 000006 000004 00003  , to preserve family unity . 
 0002 000006 000004 00004 reservation of family unity . 
 0002 000015 000002 00002  definition of family will not be welcomed by all , 
 0002 000007 000002 00002  or to build a family without being forced to marry 
 0002 000003 000001 00004 the grounds of gender . 
ination against sam
g discrimination
ion of ' family ' and the impo
ognition as a family 
 0  0
s when someone takes
 00003 of a Community famil
 0  0
 0002 000014 00000  00010 inition of the family rgently needed ;
0  00006 at they have a famil e . 
 0  ll
 0002 000008 00000  00004 ant to disrupt family  because there is a certai 
 because there is a signat 
odel throughout Eu
odel unduly but ensure tha
 374 
 0002 000014 000001 00008 es of whatever gender ? 
 0002 000007 000002 00001 n the basis of gender identity , sexual orientation 
 0002 000003 000002 00001 a text that is gender neutral and takes account of t 
 0002 000010 000002 00002 be same-sex or heterosexual couples . 
 0002 000007 000001 00003 ers of illegal immigration . 
 0002 000013 000001 00004 tating ille terrorism . 
 0002 000013 000004 00001 is not just an immigration question , it is also a q 
 0002 000012 000006 00006 ht want to use marriage as an avenue to gain illegal 
 0002 000014 000002 00005  have signed a marriage certificate . 
 0002 000013 000004 00002  I believe the mutual recognition argument has stron 
 0002 000016 000002 00001  the system
 0002
 0002 000013 000002 00003 o champion the mutual recognition principle in crimi 
er Sta 
 0002
 0002 000010 000002 00004 urope , but if same-sex marriages are recognised in 
 0002 000010 000002 00004 be introducing same-sex marriages throughout Europe 
 0002 000007 000002 00002 lone or with a sam
 0002
 0002
 0002 000003 000003 00001 ners of either sex the sam
 0002
 0002 000016 000001 00008           Even two m
 0002
 0002
 0002 000001 000007 00004 in relation to unmarried couples too , the rapporteu 
 0002 000016 000001 00005 ry but who are unmarried or in a registered partners 
EP Debate, second reading (March 8, 2004)
  
 0001
 0001 000006 000002 00002 are still m
 0001
 0001 000001 000001 00004            For bureaucratic reasons , we have only r 
 0001
gal immigration and 
 0002 000015 000004 00006 a principle of mutual recognition here . 
 of mutual recognition in this area , and 
 000016 000002 00007 e principle of mutual recognition in this area . 
 0002 000016 000002 00002 lationship are mutually recognised by the Memb
 0002 000010 000001 00003 nation against same-sex couples . 
 000016 000002 00004  talking about same-sex couples ; a growing number o 
 0002 000010 000002 00002 r form , to be same-sex or heterosexual couples . 
e-sex partner or to build a family 
 000015 000004 00001 tand here in a same-sex relationship of 20 years , y 
 000016 000002 00003 rrespective of sex . 
e rights as a spouse . 
 000007 000002 00001 der identity , sexual orientation or form of cohabit 
 0002 000013 000003 00004 and the tax or social rights that go with that - for 
en or two women who were ma 
 000016 000001 00008 ven two men or two women who were ma 
 000014 000001 00008 amily’ include unmarried couples of whatever gender 
 0002 000011 000003 00003 finition of an unmarried partner as a family member 
 
 
 
: 
 
Cat     ID1       ID2      ID3 
 000004 000001 00003 erstone of the Lisbon process and a precondition for 
 0001 000006 000004 00002 e is to reduce administrative formalities to the bar 
any barriers to exercising this fundament 
 000004 000001 00006 most important barriers to mobility is constituted b 
 0001 000005 000002 00002  not to be a ' burden on the state '  , in the langu 
 000001 000003 00008  interpret and clarify it . 
 375 
 0001 000005 000001 00004  gives greater clarity to citizens , the approach se 
 000006 000003 00003 e closeness of enlargement . 
 000007 000001 00006 re expected to facilitate entry and residence for pa 
 0001
 0001
 0001 000004 000002 00004        It will facilitate mobility by doing away wit 
 0001 000007 000001 00006 use to admit a family member , they must give a just 
 0001 000001 000001 00002 nion and their family members to move and reside fre 
 0001 000001 000004 00004 endents deemed family members within the meaning of 
 0001 000001 000003 00002 t as an almost historic step , which is , at any rat 
 0001 000004 000001 00005 ding increased mobility is not limited to the partic 
 0001 n , because it is a lot 
 0001
 0001 000003 000001 00005  a question of simplifying formalities . 
 0001 000005 000003 00004 his might be a step forward , but it still does not 
 0001
 0001
 0002 to emphasise th 
 0002
 0002 ns 
 0002 pe 
 0002 st 
 0002  fre 
 0002
 0002
 0002 000006 000004 00002 nitions of the family status . 
 0002 ge for homosexual partners exis 
 0002 000001 000003 00006  and different sex partners are only possible in the 
 
 0001 000001 000004 00005 therefore , as family members within the meaning of 
 0001 000003 000001 00009  of creating a free market for people so that they c 
 0001 000001 000005 00007 certainly be a milestone in creating European citize 
 0001 000004 000001 00006 nt barriers to mobility is constituted by the limite 
 0001 000002 000001 00003  is now indeed one legal instrument to assess what t 
 0001 000004 000002 00003 directive will replace nine existing directives and 
 000003 000001 00006 something of a simplificatio
 0001 000001 000005 00002 irective fully simplifies all the current formalitie 
 0001 000004 000002 00002 t considerably simplifies matters . 
 000006 000002 00003 ble , so as to simplify the exercise of the right to 
 0001 000001 000004 00001 inely historic step forward has been taken . 
 000005 000001 00004 that this is a step forward in terms of codification 
 000007 000002 00001 ew , the major step forward that has been taken is t 
 000006 000004 00002 the concept of family , I would like 
 0002 000002 000002 00001 ns of extended family , family and partnership , des 
 0002 000005 000002 00007 efinition of a family , that things are changing and 
 000001 000004 00003  the rights of family , there are some very interest 
 000002 000002 00001 ended family , family and partnership , descriptio
 000006 000004 00003 t to live as a family from the sphere of Union com
 0002 000003 000002 00001 cept of what a family is then we are undermining the 
 000007 000001 00006 use to admit a family member , they must give a ju
 000001 000001 00002 nion and their family members to move and reside
 0002 000001 000004 00004 endents deemed family members within the meaning of 
 000001 000004 00005 therefore , as family members within the meaning of 
 000002 000003 00001 the concept of family should also be defined effecti 
 0002 000001 000003 00006 l marriage for homosexual partners exists . 
 0002 000001 000003 00005  equivalent to marriage , such partners should be co 
 000001 000003 00006 es where civil marria
 0002 000002 000002 00005 ship entails a marriage relationship or otherwise . 
 0002 000001 000003 00006 s between same sex and different sex partners are on 
 0002 000001 000004 00002  the rights of unmarried couples are recognised even 
 0002 000001 000003 00005 ants rights to unmarried partners that are equivalent 
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Table 37: Multin
 
omial logit regression estimates, first reading vote, 6.7. 
 
 No Vote Yes Vote 
   
Left-Right Dim 10.25*** 
(2.01)      
-1.31** 
(.50)    
Gove
National Sam -1.86* 
(.82)     
.43 
(.72)      
Numb
Log pseudo-likelihood -192.34         
ension 
 
Sovereignty-Integration Dimension 
 
-4.33** 
(1.37)     
1.91*** 
(.49)      
rnment Status -.85 -2.19*** 
 (.53)     (.40)     
e-Sex Marriage Legislation 
 
Constant 
 
-.30 
(.82)     
2.24*** 
(.30)      
er of cases 514  
2Pseudo R  0.5963  
   
Note:
colum
indic
 
 
 Table entries are multinomial logit estimates. The omitted (baseline) choice for each 
n is “Abstention.” Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
ated as follows: *** < 0.001 level; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 
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Figure 77: Probabilities 6.7. I 
 
 
1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
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Figure 78: Probabilities 6.7. J 
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 1st Reading: Mean Predicted Probability of YES 
Vote Given Government Status.
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Figure 79: Probabilities 6.7. K 
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APPENDIX J 
CHAPTER 7 
Table 38:  Hypotheses Review. 
 preferences 
 
Outcomes 
 
 
  
Policy
 
 
enous 
rence model 
 
Exogenous (H1a) 
Disconfirmed (in Chapter 4) 
 
Predetermined (H1b) 
Disconfirmed (in Chapter 5) 
Exog
prefe
 
 
Garbage can model 
 
Endogenous (H2a = H3a) 
 
Random (H2b) 
 Confirmed (in Chapter 4) 
 
Disconfirmed (in Chapter 6) 
 
iling 
Confirmed (in Chapter 6) 
 
Focal point model  
 
Endogenous (H2a = H3a) 
Confirmed (in Chapter 4) 
Neither random nor predetermined; 
predictable on basis of preva
focal points (H3b) 
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